


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


THE  
CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.  
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THE



# CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

BEING SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF  
BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE, JOHN SMITH  
AND NATHANAEL CULVERWEL  
WITH INTRODUCTION BY

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## PREFACE

I HAVE tried to gather from the works of Whichcote, Smith, and Culverwel extracts which should illustrate as fairly as possible the teaching and style of each, and the relation in which they stood to one another. The passages chosen are, most of them, quite complete, and the rest very nearly complete, in themselves; and, though they lose something no doubt by being detached from the books in which they were first printed, it is to be remembered that they formed separate lectures or sermons, and—with the exception of those taken from Culverwel—were not intended by their authors to be parts of a nicely articulated series of discourses, or of a connected treatise.

For Introduction, I have set down summarily such few facts as have been preserved in the history of these writers, and have sketched their characters in outline. But I have essayed no criticism except what selection involves. That was a task for which I knew myself to be ill equipped; and it would have been superfluous to undertake it, since Principal Tulloch's chapters on the Cambridge Platonists in his *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century* are as widely known as they are justly admired. There seemed to be a need for a fresh edition of some part at least of the writings of these long neglected men, and this I have attempted to supply.

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I have not thought it necessary to modernize the spelling, though here and there I have made slight changes for the sake of clearness: and I have sometimes substituted for a word which seemed certainly to be wrong another (enclosed in square brackets). Two corrections of the text which I saw were required I unfortunately passed over at the last moment:—on p. 94, line 18; and on p. 121, line 21, for *Plato*, *Plotinus* ought to be read.

My thanks are due to the readers of the Clarendon Press, but for whose care many errors, which had escaped me, would have remained uncorrected; to Mr. Sutton, Chief Librarian of the City of Manchester, who has put at my service some old and rare books to which I could hardly have had access without his aid; to Mr. Charles Russell, who read through the proofs of the Introduction for me; and most of all, to one of my teachers at Oxford, whose lectures upon another writer of this school first led me to the study of these, and whose name, had my own part of this book been better done, I should have asked leave to put upon it;—to whom I will even now offer it, a stealthy gift, in token of my gratitude.

E. T. C.

CARDIFF,  
October 1, 1901.

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## INTRODUCTION

THE selections which make up this volume are<sup>1</sup> taken from Benjamin Whichcote's *Select Sermons and Aphorisms*, from John Smith's *Select Discourses*, and from Nathanael Culverwel's *Discourse of the Light of Nature*. These authors are little known now, and though, within the narrow limits by which their lives were bounded, they exercised a powerful influence, they enjoyed little vogue even in their own day. Not one of them actually published his own work. Culverwel, who left materials which could easily be gathered into a book, may perhaps have intended to publish; but there is no reason to suppose that Whichcote or Smith ever contemplated such a step. At any rate, at their death their writings were found to be in so fragmentary<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> I have used for the first two sermons of Whichcote the text of Wishart's edition, Edinburgh, 1742, and for the third that of Jeffery's edition (the fourth volume, London, 1707), and for Whichcote's *Aphorisms* Salter's edition, London, 1753; for the selections from Smith, Worthington's edition, London, 1660; and for those from Culverwel an edition, published at Oxford in 1669, a reprint of Dillingham's edition of 1652, into which I have introduced occasional corrections borrowed from Brown's edition, Edinburgh, 1857.

<sup>2</sup> The basis of the text of Whichcote's *Sermons* was in part his own brief manuscript notes, and in part the fuller memoranda of those who heard him preach and lecture. The difficulties encountered by John Worthington, the first editor of Smith's *Select Discourses*, are illustrated by some correspondence which passed between him and S. Hartlib. Thus Hartlib writes on May 5, 1659, 'I am very glad you are employed in publishing those excellent pieces which Mr. Smith of worthy memory hath left behind him,' and later, on February 13, 1659 (= 1660), 'I am very glad that you have overcome those Herculean labours about Mr. Smith's book.' And so Worthington, writing to commend himself to the favour of Lord Lauderdale in 1670, urges as one of his claims to promotion, 'Heretofore I have endured and gone through some toilsome labours for the public good in preparing the elaborate discourses of Mr. Smith and Mr. Mede for the Press, wherein I consulted the advantage of others more than mine own.' Worthington's edition is

disordered a state as almost to baffle the patient and enthusiastic care of those who thought that they deserved such permanence as print might give them.

Why then should these passages be now revived? That the inquiry was pertinent was felt by the earliest editor<sup>1</sup> of Whichcote's *Select Sermons*, whose preface, written in 1698, begins with an apology: 'Amongst those many things which are made public, it may be thought perhaps, of Sermons, that they are of any the least wanted; and, for the future, the least likely to be found wanting. Since to that rich and inexhaustible store, with which the learned and orthodox divines of England have already furnished us, there is daily fresh addition from worthy and able hands. Neither have we cause to fear a cessation in this kind; or that so great a blessing is likely to fail us for the future; having such security, not only from the unwearied zeal of present Divines (of whom we may always hope a worthy succession), but from the just esteem which the publick never fails to show for such pious Discourses. Upon which account, we find that many of these are every day made publick, and, as it were, forced into the world; notwithstanding the great modesty of their authors, whose humble thoughts and devoutly occupied affections lead them not towards eminence and advancement in the world.

'It may seem strange, therefore, that, in such an age as this, any one should be so officious as to search after and publish the sermons of a man long since dead, who (himself) never meant to publish any; or thought so highly of himself as that he could benefit the world by such a publication.'

indeed admirable, and gives evidence of the pains which he declared he bestowed on it. It deserved the praise of Hartlib, who commending author and editor at once, said, 'Really I am transported with ravishing joy, when I consider it by myself alone, or have occasion to show it to other discerning and judicious friends, who all seem to be as much in love with the publisher as with the author,' February 22, 1659 (= 1660), cf. Worthington's *Diary*, in Chetham Society's Publications, vol. i. 188, 189, &c.

<sup>1</sup> The Earl of Shaftesbury; cf. Wishart's edition, Edinburgh, 1742.

Two centuries have increased the cogency of these words ; for though Sermons which may be ranked as literature have never been numerous, and are perhaps rarer at the present time than they were even fifty years ago, there has been no cessation in this kind of writing.

The passages here collected must of course be their own justification, but some claims may be put forward for them in advance. It may be urged that they deserve remembrance for the teaching which they embody, for their style, and most of all, for the revelation which they give of characters of very unusual charm, and perfection.

These authors belong, with Cudworth and More among the greater names and Worthington, Rust, and Norris among the lesser, to the School of the Cambridge Platonists, or as they were called by some of their contemporaries, the Latitude men. The latter title, which has been less commonly used, was, on the whole, more fitly chosen than the other ; for it grants the breadth of view which was never denied them, and yet has a flavour of disapproval which is significant of the estimation in which they were held. The name was first thrown out in gentle censure and afterwards branded upon them in reproach. The former title has survived, though it is not much more than a name now, and is indeed more than a little misleading. Platonism was brought against them as a serious charge, which they were sometimes anxious to rebut. Whichcote defended himself on the ground that he read very little, and owed more to his own 'invention' than to any books. There is no doubt that his idealism, which he imparted to Smith and Culverwel, was deeply inspired by Plato. But they, all three, appropriated Plato's teaching in what, if a choice must be made, may, after all, be the better way, by meditation rather than by a minutely critical study, and they coloured what they borrowed in the rich and mystical light of their own imagination. To Plotinus they owed not a deeper, but a more obvious debt. They seized eagerly upon passages

which allowed a tolerably clear interpretation, and turned them to their own uses ; and they were content to brood over the more numerous passages which defy an exact rendering so long and so lovingly, but again so uncritically, that the mist which lies thick upon his pages spread itself into their own minds, and lent a hazy obscurity which is not without its charm to their own writings.

It may be that they were all indebted (as Culverwel certainly was) in some measure to Bacon for the open-mindedness with which they were prepared to receive whatever science might have to teach ; but this obligation, where it existed, may very easily be exaggerated. It must be borne in mind that the traditional scholastic training had not been discarded in Cambridge in the days even of the two younger men. And it is remarkable that (unlike the later writers of the same school, Cudworth and More) they seem to be unacquainted with Hobbes.

Smith was familiar with the work of Des Cartes, and we are told<sup>1</sup> that it was largely due to his influence that this philosopher began to be studied at Cambridge ; but Culverwel<sup>2</sup> alone shows himself generally conversant with the philosophical writing of the time.

But we should miss what is most characteristic if we tried to estimate their position simply in the light of such influences as these. For they were essentially children of their own time. They saw England divided into two great conflicting parties, but, while they were strongly affected by both, maintained a serene detachment, and were never soiled by the dust of battle. They cherished practical ambitions and took more note of what the many

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Worthington's *Diary*, i. 300.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England in Seventeenth Century* (of which I have made free use), vol. ii. 420, second edition, 'He deals familiarly with all the great writers of the time, Bacon and Des Cartes (Hobbes had scarcely yet emerged), Selden, Grotius and Salmasius ; and amongst smaller philosophers Sir Kenelm Digby and Lord Brooke. He is especially just to the speculations of Suarez and Lord Herbert in the preceding age.' Cf. Hamilton's *Reid*, p. 782.



were doing than of what the few were writing ; but yet stood in the attitude of students and were intent upon seeing what was really needed for themselves and their country—for, as they believed, to see was in some sort to possess—instead of fighting blindly in an ill-considered cause and hurrying to an imperfectly conceived goal.

What was most remarkable in this group of men was the union of original speculative activity with eager and sympathetic, yet always discriminating, interest in the political and ecclesiastical<sup>1</sup> struggles in which their contemporaries were hotly engaged—an interest which was very noble in its scope and not wholly unfruitful in its result, though it never prompted the men whom it inspired to enter into the lists as combatants on this side or on that.

Their efforts were directed towards the discovery of a middle course between the party which was dominated by the ecclesiastical statesmanship of Laud on the one hand, and, on the other, the party which was encumbered by the subtle and formal and all too complete theology of the Puritans. Against the first they urged that conduct and morality were of more moment than Church polity ; against the latter they claimed that reason must not be fettered ; and against both, that in the conscience<sup>2</sup> of the individual, governed by reason, and illuminated by a revelation which could not be inconsistent with the reason, itself a 'seed of Deiform nature,' lay the ultimate seat of authority in religion. But they were allied to both of these opposing parties.

<sup>1</sup> They were not concerned with merely paper controversies, and had nothing to say of Milton. He did not, however, escape the notice of Tuckney, Whichcote's tutor (see p. xx), who speaks of him briefly as 'infamis, et non uno laqueo dignus.'

<sup>2</sup> They were thus mystics as well as rationalists ; for the foundation of mysticism is the claim of the individual to possess a revelation which is convincing to himself though it may not be capable of demonstration to others. Strictly a School of Mystics is an impossibility ; each mystic has his own secret and is *sui generis*. Whichcote's common sense (as we shall see) kept him from making the mystical element in his philosophy into a principle of estrangement and dissociation : and his immediate followers were equally wise.

Puritans<sup>1</sup> by training, they professed loyalty to the Church from which they never alienated themselves. Men who take a *via media* between noisily conflicting sects may exert a great influence without attracting general notice.

They attempted to effect a union between philosophy and religion, and formulated a kind of 'moral divinity,' which found little acceptance at the moment, but which like a stream running underground has, though seldom detected, given a freshness and life to the ground subsequently trodden by those who have pursued either theological or philosophical inquiries.

The question with which all three writers were mainly concerned was that of the relations which subsist between reason and faith. It is a question which had not then, and now still less has, any newness, except that of perennial interest. It has ever called for and eluded an answer; and those who, like the Cambridge Platonists, have been most strongly fascinated by the problem, and most intent upon its solution, have been the readiest to admit to themselves and to others that they must content themselves not with discovery but with continual search. But they have been contented<sup>2</sup> with this, and there is no tone of dull resignation, still less of painful disappointment in their language; on the contrary, they have rather delighted in what they perceived to be the necessary conditions of such inquiry. And they approach this question from a Christian standpoint, though their language was a mosaic of Hebrew, Platonic, Neoplatonist, as well as of Christian elements. In the younger men the several strands of thought were not always harmoniously mixed, though they lent a picturesque and sometimes bizarre distinction in their manner; in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Inge, *Bampton Lectures*, 1899, p. 285, footnote; and p. xxi below.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV. iii. 1 *περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ εἰς εὐπορίαν καταστήναι, ἥ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς ἀπορίαις σπάντας τοῦτο γοῦν κέρδος ἔχειν, εἰδέναι τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἀπορον, ὁρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν πραγματείαν ποιήσασθαι.*

Whichcote's work there is more unity, and a more complete, if a simpler perfection.

He speaks as a religious teacher, and his constant theme is that religion is a temper of the mind, a condition in which all the faculties of man are in health<sup>1</sup> and in just relation to each other. No faculty must be mutilated to give an unnatural development to any other. Of all the powers of man reason is most characteristic. It cannot therefore be antagonistic to religion. On the contrary, it must be an essential part of religion; for it gives a man sobriety in belief, and vigour in the performance of duty. On this point Whichcote insists. It is not his belief, and it is not his performance of duty which makes a man's religion; though conduct and belief are both requisite. A man's religion is himself, the sum of his powers, his nature in its ideal perfection. To be religious, a man must realize himself. Reason gives his individuality to a man. But Whichcote does not neglect the social force of religion. He who best realizes himself also best realizes human nature. It is not religion<sup>2</sup> but prejudice which divides men. Healthy people are alike in what is essential; they all have vitality, they all have a fullness and roundness of development, and the fact that their vitality expresses itself in different modes is the condition of their usefulness to society. The unhealthy are differentiated from one another by every variety of disease, and from the healthy by their maimed condition.

'A man should take care,' he says, 'to be always the same. I know there is some difficulty in this because of our bodies. Every man is solicited by his body; and our bodies are overruled by the very temper and variation of the air; and no man can overcome his bodily temper but by great wisdom. Yet this is attainable. For if Reason

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* VI. ix. 1 καὶ ἡ υγιεία δέ, ὅταν εἰς ἐν συνταχθῇ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ κάλλος, ὅταν ἡ τοῦ ἐνδὸς τὰ μέρη κατασχῇ φύσις· καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς, ὅταν εἰς ἐν καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁμολογίαν ἐνωθῇ, and Whichcote, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Culverwel, p. 312.

were (as it ought to be) the settled Law of life and action, it would then be easy ; for Reason is regular, uniform, and always self-consistent. It is Humour that is various and unconstant, that drives a man from himself.' And again, 'Rectitude and Uprightness are the health and purity of a man's Soul. A man is then right and straight ; he is whole within himself, and all things are as they should be. There should never be any transporting imaginations ; no discomposure of mind, for that is a failure in the government of a man's spirit. There ought to be no eagerness or inordinacy towards the things of this world. We should not be borne down towards the objects of sense. There ought to be serenity and calmness and clear apprehensions, fair weather within ; that that the noble Platonist calls Steadiness of mind or understanding, an intellectual calmness ; a just balance ; an equal poise of a man's mind ; no perplexity of soul ; no confusion ; no provocation ; no disturbance ; no perturbation. A man should not be borne off from himself, or put out of himself, because things without him are ungoverned and disordered ; for these disturbances do unhallow the mind ; lay it open ; and make it common.'

Many of Whichcote's *Aphorisms* illustrate his doctrine even more clearly, as well as more succinctly. For example : 'They do not advance Religion who draw it down to bodily acts ; or who carry it up highest, into what is mystical, symbolical, emblematical, &c.'

'Christian Religion is not mystical, symbolical, enigmatical, emblematical ; but, unclothed, unbodied, intellectual, rational, spiritual.'

'It is usual in Scripture to sum up all Religion sometimes in a single phrase ; other while in one word. The reason may perhaps be because never any of these is *alone*.'

'Those that differ upon Reason may come together upon Reason.'

'He that gives Reason for what he saith, has done what



is fit to be done; and the most that can be done. He that gives not Reason, speaks nothing, though he saith never so much.'

'It is better for us that there should be Difference of Judgment, if we keep Charity; but it is unmanly to quarrel because we differ.' (509)

These are characteristic passages, and it is unnecessary here to add to their number. Everywhere Whichcote shows the same keenness of spiritual insight, the same strong commonsense, the same shrewdness, and almost always the same terse felicity of expression.

The question naturally arises why so powerful and so acute a thinker as Whichcote exercised an influence so narrow in its range and so short-lived.

The late Bishop of Durham<sup>1</sup> offers an answer. 'The transitoriness of Whichcote's influence,' he says, 'may be due in some degree to political causes; but it is not difficult, I think, to indicate defects in his teaching which contributed to his partial failure. He had an imperfect conception of the corporate character of the Church, and of the Divine life of the Christian Society. The abstractions of Plotinus had begun to produce in his case the injurious effects which were more conspicuous in his followers. He had little or no sense of the historic growth of the Church. His teaching on the Sacraments is vague and infrequent.'

This is, no doubt, all true. But it is also true that some of Whichcote's limitations were deliberately chosen. He distrusted ordered systems and elaborately articulated forms of belief, and never attempted to impose them on himself or on his pupils. But what it was in him to do he did. Under the pressure of the strong feeling which governed his thoughts he was able to throw out separate dicta, in each of which his whole philosophy lies implicit—and his philosophy was his character—he made aphorisms, which were parables in brief, of a picturesque quality to charm the imagination,

<sup>1</sup> Westcott, *Religious Thought in the West*, pp. 393, 394.

arresting the attention of the listener by their force, provoking thought by their pregnant suggestiveness, and yet ever baffling the analysis of those who might wish to transmute them into mere formulae. His skill as a teacher was shown precisely in this, that he made men think for themselves; he had not a little of the Socratic irony; he was unwilling to instruct, and would rather pursue an inquiry with, and by the help of, his pupils; and, if from time to time he uttered a phrase which lived in their memory, they found that its vitality was due to the fact that it called for an interpretation which they must get for themselves as they tested his words in the work of life, not from any added words of his, given by way of explanation. His teaching was religious because of practical import; and, because it was religious, necessarily veiled in metaphor; and his sayings remained isolated and fragmentary for his pupils, until they like himself welded them into a synthesis, all the more valuable because never final, by the fire of their imagination and the fervour of their piety.

It may be said that Whichcote's best sayings were, after all, only commonplace. And so they were. He repeated what had been said before; but always in his own way and upon his own conviction; and even when his thought was new, more strictly original, it was so true as to be self-evident<sup>1</sup>, and, put into words, looked like what is called a commonplace. But these commonplaces, to borrow Coleridge's apt word, never wanted 'lustre'<sup>2</sup>: for the man who used them was himself their living illustration.

Few words were enough, for he held that the really vital and operative part of all that mass of sentiments and ideas, to which we vaguely give the names of religious and moral, is something simple, and had best be expressed simply and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Culverwel, p. 288.

<sup>2</sup> Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 3. 'To restore a commonplace truth to its first uncommon lustre, you need only *translate* it into action. But to do this you must first have reflected upon its truth.'

with that reserve which better suits deep feeling than more copious utterance. This clear simplicity and this austere controlled passion give Whichcote's sentences their poetic rhythm. They reveal their author, a man who was what he taught<sup>1</sup>, and whose teaching, being alive, was incapable of formal completeness.

He believed that a system woven by one man could be nothing but a shroud for another, and would only continue to fit the maker, if he never grew.

How well Smith had learnt this lesson may be seen from a passage<sup>2</sup> in his *Discourse concerning the True Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge*.

'Divine Truth is better understood,' he says, 'as it unfolds itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives, than in all those subtil niceties into which curious wits may lay it forth. And therefore our Saviour, who is the Great Master of it, would not, while He was here on earth, draw it up into any System or Body, nor would his disciples after Him; He would not lay it out to us in any Canons or Articles of Belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the world with opinions and notions as with true Piety, and a Godlike pattern of Purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope was to promote a Holy life, as the best and most compendious way to a right Belief. He hangs all true acquaintance with Divinity upon the doing God's Will; If any man will do His Will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.'

Again, it may be worth while to note that for popularity and wide renown, a price must be paid which Whichcote was very loth to pay. 'To drudge in the world,' he says, 'is not the adequate employment of an intellectual nature; this is not that which doth employ the highest and noblest part of man.' It must not be supposed that he was of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Nettleship, *Lectures and Remains*, vol. i. pp. 88 and 105.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Smith, pp. 86-7.

what is called an unpractical disposition ; on the contrary, he was a diligent tutor, and had aptitude not only for government and discipline but for affairs. But for making a name he had neither care nor skill, and was unwilling to be burdened by those sordid occupations which encumber men who have the art of 'getting on,' a τέχνη χρηματιστική for which quite special qualities of character are needed, qualities in which he was signally and beautifully deficient. And the value of a man's work may be at least as well measured by its intensity and finish as by its range. The sphere in which Whichcote moved was not wide ; his work was first that of a college tutor, and afterwards that of a parish priest, and it is no disparagement to his powers of mind to admit that they were wholly engrossed in his work, or to his courage and strength of purpose that he never allowed himself to wander from his own province into wider fields. Whichcote held the belief, untainted by morbid self-consciousness, that a man's first concern is himself ; and his life was his work. He found 'fit audience, though few.'

Happily, we are able from the funeral sermon preached upon Whichcote's death by Archbishop Tillotson, from one or two passages in Burnet's *History of my own Time*, and from the preface written (1753) by Dr. Salter, Prebendary of Norwich, for an edition of Whichcote's *Aphorisms*, and his correspondence with Tuckney, to gather a pretty complete account of his career, and a clear and vivid picture of his character.

Benjamin Whichcote was born on March 11, 1609, at Whichcote Hall, in the parish of Stoke in Shropshire. We are told by Salter rather vaguely that he came of an 'ancient and honourable family,' but directly we can learn nothing of interest or importance concerning his ancestors, and of his boyhood nothing distinct is to be had. Indirectly we may find an indication as to the traditions in which

he was reared from the fact that he was entered in 1626 at Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Here, during his first year of residence, he was the pupil of Antony Tuckney ; and when Tuckney left Cambridge (1627) he had Thomas Hill, afterwards Master of Trinity, for his tutor. To both of these men Whichcote owed much, and he was very ready to acknowledge his obligation. To Tuckney, though he enjoyed his society and his teaching for so short a time, Whichcote was particularly indebted. Tuckney was ten years older than Whichcote, and had come up to Emmanuel as a scholar, when he was barely fourteen years old, in 1613 ; ' which shews,' so Salter writes, ' that he had been educated hitherto in a dislike to the Church Establishment ; for that College, though it abounded for many years in most excellent scholars, and might therefore very justly be esteemed, and flourish on their account, yet was much resorted to for another reason, about this time ; viz. its being generally looked on, from its first foundation, as a Seminary of Puritans.' Whichcote was an apt pupil, and read widely, though not always in Tuckney's judgement with a wise choice of authors. There was, from the earliest day of their association, a divergence, which became more strongly marked with time, between the interests and tendency of the two men. But this divergence would appear only to have served to give emphasis to the strong sympathies which united them : certainly, nothing was ever able to damage the respect and affection which each had for the other.

Tuckney possessed in rare combination, humour and piety, scholarship and common sense, caution and vigour. And, what seems to go with these qualities, he had a faculty of condensed and pregnant speech, which would quickly and deeply stamp itself on the memory of an eager disciple. It cannot be doubted that Tuckney encouraged, perhaps quite unconsciously, the development of some of Whichcote's most salient characteristics. Tuckney was later elected

Master of St. John's. In his election there 'when the President, according to the Cant of the times, would call upon him to have regard to the godly ; the Master answered, no one should have a greater regard to the truly godly than himself ; but he was determined to choose none but scholars ;' adding (very wisely Salter confirms his judgement) 'they may deceive me in their godliness, they cannot in their scholarship.'

Whichcote had a like shrewdness. Again, Tuckney was at once very zealous in the maintenance of his principles, and yet tolerant towards those who differed from him. We learn that as Vice-Chancellor and Master he was 'resolutely disregarding of the arbitrary and irregular commands of those in authority.' He was willing to run risks, and to pay the price of his independence in judgement and action ; and yet he was never headstrong, and never lost his balance.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Whichcote, who himself exemplified some of these qualities in his own career, should have felt that he owed much to his first tutor.

In 1629, Whichcote became B.A., and M.A. in 1633, in which year he was appointed to a fellowship at Emmanuel. In the next year, Hill left Cambridge, and Whichcote took up his work as tutor. In this office he continued for nine years—the most important and fruitful of his life. He found little time for reading during this period, and what leisure his engagements with his pupils allowed him he gave rather to meditation than to books.

He had an unusual power of continuous thinking—a gift of intellectual activity accomplished in repose, and yet he was studious to fulfil the duties which his station imposed upon him. So it was rather by what he was than by what he taught that he gained the allegiance and admiration of his pupils, by example more than by instruction, and by stimulus more than by coercion. And yet, like all men whose influence is wholesome, he was diffident of his own



value, and never sought power. He was anxious to get the best out of those with whom he had to do, and to offer them the best of himself; his modesty and his humour helped him in both attempts. He encouraged conversation not only by his own rich and apposite speech, but also by his listening, without condescension or weariness, to those who were quicker to speak, though they might have less to say, than himself. Only of quite idle talk was he impatient. He never took offence, and was able to reprove or censure others without causing it. Tillotson, in the funeral sermon which he preached over Whichcote, gives us a beautiful portrait of the man.

‘His conversation was exceeding kind and affable, grave and winning, prudent and profitable. He was slow to declare his judgment, and modest in delivering it. Never passionate, never peremptory; so far from imposing upon others that he was rather apt to yield. And though he had a most profound and well poised judgment, yet was he of all men I knew the most patient to hear others differ from him, and the most easy to be convinced when good reason was offered; and, which is seldom seen, more apt to be favourable to another man’s reason than his own.’

Tillotson drew the portrait at a rather later age than that at which we have arrived in this outline of Whichcote’s life. But the sketch which he supplies is quite trustworthy as a guide to Whichcote’s character during the years of his tutorial work at Emmanuel. So he continues: ‘Studious and inquisitive men commonly at such an age (at forty or fifty at the utmost) have fixed and settled their judgments in most points, and, as it were, made their *last understanding*, supposing they have thought, or read, or heard what can be said on all sides of things; and after that, they grow positive and impatient of contradiction, thinking it a disparagement to them to alter their judgment. But our deceased friend was so wise as to be willing to learn to the last; knowing that no man can grow wiser without

some change of his mind, without gaining some knowledge which he had not, or correcting some error which he had before.'

These words recall one of Whichcote's own aphorisms, and show how these, and indeed all his dicta are to be estimated. They are not the fruit of mere speculation; they are the canons by which he ruled his own life. 'He that never changed any of his opinions never corrected any of his mistakes; and he, who never was wise enough to find out any mistake in himself, will not be charitable enough to excuse what he reckons mistakes in others.'

To complete the picture, Tillotson adds: 'He very seldom reprov'd any person in company otherwise than by silence, or some sign of uneasiness, or some very soft and gentle word; which yet from the respect men generally bore him did often prove effectual; for he understood human nature very well, and how to apply himself to it in the most easy and effectual ways.'

It is easy, then, to believe what we are told by Tillotson, and Salter after him, that Whichcote was an excellent tutor.

In 1636 Whichcote was ordained deacon and priest by Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, and immediately began a labour in which he persevered for nearly twenty years, with little interruption; he 'set up' a Lecture in Trinity Church on Sunday afternoons. In these lectures and by the sermons which he delivered as a select preacher before the University, he became more widely known in Cambridge. His addresses, from the outset, attracted attention. His aim was, according to Salter, 'to preserve a spirit of sober piety and rational religion in the University and town of Cambridge in opposition to the fanatic enthusiasm and senseless canting then in vogue,' and we are informed that 'in those wild and unsettled times he contributed more to the forming of the students of that University to a sober sense of religion than any man in that age.'

Burnet's<sup>1</sup> testimony is in the same sense: 'Whichcote was a man of rare temper; very mild and obliging. He had great credit with some that had been eminent in the late times; but made all the use he could of it to protect good men of all persuasions. He was much for liberty of conscience, and, being disgusted with the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider Religion as a seed of Deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to do this he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers: chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin; and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature; in which he was a great example, as well as a wise and kind instructor.'

In 1640 he took the degree of B.D. Three years later he went down to North Cadbury in Somerset, where he had been presented to a living in the gift of the college, and about the same time he married. He continued to hold this preferment until 1650, when he was succeeded in it by Ralph Cudworth. But he was quickly recalled to Cambridge and, much against his inclination, was (March 19, 1644) made Provost of King's College in the place of Dr. Collins, who had been ejected by the Parliament. It was characteristic of him to propose an arrangement, which was agreed to by the fellows of the college, for paying half the revenues of his new office to his predecessor as long as he lived: an arrangement, of course, which was not well calculated to recommend him to those to whom his own promotion was due. Moreover, he himself never took the covenant, and secured the same liberty for most of the fellows, while to the few who were ejected with Collins he contrived that their emoluments should be paid for a year after their expulsion.

In 1650-1 he was Vice-Chancellor in succession to

<sup>1</sup> *History of my own Time*, i. 186-7.

Tuckney, who had returned to Cambridge and been elected to the Mastership of Emmanuel<sup>1</sup> in 1645. To this year belongs the equally interesting and important correspondence between Whichcote and Tuckney. It has been said that there were from the first days of their connexion some differences between the two men. These differences had swelled, and in 1651 Tuckney felt himself bound to expostulate with Whichcote upon the dangerous tendency of his teaching. The letters are valuable for the light they throw upon the character of the two disputants, and still more for the information they give as to the different currents of thought along which men were being carried in Cambridge at that time.

Whichcote wrote throughout with exemplary moderation and gentleness; firmly maintaining his own ground, he was careful to show, both by the general tone of his letters and by repeated expressions of respect, the regard which he entertained for Tuckney; he was always on the defensive, and, though he guarded himself strongly and nimbly, never yielded to the temptation, if he felt it, of taking the offensive against his opponent. Tuckney's attitude was, of course, that of an expostulating critic; he was making an attack upon a position which he held to be very dangerous both for Whichcote himself, and for the University in which Whichcote's influence was now powerful; but, except for a few passages in which he shows some heat, and seems to be irritated by the fearless, though modest, defence made by his former pupil, he rivals Whichcote in dignity and good temper. It is difficult in a word or two to describe the nature of the controversy; in a summary of the letters it would be impossible to reproduce anything but the tediousness of the argument (for some parts of it are tedious). But in brief Tuckney's complaint was that in Whichcote's teaching Plato and Plotinus were being set above the Gospel, and the reason above the spirit. Whichcote's

<sup>1</sup> Tuckney was elected Master of St. John's in 1653.

reply to the first part of the accusation has already been named; to the second he said, 'I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational<sup>1</sup>.' Neither, of course, convinced the other.

At the Restoration he 'was removed from the Provostship by especial order of the King; but, though removed, he was not disgraced or frowned upon.' In 1662 he was appointed to the cure of St. Anne's, Blackfriars, which he held till the church was burnt down in the Great Fire. He then retired to Milton in Cambridgeshire, to a sinecure rectory which Collins had held from his deposition until his death in this year. This preferment Whichcote held as long as he lived. But his migrations were not yet ended. After some years of seclusion at Milton he was presented to the vicarage of St. Lawrence, Jewry, where he regularly preached to a 'small but judicious auditory,' and busily engaged in the work of his parish. He found time, however, to pay occasional visits to Cambridge, and died there in Cudworth's house, at Easter, 1683.

Of the lives of Smith and Culverwel very little can be said with certainty.

Smith was born in 1618, at Achurch, near Oundle in Northamptonshire, and was sent in 1636 to Emmanuel College. In 1640 he took the degree of B.A., and that of M.A. in 1644, when he was appointed to a fellowship at Queens' College. He would no doubt have been chosen a fellow of Emmanuel, but for a regulation forbidding two natives of the same county to hold fellowships at the same time in that college, and Culverwel had already been elected to one. He died on August 7, 1652.

Of Smith's character we are able to learn much from the funeral sermon preached upon him by Patrick<sup>2</sup>, a fellow of Queens' College. This sermon is a remarkable piece

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 55 and 57.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Bishop of Chichester and of Ely successively.

of English writing. It is very difficult for us, whose language is at once more direct and more reserved, to understand how a man could write and speak with so much elaboration and artifice about a friend whom he loved, and a teacher whom he venerated. And yet the sermon is sincere and natural.

There is a long catalogue of virtues which Smith is said to have possessed in a high degree of perfection. We are told of his eminency, sobriety and worth, of his learning, of his wisdom and prudence ; his skill in the management of affairs, his humility, his courtesy, gentleness, and meekness, the quiet and tranquillity of his soul, his faith and its effects on his character and life.

‘For this indeed was the end of his life, the main design which he carried on, that he might become *like to God*. So that if we should have asked him that question in Antoninus, τίς σοῦ ἡ τέχνη ; what is thy art and profession, thy business and employment ? He would not have answered, To be a great Philosopher, Mathematician, Historian, or Hebrician (all which he was in great eminency). To be a Physician, Lawyer, General Linguist, which names and many more his general skill deserve. But he would have answered as he doth there, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, my Art is to be good.’

In a strain like this Patrick continues his panegyric through page after page, only pausing here and there to exclaim that his own powers are wholly unequal to his high theme, and his words inadequate to express his reverence and affection for a man for whom he claims, ‘that he was truly a Father, that he wanted age only to make him Reverend, and that, if he had lived many generations ago, and left us the children of his mind to posterity, he might by this time have been numbered among the Fathers of the Church.’

‘The memory of so great a man,’ Patrick urges, ‘might well be preserved by some annual ceremonial in which his College should express, “all these three, our Respect, Affection, and Sense of our Loss,” but,’ he goes on, ‘let me



tell you, in conclusion of all, that herein would be shewn our greatest love and affection which we bare to him, this would be the greatest honour of him, if we would but express his life in ours, that others might say when they behold us, there walks at least a shadow of Mr. Smith.'

This sounds almost like an anti-climax in our ears ; for indeed the name of Smith lends itself uncomfortably to long-sustained encomium. But there is no anti-climax in the thought. The portrait which Patrick gives is consistent. It is the portrait of a man of power and learning, and of peculiar skill in teaching, who impressed those who knew him, more than by these gifts, by the purity and quiet strength of his character. This personal influence, due to pre-eminent goodness, is what stands out most clearly.

It has been said that the Oration is full of interest to the student of English prose ; it is equally valuable as a piece of character-drawing.

The records of Culverwel's career are very bare. He came, as we have already said, of a Northamptonshire family, and was entered as a pensioner at Emmanuel College in 1633. We do not know how old he was at this time, but may safely conjecture that he was not more than eighteen years of age, and not less than fourteen. He may well have been nearer the lower limit, for in the seventeenth century academic life began for most students at an age at which in our own day school life has yet several years to run. He became B.A. in 1636, and M.A. in 1640, and was elected shortly afterwards (though it is not known precisely in what year) to a fellowship at the same college. It would appear that he died in 1650 or 1651.

These meagre outlines are coloured and enlivened by a short but valuable paragraph which closes Richard Culverwel's preface to his brother's treatise on *The Light of Nature*. The several sections of the discourse formed, it must be remembered, so many lectures or sermons given

to academic audiences. 'These exercises,' writes Richard Culverwel<sup>1</sup>, 'suit well with the place where, and the audience to whom they were delivered, but, like Aristotle's *Physical Lectures* (ἀκροάσεις φυσικοί) they are not for vulgar ears. Their lucubrations are so elaborate that they smell of the lamp, "The Candle of the Lord!"' The criticism, so playfully put, is just. And he adds, 'As concerning the author of this treatise, how great his parts were, and how well improved, as it may appear by this work, so they were fully known, and the loss of them sufficiently bewailed by those among whom he lived and conversed; and yet I must say of him he suffered a misfortune incident to man (ἀνθρωπινόν τι ἔπαθεν). And as it is hard for men to be under affliction, but they are liable to censure, so it fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts, although they that knew him intimately are willing to be his compurgators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under water crooked, though we know it to be straight.'

What this affliction was, we do not know, but it seems, in the last few years of Culverwel's life, to have become almost a mental estrangement.

The undergraduate days of both men fell in the earlier part of the period during which Whichcote was actively occupied with tutorial work in the college. Culverwel was probably, and Smith was certainly, a pupil of Whichcote's, and both came under his influence and caught something of his spirit.

Each of them had originality; and yet nothing is more remarkable in their writing than the intimacy of their connexion with their teacher, and the extent of their in-

<sup>1</sup> Culverwel did not forget that he was addressing an academic audience, 'You that are genuine Athenians,' he says to his listeners, 'fill yourselves with noetical delights. . . . Happy Athenians, if you knew your own happiness.' *Light of Nature*, chap. xvii, 'The Light of Reason a pleasant Light.'

debtedness to him. They added their own to his words ; they threw his sentences into a fresh context, and illustrated them with the wealth of their wider erudition and their finer scholarship ; but just as, through all the movements of some composition in music, which becomes more and more complex in its successive developments, the ear can catch the simple melody on which the whole is based ; so, in all that the younger men wrote, whether they are intent upon their elaborate (and often quite unconvincing) dialectic, or whether they indulge their curious, but fertile and natural imagination in passages of delicate workmanship and fascinating beauty, or give themselves up to the freer and more passionate oratory, in which, for all the silence of print, one seems to be listening to the eloquent voice of living speakers, the reader can hear, as it were in an undertone, the plain, moderate speech of their master.

Verbal resemblances are not uncommon.

So Whichcote writes, 'Heaven is first a Temper, and then a Place,' and again, more fully, 'For we cannot ascend higher in our acting, than we are in our Beings and Understandings ; and these men, that think our happiness lies in the sensual objects of Delight, are not capable of understanding either the Reason or necessity of mortification, inward Renewal and Repentance, in order to admittance into Heaven. For they do not look upon Heaven as a State and Temper of mind, which is requisite to be reconciled to the nature of God and to be according to His mind and will ;' or once more, 'It is not possible for a man to be made happy, by putting him into a happy place, unless he be in a good state.'

And the echo in Smith is, 'As the Kingdom of Heaven is not so much without men as within, . . . so the tyranny of the Devil and Hell is not so much in some external things as in the qualities and dispositions of men's minds. And as the enjoying of God and conversing with Him consists not so much in a change of place as in the

participation of the Divine Nature, and in our assimilation unto God ; so our conversing with the Devil is not so much by a mutual local presence, as by an imitation of a wicked and sinful nature derived upon men's own souls.'

Or again, when Whichcote says, 'Sure it is, there is no genuine and proper effect of religion where the mind of man is not composed, sedate and calm,' and, 'The longest sword, the strongest lungs, the most voices are false measures of Truth.' Smith amplifies the idea thus :

'There is a pompous and popular kind of tumult in the world which sometimes goes for zeal to God and His Kingdom against the Devil ; whereas men's own pride and passions dignify themselves under the notions of a Religious fervency. Some men think themselves the greatest champions for God and His cause, when they can take the greatest liberty to quarrel with everything abroad and without themselves, which is not shaped according to the mould of their own opinions, their own self-will, humour and interest ; whereas, indeed, the spiritual warfare is not so much maintained against a foreign enemy, as against those domestick rebellions that are within ; neither is it then carried on most successfully, when men make the greatest noise and most of all raise the dust. . . . As Grace and true Religion is no lazy or sluggish thing, but in perpetual motion, so all the motions of it are soft and gentle ; while it acts most powerfully within, it also acts most peacefully.'

And the text of Culverwel's whole discourse *φῶς κυρίου, πνοὴ ἀνθρώπου*, might with as much propriety have been the text of Whichcote's sermons. It is a sentence which he uses in one of his *Aphorisms*, and his paraphrase contains in little what Culverwel wrote out at length, 'The spirit of a man is the Candle of the Lord ; lighted by God and lighting to God—*res illuminata, illuminans*.' It is not necessary to give numerous instances of a likeness which may be traced continually between Culverwel's chapters and the passages of Whichcote which he had got by heart ;

a single example may here stand for many. 'To go against Reason,' wrote Whichcote, 'is to go against God; it is the self-same thing to do that which the Reason of the case doth require, and that which God Himself doth appoint. Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God.' 'So that to blaspheme reason'—so Culverwel repeats the same thought on the very first page of his Discourse—'is to reproach heaven itself, and to dishonour the God of reason, to question the beauty of his image, and, by a strange ingratitude, to slight this great and royal gift of our Creator.' These fundamental similarities must engage the notice of every reader who makes a comparative study of the three authors. But Smith and Culverwel did more than echo Whichcote's thoughts; they amplified them, and pursued them in directions which their master did not himself take.

Smith attempted a philosophy of Religion, and inquired what were the elements of Religion and how to be apprehended. The answers which he offered to these questions may be sufficiently seen in the Extracts<sup>1</sup>. His general position may be summarized here in a sentence or two of his own: 'To seek our Divinity merely in books and writings, is to seek the living among the dead; we do but in vain seek God many times in these, where His truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed: No, *intra te quaere Deum*, seek for God within thine own soul: He is best discerned, as Plotinus phraseth it, by an intellectual touch of Him; we must "see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the Word of Life," that I may express it in St. John's words.'

He postulates and appeals to a spiritual sense, and in the arguments which he uses in support of his position, exhibits a faculty of psychological analysis, the results of

<sup>1</sup> See especially the *Discourse concerning the True Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge* (pp. 77-98).

which anticipate in a remarkable way much more modern speculations.

It would appear that Culverwel's discourse is only a fragment of a much larger treatise which he meant to write. In what we have, we find out not a Christian philosophy such as Smith essayed, but an introduction to it, confined almost entirely to more directly philosophical questions.

Culverwel inquires what nature is, and in his answer maintains the view that nature includes the realm of spiritual things, as well as that of physical phenomena; then, in order to prepare himself to meet the question of what the law of nature is, he deals with the nature of law in general, and of the eternal law.

'There are,' he says, 'stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature'; and he adds, 'Now these first and radical principles are wound up in some such short bottoms as these: "We must seek good and avoid evil," "We must seek happiness," "Do not do to others what you do not wish to have done to yourself." And reason, thus, by warming and brooding upon these first and oval principles of her own laying, it being itself quickened with a heavenly vigour, does thus "Hatch the law of nature." . . .

'You must look, in the next place, to that light of nature, that candle of the Lord by which this law of nature is manifested and discovered.'

He lays in metaphysics the foundations for the system of ethics and religion which he hoped to build, but never accomplished. The result is that what is most interesting to his readers is his theory of knowledge, developed simply by way of preparation for what mainly interested himself.

He insists, as we have seen from the passages just quoted, upon the existence of some primitive elements of knowledge in the mind; but he shows that these principles, though



present, have no true life until they are called into activity by experience. Contact with the world does not create them, but gives them the opportunity for showing themselves.

These elements of original knowledge are universal, and self-evident, and, he urges, it is impossible to think at all without admitting them.

From this he advances to the doctrine that the perception of moral distinctions is also universal; and he goes on to show that the moral law is founded upon the nature of God, and that moral obligation depends upon the will of God.

In the remainder of his treatise he proceeds to discuss the origin and character of this light of nature or reason. His doctrine on each of these topics is exhibited in the selections which follow.

The selections from Culverwel's work have been arranged here after those from Smith, for though Culverwel, senior certainly in academic standing, and probably also in years, may have written his treatise earlier, he yet carries their common principles on to a more purely philosophic development than his friend, just as Smith advanced further in this direction than Whichcote; and the logical order in which the three writers are to be placed is plainly Whichcote, Smith, Culverwel. If we regard the style of the three writers, as well as their matter, this order is confirmed. That Whichcote had the gift of clear and succinct utterance is clear from his *Aphorisms*; but the *Sermons*, pieced together as they are partly from his own scanty notes, and more largely from the notes of his hearers, have less literary excellence than the work of his pupils, though they probably give a quite inadequate representation of the eloquence which is ascribed to him as a preacher. Smith is an elaborate writer, annoyingly pedantic at his worst, too often oppressed by his own learning, and confused by the length and multitude of his quotations—his practice of quotation is a strange lapse upon the traditionalism against which he struggled—but at his best, capable of rising to a very

high plane of genuine oratory, always indeed showing the marks of labour, and calling upon the reader for close attention, but strong, pure and richly ornamented.

Culverwel writes best of all. After the unhappy subtilties of his early pages, he is always lucid and vigorous ; he is more orderly than Smith, and far more modern in tone ; the language which he uses is well in his command, and he passes smoothly and easily from his more sedate passages to those in which he gives his imagination a loftier flight.

# BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE

## THE GLORIOUS EVIDENCE AND POWER OF DIVINE TRUTH

*Never Man spake like this Man.*—JOHN vii. 46.

BECAUSE there are amongst us, those who are bold to call into question DEITY ; those who dispute against the main and principal Matters of Christian Faith, under pretence of *Reason* (the Excellency of God's Creation, by which I will be concluded ;) therefore I make choice of these Words to deal with them, with their own Instrument.

*Never any Man spake as our Lord and Saviour.*—  
I will not lay the Stress of my Argument upon the Credit of those who spake these Words ; for they were I know not whom : And I will make no more Advantage than I will give to the Devil himself, who is related to speak many things that are reported in Scripture : But I will found my Argument on the Quality of the Matter.—  
Yet, it is considerable, that they who are engaged in the contrary [Party] are declared Enemies, and have a contrary Interest ; that even *they* are over-born, and so far subdued, as to make an Acknowledgment.

There are, among us, Persons, that are sensual, and out-right brutish ; that put off human Nature, and discharge themselves of Principles of Reason and Understanding. I think no Man doubts of this. It seems to be evident and undeniable. Yea, they themselves are self-condemn'd in what they do : And Men that do distemper themselves, and put themselves out of the Use of their Reason ; when they do recover ; they wish they could do otherwise.

But, then, there are those that pretend to dispute against Deity; and, under Excuse of Reason, pretend to be Atheists. These make a great Bluster and Noise in the World, and undertake to defend themselves with Show and Colour of Reason and Argument.

And again: There are those who will admit of Principles of Reason to the full, and all the immediate necessary Results and unavoidable Deductions from it; and yet they stick at Reveal'd Truth; pretending Want of Evidence, and a Failure in point of Assurance, and of infallible Conviction and Confirmation. These Men avoid Atheism: But stick in Infidelity.—— [Now] with him that pretends to Atheism, or [who] if he doth acknowledge Deity, is an Infidel and sticks at Reveal'd Truth; these *two* last I will deal with, from this Scripture: For, [as for] the first sort; they being self-condemn'd, are easily convinc'd.

Among other Excellencies of Divine Truth, this is none of the smallest Weight; that when it is declared, it doth recommend itself to, and satisfies the Mind of Man concerning its Reality and Usefulness. Men are wanting to themselves, that they do not see with their own Eyes; that they do not make a particular Search; that they do not examine; that they do not consider; or, in a word, that they do not use the Judgment of discerning. For we that are of the Reform'd Religion, who deny the infallible visible Judge, we do allow to every Christian a private Judgment of discerning; not [only] as *his Privilege* that God hath granted him; [but] as his *Charge*. Where People are of no Education, have no Liberty or Advantage in respect of Leisure, or other Opportunities; we do advise them to use Modesty and Humility, and to be rather Learners than forward to teach. For it is good Counsel, and it is that which is done in all other Affairs: Whosoever he be that hath not the Opportunity to acquaint himself with the Mystery; it is safer for him to make use of other Expedients, than for him

to be peremptory in a Resolution. But this, for certain, Men are wanting to themselves, if they do not see with their own Eyes ; if they do not search and use a Judgment of discerning. For Men attain to no settled State in Religion, no Heights or Excellency of Spirit, who do not make a Discernment by their Judgments : But they run away with Presumptions, Suppositions ; with conceited Imaginations, with received Dictates ; are Light of Faith, credulous ; do comply with others in Sense, in Judgment, in Practice : And it is their Necessity so to do ; if they will not make Matters of Knowledge their Business : There cannot be receiving of Truth in the Love of it, and consequently in the certain Obedience of it, where there is not receiving of Truth, in the particular Judgment of the certain Verity of it, and the Sense of the Goodness of it. This Advantage Truth hath : It hath so much of Self-evidence, it is so satisfactory to the Reason of an ingenuous Mind, that it will prevail, unless there be an Indisposition in the Receiver. This I take for the certainest Matter of Experience : All Things are according to the Disposition of the Receiver ; one Man will interpret into a Courtesy, that which another turns into an Injury. According as Men are in Preparation and Disposition of Mind, so will Things be entertain'd that are offered to Consideration, and proposed. But Truth, if it doth appear, if it be represented and fairly proposed ; it will find Entertainment in a Man's Mind ; if a Man's Mind be not by contrary Indisposition made in an Incapacity. Truth is the Soul's Health and Strength, natural and true Perfection. As increated Wisdom speaks to God ; (*Prov.* viii. 30) so Truth speaks the same Language to Man's Soul : *I was by him, as one brought up with him, I was daily his Delight.* Truth is so near to the Soul ; [so much] the very Image and Form of it ; that it may be said of Truth ; that as the Soul is by *Derivation* from God, so Truth by *Communication*. No sooner doth the Truth of God come to our

Soul's Sight, but our Soul knows her, as her first and old Acquaintance : Which, tho' they have been by some Accident unhappily parted a great while ; yet having now, through the Divine Providence, happily met, they greet one another, and renew their Acquaintance, as those that were first and ancient Friends.

Truth is of a different Emanation (for I cannot distinguish Truth in itself ; but in way of descent to us :) *Truth* either of *first Inscription*, or of *After-revelation* from God.

The Truth of first Inscription is connatural to Man, it is the Light of God's Creation, and it flows from the Principles of which Man doth consist, in his very first Make : This is the Soul's Complexion.

And Truth of After-revelation is the Soul's Cure, the Remedy for the Mind's Ease and Relief. The great Expectation of Souls, is the Promise of God's *Messiah* : They *wait for the Consolation of Israel*. For this hath been the State of the World : Man, in Degeneracy and Apostacy, disabled himself, prejudiced his Interest in God : Losing his Interest, by his Degeneracy and Apostacy, he is in Hope and Expectation of some Revelation from God, concerning Terms of Reconciliation and Recovery : And when these did appear, then [was it] said ; *Lord now lettest thou thy Servant depart in Peace*. Here comes Truth of *After-revelation*, for the Recovery of Man, when he was Apostatized from the Truth of *first Inscription*.

The former of these, is of things necessary in themselves, in their Nature, and Quality ; so, immutable and indispensable. The latter, is the voluntary Results and Determinations of the Divine Will. Things that are of an immutable and indispensable Nature, we have Knowledge of them by the Light of first Impression. The voluntary Results of the Divine Will, we have by Revelation from God.

Man's Observance of God in all Instances of Morality ; these are Truths of *first Inscription* ; and these have a



deeper Foundation, greater Ground for them, than that God gave the Law on Mount *Sinai*; or that he did after engrave it on Tables of Stone; or that we find the Ten Commandments in the Bible. For God made Man to them, and did write them upon the Heart of Man, before he did declare them upon Mount *Sinai*, before he engraved them upon the Tables of Stone, or before they were writ in our Bibles; God made Man to them, and wrought his Law upon Mens Hearts; and, as it were, interwove it into the Principles of our Reason; and the things thereof are the very Sense of Man's Soul, and the Image of his Mind: So that a Man doth undo his own being, departs from himself, and unmakes himself, confounds his own Principles, when he is disobedient and unconformable to them; and must necessarily be self-condemn'd.—The Law externally given was to revive, awaken Man, after his Apostacy and Sin, and to call him to Remembrance, Advertency, and Consideration. And, indeed, had there not been a Law written in the Heart of Man; a Law without him, could be to no Purpose. For had we not Principles that are *Con-created*; did we not know something, no Man could prove any thing. [For] he that knows nothing, grants nothing. Whosoever finds not within himself, Principles suitable to the Moral Law, whence with Choice he doth comply with it; he hath departed from himself, and lost the natural Perfection of his Being: And to be conformable to this, is the Restitution to his State.

Things of Natural Knowledge, or of first Inscription in the Heart of Man by God, these are known to be true as soon as ever they are proposed: And he hath abused himself, and forc'd himself from his Nature, and deformed the Creation of God in him, whosoever doth not take Acquaintance with, subscribe to, make acknowledgment of these great Things, *The great Principles of Reverence of Deity: Of Sobriety in the Government of a Man's own Person: Moderate*

*use of the Pleasures and Contentments of this Life : The great Instances of Righteousness and Justice in Mens Transactions one with another :* For they are Connatural to Man.

Then, for Truth of Gospel-Revelation, that, speaks for itself, recommends itself, and shews itself to be of God. In this Case, we may say as the *Samaritans* to the Woman : They were brought to take Cognizance of our Saviour, by the credible Report of the Woman : But after they had had converse with him ; *Now*, say they, *we believe in him, not for thy Words* (but we credited thee so far forth as to come and see him :) *but because we have seen, and heard*, Joh. iv. 42. Such are the Declarations of Faith in God by Jesus Christ, of Remission of Sins, of God's accepting of Sinners upon Repentance, that any Man that is awake to any true Apprehensions of God, he will readily believe them, and embrace them, when they are declared to him by any Instrument. The great Things of Reveal'd Truth, tho' they be not of Reason's Invention, yet they are of the prepar'd Mind readily entertain'd and receiv'd : As for Instance : Remission of Sins to them that repent and deprecate God's Displeasure ; it is the most credible Thing in the World : For God made us Creatures fallible, at the best. Now here is *finite and fallible ;— failing and miscarrying ;— repenting and reforming, upon a Declaration from God.* — So false is it that the Matter of our Faith is unaccountable ; or that there is any thing unreasonable in Religion ; that there is no such Matter of Credit in the World as the Matters of Faith ; nothing more intelligible. It was a Mystery *before* ; God in Christ reconciling the World : *Now* all the World is taken into a Possibility of receiving Benefits hereby. Tho' there be nothing of Merit on the Creature's side ; nothing that we can do that can deserve ; yet it is a Matter of very fair Belief, that the Original of all Beings, the Father of all our Spirits, the Fountain of all Good, will, one way or other, pardon Sin, and do what behoves him, for

the Recovery of his laps'd Creation : And any probable Narration made in the Name of God, of the Way and Means, and the particular Circumstances whereby God will do it. will fairly induce Belief with sober, serious, and considerate Minds : And what have we to do with others, upon the Account of Religion ? If they be not serious and considerate, they are not in a Disposition towards Religion. That Promise of *the Seed of the Woman breaking the Serpent's Head* : God hath been speaking this out further and further, by his various Revelations in the several Successions of Time : He has represented it in divers Shapes : But now we have it expounded. For *the Seed of the Woman* is, God manifested in the Flesh : And *breaking the Serpent's Head* is, destroying the Work of the Devil. The Anti-type doth exactly answer the Variety of the Types. All foretold of our Saviour was fulfill'd in him.—— We have many things in prophane Stories in several Ages that give Testimony and Light to Parts of Reveal'd Truth. Many of their Stories are in Imitation of Scripture History : As *Nisus's* Hair in Imitation of *Sampson's* : *Deucalion's* Flood in Imitation of *Noah's* : *Hercules* in Imitation of *Joshua*, &c.—— Many of the Heathens that were not corrupted by Education, or Interest, or the Strain of the Time, do relate many things that are consistent with those that are in the Bible. *St. Austin* tells us, he found the Beginning of the first Chapter of *St. John's* Gospel among the Platonists. *Eusebius* read in the Commentaries of the Heathens those Circumstances and Matters of Fact that the Evangelists do mention, and also the Signs at our Saviour's Crucifying, as the Eclipse of the Sun, and an Earthquake, and other Accidents. *Tertullian* speaks of sundry things which *Pilate* writ to *Tiberius*, suitable to what the Evangelists relate concerning our Saviour. Yea, *Mahomet* himself, who is the last great Impostor, doth mention the Soldiers apprehending our Saviour with an Intention to put him to Death :

Acknowledging him to be a great Prophet ; but he tells us, when those Soldiers were stricken down, God took him away, and they lighted upon another something like him, and crucify'd him. *Plutarch*, an eminent Author, gives us an Account of *Pan*, the great Dæmon of the Heathens, who was heard greatly to complain, that a *Hebrew* Child was born, and they never heard him after ; all the Oracles then ceasing. *Porphyry*, tho' of no great Credit, says, that after one whom they called *Jesus*, came to be worshipp'd, they never could receive any more Benefits by any of their Gods. One of the *Roman* Emperors was so possess'd with what was related concerning a Kingly Race among the *Jews*, and was so startled with the Credibleness of the Report, that he set himself to destroy all of the Family. *Publius Lentulus* gives the Senate an Account, that he saw, himself, and was an Eye-witness of the Man *Jesus* among the *Jews*, who cured all Diseases and raised from the Dead : Insomuch, that *Tertullian* bids the Heathen Emperor search their Records : For your own Kalender [says he] recites the Things that are done by our Saviour. This, in the Days of *Julian*, who was turn'd off, by the Feuds and Exasperations, by the Factions and Divisions among those that were call'd Christians : Insomuch, that he hated Christianity ; but otherwise, a Man of eminent Justice, and good to the Common-wealth : One who was a Philosopher gives an Account of the Christian Religion : "The Christian Religion (says he) consisting in "Spiritual Worship and Devotion to God, Purity of Mind, "holy and unblameable Conversation ; of all things that are "call'd Religion, it is the most Entire, the most Pure ; but "only mightily hurt by some who have fill'd it with superstitious Things." *Am. Marcel.*

So that we may resolve, that the Difficulty of Faith arises from the wicked State of the Subject, rather than from the Incredibility of the Object. It is hard to act otherwise than the State from within doth dispose a Man. It is not

imaginable, that any Man can believe contrary to the Life he lives in: When he lives in the State of eternal Death; to believe eternal Life: Or to believe the Pardon of Sin, when he lives in it, and slights the Sin he lives in. For our Saviour says, *You cannot believe because of your wicked Hearts.* It cannot stand together: To live in Sin; and to look for Pardon of Sin. For God doth not give to any one that is impenitent, the Power of Faith. *Be not conform'd to this wicked World, but be ye transform'd by the renewing of your Mind, that you may prove what is the good and acceptable Will of God,* Rom. xii. 2. Intimating, that if a Man lead a wicked and ungodly Life; if a Man in respect of State, Complexion, and Constitution of Soul, be in Contradiction to the Principles of Religion, the Principles of God's Creation; he cannot *prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect Will of God.* They that were in a Religious Disposition did readily believe and entertain our Saviour, and acknowledge him to be the *Messiah* that was promis'd of old: But those that were perfectly obstinate, in the Pharisaick Disposition, they rejected him. And this is clearly true, that Men cannot believe while they live in Sin, and are in Impenitency, and are under the Commands of their Lusts. For we find that an ingenuous Mind, and one that is a true Penitent, he doth with more Difficulty forgive himself, than God doth. He that is truly affected, and cordially turns to God, he is truly sensible of the Deformity and Impurity of Sin: Though Repentance give Heart's Ease and Satisfaction, and tend to the Quiet of his Mind; yet he doth more hardly excuse himself, than God doth. But a Man that is wedded to the World, that is under the Power of his Lusts, that applauds and magnifies himself in Self-will, is given up to Affectation, Arrogancy, and Self-assuming, how can this Man give himself Satisfaction concerning Pardon of Sin, when he is in a contrary Spirit, in a contrary Disposition? He cannot believe that God

will pardon Sin; because he himself doth not pardon any other Offender. God's Goodness well consider'd, speaks him to be propitious and inclinable to Compassion: But Impenitency speaks a Man's Incapacity of being pardon'd.

This is the Sum. All Divine Truth is of one of these two Emanations:— Either it flows from God, in the first Instant and Moment of God's Creation; and then it is the Light of that Candle which God set up in Man, to light him; and that which by this Light he may discover, are all the Instances of Morality; of good Affection, and Submission towards God; the Instances of Justice and Righteousness to Men, and Temperance to himself:— Or else, it is of an after Revelation and Discovery. Man being out of the Way of his Creation, by his Defection from God, is recover'd by this Revelation. Upon this Consideration, that Man was never better than finite and fallible, and considering that we have given an Offence; and [considering] the Relation that God stands in, to his Creatures; and that he is the first and chiefest Goodness; it is [what] may be fairly supposed, that God will recover his Creation, one way or other. Wherefore, that which the New Testament doth discover, is that which was in general Expectation.

Now the Terms of the New Covenant are possible to Sinners:— They are Just and Fit, Reasonable and Equal:— They are to us (who are departed from Truth) Restorative:— They are satisfactory to our Mind, and quieting to our Conscience.— For if I have offended against the Rule of Right, I ought to repent of it, confess it, be sorry for it, and do my Endeavour to commit it no more. And there is Reason to think that God can pardon. For every one's Right is in his own Power. Every one doth dispose of his Right in that way which he will. Since therefore it is God's Right, upon the Failure of Obedience, to reduce the Creature by Punishment; it is in his Power to abate of Punishment if he pleases, or to remit it. And it is



most reasonable to think, that God should be allow'd to do this in what way he would.

Therefore we conclude, that all the Instances of Christian Doctrine, either they are fairly knowable, if we use our Faculties and Understanding [(and these are the great Instances of Morality and Principles of Reason ;)] or else, if we do consider those Things that are considerable in the Case ; the Things of Reveal'd Truth, are of fair and easy Belief. The former of these, the great Principles of Reason, they are [by] awakened Minds easily and readily found out. The latter are, [by] prepar'd Minds, fairly admitted and entertained. This I say against the Atheism of the prophane World, and those that do affect to be Infidels, because they pretend they have not the Assurance of former Times, [nor of] powerful Miracles.

I will now instance in those Assurances that we have, to settle us in the Entertainment of Divine Truth. And they are these Five :

1. They are concurrent with the Sense of the Heathens and Strangers, who do agree with us in all the Instances of Morality ; in these we cannot speak beyond them, they speak and act so as to shame us : For how many of us do act below them in these Particulars ? and as to many Things of the New Testament concerning Christ, we have great Testimony from them ; as was shew'd.

2. The Representation that is made to us by Truth concerning God. He is represented worthy himself, and so as we may credit what is said of him.

3. The ingenuous Operation that Divine Truth hath upon Mens Minds.

4. Its Fitness to Man's State.

5. The Agency of the Divine Spirit in pursuance of it.

- I. As to Morals ; we have the full Concurrence with us of Heathen Authors, all those that are any whit reform'd. And for the rest, we have a good Rule in Philosophy, which



tells us, that he is incompetent to give Testimony upon account of Morality, that is himself vicious. For he that is vicious, is himself a Moral Monster. And upon a Moral Consideration, every Man is vicious that either is stupidly ignorant, or dissolute or profane ; and their Judgment in point of Truth is inconsiderable. In Morals, all those of the Heathens that have attain'd to any Reformation, either to the Improvement of their Intellectuals, or the Refinement of their Morals, they all concur with these immutable and indispensable Verities. And as to those reveal'd ; the several Parts of History concur in all the Things that the Evangelists do declare concerning Christ. It is very true, there have been in the World several Persons that have grossly neglected the Materials of Natural Knowledge ; so that Men have suffered their Faculties to lie asleep : The Mind and Understanding have been in most Men useless and unemploy'd : And there hath been invincible *Ignorance* as to the great Points of Reveal'd Truth in several Ages and Places of the World : But this I dare assure you ; that there never was any considerable *Opposition* against the main Principles of Natural or Reveal'd Truth, by those that have any Knowledge of it. No Man of any Competency of Knowledge, or Proportion of Goodness, hath risen up against any of these great Instances of Morality, or the main Articles of Christian Faith : But these have had (as I may say) *Universal Acknowledgment*. For if any have risen up against them ; they have been incompetent ; and so of no Moral Consideration : The Universal Acknowledgment of a Thing for Truth doth not ly in every individual Person's receiving it (for then you have nothing that is of Universal Acknowledgment ;) but in the due and even Proportion it bears to the Universal Reason of Mankind. This Principle no Man in his Wits will deny, *That it is impossible that the same thing should be, and not be, at the same time* ; yet some were so perverse and cross, absurd, and degenerate from

sober Reason, that they did deny it : And *Plutarch* saith, *That nothing yet was ever in the World so absurd, but some have held it.* Therefore we may entertain that which any sober Man in the due Use of Reason hath entertain'd, and proposed, upon Terms of Reason, for the Satisfaction of others. And we may conclude, that the Universal Acknowledgment of a Thing as Truth, it doth not depend upon every individual Person's receiving of it ; but upon the even and true Proportion that things bear to the Universal Reason of Mankind. This is all that can be said, when Men pretend to prove any thing by Universal Reason. Thus the Being of a God is proved by Universal Reason : For except only Monsters (those that are, upon the Account of Morality, very Monsters ; Persons that have grosly neglected their Understandings, and lived like Beasts ;) none else but have acknowledged *Deity*. Men improved in their Intellectuals, and refin'd in their Morals, have received and entertain'd it on Grounds of Reason.— It is observable, that the great Differences that have been between Men in the several Ages of the World, they have not been about any necessary and indispensable Truth, nor any thing that is declared plainly in any Text of Scripture : But all the Differences have been either in Points of very curious and nice Speculation, or in Arbitrary Modes of Worship. Now, notwithstanding these Differences, I dare say, and give assurance, that God gives Men leave, with a safe Conscience, to live in Peace, and to keep the Communion of the Church of God in the World, and to submit to the Government. Whosoever hath professed himself a Christian doth acknowledge Christ to be the Head. The Christian World scattered into particular Ways, and multiplied into Sects and Parties, yet do agree in the great and bright Truths of Reason and Christianity, such as are fixed, and of the greatest Magnitude. The *Mahometans* themselves did never charge *Moses*, or *Christ*, as being Impostors :

For they acknowledge *Moses*, as we do, for a true Prophet; and go along with us in the History of Christ, till the Fourteenth of *John*, and *Vers.* 16. and there is their first Departure. They acknowledge all that is related concerning Christ: Only they tell us that what Christ said of sending the Spirit, and another Comforter, is meant of *Mahomet*: and they tell us that our Saviour set down his Name; but afterwards his Disciples put it out. They acknowledge Christ to be a true Prophet, and beyond *Moses*; and out of respect to him, they deny all that is said about his Death and Crucifixion.

Reason doth *suppose* two things by which we may be further confirm'd in the Truth of our Religion.

(1st.) That if it had been a Cheat and an Imposture, it would have been deprehended in length of Time; being often told, and in several Ages and Companies, sometimes by parts, sometimes together, and under several Circumstances, and upon several Occasions; there would have been some Differences in the Relations. Had there been any thing false in our Religion, [or that were] not solid, true and substantial; it having past through Sixteen Ages, being above Sixteen hundred Years old, those Men that lived before us being inferiour to none of us for Parts; they would have deprehended it as guilty, and forewarn'd us of it. Therefore we may take it for granted that the great Matters of Natural Knowledge and Faith, that have pass'd through so many Ages and Generations are solid, true, and substantial; and that the Book call'd the *Bible*, which hath run down, from the time of our Saviour and his Apostles, to this Day, may be received with double Assurance, Credit, and Advantage. For Error and Falshood is never long-liv'd: but Truth is Eternal, and that which will continue for ever.

(2dly.) I do *suppose* another thing with great Reason; and that is, considering the Goodness of God, the Care he

has of his Creatures, his Love to Truth, and the Respect that he bears to those that worship him ; that he would not suffer the Good Intentions of such to be abused by any Imposture, nor suffer that which is false to take such place in all Times and Ages of the World, without the least Check or Controul.— But some may object ; if this be so, what say you to the *Mahometans*, and the great *Factions* that have been in the World and prevailed ? Are not these, Testimonies against the Truth of our Religion ?— As for *Mahomet* ; he had only the Assistance of an Apostate Monk who taught him to compound a Religion out of Gentilism and Judaism, and in the Composition that he hath made, so far as he hath added any thing of his own, it is so contemptible to sober Reason, and so contrary to those things that he hath taken out of the Old Testament, that it is not hard to detect him for a Cheat and an Impostor. For devest him but of those things which he stole out of the Bible ; and that which is his own will appear base, vile, and contemptible to the Reason of Mankind, and most ridiculous. Now if God had given Testimony to *his* Religion ; it would have been in a way of Reason, and most agreeable to the Understandings of Men ; and not in a way of stupid Ignorance : but in such a way as might challenge the greatest Opposers to find any thing contrary to those Principles of Reason and Understanding which he hath planted in Man's Mind. But as to *Mahomet* ; History doth declare him to be a Person of a debauch'd Life ; and one that had not Credit in the time of his Life.— As to the great *Factions* that have been in the several Ages ; tho' they have been many Persons ; yet they have been but one *Party* : and one *Party* is to be consider'd but as one Opinion : for if there be a thousand Men in a *Party*, it is but *one* Opinion ; and one single Person is as much as a whole *Party*. All those of a *Party* are bound up to one Opinion, [and to believe as their *Party* believes.] Therefore

I except against those that have blindly gone on without Consideration. For these have not acted by the Guidance of Humane Reason.

II. Now I shall give you some *Intrinsick Arguments*, by which I shall convince those of their Wickedness, and Folly, that affect either Atheism, or Infidelity. The first is this, (which is the second Assurance we have of Divine Truth) The Representation that Religion makes to the Mind of Man concerning God, even such a Representation as the Mind of Man, if duly used, and well informed, would conceive concerning him. For God is represented lovely, amiable, and beautiful, in the Eyes of Men; and what is said of God, is worthy of Him, and is consistent with what Man is *made* to think, or know, concerning him: For this is truly Divine, and God-like, to do Good, to relieve, to compassionate; and on the contrary it is Diabolical, and most opposite to the Divine Nature, to destroy, to grieve, to oppress. And what a relation doth the Bible make of God, to be Merciful, Gracious, Long-suffering, Full of Compassion?—So, [on the other side], how is the Devilish Nature describ'd and represented to us?—The Devilish Nature is hurtful, given to Malice, Hatred, and Revenge; but the Divine Nature is placable, and reconcileable; ready to forgive, full of Compassion, and of great Goodness, and Kindness.

This, for the Representation that both Old and New Testament make of God, and this is agreeable to the Sense of every awaken'd Mind. All that the Gospel requires, is, Repentance from Dead Works, and Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. And this is the Sum of all that is declared and superadded; and nothing in all the World can be declared or required upon Terms of greater Justice, Reason, and Equity. For will not any one acknowledge, that if an Inferior give Offence to a Superior, he ought to humble himself, and ask Forgiveness? Can any Man's Reason in

the World be unsatisfied in this?—Then, for Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; is it not very equal, and fit, that if God will pardon Sin, he should do it in what way he thinks fitting? that if we go to him for Cure, he should take that way to recover us which he thinks best?

So that these [Terms] which are superadded to the Principles of God's Creation, are such, that there were never more equal, fit, and reasonable, proposed to Men: neither is this all; but they are satisfactory to the Reason of our Mind: For this is found to be true upon Experience, that the Mind of an Impenitent cannot receive Satisfaction nor Consolation in any other way. Should all the Men in the World, or an Angel from Heaven speak [Pardon] to an Impenitent; the Sense of Repentance would be better Satisfaction to his Mind; beyond any foreign Testimony whatsoever. Though God should tell me, my Sins were pardon'd; I could not believe it, unless I repent and deprecate God's Displeasure. For Repentance is satisfactory to the Reason of my Mind; is necessary to quiet my Conscience; and I should not be rational or intelligent in Religion unless I satisfied my Mind; which is to do what I can to revoke what I have done amiss, and to deprecate God's Displeasure; and then apply to him for his Grace, in that way which he has declared.

Therefore these [Terms] are not only just and equal in themselves; but tend to the Quiet and Satisfaction of a Man's Mind; [and] are restorative to our Natures.—Now the Representation that is made to us by Divine Truth, either natural, or reveal'd, is that which is satisfactory and consonant to the Reason of our Mind: it is that which doth justly represent God, as he stands in opposition to the Cruel, Devilish, and Apostate Nature, as being Placable, Compassionate, and Reconciling; and so, in the use of true Reason a Man would have thought and imagin'd concerning him; that he would not be wanting to afford unto



Men fitting Aid and Assistance for their Recovery. And thus is God represented Lovely, Beautiful, and Amiable, in the Eyes of the whole Creation.

III. [Another] Intrinsick Argument (which is the *Third Assurance* of Divine Truth) is, the ingenuous Operation that Divine Truth, both Natural and Reveal'd, hath upon the Mind and Understanding of Man. For these Truths call Creatures to Self-resignation, to commit themselves to God, to depend upon him. And how doth this tend to the Heart's Ease, [and to the] Quiet, and Satisfaction of a Man's Soul? For we know by Experience that even the best, and wisest of us, are oft times transcended by our Occasions, and at a loss. The Affairs of the World do transcend the Capacities of our Mind and Understanding: Now Religion both Natural, and Reveal'd, doth teach us, that in respect of God we are but Instruments assumed, determin'd, and limited, (and it is no Disparagement to an Instrument if it fail) that we are but Creatures, and have our Dependence upon him. And how doth this tend to the Satisfaction of our Minds! because we know that God is wiser than we, and that he is greater, and every way better than we; [so that if any thing succeed ill]; which either the Honour of God, or the Good of his Creatures, [seemed to] require; then, we being but God's Instruments, and subservient to him, [may] know that we should not have failed, unless God would. Thus our Religion teaches us Submission to God, Acknowledgment of him, Dependence upon him: It assigns to Man his proper place respectively to his true Center; and so lays a Foundation of Heart's Ease, Quiet, Content, and Satisfaction. The Grace of the Gospel, whereby we hope to be saved, doth not only give Continuance, Help, real Furtherance, and Assistance to Natural Truth, (which lost much by Man's Apostacy from God, and so needed a hand to help it up;) but it also doth its own proper Work; by emptying the Mind of Man of Wilfulness,



Presumption, and Self-conceit, which is incident to his Nature; and so making room for the Help of Grace, and Divine Assistance, and Forgiveness.—But to pursue this Argument a little further.

A Gospel-Spirit doth excel in Meekness, Gentleness, Modesty, Humility, Patience, Forbearance; and these are eminent Endowments, and mightily qualify Men to live in the World. This is that which makes Men bear universal Love and Goodwill; and overcomes Evil with Good.—This I dare say, had we a Man among us that we could produce, that did live an exact Gospel-Life; were the Gospel a Life, a Soul, and a Spirit to him, as Principles upon Moral Considerations are; this Man, for every thing that is excellent, and worthy, and useful, would be miraculous and extraordinary in the Eyes of all Men in the World: Christianity would be recommended to the World by his Spirit. Were a Man sincere, honest, and true in the way of his Religion; he would not be grievous, intollerable, or unsufferable to any Body; but he would command due Honour, and draw unto himself Love and Esteem. For the true Gospel-Spirit is transcendently, and eminently remarkable every way, for those things that are Lovely in the Eyes of Men; for Ingenuity, Modesty, Humility, Gravity, Patience, Meekness, Charity, Kindness, &c.—And for all this that I have said, I will refer you but to that of the Apostle, where he doth set out the *Fruits of the Spirit*, and the *Works of the Flesh*: He tells you, that *the Works of the Flesh are Hatred, Malice, Emulation, Strife, Sedition, and such like*, Gal. v. 20. all of a kind; and all of them do speak Hell broke-loose, and come in upon us in the World: For these are from Hell, and tend to Hell, and represent to us in this World the Hellish State that we dread to meet with hereafter.—But on the other side; the *Fruits of the Divine Spirit in Men*, they are *Love, Joy, Peace, Long-suffering, Meekness, Gentleness*, and such like, Gal. v. 22.

And all of these are such lovely things that they make Heaven, in a degree, where they are found. [Whereas] the former turn the World into a kind of Hell.

Such is the Nature of Religion, that it keeps the Mind in a good Frame and Temper; it establishes a healthful Complexion of Soul, and makes it fit to discharge itself duly in all its Offices towards God, with itself, and with Men. Whereas the Mind of a wicked and profane Man, is a very Wilderness, where Lust and exorbitant Passions bear down all before them; and are more fierce and cruel than Wolves and Tygers. So the Prophet, *Isaiah* lvii. 20. *The Wicked is like the raging Sea, always casting forth Mire and Dirt*: and *Prov.* xvii. ver. 12. *One had better meet a Bear robbed of her Whelps, than a Fool in his Folly*: and you all know who is *Solomon's Fool*; even every wicked Man.—The Heavenly State consists in the Mind's Freedom from these kind of things. It doth clear the Mind from all impotent and unsatiable Desires, which do abuse a Man's Soul, and make it restless and unquiet: It sets a Man free from eager impetuous Loves; from vain and disappointing Hopes; from lawless and exorbitant Appetites; from frothy and empty Joys; from dismal presaging Fears, and anxious Cares; from inward Heart-burnings; from Self-eating Envy, from swelling Pride, and Ambition; from dull and black Melancholly; from boiling Anger, and raging Fury; from a gnawing, aiking Conscience; from Arbitrary Presumption; from rigid Sowness, and Severity of Spirit: for these make the Man that is not biass'd and principled with Religion, inwardly to boil; to be Hot with the Fervours of Hell; and, *like the troubled Sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up Mire and Dirt*, *Isa.* lvii. 20.

But on the other side; Things that are connatural in the way of Religion, the *Illapses*, and Breakings in of God upon us; these require a Mind that is not subject to

Passion; but in a serene and quiet Posture; where there is no Tumult of Imagination. It is observed among the Rabins that if a Prophet fall into a Rage and Passion, the Spirit of Prophecy leaves him. They say that *Moses* did not prophesy, after the Spirit of Passion moved him. But sure it is, there is no genuine and proper Effect of Religion, where the Mind of Man is not composed, sedate, and calm. I find among the Philosophers, that they never had Expectation of any Noble Truth, from any Man that was under the Power of Lust, or under the Command of Fancy and Imagination; or that lived in the common Spirit of the World; they thought that God did not communicate himself to such. But this is certain; that no Man that is immers'd in a sensual brutish Life, can have any true Notion of Heaven, or of Glory: These things must signify no more to him, than a *local* Happiness, and sensual Enjoyment; than the highest and greatest Gratification of the Animal Principle: all that he can think of Heaven is, that it is a Place of great Enjoyment; some local Glory; something that is suitable to the sensual Mind. For we cannot ascend higher in our Actings than we are in our Beings, and Understandings: And these Men that think our Happiness lies in the sensual Objects of Delight, are not capable of understanding either the Reason or Necessity of Mortification, inward Renewal, and Regeneration, in order to admittance into Heaven. For they do not look upon Heaven as a State and Temper of Mind, to which it is requisite to be reconciled to the Nature of God, and to be according to his Mind and Will.—But Religion is the Introduction of the Divine Life into the Soul of Man: and Man cannot possibly be really happy in the separate State, but by these things; by having a Divine Love ruling in their Hearts; by Self-resignation, and Submission to the Divine Will, and by being like unto God.

Things are very well known, what they are in being, by what they are in working; what the Principle of them is, by the Effect that flows from them: Now I may say of Divine Truth, whether Natural, or Reveal'd, that these do satisfy the Mind of Man, and keep him from being barbarous, cruel, and inhumane. Religion doth give such Evidence and Assurance of itself, that if you put it in competition with any thing that any Natural Man, whether Atheist or Infidel doth ever rest upon; it will appear to have a greater Foundation in Nature, and [on] the Grounds and Principles of common Reason, Equity, and Justice, than any thing which can be set up against it, to counter-balance it. And Reveal'd Truth superadded to Natural, doth not only give Assurance to it, and helps to recover *that* which we know by the Light of God's Creation, (which is weaken'd by Man's Sin, and [his] Apostacy from God) but it doth also do its own proper Work, and teach a Man to return to his own Place, to acknowledge God, depend upon him, and be subservient to him: [It teaches him] to empty his Mind of all Presumption, Pride, Arrogance, and Self-assuming: So that a Man is fit to receive the Grace of Pardon and Forgiveness of Sin, together with all Divine Influence, Concurrence, and Assistance.

But since I have laid so mighty a Weight, and so great a Stress upon this Acknowledgment in the Text; I must needs here prevent an Objection which may be raised; and it is this.—Some may object, and say, you have no Divine Authority for these Words; for tho' they are in the Bible, they are but here *related*. I confess I have no more Authority from these Words, (being spoken by these Persons of whom they are related) than if they were clean the contrary to what they are. For I do find concerning our Lord and Saviour, that some Persons of like Disposition, say, that he did do his Miracles by *Belzebub* the Prince of Devils: and if we lay stress upon the Sayers; we must

as well credit them, as these. Therefore I will grant you, that I have no Authority for ought I have said, from these Words materially consider'd, or as related and put down here: Neither do I lay any Weight or Stress on the Sense of these Reporters; for I will grant that it might be hazardous what these Men said; for as much as they did not speak out of any Purpose or Intention, or out of any settled Principle: and such Men have, upon the like Occasion, given a clean contrary Report.—Now I will give you a profitable Observation from hence: Take care how you quote Scripture; for *that* is Scripture for which you have Divine Authority, not *that* which is barely related in the Text. For you have the Speeches of the Devil, and the Advice of the worst of Men related in Scripture.—Scripture is only consider'd in the Truth of Matter of Fact, and that these things were done; but it doth not follow from hence that they are materially Good: No Man must pretend to do as *Ehud* did; because his Action is recorded in Scripture: No Man must pretend to borrowing without Intention of paying, as the *Israelites* did; for if they had not extraordinary Warrant, they were [to be] condemn'd in their Practice. So, for us, to curse our Enemies, as we read in the *Psalms* the Prophet did, not knowing in what Spirit it was done; [it] is not warrantable for us to do the like from thence: Neither must we hate any, because the Jews were to hate and to destroy the *Seven Nations*; which they interpreted a Commission to hate *all Mankind but themselves*. Therefore in like case, we cannot certainly prove that any thing in the Book of *Job* is certainly Divine, that was spoken by *Job's* Friends; because God himself declares, that they had not spoken that which was right concerning him, as his Servant *Job* had done. Therefore if you will have Divine Authority, see what is said; and think it not enough that it is barely related in the Book: Neither is it enough to pretend to a single Text, nor the

Practice or Perswasion of any Man whatsoever; nor to any thing accidentally spoken, that can amount either to Matter of Faith, or Divine Institution: It must be express Scripture; it must be Scripture in conjunction with Scripture: For Scripture, as a Rule of Faith, is not one Scripture but all. And therefore, tho' I have taken Advantage from these Words, yet all along, I have laid such certain and such infallible Grounds, tending to give Satisfaction in the Matters of Reason and Faith, as the several Points are capable of.

And now I proceed to a fourth Argument, which is this,—

IV. The Suitableness of natural Truth to Man in the State of his Creation; and the Suitableness of Reveald Truth to Man in his lapsed and fallen Condition, in order to his Restitution and Recovery.

And first, for the Suitableness of that which we call *Natural Religion*.—Natural Religion was the very Temper and Complexion of Man's Soul, in the Moment of his Creation; it was his natural Temper, and the very Disposition of his Mind; it was as connatural to his Soul, as Health to any Man's Body: So that Man forc'd himself, offered Violence to himself, and his Principles, went against his very Make and Constitution, when he departed from God, and consented to Iniquity.—It is the same thing in moral Agents, to observe and comply with the Dictates of Reason, as it is with inferior Creatures, to act according to the Sense and *Impetus* of their Natures. It is the same thing with the World of intelligent and voluntary Agents, to do that which right Reason doth demand and require, as it is in Sensitives, to follow the Guidance of their Senses, or in Vegetatives to act according to their Natures. It is as natural for a Man, in respect of the Principles of God's Creation in him, to live in Regard, Reverence, and Observance of Deity; to govern himself according to the Rule



of Sobriety and Temperance ; to live in Love, and to carry himself well in God's Family ; this, I say, is as natural for him, as for a Beast to be guided by his Senses, or for the Sun to give Light.—How far therefore are we degenerated and fallen below the State in which God created us ; since it is so rare a thing for us to comply with the Reason of things !—Nothing is more certainly true, than that all Vice is unnatural, and contrary to the Nature of Man. All that we call Sin, that which is naught, and contrary to the Reason of Things, is destructive of Human Nature ; and a Man forceth himself when he doth it : So that, to comply with those Principles of natural Light and Knowledge which God did implant in us, in the Moment of our Creation ; and exactly to be obedient to the Ducture of Reason, is connatural to Man, in respect of the State of God's Creation : And it may be as well expected from an intelligent Agent, to observe God, and to live righteously, and soberly, as from any sensitive Agent, to follow its Appetite.—Humility, Patience, Meekness, and such like Virtues, they do favour Nature ; whereas Passion, Pride, and Envy do waste and destroy Nature.—*Nature's* Desires are all moderate, and limited ; but *Lust* is violent and exorbitant. Nature is content with a very few things ; but if a Man give way to inordinate Desires, then there is no Satisfaction to be obtain'd. Lust is not a thing that will be satisfied by adding and adding ; but he that would be satisfied, must abate and moderate his Desires, and undue Affections.—It is certain, that all *Natural Truth*, all that is founded in Reason, and that derives from the Principles of God's Creation ; that all of these do agree with Man's Constitution in the State of Innocency.

And for Reveal'd Truth ; *that* fits and supplies Man in his lapsed State.—Every Man that knows his State, feels Want in himself of Health and Strength : And reveal'd Truth is *that* which doth supply this Want ; and



is *that* which he would have wish'd for from God. In this, he hath Terms proposed to him of Pardon and Reconciliation, upon Repentance, and returning to God. Never did Patient and Physician meet more happily; Disease and Physick; than Man in a lapsed Condition, and the Proposals that are through the Grace of God in the Gospel. In the *one* there is Man full of Misery; in the *other* the Grace of God for Mercy and Forgiveness. Man's Language in that State is, *O wretched Man, who shall deliver me from this Body of Death!* Rom. vii. 24. The Grace of the Gospel puts these Words into his Mouth; *I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord, that he hath delivered me.* And he is bid to have no evil Heart of Unbelief. There is a State of Guilt on the one side, a State of Justification on the other: A State of Sin, and a State of Holiness: Fear of eternal Death, and a Promise of eternal Life.— So that the Grace of the Gospel is fitted to Man in his lapsed State and Condition, in order to his Restoration and Recovery.

V. The fifth and last Argument is, *the Agency of the Divine Spirit, in pursuance of what God hath done in the Way of Divine Truth.* For God sends not his Truth into the World alone; but having done one thing, will also do another, to make the former effectual. Now they that have not the Divine Spirit, want the great Commentator upon Divine Truth in the World. And therefore let such Men look after it: For this is a great and a certain Truth; that God, in his Grace and Goodness, will give his Spirit to guide, and teach, and assure the Minds of good Men; tho' none know it but those that feel him. But they who have the Spirit of God, know nothing more certain: For they have Satisfaction, and inward Peace, and Joy in believing; they perceive such Operations of God in themselves, whereof the World cannot receive any Account: The Divine Spirit doth open their Understandings, as it

did the Apostles ; brings Things to their Remembrance ; makes them consider the Inwards of Things ; and calls them to Advertency and Consideration. The great Work of the Divine Spirit is to lead Men into right Apprehensions, and stay a Man's Thoughts in Consideration, till the Principles do receive Admittance, and become a Temper and Constitution, till they infuse and instil themselves, and make a lasting Impression. Tho' for my part, I do believe, that the Scripture is clear and full of Light, as to all Matters of Conscience, as to all Rules of Life, as to all necessary Matters of Faith ; so that any well-minded Man that takes up the Bible and reads, may come to Understanding and Satisfaction. And hence it is that we have Sufficiency from God, to preserve us from Cheats of all Sorts. So that a well-minded Man, that hath this Instrument of God, need not be mistaken in any necessary Matters of Faith. For the Bible is sufficient and intelligible in the Way of Religion, and for all the Purposes thereof, as any other Book, for the Learning of any other Art or Science. And upon this account God hath done that which will justify him ; and at our Peril be it, if we be found ignorant, or have been deceived : For we needed not ever have been ignorant, or mistaken in any thing that is vital in Religion. And to this Purpose there is also the divine Spirit still to attend upon this Instrument of God : So that they who do acknowledge God, and pray unto him for his Help and Assistance, have the Advantage of being taught by the Spirit, and by means thereof, are in a sure Way of Knowledge, with the consequent Effects of Holiness and Goodness.

By these *Five* Arguments, a Man may be resolved against the Atheism, Infidelity, and Prophaneness of the World. And from this Discourse, about which I have been long, I do infer,

That Atheism and Infidelity are the most unaccountable

Things in the World, and inexcuseable. The Atheist must be *every where* self-condemned ; and the Infidel *within the Pale of the Church*. There is nothing that God hath done more in any way whatsoever, than he hath done for the Security of Men against Atheism ; for I dare say, if any Man do but think, and use Reason, he may know all natural Truth. And what can a Man do less ? How is he a Man, if he do not either of these ? Doth any Man know any thing but by Thinking and Considering ? Yea, perhaps, *this* is all that we pretend to ; for we are born to nothing else. All Habits and Dispositions, all actual Knowledge, is our own Acquisition (with respect to the Grace of God). No Man is born to any actual Knowledge in the World, or to speak a Word, or understand a Notion ; but all Habits and Dispositions are acquired. And therefore an Atheist shall be self-condemned : as one that never used his Reason, nor so much as exercised his own Thoughts. And for the Infidel within the Pale of the Church ; if he will but search, and consider, he may find that which will beget Faith and Belief. And therefore the Atheist and the Infidel are the most unaccountable and unexcuseable Persons in the World ; for they have done nothing themselves ; they have not so much as thought or considered ; they have not seen with their own Eyes.— If a Man living in the World, or in the Church, be either an Atheist, or an Infidel ; he hath been an idle Person in the World, and a Sluggard : His Understanding hath received no Culture or Care ; he hath made no Improvement of himself, nor done any thing worthy of a Man.

## THE VENERABLE NATURE, AND TRANSCENDANT BENEFIT OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION

*For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: For it is the Power of God unto Salvation, to every one that believeth, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.—*  
ROMANS i. 16.

I HAVE declared several Assurances we have of divine Truth, *Natural*, and *Reveal'd* in Scripture; against Atheists, Infidels, and the Prophane: As,

1. The great Acknowledgment it hath met with, in the several Ages of the World.

2. The Representation that is hereby made of God, [which] is agreeable to what Man is made to know. The Proposals made to us by God, the Invitations made by him, the Prohibitions, Commands, and Promises, all these testify of God, and declare worthily concerning him.

3. The ingenuous Effects and Operations of Divine Truth, upon Mens Spirits, and in their Lives.

4. The Suitableness of *Natural* Truth to Man in his State of Institution; and of *Reveal'd* Truth, to Man in his lapsed State, in order to his Restitution and Recovery.

5. The Agency of the Divine Spirit in pursuance.

Now if [this be] so, we may concur, in sense and Resolution with the Apostle. *I am not ashamed of the Gospel, &c.*

*I am not ashamed.*—This intimates, that there is some where Matter of *Shame*, within the Compass of the Business. Now here Man's Apostacy, and Sin; these are shameful things, which was the Occasion of the Gospel-Revelation.

The Grace of the Gospel, which comes to repair and to restore, puts us in mind of our ruinous and necessitous Condition: So that there is cause of Shame in the Case; though Cause of Glory and Triumph in the Grace of God.

*It is the Power of God unto Salvation.* POWER, not *strictly*, as limiting to one Perfection; but eminently, to attribute to the Efficacy of Divine Grace [these two Things], *viz.* Regeneration, Nativity from above (which is the Salvation of this State;) Glorification, and consummating us in Holiness; which is the Salvation of the Future.

To advance this Grace, and to raise our Apprehensions of it, consider the Author of it; (it is the Effect of the divine Wisdom, the Fruit of the Divine Love:) what it is in itself; *and* of what Benefit to us.

There must be Greatness of Power to erect such a Fabrick and Structure as the World is; and Excellency of Wisdom to administer the Affairs of it, in all Variety of Cases. Now it is pity any should do the like, that cannot also recover, and restore, if Necessity require: For so should finite and fallible (as we are) if in any Error or Mistake, be under an Impossibility of Redemption. It is according to Nature's Sense, rather never to have been, than for ever to be irrecoverably miserable: Wherefore, if I believe God made me, I will also believe God can restore me.

Nothing is clearer in Reason, nothing is fuller in Scripture, than that God is the first and chiefest Good. In respect of his Relation to his Creatures, earthly Parents do but resemble him: *John* iii. 16. *God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, &c.* It must be attributed to his Goodness and Compassion; because it was that which we cannot say he was at all bound to do: It was that which he could not be constrained to do: It was that which he was no Gainer by: For our Righteousness is not

profitable to him.—The Gospel of Christ is no Invention of Human Reason: Man neither prevented God, nor recompenced him after: Only the Necessity of Man's State required it; and God's Goodness afforded it: The Excellencies of Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, are displayed in it.

'Tis not a Mystery now; though formerly it was *hid from Ages and Generations*, Col. i. 26. But now it is *the Council of God's Will declared*.—He that *darkens Words without Knowledge*, brings us back again to the Infancy of the World. It was the Imperfection and Shortness of the Mosaical Dispensation that it was Typical, Mystical, Ceremonial, Symbolical; full of Shadows, things that did veil and darkly represent. Obscurity is Imperfection, as Darkness in comparison with Light. Life and Immortality, and all [the] Principles of it are brought to Light through the Gospel.

The Gospel is admirable Speculation; excellent Matter of Knowledge: For here is the Revocation of an insolent bold Act of Usurpation upon God, by Christ's full Submission and entire Self-resignation. A Prince and a Saviour is raised up by God, sent into the World, not to make Havock, to ruin and destroy; not as it is 2 *Sam.* xii. 31. where the People were put under Saws and Harrows of Iron, made to pass through Brick-kilns; a thing intolerable to behold; dreadful to read of; (though in this impotent incompetent World, many great Warriours are made famous for such things, even in unjustifiable War:) But he came to give Repentance and Forgiveness of Sin; He came to seek and to save that which was lost.

The Gospel is a *Vital Principle*, not of Natural Life, but Divine; as it satisfies the Reason of our Minds by Removal of Fears and Doubts, by the Life of Faith, Affiance, and Trust in God;—and, as it reforms our Spirits and Lives, as conveying and communicating Principles of Goodness

and Righteousness ; [by which] we are made Partakers of the Divine Nature.

The Substance of the Gospel is, Repentance from dead Works, and Faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. These do go together, and encourage each other ; in as much as no Man repents, who doth not believe ; nor can any believe, who doth not repent. *To believe*, there is requisite an internal Disposition and Preparation of the Subject, as well as a Divine Promise to build upon. *Joh. v. 44. Can you believe who receive Honour one of another, and seek not Honour from God?* The same is in all Cases of Inordinacy and Sin. Repentance and Faith in the Gospel are indifferently used : *He that believeth on the Son hath eternal Life*, *Joh. iii. 36.* Now he doth not really believe, who doth not truly intend to do answerably. The Scripture calls *believing* on Christ, *receiving of him*, *Joh. i. 12.* If we receive him, then we receive him *such* as he is, and to *such* Effects and Purposes as God sent him for : Now God sent him to bless us, in turning us from our Iniquities. The Scripture useth *Synecdoches* : Sometimes *Believing* is put for the whole of Religion ; sometimes *Repenting* ; sometimes *Fearing* ; sometimes *Love*. If we would not be partial, nor deceive our selves, we must always take in all concomitant Acts. Scripture, as the Rule of Faith, is not *one single Text*, (which may be short, and intend another thing) but *the Fulness of Scripture*. In all other Cases, he that believes doth according as he thinks. Faith includes an Intention of new Obedience.

I may with great Reason say, that the Matter of the Gospel is a *Vital Principle* ; as it satisfies the Reason of our Mind, [and] so sets us at Rest and Quietness within ourselves, as thereby seeing and knowing that we are out of danger.—In the intellectual Nature, a Principle of Knowledge, *as to the Understanding*, is vital ; as well as an habitual Disposition, *as to the Will*. What more Satis-



faction can there be to the Reason of our Minds, [what more] tending to the Quiet of our Consciences, than to be assured, in a Matter of such Importance to us, that God, to whom we are so obnoxious by Transgression and Sin, is most placable and reconcileable of himself, through the Perfection of his own Nature; and that he is absolutely resolv'd and engaged, by his voluntary Determination and Promise, to pardon Sin, in and through Christ, to all who repent and believe the Gospel: And this, and nothing less than this, is the Matter of the Gospel: This is *to be accepted in and through Christ*, and is the real Explication of Justification by imputed Righteousness. For this being suppos'd, and proving true; We are sure of God,—we know his Terms.—The Terms are fair and equal in themselves; fit and just: For should not an Offender do what is in him to undo what he hath done amiss?—The Terms are good for us; for we cannot be happy by God, in a way of opposition to God, but by Submission and Reconciliation to him.—They are such as are possible, through the Grace and Assistance of God.—So that there is nothing in the whole World that we have more Reason to desire and pray for, than that they be verified, fulfilled and accomplished in us.

There are no two things more inward to us, than Satisfaction to our Reason, that we may be at quiet; and the settling of our Minds in Frame and Temper, that we may enjoy ourselves. In these *two* the Life of Man consists; and these depend on the Knowledge of the Gospel.

[Now], the Matter of the Gospel is [also] a vital Principle, as it is a Byass upon our Spirits, an habitual Temper and Disposition constantly affecting us, and inclining us *Godward*, and to ways of *Goodness, Righteousness and Truth*. For it is inwardly received, so as to dye and colour the Soul; so as to settle a Temper and Constitution: And so

it is restorative to our Natures.—That which we do but indifferently by our Ability, we are able to do dexterously and easily by Custom. Through the Divine Grace and Assistance we are both able and freely willing. The Law of the Spirit of Life in Christ frees us from the Law of Sin and Death. The Principles of the Christian Religion do not only controul intemperate and exorbitant *Acts*, but regulate the inward Frame and *Temper* of Mind, the Inclinations, *elicit* Acts, and first Motions. As Christ said to God, *not my Will but thy Will*; so we must, through Participation of Christ, be let into a Temper of Meekness and Gentleness to our Fellow-Creatures, and a submissive self-denying Frame in respect of God. Hence our Lives and Manners are of another Fashion. By the Spirit of the Gospel we are transformed into another Nature, Life and Temper. Neither do I terminate the Ultimate Issue of Christ in the happy Effects of Renovation in ourselves, and Reconciliation to God; (tho' these are Benefits transcendent to all worldly Wealth, Greatness and Power;) but it doth not now appear, neither can we now bear the thought of it, what we may be when God shall be all in all; and all Enmity subdued.—These are *two* things, and very different; what Man may come to, by the Improvement of himself, in the right use of himself, his natural Power and Faculties, directing himself by his ordinary Rules, [as] he is God's Creature, and may attain his Natural State and End; and what Man may come to, as he is endued with Power from above; as he is assumed into a Relation to God, by Jesus Christ; as he is a Member of that Body whereof Christ is the Head, as the Adoption of God by Jesus Christ; and as he is so enliven'd by the Divine Spirit, as did not belong to Man in the State of Innocency.—But these are not things of our present State; for even *Adam*, as he was made, was not fit. *For Flesh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.*

The Application now only remains.

Having made appear to you that the Doctrine of the Gospel, both in respect of its proper Vertue and Efficiency, as also in respect of Divine Intention, is effectual to the bringing of Men to Salvation; then are you, *first* to acquaint yourselves thoroughly with the Terms of the Gospel, to pass [Judgment] upon it, to consider well all the Circumstances that make up the Case; *Our contracted Impotency and great Deformity by our Fall; the Necessity of Recovery and Restoration; the Efficacy and the Freeness of the Grace of God to Conversion.* So that we may resolve our Minds; tho' our Case be very forlorn, because of our Defection and Apostacy from the Innocency of our Creation, and self-contracted Misery; yet nothing is desperate, nothing is impossible in the Case; but our Recovery, through the Grace of God, is fairly easy.

And being thus prepar'd by such Knowledge and Apprehensions; pursue the Intent of the Gospel in your own Spirits, and in Conjunction of yourselves with others, by free Communication in Converse; for this is certain, and found by Experience, that the only way to do a Man's self good in Intellectuals and Spirituals, is to do good to others. No Man gains so much as by Teaching. No Man so Improves in Intellectuals, as by Communication; which doth much commend Intellectuals, that *they increase by Expence.* If a Man hath brought himself to some Perfection by Consideration, he will make himself much more, by free Communication; and in free Communication, you will have another suggest that which, it may be, you did not think of: So he will put you upon further Consideration, or else preserve you from Presumption. None are of such modest Spirits as [they] who live in free Communication and Converse. This I subjoin, for the improving of a Man's self in the way of the Gospel, and answering the vigorous Spirit of the Gospel; *be com-*

*municative.* And this is the Purpose of all our Meetings : Free Communication, to answer every Man's Doubts ; to give every one Satisfaction. It is the highest Service, and greatest Courtesy we can do one another, freely to tell what we have conceiv'd ; and we do ourselves most effectual Good, when we carry on others with us, when we do Good unto others.

The first thing in Religion is to teach a Man's own Mind ; to satisfy a Man's self, in the Reason of things ; to look to the Grounds and Assurance that a Man hath for his Thoughts, Apprehensions and Perswasions : But then it is prodigious and monstrous if *that* wherein my Reason is resolv'd and satisfied, should not have such an Influence upon my Mind, as to establish me in Life accordingly, and to be a Rule both in Temper and Practice. That which we call in Morals *against the Order of Reason*, is so much more horrid, unnatural, and prodigious than in inferiour Nature, for *Sensitives* to go against the Guidance of Sense, [or] for *Inanimates* against the Force of Nature ; [it is, I say], so much more unnatural ; as *Intelligent Agents* transcend, in Perfection, *Sensitives*, and *Inanimates* : Reason being as proportionable to its Effects, as any Principle in inferior Nature.

There are two Orders or Ranks of Creatures in this visible World ; the Order of *Sensitives*, and of *Inanimates* : The World of *Sensitives*, they are true and infallible ; they are true to that which is their *predominant Principle* ; that is, *Sense* ; and they never vary : And *Inanimates*, they certainly tend according to their Nature. Now the Principle in the higher Order of Creatures, *viz.* of Rational and Intelligent Agents, is *Apprehension of the Reason of things*. Now the Reasons of things are Eternal ; they are not subject to any Power ; we practice not upon them : It is our Wisdom to observe them ; and our Goodness to comply with them : But they are as much our Rule,

as *Sense* to Sensitives, and the *Impetus* of Nature to Inanimates. Now you would think it monstrous, prodigious and unnatural, for the Sun to give over shining, for heavy things to ascend, for light things to descend, for Fire not to burn: Yet it is more prodigious for any one that is an Intelligent Agent and voluntary, not to comply with the Reason of things; because he is a Creature of a higher Order, and his Principle is more excellent. By which you may see the Degeneracy of us Mortals; in that the State below us remains in the same Principle it was created in; but we Men do neither find out the Reasons of things, nor comply with them. Our Deformity is more; because our Perfection is more, and the Order of our Being is higher; and we were made more sufficient to our Con-natural Acts, than either Sensitives, or Inanimates to their proper Acts; and we use to say, the Fault is greater in him that is in a higher State.

This is to awaken Men to understand the Reason of the Gospel, and to consider it; that it may become the Reason of our Mind: And if it be the Reason of our Mind, it will be a *vital Principle* of Life.

The Intent of the Gospel being such as it is, (*viz.* the greatest *Good* possible;) and it being the Enquiry of all Mortals, *Who will shew us any Good?* it is matter of great Astonishment, that it should be so neglected; so much being done *on God's part* towards Man's Salvation, and so much Reason for it *on Man's part*.

1st, So much being done on God's part. For, Man's *Salvation* doth import *Man's Happiness*. Salvation from first to last, doth include the several Stages and Progressions in the passing from the Death of Sin, from the Carnal Mind, from the Corrupt Nature, into a Spiritual State and Divine Life. This is the Salvation of this State: And the Consummation of this is the Salvation of the

other. Do but consider how much God hath done upon this Account. Consider the many Promises and pathetic Invitations God hath made to Sinners; Promises to receive them; Promises to enable them; Promises to reward them. How did our Saviour mourn over *Jerusalem*? How did God by the Prophets every where complain, upon Man's Remissness?

*2dly*, Considering there is so much Reason for it on Man's part; that it is not only just, and fit in itself; but good for us. It is just and fit, *to repent*: For can any one think that it is reasonable, by an After-Act, to justify an Act of Arrogance? If he doth not, he must repent: For whosoever commits a Sin, and doth not repent of it, he lives to justify it.— Repentance is good for us; for without it, we are self-condemn'd, and in an Incapacity of Happiness. Self-condemnation I take to be the very Life of Hell: And a Man must be self-condemn'd, unless he repent, after the committing of Sin.— Repentance doth ease a Man's Mind. He that doth repent, would make Satisfaction, and doth recal it, what he can. It is not possible for a Man to be made happy, by putting him into a *Happy Place*, unless he be in a *Good State*. A Man is not happy in the State wherein he is not qualified. We are not capable of Happiness, unless we be restored to Innocency by Repentance. The Gospel is the Restitution of us to the State of our Creation, to the use of our Principles, to our healthful Constitution, and to Acts con-natural to us; and, under the Grace of God, is not only possible, but a thing of easy and fair Performance: For though without God, we are insufficient to do any thing; yet through the Grace of God, we are enabled to do all things that the Gospel requires. In this way, the Mind of Man may have Assurance and Satisfaction. It is a compassionate Case for him that is Supreme and Sovereign, to pity an unavoidable Necessity and Misery,

and to pardon so far as the Case is compassionate. Now we are in the Hands of him that is primarily and originally good : And he will certainly commiserate every Case, so far as it is compassionate. Now the Case of a Sinner is compassionate, if he be penitent ; because he was never better than finite and fallible. Nothing is more credible than that the first and chiefest Goodness will save to the utmost Extent of Disposition in the Subject.

On the other side, consider we God as the first and chiefest Goodness ; it is worthy of him, and in itself good, that Evil be controuled : Therefore I cannot conceive, but that the Goodness of God must engage him to punish obstinate Sinners. Parents think it becoming, to punish an obstinate Child. — Consider we him also in a relative Capacity, as he is the Governor of the World : He is engaged to maintain Order, so it is not comely in God to pass over Contumacy in Sin without challenging or controuling. So that as I do easily see, that the Case of a Sinner that is penitent is compassionate ; so on the other side, I cannot conceive that a contumacious impenitent Sinner can be pardoned ; since it is in itself good, and also worthy God (either considered *absolutely in himself*, as the first and chiefest Good ; or *relatively*, as the Governor of the World) to controul and challenge wilful and pertinacious Transgressors.

Consider we, the Unreasonableness of Sin in *Three* Particulars.

1<sup>st</sup>, In Acts of Impiety against God. Can any Reason be imagined for these ? For, God being the Original of Man's Being ; the Center of his Soul ; his ultimate End, and every Way well deserving of him ; Can any give a Reason why any Man should be rebellious against him ? Is there any Temptation to sober Reason unto Impiety ? What can be alledged to induce Men to affront and offer Contempt to God ?



*2dly*, What can be alledged for Intemperance ; since Nature is content with very few things ? Why should any one over-do in this kind ? A Man is better in Health and Strength, if he be temperate. We enjoy ourselves more in a sober and temperate Use of ourselves. What Aches, Diseases, Pains, and Sicknesses doth a Man bring upon himself, if he be intemperate ? How many of these are founded in Excess ?

*3dly*, Sins of Unrighteousness ;—whosoever doth an unrighteous Act, he doth justify all the Villanies in the World, even Highway-men and Robbers : For it is the same thing ; you are Sinners in the same kind ; for all is Unrighteousness ; there is Difference only in Degree. One may offend more in human Laws : But the Offence is the same in righteous Laws.—Besides, what Confidence can we ourselves have in respect of others ? For no man will think better of others than of himself. He that is guilty of Unrighteousness, cannot but be jealous, and think the same of others : So that he can have no Confidence in others.

Thus you see the Unreasonableness of Sin. Yet because of ill Use, Custom, and Practice, Difficulty is pretended [and it is thought hard], to be vertuous. Do not Beasts observe the Rules of their Nature ?—That which Religion requires, is to find out the Reason of Things, and to comply with it ; to move according to the Dictates of Reason ; and to observe the Order of the End ; to avoid such things as will do us harm ; in short, to live according to the Difference of Good and Evil ; to do the *one*, and to avoid the *other* ; which are not positive and arbitrary Impositions ; but they arise from Conveniencies, and from Inconveniencies of our Natures, States, and Relations. So that the Sinner is a Person of violent Practice, and one who doth unnatural Acts. And an Impenitent is one of a senseless and stupid Mind.

The Things that are the Bane of Mankind, and that do alienate us from God, are *Sensuality*, *Worldly-mindedness* and *Wickedness*. The two former of these do sink the Creation of God below itself; so that it doth not continue the same that God made it. A Man, by *these*, is rendred utterly unfit for Converse and Communication with God. For, by *these*, he sinks himself below his Kind, and makes himself equal to the Beast that perishes. And by the latter ([viz.] Wickedness) Man passeth into a clean contrary nature, becomes an Enemy to God, and makes God an Enemy to him.

Against Sensuality and Worldliness, I propose for Remedy, the Application of the Principles of Reason and Vertue, and the applying of our highest Faculties to their End and Object. For while the Mind is employed in heavenly Meditation, or in extracting spiritual Notions from material Things; it is employed worthy of intellectual Nature: And our proper Business is to be thus employed: By which the Concerns of the Body will be either laid aside, or moderately engaged in, and regarded. Whereas this Power of our Souls is, as it were lost, where Men use themselves as if they had no Spirits, but were altogether Body; or as if the Body were the principal or governing Part. And in such a Condition are they, who cannot understand what we mean when we bid them *lift up their Hearts to God*. For the Candle of God's lighting within them, whereby they are qualified to find God out in his Works, and to follow him in his Ways, either it burns so dim that they cannot see by it, or it is quite put out. For it is found by Experience, that the Malignity of the Heart doth blind the Understanding: And true Wisdom will never abide in a malicious and wicked Soul.—There are indeed Souls that are [so] active and so well acquainted with heavenly Meditation; that they very well know what is the Food of Souls, and have the Fore-taste of the Delight and Pleasure of the other

World. And certainly, these Men have the greatest Satisfaction in their Lives of any other Persons. For there is more Satisfaction in Meditation, in Reading, in Conference about Divine Things, in Application to God by Prayer, and other holy Exercises, than in any bodily Pleasure whatsoever. For all *bodily Exercise* comes off with Disquiet of Spirit: Whereas in the other Way there is Refreshment every Moment; there is new Acquisition: For if there be any thing like Infinite in the Creation under God, it is in Invention, and the Power of Thinking. This is the Advantage of *Intellectual Exercise*, above *Bodily Exercise*. The one works inwardly, is still on the getting hand, and is still in use; for what this Man gets, he hath still in Store; and that which is got in this way of intellectual Employment, will still improve by Use; and what we get, we always keep; for Knowledge is no burden: whereas in things of the Body, *use, and Want: Spend, and be ever after without*. But it is no wonder, that they who never acquainted themselves with retiring from the World, know not what these Things mean; who mind only worldly Things, and know no more than what belongs to the animal Life. But, on the other Side, if a Man make Application to God, he acts with all his Might; he recollects himself, and gathers himself into himself, that he may receive from God, what God hath to communicate. And the Things that God hath and doth offer, are so great and glorious, that our narrow Vessels had need be wholly emptied to make room for them.

Therefore the Minds Substraction from the World is necessary, by way of Preparation and holy Meditation, to beget in us such a Disposition, by which we may receive from God. A Man that can enjoy himself alone, by Consideration, and exercising his Faculties, may run thro', as it were, all times: For a Man may live *before* he lives, and *after*, in this way: He may, by reading, acquaint himself with what was in former Times; and by what

Things are, he may guess what are to come. If he reflect upon Things past, and view Things that are present, and take a Prospect of Things to come, as the Effect of Causes that are in being; in this way rational Faculties have sufficient Employment; whereas they that are always drudging in the Affairs of the World, and never enjoy themselves alone; will find little Satisfaction in these Things.

It is the proper Work of Reason in Man, to find God out in his Works, and to follow him in his Ways.

It is the proper Employment of our intellectual Faculties, to be conversant about God, to conceive aright of him; and then to resemble and imitate him. Religion is an Obligation upon us to God. The *first* Motion of Religion is to understand what is true of God: And the *second* is to express it in our Lives, and to copy it out in our Works. The *Former* is our Wisdom; and the *Latter* is our Goodness. In these two consist the Health and Pulchritude of our Minds. For Health to the Body, is not more, than Vertue is to the Mind. A depraved and vicious Mind is as really the Sickness and Deformity thereof, as any foul and loathsome Disease is to the Body. And as really as these tend to the Death and Dissolution of the Soul and Body; so the Vices of the Mind tend to the Separation of God and the Soul.

What is short and inferior to *Converse with God*, doth require a Recess from worldly Business and Employment. A Man can hardly compose an ordinary Poem without this: But for the noblest Employment *receiving from God*, and *making Acknowledgement to him*; is a Man fit for this, in the Hurry of Business, and Confusion of Things? It is also observed, that this Life of Privacy, and Retirement is either the best, or the worst Life: For, in it, we do as God doth; or we imitate the Devil. He who can be alone to his own Content, in Measure and Degree, is as God is: For what

other Employment had God from Eternity, but satisfying himself in his own Goodness? But as [this] may be *the best*; so it may be the worst Life: For a Man may be employed in contriving Mischief as the Devil is, whose Work is said to be to bring Men into Condemnation. If therefore [we are] alone to ill Purposes and Designs; then, Solitariness and Retirement do make the worst Life. [But] if [Man] be retired and alone, and not intellectually employed; then through Stupidity and Dulness, he sinks down into the State of a Beast: For take it for a certain Truth, to be *Well* and *Unactive* do not consist together. No Man is well without Action; nothing is more irksome than Idleness. A Man must use his Faculties, and put himself upon Action. Therefore, if he be alone and unactive, he cannot be well. In all honest Labour there is Satisfaction; whereas Sluggishness and Neglect are unaccountable, and unsatisfactory.

The Mind diverted from God, wanders in Darkness and Confusion: But being directed to him, soon finds its Way, and doth receive from him in a Way that is abstracted from the Noise of the World, and withdrawn from the Call of the Body; having shut the Doors of our Senses, to recommend ourselves to the Divine Light, which readily enters into the Eye of the Mind that is prepar'd to receive it. For there is Light enough of God in the World, if the Eye of our Minds were but fitted to receive it, and let it in. It is the Incapacity of the Subject, where God *is* not; for nothing in the World is more knowable than God. God only is absent to them that are indisposed, and disaffected: For a Man cannot open his Eye, nor lend his Ear, but every thing will declare more or less of God. It is our Fault that we are estranged from him: For God doth not withdraw himself from us, unless we first leave him: The Distance is occasioned through our unnatural Use of ourselves.

They who live the Life of Sense, are apt to be beaten off from all Regard to God, by those Occurrences that discompose their Minds. [But] they who are separated from Body, who sit loose to earthly Things [which] obstruct the Mind, do easily receive the Divine Light. Whereas those that are in Prison in gross Bodies, need the Fire of Divine Affection to quicken them. And this I understand in the Language of the Scripture, to be *Baptizing with Fire*, Mat. iii. 11. when Divine Affection burns up all contrary Principles in the Soul, and brings the Soul into a Likeness and Similitude to God. For, the Divine Light received into the Mind, doth first irradiate and clear the Mind from its gross and thick Darkness, whereby it was unexercised and unemploy'd about God: And this is the first Work; *Mental Illumination*; *raising right Notions of God, and Things in our Minds*; [scattering] the *Mists of Darkness*. [Yet] Light alone works not a Change: But there must be *holy Affection*. Knowledge is the *first* Step to Virtue: But [Goodness] is not but *by Delight and Choice*.

It is a mighty unequal and unaccountable Distribution of Time, for a Man to lay out himself for his Body; and to neglect his Mind, to feed the *Beast* (for so the Body [is], in respect of the Mind: [It] is but *the Beast* that carries the Soul :) And this for these Reasons: Because the Mind is so much annoyed and disturbed by Body: I speak not now of the Body, *as sinning and distemper'd*: But in ordinary Cases, take the Body in all its Advantages, 'tis an Incumbrance to the Mind: For when the Mind raiseth itself to Contemplation of immaterial Things; the Imagination doth suggest the Management of corporeal; which are things of an inferior Nature. Bodily Sense reacheth but a little Way, whether by the Eye, or by the Ear, or any other Sense. That which is equal, just, [and] fit; [that] wherein we are most concerned, in point of Goodness, Wisdom, and Happiness; these are all imperceptible Notions to every

Thing of *Body*. What is fit, what is just, what is equal, what is good and excellent, what is reasonable : of these no bodily Sense doth judge. And, yet, these are the Things that we are most concern'd in, upon account of our Happiness.

A Mind subdued and subordinate to God, in all its Actions and Motions, is as the sublunary Bodies here below, which are subject to the heavenly Bodies above ; as Wax under the Seal, or Clay in the Potter's Hand. The Motion is a great deal more noble and generous, because it is in a higher Order, by Illumination and Conviction, by Perswasion and mental Satisfaction ; but it is not less effectual to [its] Intent and Purpose. Religion puts the Soul in a right Posture towards God ; for we are thereby *renew'd in the Spirit of our Minds*. The Soul of Man to God is as the Flower to the Sun ; it opens at its Approach, and shuts when it withdraws. Religion in the Mind is as a Biass upon the Spirit, inclines it in all its Motions ; tho' sometimes it be jogg'd and interrupted, yet it comes to itself. It is a Rule within, a Law written in Man's Heart ; it is the Government of his Spirit. We say, Men shew their Spirit, by their Carriage, Behaviour and Words ; and it is true. The good Man is an Instrument in Tune ; Excite a good Man, give him an Occasion, you shall have from him savoury Speeches out of his Mouth, and good Actions in his Life. Religion contains and comprehends in it all good Qualities and Dispositions of Mind ; it doth take in all the Virtues that human Nature is capable of, which are the Qualifications and Ornaments thereof, and which are the Mind's Instruments for good Actions. Religion is rational, accountable, and intelligible : The Difference is not more sensible between a Man that is weak and strong, a Man that is sick and in Health, [than between a Man that is truly Religious, and one falsly so]. You may observe it, if you put them upon Action. So, a Man that is



truly Religious, if you put him in Motion, he will acquit and approve himself so: If he be false in his Religion, you will see it by his Failing and Miscarriage of Life.

Such is the Christian Religion, in respect of the Nature and Quality of it, all the Principles of it, all the Exercises and Performances that it puts Men upon; it is so sovereign to our Natures; so satisfactory to the Reason of our Minds; so quieting unto, and of such Security against the Molestations of our Consciences; so sanatory, so full for our Recovery, that none who knows, or doth seriously consider, would chuse to have his Obligation to Religion either released, cancell'd, or discharged.

To conclude, How inexcusable, how unaccountable are they who have turn'd the Doctrine of the Gospel, or *the Grace of God into Lasciviousness*; and to use St. Paul's Phrase, *have made void the Law through Faith*. He represents it as the most sad Miscarriage, to disoblige a Man in Morals; to set a Man at Liberty [as] to those things that are reasonable and necessary. For the Law of God's Creation is no way damnified, but restor'd, and secured by the Doctrine of the Gospel; yet these excuse themselves from strict Morality, and conscientious Living, which the better Sort of Heathens thought themselves obliged unto.

— We prejudice ourselves miserably by Mistakes. Some think that the hellish State is the Product of Omnipotency and Sovereignty, the Effect of God's Power; and they think of God, that he useth his Creatures *as he will*; giving no Account of any of his Matters to Principles of Reason and Righteousness. But certainly the Ways of God are most accountable of any thing, to Rules of Righteousness. These are injurious Apprehensions of God, and dishonourable to him; and are disclaimed by him every where in Scripture; and God owns no such Power; neither doth he look upon it as a *Privilege*; nor doth he clothe himself with such a Prerogative.—Here is the Truth of the Case: *Misery*

*doth arise out of ourselves*; and Misery and Iniquity have the same Foundation. Hell (for the main of it) is our Guiltiness and Conscience of it: So that a Sinner is in a self-condemned State, without Relief.—These *two* are the Ingredients of the hellish State; Self-condemnation from the Guilt of a Man's Conscience, that is not removed by Repentance; and God's Refusal upon a righteous Cause, because the Sinner would not come within the Latitude of a compassionate Case.

## THE WORK OF REASON

*Think on these Things.*—PHILIP. iv. 8.

I HAVE treated (as you know) of the several Perfections and Accomplishments that are charged upon us here by the Apostle upon account of Religion, and have given you an account what those things are that the Apostle doth recommend, as the necessary Qualifications and due Endowments of a Christian Spirit.

In the first place we had, *Whatsoever Things are true.* Religion requires Simplicity, Ingenuity, Sincerity, Integrity, Uprightness in our Profession.

2. *Whatsoever Things are grave, venerable, seemly, comely, honourable,* unto the Person. Religion requires good Behaviour, fair Deportment of our selves, such demeanour and carriage as may gain Reverence and Esteem, and bear off all Contempt and Disrespect.

3. *Whatsoever things are just or equal.* Religion holds us to Rules of Right; and if Equity require that which is better and exceeds Right, we are to do the thing that is equal, to consider all compassionate Cases as God does, to make allowance as far as Reason may require.

4. *Whatsoever Things are pure or holy.* A Person of Religion is truly devout; affected towards God, and the things wherein he may observe him and shew his regard towards him: He is no trifier nor dallier with God, nor a prophaner of holy Things.

5. *Whatsoever Things are lovely.* A Person of Religion is for the nobler and worthier part, in all competition of Things and Actions.

6. *Whatsoever Things are of good report.* A Person of Religion approves himself to all Rules and Laws of Reason and of Righteousness ; is irreprovable in the judgment of sober and impartial Men.

7. *If there be any Virtue.* Whatsoever Virtue there is, in account, or esteem, amongst Men ; A Person of Religion is prepared to all good Offices, he is for all good Purposes, he is a Person exercised in all the several Virtues and Accomplishments of Humane Nature ; he is baptized into, and sanctified by the Virtues, as the Moralists speaks.

8. And lastly, *If there be any Praise.* A Person of Religion employs himself in things that are commendable and praiseworthy. Of all these I have given you some Account.

And now here, upon the whole Matter he doth enjoyn them all together by superadding these Words, *Think on these Things.* The *English* Translation abates of the Emphasis that is in the Greek ; for if you read them according to the Greek, it is, *In the use of your Reason and Understanding think these things to be reasonable ;* use your own Faculties ; use Mind and Understanding, and you will be satisfied that all these things are worthy of you, and becoming you ; they will be suitable to your Reason.

A Person of Religion is, First, all this in his Judgment and internal Sense.

2dly, He is all this in his Temper, and the disposition of his Mind, the settled complexion and constitution of his Soul.

3dly. He is so in his Life and Practice, and in his whole Conversation with Men ; he is not only so now and then, and as we say, by fits and starts, on occasion, when he is specially engaged ; but the very Reason of his Mind is reconciled to the Rule and measure of Things and Actions.

Now this is that which I am to recommend to you, not

only that these things should have an Obligation upon you at some times, (for that is but dull), but that you should be reconciled to all these things in the Reason of your Minds, that these things should become natural to you, a Frame and Temper, a Complexion and Constitution of Soul. Apply these things to the Reason of your Minds, and you cannot but be convinced of the reasonableness of them ; for the Materials of Religion do exercise, teach, and satisfie.

That which is the Height and Excellency of Humane Nature, *viz.* our Reason, is not laid aside nor discharged, much less is it confounded by any of the Materials of Religion ; but awakened, excited, employed, directed, and improved by it : For the Mind and Understanding of Man, is that Faculty, whereby Man is made capable of God, and apprehensive of him, receptive from him, and able to make returns upon him, and acknowledgments to him. Bring that with you, or else you are not capable Receivers : Unless you drink in these Moral Principles ; unless you do receive them by Reason, the Reason of Things by the Reason of your Mind, your Religion is but shallow and superficial. For this you are to understand, that Man is a Compound of different things, hath several sorts of Faculties, above any Creature in this visible World. He hath an immortal Spirit, as well as a bodily Substance : And though the Spirit of Man in this State be joyned to a Body, and made a Member of this material visible World, yet it self doth belong to another Country. I say, a Man is a Compound of different and several things ; he hath several sorts of Faculties, which we are wont in our Philosophy to call his upper and his lower Powers ; and by these he doth converse with things of a very different order. By the higher Powers, he is able to converse both with God and things Spiritual and Cœlestial ; and by the lower Powers, with Terrene and Earthy. As to Instance :

By Mind, and Understanding, and Will, he hath intercourse and communion with God, and things invisible; and by these he is fitted to the improving all the lower Objects to Heavenly Ends and Purposes. But then, by Sense, Imagination and brutish Affection, we can only maintain Acquaintance with this outward and lower World. But by this Principle of Reason and Understanding, we are made capable of Religion. So that Man's peculiar Object and proper Business, is in things of the Mind; and therefore he ought to use those high Faculties of his Soul, to enquire after God, and find out Truth, and the Reason of Things; and consequently after such enquiry, to determine himself in his Resolution and Choice, to Things according to their intrinsick worth and value.

Two things here I say. 1<sup>st</sup>, No Man is born to be idle in the World: For tho' it is the privilege of some particular persons, that they who were born before them have provided for all Comforts, Necessities, and Conveniences of Life; so that they have enough to enjoy, with a Superfluity and abundance: Yet this I will say of all Men, and indifferently of all our Ancestors, that though they might acquire Inheritances and worldly Conveniencies, yet they could not acquire for, or leave to any of us, mental Endowments, no habitual Dispositions: But in respect of these 'tis true, that every body is Master of his own Fortune under God; Every Man hath himself, as he useth himself. He that by Motion upwards contemplates God, converses with things Spiritual and Immaterial, he doth fit himself more for attendance upon God, and converses with Angels and separate Souls; but he that through Brutishness and Sensuality sinks into this lower World, and lives to grow less, he will finally shrivel up and come to nothing.

Now here is that, which I recommend to you all; Work for the Mind; and this is that which is most peculiar and

proper to Humane Nature. No one is born to this, more than another : But if you will be intellectually improved, if you will be refined in your Spirits, refined in your Morals ; if you will be more than the *vulgus Hominum* ; you must set your selves in the ways of Reading, Meditation and Conference, and Self-reflection, and awaken your Intellectuals ; or else you shall come to nothing.

2. That which in the second place I superadd, is this : That the first Operation in Religion, is Mental and Intellectual, (*viz.*) Consideration, Discussion, Examination, Self-reflection, approving the Reason of Things to the Reason of our Minds as the proper Rule. This is a Notion worthy of your Consideration. In all Things of weight, in the great Points of Conscience, in the great Materials of Religion, there is a Reason in the Things, that doth enforce them, and enjoin them upon us, and require them of us. As, if I be God's Creature, stand in relation to him, am capable of him ; I am naturally and unavoidably under an obligation of Duty and Affection to him ; and I am bound to serve him, honour, and live in regard of him. Here is the Reason of the Thing ; And the Reason of your Mind is to find it out ; which a Beast cannot do ; therefore is incapable of Religion. But this is that which you are to do ; and there is no Religion but in this. I say, if so be a Man doth not admit what he receives, with satisfaction to the Reason of his Mind ; he doth not receive it as an intelligent Agent, but he receives it as a Vessel receives Water ; he is *continens* rather than *recipiens*. But this is the peculiarity of Humane Nature, that through the Reason of his Mind he may come to understand the Reason of Things : And this is that you are to do ; and there is no coming to Religion but this way. Wherefore they begin at the wrong end, who do not set themselves at first thus to work ; and so are not at all likely to hold out, or go on ; or if they



do continue to retain a certain Mode or way of Religion, they are not likely to bring any thing in Religion to perfection; For the Mind's Satisfaction and Resolution is the first and principal: And if we leap over this, and jump into a profession of Religion without this Consideration, Discussion, Examination, Self-reflection, and approving the Reason of our Minds to the Reason of Things as the proper Rule; we shall be ever lame in our way, and slight in our business. We shall not build upon a Rock; we shall not lay a solid Foundation. Our Saviour therefore bids us, before we engage to build a Tower, to sit down, consider, and recount whether we shall be able to finish it, *Luke* 14, 26, to the 32. For, assure yourselves, whatsoever is rashly begun, it uncertainly goes on, and foolishly deceives, either in Religion or any thing else.

Of all Impotencies in the World, Credulity in Religion is the greatest. This *Solomon* hath observed, that simple, weak, shallow Heads are foolish, and believe that which any one saith; sail with every Wind that blows. *Prov.* 14, 15. *The Simple believeth every word; but the prudent Man looketh well about him.* When a Man hath made a deliberate Act of Judgment in a Case, upon consideration of Reason, Grounds and Principles; he hath always ever after within him, whereby to encourage him to go on, and answer all Objections as they shall arise. Whereas he that begins not thus; upon all contrary appearances, he will be unsettled and unstable in all his ways: But the Person of Examination and Consideration, that begins upon Discussion, &c, and so comes to well-grounded Resolution; he is encouraged from the memory of the Motives that made him begin, the Motives that set him at work; and the prospect of the End at which he did aim, and which he did design, and which he hath also constantly in his Eye. But he that begins inconsiderately, he is so weak in his way, that there is little expectation

of his holding out. And truly this is a just account of all the shameful and horrid Apostacy of all formal Professors ; they did never weigh and examine, they did never reconcile their Religion to the Reason of their Minds ; so that really they have but an external Denomination from their Profession.

Man is not at all settled or confirmed in his Religion, until his Religion is the self-same with the Reason of his Mind ; that when he thinks he speaks Reason, he speaks Religion ; or when he speaks religiously, he speaks reasonably ; and his Religion and Reason is mingled together ; they pass into one Principle ; they are no more two, but one : just as the light in the Air makes one illuminated Sphere ; so Reason and Religion in the Subject, are one Principle.

To hold this forth more fully, I will lay it out in four Propositions.

*First*, It is Lowness and Imperfection in Religion, to drudge in it ; and every Man drudges in Religion, that takes up Religion as a Task, carries it as a Burden ; and doth it, because he must do it, or because his Superiours require it of him, or because time, and place, and custom calls for it ; because the Day requires it, or because it is such an Hour, because he is now up, or because he must now go to bed. If this be the best Motive a Man hath, his Religion is but a Burthen. But they who are come to any growth in Religion, are free spirited in it, and do it with inward Satisfaction, Pleasure and Content : They harmonize with it : They understand it is in it self best, and fit so to do ; and that it is also good in it self, and good for them ; worthy in respect of God, and becoming them in the relation they stand in to him ; tends to their Perfection, and will bring them to Happiness.

A Man hath this at least by his Religion, that if by accident he admits of Sin, he never does it with pleasure ;

he doth not, like the Ox, drink Iniquity like Water, as *Eliphaz* elegantly expresses it; But this is his Temper, and he hath *Joseph's* Resolution, *How can I do this great Wickedness and sin against God?* I say again, he hath this advantage by his Religion, that if by Temptation, by Surprise, or violent Assault, he happens to admit any evil, he doth it with displacency, he offends himself as well as God: And he hath a Principle within him of Self-recovery, viz. that which St *Paul* speaks of *Rom. 7, 23, the Law of his Mind*: So that, as Water, if it chance to be sullied, hath in it a Principle to work the Dregs to the bottom; so will this Man by Repentance and Ingenuity recover himself to his Innocency; And this is that which our Saviour means by *pure in Heart*; and in this he hath a convinced, satisfied Judgment, because he hath an internal Principle. The reason of his Mind is taught and illuminated; he is in this condemned in his own Conscience, and he will hasten to make his Peace with himself as well as with God.

And indeed I tell you by the way, it is a harder matter for a truly good Man, of honest Principles, to forgive himself, than to obtain forgiveness of God; though I make no question but that God, according to his Promise, doth presently forgive every true Penitent, if he go to God according to his direction.

I say in this case he is condemned of himself, and therefore he will hasten to set all things right and streight within himself, and be at peace with his own Mind; and that is by revocation of what was done amiss; by deprecating God's Displeasure, by asking God forgiveness, by crying him Mercy, by double Diligence and Watchfulness and Resolution never to do the like again.

*Secondly*, The Seat of Religion is the inward Man; it is first the sense of a Man's Soul, the Temper of his Mind, the *Pulse* of his Heart. You have always in intellectual

Nature, the elicit Acts, as we call them ; that is, mental and internal Acts ; and they always precede and go before imperate *Acts*, that is, external Acts. The elicit Acts of the Mind, they are first. It lies first *within the Mind* ; after that, it doth appear externally, in Speeches, Gestures, Actions, and the Effects of all good Self-government.

In rational and in all intellectual Nature, you have first that which we call the speech of a Man's Mind with it self ; the Mind doth parly with it self, debates the thing throughly ; then you have the Overt-Acts, and afterwards you have the Mind's Sense put into Language. This is the way of Operation in intellectual Natures, to speak with our selves before we speak with others ; and it doth not become us to make too much haste with the latter, before the former be over ; it is just as *Solomon* hath observed it, *Eccl. 10, 14. The Fool is full of Words, but the Wiseman is not so* ; at least he thinks before he speaks.

My *Third* Proposition is this, That in the state of Religion, Spiritualls and Naturalls joyn and mingle in their Subjects ; so that if a Man be once in a true State of Religion, he cannot distinguish between Religion and the Reason of his Mind ; so that his Religion is the Reason of his Mind, and the Reason of his Mind is his Religion. They are not two things now ; they do not go two several ways, but concur and agree ; they both run into one Principle, they make one Spirit, make one Stream. The Effects and Products of his Reason and Religion are the same, in a Person that is truly religious ; his Reason is sanctified by his Religion, and his Religion helps and makes use of his Reason : So that in the subject it is but one thing ; you may call it, if you will, religious Reason, and Reason made religious ; they are not divided or separated ; but the Union is more intimate and near, as these Principles are more Immaterial and Spiritual ;

whereas gross and material things keep at a distance, because of the impossibility of *penetration*.

*Fourthly* and lastly. Religion doth us great Service, great Pleasure both for Mind and Body.

1. For our Mind, immediately by its formal Presence and Residence.

2. For our Body, by the good Consequences that follow upon the Minds good Government.

In particular. Your Religion is the Mind's Health and good Temper, and it doth help to conserve the Bodies Strength: As for instance, Sobriety, Gentleness, Temperance, Meekness, Modesty, Humility, which are the materials of Religion; all these do spare and favour the Body: On the contrary, Pride, Arrogance, Haughtiness, Presumption, Fierceness, Intemperance, which are things contrary to Religion, these waste and spoil the Body. Also Faith and Affiance in God, Love of God, Goodness and Complacence with God, harmony with him, delight in him; these do maintain and keep up Mens Spirits; and you know Mens Spirits do strongly resist all manner of Disease: On the contrary, Male-content, Distrust, Despair, Diffidence, Sowness, Peevishness, Wrathfulness, Anger, Displeasure; these do hurt our Minds, spoil all our Mettle, and abate our Courage. Wherefore you see God hath given us Religion altogether for our advantage, not only for the future Estate, but also for the present: The Souls Safety, the Bodies better Security.

To go on further: How doth Malice, Envy, and purpose of Revenge, prey upon the Body, spend Mens Spirits? whereas they who live in Love and Good-will, are of gentle and quiet Spirits, they favour their Bodies; the Body is wasted under the former, but bodily strength is maintained under these. *Psal. 55, 23, The bloody and deceitful Men do not live out half their days.* And it is observed by Solomon, Prov. 3, 13. *Happy is the man that findeth*

*Wisdom*: Wisdom is Religion in his Sense. And *verse 16*, *Length of days are in her Right-hand, and in her Left-Hand Riches and Honour. Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are Peace.* Farther; in ways of Temperance there is Health, Strength, and long Life: Whereas the Licentious and Exorbitant Livers, they do load themselves with Distempers, and often die before the time. Wherefore *Solomon* advises, *Eccl. 7, 17. Be not over-much wicked, neither be thou foolish; why shouldest thou die before thy time?* Wherefore you see Religion is good for the Purposes of this Life, as well as for the State of Eternity.

I hasten now to a Conclusion, and will conclude with a double Exhortation.

*1st.* If you love your selves, either Bodies or Souls, acquaint your selves with Religion.

*2dly*, if you would be religious, be intelligent and rational in your Religion; or else your Religion may be only a denomination, and not sovereign to you.

*1st.* If you love your selves, either in respect of the present or future State, acquaint your selves with Religion.

*2dly.* If you meddle with Religion, be intelligent and rational in your Religion; study Religion till the Reason of your Minds receive Satisfaction; for till then you cannot account it your own, neither call it your own; neither hath it security and settlement in its Subject.

And till this be, Men will not be friendly to their Religion, they will not make it their Choice; but rather look upon it as their Exactor, their Tormentor, the Controuler of their Liberty: It will be a Taskmaster, they will carry it as their Burthen, which a Man will throw off as soon as he hath opportunity.

Now I dare undertake to shew, that all true Reason is for Religion, and nothing of Truth against it; and this I will shew thus. There are but two things that are sincere and solid, real and substantial in the World, *The*

*Reason of the Thing*, for the Rule ; and *the Reason of the Subject*, for the discerning Faculty. Now the *Reason of the Thing*, that is certainly for Religion ; and the Reason of the Thing is as infallible a Rule, and as certain as the Law of Heaven. For the Reason of the Thing, if it be in Institutes, it is according to the Revelation of the Divine Will ; and if it be in Necessaries, it is according to the Nature of God himself. In things depending upon Will and Pleasure revealed from God, it is according to the Divine Will ; In things that are in themselves necessary, it is according to the nature of God. Therefore the Reason of the Thing, that is certainly for Religion. Now the *Reason of the Subject*, either it is blind or byassed, prepossest or corrupted, if it be against it ; that for certain. Now if it be so, here is our great Challenge ; The Reason of the Thing, That is made to our hands ; the Use of our Faculties, that is to find it out. The Reason of the Thing, it is a Rule to the Reason of the Subject ; if it varies, it is to be rectified, corrected by the Rule. The Reason of the Thing is always for Religion ; if the Reason of the Subject is to comply with the Rule, then a Man's Reason and his Religion will accord and meet. If we be in the true use of Reason, we may see cause for what we do in the way of Religion ; but if we be ignorant, we are neither rational nor religious.

Where a Man hath not weighed and considered, searched and examined, he is no body. If he be rational, then he discerns the reason of the thing ; and the reason of the thing, if he comply with it, is Religion. Blind Presumption and Suspicion, are very sorry things, and have no place any where ; for Prepossession and Anticipation shew Men to be of a Party, but no true Discerners of Truth.

In the close of all, let me advise you to clear Understanding, true Perception, and right apprehensions of Things, that you charge your selves with upon account



of Religion: I would never advise a Man to be light of Faith in matters of Religion, or to run away with Suppositions, or dully to refer himself or compromise with any Party; but so far as he thinks Religion concerns him, let him take to himself leisure and opportunity; let him weigh and consider, and let him use his Faculties, as he may do: This is the direction in Religion; use your Reason so far as you may have perception of these things, and such a Sensation of them that you may receive satisfaction. If you do not do so, really you do not come within the compass of Religion. A Man may admit that which is a true Principle upon account of Religion; yet because he doth not receive it upon account of its own Evidence, Light and Truth, he doth not entertain that of Religion as a point of Religion; but he believes it as he believes a Story that he hears a Man tell, but never considers it whether it be true or false.

Religion is not a thing that can be made up of ignorant Well-meanings, or of fond or slight Imaginations, credulous Suspicion, or fond Conceit; such are the Suppositions of all Superstition; But of deliberate Resolutions, and diligent Searches into the Reason of Things, and into the rational Sense of Holy Scripture.

We have cause to give God thanks, that so far as Revelation is necessary to convey any thing by way of Superaddition to the Light of God's Creation; to the Principles whereof, God made us in the moment of his Creation; God hath not left us to vain Supposition, nor to the ungrounded guesses of fond Minds; but you have it clearly plainly, fully, satisfactorily laid down in Holy Scripture; so that Religion is the clearest and most self-evident thing in the World; But if a Man do not enquire into the Reason and Grounds of his perswasion; if he gives himself up to drudge in the World, and refer himself in his Religion to other Mens Sense, delivering himself

to a Party ; I will assure him he is not religious, not in that which he receives, though it may be materially true in Religion : For he doth not receive it as becomes a Disciple of Reason, much less of Religion ; for it might have been false, or the contrary, for any thing he knows ; and for the selfsame Reason that he admitted this as Truth, he might have admitted the contrary, if so be the Party, with which he doth compromise, had offered it.

The truly religious are not idle Bodies, but they do exercise themselves in the highest and noblest Employment ; and their work is to affect the inward Man ; and we are wont to say, that in competition the Body is nothing, it is but the Souls Mansion-House ; every Man's Mind is the Man.

I will conclude all in a few Words, to recommend Religion to the reason of your Minds.

1<sup>st</sup>. It doth relieve us in the case of the greatest Evils that we are in danger of ; and the greatest Evils we are exposed to, are the guiltiness of our Consciences, and malignity in our Minds.

2<sup>dly</sup>. Religion doth possess us of the truest inward Good.

3<sup>dly</sup>. It restores us to the object of our Happiness, and to our ultimate end.

*First*, Religion doth relieve us in respect of the greatest inward Evils that we are liable to, *viz.* guiltiness in our Conscience, and Malignity in our Minds ; which, if not removed, we must of necessity be miserable, as a Man must be miserable tho' he lie upon a Bed of Down, if he be sick and distempered, and cannot be cured of internal Malady. Now these two are internal Evils, that are greater than any other internal Evils in the World : A wound in the Conscience, guiltiness in the Mind ; the worm of Conscience, the sting of Sin ; these two are the Life of Hell. And then the other great Evil is Malignity,

Rancour, Malice and Poyson in the Mind ; And this marrs our Natures, spoils our Dispositions and Tempers, and puts us at a distance and abhorrence of God and Goodness, and makes us harmonize with the Devil and Sin. Now there is no way to be relieved in respect of these internal Evils but in the way of Religion, and by the Blood of sprinkling, for the cleansing our Consciences by way of attonement, and by the Operation of the Spirit, for the renewing, repairing and restoring our Natures : That's the *first*.

*Secondly*. It possesses us of the truest inward Good, and that in three Particulars.

1. Satisfaction to a Man's Mind ; and content, all the World will say, is one of the greatest Goods ; What is better to a Man, than his Mind's satisfaction ? And in the way of Religion, a Man's Mind is satisfied ; for he understands upon what Grounds and in what way ; And he sees before him, and knows what he is to trust to.

2. Religion is restaurative to the Nature of Man ; And what is more to any Man than to be internally whole ? If a Man hath an internal Disease, an internal Wound, or any inward Ulcer in his Mind ; to restore him to perfect health and strength, this is done in the way of Religion.

3. It is pacifying to a Man's Conscience : For what is more dreadful than the Torments of a Man's own Breast ? When a Man's Heart akes, though he be applauded and adored by By-standers, yet his Heart akes because of his Guilt ; he finds internal Wounds. He may fly from the World, but he cannot fly from himself ; *The wicked flees when no Man pursues* : And it is observed, That Guilt in a Man's Breast, is a Prophet that foretells future Evils ; *Art thou come to call my Sins to remembrance ?* But Innocency is stout, rises up in its own defense : But when a Man is faulty, his Heart will not serve him.

*Thirdly and lastly*, Religion restores us to the Object

of our Happiness, to our ultimate End. So saith the Psalmist, *Psalm 17, 15. I will behold thy Face in Righteousness: I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy Likeness.* We must be reconciled in Temper and Disposition, to the Nature, Mind and Will of God, and the Law of everlasting Goodness, Righteousness and Truth; or else it will come to what *Solomon* saith, *Can two walk together that are not agreed?*

Thus have I given you an account of this full and pregnant Scripture, that doth contract and epitomize our Religion, comprehends the Moral part of Religion, that which in part will make us like God; and if these things be received into a Temper, Complexion and Constitution of Soul, we shall become God-like, and partakers of the very Nature of God.

## MORAL AND RELIGIOUS APHORISMS

IF there be no Knowledge, there is no *Beginning* of Religion; if there be no Goodness, there is no *Sincerity* of Religion; but a Contradiction to it; by '*holding the Truth in Unrighteousness.*'

*Knowledge* alone doth not amount to *Virtue*; but certainly there is no *Virtue*, without *Knowledge*. *Knowledge* is the first *Step* to *Virtue* and *Goodness*: but *Goodness* is not without *Delight* and *Choice*.

It is the work and business of Religion, and of our Lives, to Reconcile the *Temper* of our Spirits to the *Rule* of Righteousness; and to incorporate the Principles of our Religion, into the *Complexion* of our Minds.

This is to be done, 1. By *searching* into the Nature of Things, and the Reason of our Duty; that our Judgment may be such, as to *approve* the Laws of our Religion: 2. By *practising* according to our right Apprehensions of things; till it becomes easy and delightful to us: 3. By *persisting* in this Course all our days; ever designing and meaning Righteousness; and ever retracting and correcting what is Unrighteous.

Did *Christians* live *according-to* their Religion; *They* would do nothing, but what Truth, Righteousness, and Goodness do; according to their Understanding, and Ability: and then one man would be a *God* unto another.

When the Principles of our Religion become the *Temper* of our Spirits, then we are truly religious; and the only way to make them become so, is, to reason ourselves into an Approbation of them: for nothing, which is the Reason

of Things, can be refused by the Reason of Man; when understood.

The *Rule* of Right is the Reason of Things; the *Judgment* of Right is the Reason of our Minds, *perceiving* the Reason of things.

Men have an itch rather to *make* Religion, than to *use* it: but we are to use our Religion; not to make it.

To use *Power*, to controul the Principles of Human Nature; (the Use of *Reason*, the Exercise of *Liberty*) is as strange a *Phænomenon*, as to cross or pervert the common Course of Natural Agents; to bring the Sun back again, or to make it fill the world with darkness. God does not this: if he did, he would contest with himself; his *Power* would rise-up against his *Wisdom*; and he would disparage and frustrate his own workmanship. Why should We think to do that, which God will not do—to over-bear *Reason* with *Violence*!

There is no solid Satisfaction; but in a mental Reconciliation with the Nature of God, and the Law of righteousness.

He that never *changed* any of his opinions, never *corrected* any of his Mistakes: and He, who was never *wise* enough, to find out any mistakes in Himself; will not be *charitable* enough, to excuse what he reckons mistakes in Others.

A man must *cultivate* his Mind, by enquiries after the Measures and Reasons of his duty; by Reconciliation of his Temper to those Measures, upon those Reasons: and he must cultivate his Life, by acting according to the Improvement of his Mind.

We are only so *Free*; that Others may be free, as well as We.

Those that *differ* upon Reason, may come together by Reason.

Conscience, without Judgment, is *Superstition*; Judgment without Conscience, is *Self-condemnation*.

Every man is Born with the *Faculty* of Reason, and the Faculty of Speech: but why should he be able to Speak, before he has any thing to say?

It is not to be expected, that *another* man should Think as I would, to please *me*; since I cannot think as I would, to please *myself*; it is neither in His nor My power, to think as we will; but as we see reason, and find cause.

To go against *Reason*, is to go against *God*: it is the self same thing, to do that which the Reason of the Case doth require; and that which God Himself doth appoint: Reason is the *Divine* Governor of Man's Life; it is the very Voice of God.

When the *Doctrine of the Gospel* becomes the Reason of our Mind, it will be the Principle of our Life.

If Reason may not *command*, it will *condemn*.

Reason *discovers* what is Natural; and Reason *receives* what is Supernatural.

Nothing is *worse* done than what is *ill* done for Religion. That must not be done, in the *Defence* of Religion, which is *contrary* to Religion.

I will not make a Religion for *God*: nor suffer any to make a Religion for *me*.

Nothing spoils human Nature more than false Zeal. The *Good-nature* of an Heathen is more God-like than the furious *Zeal* of a Christian.

Our Fallibility and the Shortness of our Knowledge should make us peaceable and gentle: because I *may* be Mistaken, I *must* not be dogmatical and confident, peremptory and imperious. I *will* not break the certain Laws of Charity, for a doubtful Doctrine or of uncertain Truth.

Certainly our *Saviour* accepts of no other Separation of *His Church* from the other part of the world than what is made by Truth, Virtue, Innocency, and Holiness of Life.

*Religion itself* is always the same: but Things *about Religion* are not always the same. These have not in them



the power or virtue of *Religion*, they are not of a sanctifying nature; they do not purify our Minds, as the things of a *Moral* nature do; so that Religion may stand without them.

A *Rule in Practice* is a Notion incarnate, made like to us.

Obligation to divine Truth is *Religious Liberty*; Obligation to the contrary error is *Superstitious Vassalage*.

There cannot be *Receiving Truth* in *Love*, where there is not receiving it in *Judgment*.

Vice is contrary to the Nature of Man, *as Man*; for it is contrary to the order of Reason, the peculiar and highest Principle in Man: nor is any thing *in itself* more unnatural or of greater Deformity in the whole world than that an Intelligent Agent should have the Truth of Things in his *Mind*, and that it should not give Law and Rule to his *Temper, Life* and *Actions*.

The *first* act of Religion is to *Know* what is True of God; the *second* act is to *Express* it in our Lives.

The *Moral* part of Religion never alters. Moral Laws are Laws *of themselves*, without Sanction by Will; and the Necessity of them arises from the Things themselves. All *other* things in Religion are *in Order to* These. The Moral Part of Religion does *sanctify* the Soul; and is *Final* both to what is Instrumental and Instituted.

*Hypocrites*, and men of carnal Spirits, desire *Abatement* in Morals; though they *Allow* for it in Rituals.

Truth is *connatural* to a man's Soul; and, in Conjunction with it, becomes the mind's Temper and Complexion and Constitution.

Religion doth not *destroy* Nature; but is built upon it.

Religion *in the Subject* is not a Notion; but the Frame and *Temper* of our Minds, and the *Rule* of our Lives: a man is not well *settled* in his Religion until it is become the self-same with the *Reason* of his Mind.

*Ignorance* is no Principle of any Action. No Ignorance can excuse *Immorality*, in any Instance whatsoever: but invincible Ignorance doth excuse *Infidelity*, in the chiefest Point.

*Ignorance* of mere *Institutes* may be invincible: because Institutes must be declared, by some Instrument of God; [by Revelation] whereof the party may have no notice: but, in *Morals*, we are *made* to know and judge and determine; and the light of God's Creation is sufficient thereto: So that *here* there is no invincible and consequently inculpable Ignorance.

It is the chiefest of Good Things for ■ Man to be *Himself*.

The *first* operation of *Truth*, in any Subject, is upon the Subject itself.

If you only *say*, you have ■ *Revelation* from God; I must have a Revelation from God too, before I can believe you: as St. *Peter* and *Cornelius*.

Heaven is *first* a Temper, and *then* a Place.

The longest Sword, the strongest Lungs, the most Voices, are false measures of *Truth*.

Let all *Uncertainties* lie by themselves, in the catalogue of Disputables; matters of *farther* inquiry: Let the *Certains* of Religion settle into *Constitution*; and issue in Life and *Practice*.

Truth is first in *Things*, and then the Truth is in our *Understanding*. Things give *Law* to Notion, and Apprehension.

Morals are inforced *by* Scripture; but were *before* Scripture: they were according-to the nature of God.

He that is full of him-*self*, goes out of company as wise as he came in.

*Sin* is an Attempt to *controul* the immutable and unalterable Laws of everlasting Righteousness, Goodness and Truth, upon which the Universe depends.

Fair construction and courteous Behaviour are the *greatest* Charity.

There is nothing more Unnatural to Religion than *Contentions* about it.

Things are greater than we, and will not comply with *us* ; we, who are less than Things, must Comply with *them*.

Reverence God in *thyself*: for God is *more* in the *Mind* of Man than in any part of this world besides ; for we (and we *only* here) are made after the Image of God.

That Faith, which is not a Principle of *Life*, is a Nullity in Religion.

That action is ill, wherein we lose our selves : and there is no *Recompense* for the loss.

The Laws of God are not *Impositions* of Will or Power and Pleasure ; but the Resolutions of Truth, Reason and Justice.

God is to us, according to our Capacity. *Objects* affect, as *Subjects* are capable.

That is good, as a *Means*, which doth promote the *End*. There is the *Religion* of the Means ; and there is the *Religion* of the End. There is *in* Religion, what is Instrumental ; and what is Final.

Nothing *without* Reason is to be *proposed* ; nothing *against* Reason is to be *believed* : Scripture is to be taken in a rational sense.

Fallibility is a *Reason* for Modesty.

A great *Faction* is many *Persons*, yet but one *Party* ; and that is but one *Opinion* : such a Faction is but one man, in point of *Judgment* : one free-spirited man is, in this particular, equal to a whole Faction.

The *Spirit* of a Man is the *Candle* of the Lord ; Lighted by God, and Lighting us to God. *Res illuminata, illuminans*.

The Sense of the *Church* is not a *Rule* ; but a thing *Ruled*. The Church is bound unto Reason and Scrip-

ture, and governed by them, as much as any *particular* Person.

Where there is a Principle of *Nature*, there will be Progress to Perfection ; unless there be the Impediment of Violence.

As great a mind as God hath to *Convert* Sinners, He never did *Force* them ; but doth *Persuade*, and deal with them according to the Principles of their Make.

To *Impose* what is Unreasonable is to Usurp upon the Creation of God.

Our *moral* actions are the foundation of our *future* condition.

Nothing is more *Spiritual* than that which is *Moral*.

He that believes what God saith, *without* Evidence that God says it, doth not believe *God*, while he believes the Thing, which comes from God.

Then you have hear'd a thing *often* enough, when what you have hear'd is pass'd into a Principle, and makes a Constitution of Mind, and is seen in Practice.

Determinations, *beyond* Scripture, have indeed *enlarged* Faith ; but lessened *Charity*, and multiplied Divisions.

*Some* are the *worse* for their Religion ; but such Religion is certainly bad. If this Notion be not understood and admitted ; 'that Difference of Opinion, in some matters about Religion, shou'd not make Difference in Affection ;' We shall *All* be the worse for our Religion.

Religion *is not* a Hear-say, a Presumption, ■ Supposition ; is not a customary Pretension and Profession ; is not an Affection of any Mode ; is not a Piety of particular Fancy ; consisting in some pathetic Devotions, vehement Expressions, bodily Severities, affected Anomalies and Aversions from the innocent Usages of others : *but* consisteth in a profound Humility, and an universal Charity.

*Several* Forms of words in Scripture express the *same* State, and so vary only the notion ; and *σχεσεις* differ not

materially ; but in Substance are the same. To stand upon nice and accurate Distinctions of them is needless ; useless ; since Scripture uses them *indifferently*. [Regeneration &c.] This is fit to be known ; to avoid troublesome multiplicity in Religion, and the possessing the minds of men with thoughts ; that Religion is more intricate and voluminous than indeed it is : whereas Truth lies in a *little* compass, and *narrow* room. *Vitals* in Religion are *Few*.

It is not *Morally* good to forbear the Use, or abandon the Possession, of what is *Naturally* good : *Mortification* is not denying our Bodies ; but denying our Lusts : Contempt of the World is not *Piety* ; but Contempt of those that have the World, is *Pride*. And indeed, Pride and Humility are not distinguished by Wealth and Poverty.

As Sin is a Vitiating the Reason of Man ; the Restauration must be by the Reason of God ; by Christ, ὁ λόγος.

How much *Easier* is it quietly to enjoy, than eagerly to contest ! How vastly *wiser* !

Allow for difference of *Temper*, before you consider the *Religion* of the party. The activity of Choler shou'd not have the esteem of Divine Zeal ; the mild Sanguine complexion shou'd not have the honor of Christian Meekness ; the black Melancholy shou'd not be condemned, for the heart of Unbelief ; the dullness of Phlegm shou'd not fall under the censure of Dead-heartedness towards God.

It is a great Performance, *Hoc agere* ; to mind and attend-to what we are about : He, who hath not a certain mark in his Eye, will shoot at Rovers. *Anima, quae ubique est, nullibi est* : He, that thinks of every thing, thinks of no thing. The most Buisy men make the least Riddance of Work. It is not within our measure and proportion to be good at every thing.

The Materiality of *Vice* is in the Complexion of the Body ; the Formality of *Vice* is in the Consent of the Mind.

The self-same thing in man is the *Matter* of *Virtue* and of *Vice*; when the Consent of the Mind is the *Form* of *Vice*, the Dissent of the Mind is the *Form* of *Virtue*; and *vice versa*. There was in Man's Nature, at the Creation, the Matter of *Vice*, as well as of *Virtue*; the one cou'd not have been, without the other: for the same thing is the Matter of either. And as this was in Man, so it was in the World: and the Matter of *Evil* is not *Evil*.

*Conscience* is God's Vice-gerent; Θεὸς ἐνοικὸς the God, dwelling within us.

To *lessen* the number of things *lawfull in themselves* brings the Consciences of men into Slavery, multiplies Sin in the world, makes the way Narrower than God has made it, occasions Differences among men, discourages Comers to Religion, rebuilds the Partition-Wall, is an Usurpation upon the Family of God, challenges successive Ages backward and forward, assigns New Boundaries in the world, takes away the opportunity of Free-Will Offerings.

It is a thing of the greatest Importance, upon what *Authority* we Believe.

Among *Politicians* the Esteem of Religion is profitable: the Principles of it are troublesom.

*Weigh* every matter of Religion, till the mind receives Satisfaction about it: God gives this Allowance; and will stay for Observance, in that particular, till it be done.

If you *See* not well, *Hear* the better; if you see not far, hear the more: the Consequence of Truth is *great*; therefore the Judgment about it must not be *negligent*.

The *state* of Religion, in it's Subject, consists of *three* parts; 1. the due Composure of the mind; it's calm and quiet Temper, it's settlement in Peace through the established Government of sober principles of Reason and Understanding over Sense and brutish Affection. 2. an universal Reconciliation with the whole Creation of God; particularly, a living in Concord and good Will with those

made in our Image and Likeness; a hearty and true Endeavor to promote and advance the general good of Mankind. 3. the Mind being united to God, by Faith and good Affection.

In worldly and material things, what is *Used* is spent: in intellectuals and spiritual things, what is not Used is not Had.

Men are in Thought and Apprehension such, as they are in Temper and Affection.

It is a wonder, any shou'd think; That *might* be done by Sacrifice, which *cou'd not* be done by mental Devotion. Nothing in Sacrifice cou'd be acceptable to God, but the *meaning* of the Sacrificer.

God hath rejected His *own* Institutions; when they have been made Final, put in competition with Morals, or made compensations for Morals—*Isa.* i. 11—17. lxvi. 3. *Mic.* vi. 7, 8. *Jer.* vii. 4, 5. *Amos* v. 21. *Isa.* lxiv. 6. *Rom.* xii. 1. *Eph.* v. 27. *Rev.* xix. 8. 1 *John* iii. 7, 8, 9. *Rom.* viii. 2. Institutes have their foundation in the *Will* of God; and the matter of them is alterable: Morals have their foundation in the *Nature* of God; and the matter of them is necessary and unalterable.

Take-away the *Self-conceited*; and there will be Elbow-room in the world. The Lesson given by Wisdom is *Ἐν ὁθισεαυρόν*, and none have learned it, but the Wise.

*Platonists'* principle of Creation, *Ἐρως* and *Πενία* the Activity of divine Love; the Non-entity of all Creatures. The grossest Errors are but Abuses of some noble Truths.

Some run *abroad*, to fetch nothing home: some are so ever *a-doing*, that nothing is done: some can not Do, for want of Thinking; and can not Think, for Thinking.

Some *speak*, only because they will not hold their Tongue: making Speech an End, not a Means. If we cannot Govern our tongues, we may Imprison them. *Ἐρκος ὁδόντων.*



He, that neither *knows* himself, nor thinks he can *learn* of others, is not Fit for Company.

No *Sign* can warrant our Belief, unless it be in conjunction with a Doctrine worthy of God.

Enthusiastic Doctrines—good things strained out of their Wits. Among Christians, those, that pretend to be *Inspired*, seem to be Mad: among the *Turks*, those, that are Mad, are thought to be Inspired.



A  
D I S C O U R S E  
Concerning  
The true WAY or METHOD  
of attaining to  
DIVINE KNOWLEDGE.

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Pfal. 3. 10.

*The Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom: a good Understanding have all they that doe his Commandments.*

John 7. 17.

*If any man will doe his Will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God——*

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*Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 3.*

Πῶς δέ ἐστι δυνατόν, ἡττηθέντα τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τῷ Κυρίῳ, ἢ γινῶσιν ἔχειν Θεοῦ; --

Θεοῦ δὲ γινῶσιν λαβεῖν τοῖς ἔτι ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἀγομένοις, ἀδύνατον——

Τὰ τῆς πολιτείας ἐλέγχει σαφῶς τοὺς ἐγνωκότας τὰς ἐντολάς. ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ δένδρον, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθῶν καὶ πετάλων, γνωρίζεται. ἡ γινῶσις οὖν ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἄνθους.



# A PRAEFATORY DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

THE TRUE WAY OR METHOD OF ATTAINING

TO

## DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

Section I. *That Divine things are to be understood rather by a Spiritual Sensation than a Verbal Description, or meer Speculation. Sin and Wickedness prejudicial to True Knowledge. That Purity of Heart and Life, as also an Ingenuous Freedom of Judgment, are the best Grounds and Preparations for the Entertainment of Truth.*

Sect. II. *An Objection against the Method of Knowing laid down in the former Section, answered. That Men generally, notwithstanding their Apostasie, are furnished with the Radical Principles of True Knowledge. Men want not so much Means of knowing what they ought to doe, as Wills to doe what they know. Practical Knowledge differs from all other Knowledge, and excells it.*

Sect. III. *Men may be consider'd in a Fourfold capacity in order to the perception of Divine things. That the Best and most excellent Knowledge of Divine things belongs onely to the true and sober Christian; and That it is but in its infancy while he is in this Earthly Body.*

### SECTION I.

It hath been long since well observed, That every Art and Science hath some certain Principles upon which the whole Frame and Body of it must depend; and he that will fully acquaint himself with the Mysteries thereof, must come furnisht with some *Praecognita* or προλήψεις, that I may speak in the language of the *Stoicks*. Were I indeed

to define *Divinity*, I should rather call it ■ *Divine life*, then a *Divine science*; it being something rather to be understood by a *Spiritual sensation*, then by any *Verbal description*, as all things of Sense and Life are best known by Sentient and Vital faculties; γνῶσις ἐκάστων δι' ὁμοιότητος γίνεται, as the Greek Philosopher hath well observed, Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogie with it: and therefore the Scripture is wont to set forth a *Good life* as the *Prolepsis* and Fundamental principle of *Divine Science*; *Wisdom hath built her an house, and hewen out her seven pillars*: But the fear of the Lord is ראשית חכמה the beginning of wisdom, the Foundation of the whole fabrick.

We shall therefore, as a *Prolegomenon* or Preface to what we shall afterward discourse upon the Heads of Divinity, speake something of this *True Method of Knowing*, which is not so much by *Notions* as *Actions*; as Religion it self consists not so much in *Words* as *Things*. They are not alwaies the best skill'd in Divinity, that are the most studied in those *Pandects* which it is sometimes digested into, or that have erected the greatest Monopolies of Art and Science. He that is most *Practical* in Divine things, hath the purest and sincerest Knowledge of them, and not he that is most *Dogmatical*. Divinity indeed is a true Efflux from the Eternal light, which, like the Sun-beams, does not only enlighten, but heat and enliven; and therefore our Saviour hath in his *Beatitudes* connext Purity of heart with the Beatifical Vision. And as the Eye cannot behold the Sun, ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γινόμενος (Plotin. *En.* 1. 6. 9), unless it be *Sunlike*, and hath the form and resemblance of the Sun drawn in it; so neither can the Soul of man behold God, θεοειδὴς μὴ γινομένη, unless it be *Godlike*, hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of the Divine Nature. And the Apostle S. *Paul*, when he would lay open the right way of attaining to Divine Truth, he saith that *Knowledge puffeth up*, but it

is *Love that edifieth*. The knowledge of Divinity that appears in *Systems* and *Models* is but a poor wan light, but the powerful energy of Divine knowledge displaies it self in purified Souls: here we shall finde the true *πεδίον ἀληθείας*, as the antient Philosophy speaks, *the land of Truth*.

To seek our Divinity meerly in Books and Writings is *to seek the living among the dead*: we doe but in vain seek God many times in these, where his Truth too often is not so much *enshrin'd*, as *entomb'd*: no; *intra te quære Deum*, seek for God within thine own soul; he is best discern'd *νοεῖν ἐπαφῇ*, as *Plotinus* phraseth it, by an *Intellectual touch* of him: we must see *with our eyes*, and hear *with our ears*, and our hands must handle the word of life, that I may express it in *S. John's* words. Ἔστι καὶ ψυχῆς αἰσθησίς τις, The Soul it self hath its sense, as well as the Body: and therefore *David*, when he would teach us how to know what the Divine Goodness is, calls not for *Speculation* but *Sensation*, *Tast and see how good the Lord is*. That is not the best and truest knowledge of God which is wrought out by the labour and sweat of the Brain, but that which is kindled within us by an heavenly warmth in our Hearts. As in the natural Body it is the Heart that sends up good Blood and warm Spirits into the Head, whereby it is best enabled to its several functions; so that which enables us to know and understand aright in the things of God, must be a living principle of Holiness within us. When *the Tree of Knowledge* is not planted by *the Tree of Life*, and sucks not up sap from thence, it may be as well fruitful with *evil* as with *good*, and bring forth *bitter* fruit as well as *sweet*. If we would indeed have our Knowledge thrive and flourish, we must water the tender plants of it with Holiness. When *Zoroaster's* Scholars asked him what they should doe to get *winged Souls*, such as might soar aloft in the bright beams of



Divine Truth, he bids them bathe themselves in *the waters of Life*: they asking what they were; he tells them, *the four Cardinal Vertues*, which are *the four Rivers of Paradise*. It is but a thin, aiery knowledge that is got by meer Speculation, which is usher'd in by Syllogisms and Demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true Goodness, is *θειότερόν τι πάσης ἀποδείξεως*, as *Origen* speaks, it brings such a Divine light into the Soul, as is more clear and convincing then any Demonstration. The reason why, notwithstanding all our acute reasons and subtile disputes, Truth prevails no more in the world, is, we so often disjoyn *Truth* and true *Goodness*, which in themselves can never be disunited; they grow both from the same Root, and live in one another. We may, like those in *Plato's* deep pit with their faces bended downwards, converse with *Sounds* and *Shadows*; but not with the *Life* and *Substance* of Truth, while our Souls remain defiled with any vice or lusts. These are the black *Lethe-lake* which drench the Soules of men: he that wants true Vertue, in heavn's Logick *is blind, and cannot see afar off* (2 *Pet.* 1. 9). Those filthy mists that arise from impure and terrene minds, like an *Atmospheare*, perpetually encompass them, that they cannot see that Sun of Divine Truth that shines *about* them, but never shines *into* any *unpurged* Souls; the darkness comprehends it not, the foolish man understands it not. All the Light and Knowledge that may seem sometimes to rise up in unhallowed mindes, is but like those fuliginous flames that arise up from our culinary fire, that are soon quench'd in their own smoak; or like those foolish fires that fetch their birth from terrene exudations, that doe but hop up and down, and flit to and fro upon the surface of this earth where they were first brought forth; and serve not so much to enlighten, as to delude us; nor to direct the wandring traveller into his way, but to lead him farther out of it. While we lodge any filthy vice in us, this will be perpetually

twisting up it self into the thread of our finest-spun Speculations; it will be continually climbing up into the τὸ Ἡγεμονικόν, the *Hegemonically* powers of the Soul, into the bed of Reason, and defile it: like the wanton Ivie twisting it self about the Oak, it will twine about our Judgments and Understandings, till it hath suck'd out the Life and Spirit of them. I cannot think such black oblivion should possess the Mindes of some as to make them question that Truth which to Good men shines as bright as the Sun at noon-day, had they not foully defil'd their own Souls with some hellish vice or other, how fairly soever it may be they may dissemble it. There is a benumbing Spirit, a congealing Vapour that ariseth from Sin and Vice, that will stupifie the senses of the Soul; as the Naturalists say there is from the *Torpedo* that smites the senses of those that approach to it. This is that venomous *Solanum*, that deadly *Nightshade*, that derives its cold poyson into the Understandings of men.

Such as Men themselves are, such will God himself seem to be. It is the Maxim of most wicked men, That the Deity is some way or other like themselves: their Souls doe more then whisper it, though their lips speak it not; and though their tongues be silent, yet their lives cry it upon the house-tops, and in the publick streets. That *Idea* which men generally have of God is nothing else but the picture of their own Complexion: that Archetypall notion of him which hath the supremacie in their mindes, is none else but such an one as hath been shap'd out according to some pattern of themselves; though they may so cloathe and disguise this Idol of their own, when they carry it about in a pompous Procession to expose it to the view of the world, that it may seem very beautiful, and indeed any thing else rather then what it is. Most men (though it may be they themselves take no great notice of it) like that dissembling Monk, doe *aliter sentire in Scholis, aliter in*

*Musæis*, are of a different judgment in the Schools from what they are in the retirements of their private closets. There is a *double head*, as well as a *double heart*. Mens corrupt hearts will not suffer their notions and conceptions of divine things to be cast into that form that an higher Reason, which may sometime work within them, would put them into.

I would not be thought all this while to banish the belief of all *Innate notions* of Divine Truth: but these are too often smother'd, or tainted with a deep dye of mens filthy lusts. It is but *lux sepulta in opaci materia*, light buried and stifled in some dark body, from whence all those colour'd, or rather discolour'd, notions and apprehensions of divine things are begotten. Though these *Common notions* may be very busie somtimes in the *vegetation* of divine Knowledge; yet the corrupt vices of men may so clog, disturb and overrule them, (as the Naturalists say this unruly and masterless *matter* doth the natural *forms* in the formation of living creatures) that they may produce nothing but Monsters miserably distorted and misshapen. This kind of Science, as *Plotinus* speaks, τῷ ὕλικῷ πολλῷ συνοῦσα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν εἰσδεξαμένη, εἶδος ἕτερον ἡλλάξατο κράσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, *companying too familiarly with Matter, and receiving and imbibing it into it selfe, changeth its shape by this incestuous mixture*. At best, while any inward lust is harboured in the minds of men, it will so weaken them, that they can never bring forth any masculine or generous knowledge; as *Ælian* observes of the Stork, that if the Night-owle chanceth to sit upon her eggs, they become presently as it were ὑπηνέμια, and all incubation rendred impotent and ineffectual. Sin and lust are alway of an hungry nature, and suck up all those vital affections of mens Souls which should feed and nourish their Understandings.

What are all our most sublime Speculations of the Deity, that are *not impregnated with true Goodness*, but insipid

things that have no tast nor life in them, that do but swell like empty froath in the souls of men? They doe not feed mens souls, but onely puffe them up and fill them with Pride, Arrogance and Contempt and Tyrannie towards those that cannot well ken their subtile Curiosities: as those Philosophers that *Tully* complains of in his times, *qui disciplinam suam ostentationem scientiæ, non legem vitæ, putabant*, which made their knowledge onely matter of ostentation, to venditate and set off themselves, but never caring to square and govern their lives by it. Such as these doe but Spider-like take a great deal of pains to spin a worthless web out of their own bowels, which will not keep them warm. These indeed are those silly Souls that are *ever learning, but never come to the knowledge of the Truth*. They may, with *Pharaoh's* lean kine, eat up and devoure all Tongues and Sciences, and yet when they have done, still remain lean and ill-favour'd as they were at first. Jeune and barren Speculations may be hovering and fluttering up and down about Divinity, but they cannot settle or fix themselves upon it: they unfold the Plicatures of Truth's garment, but they cannot behold the lovely face of it. There are hidden Mysteries in Divine Truth, wrapt up one within another, which cannot be discern'd but onely by divine *Epoptists*.

We must not think we have then attained to the *right knowledge* of Truth, when we have broke through the *outward Shell* of words and *phrases* that house it up; or when by a *Logical Analysis* we have found out the dependencies and coherencies of them one with another; or when, like stout champions of it, having well guarded it with the invincible strength of our Demonstration, we dare stand out in the face of the world, and challenge the field of all those that would pretend to be our Rivalls.

We have many Grave and Reverend Idolaters that worship Truth onely in the Image of their own Wits; that

could never adore it so much as they may seem to doe, were it any thing else but such a Form of Belief as their own wandering speculations had at last met together in, were it not that they find their own image and superscription upon it.

There is a *knowing of the truth as it is in Jesus*, as it is in a *Christ-like nature*, as it is in that sweet, mild, humble, and loving Spirit of Jesus, which spreads itself like a Morning-Sun upon the Soules of good men, full of light and life. It profits little to know Christ himself after the flesh ; but he gives his Spirit to good men, that searcheth the deep things of God. There is an inward beauty, life and loveliness in Divine Truth, which cannot be known but onely then when it is digested into life and practice. The Greek Philosopher could tell those high-soaring *Gnosticks* that thought themselves no less then *Jovis alites*, that could (as he speaks in the Comedy) ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ περιφρονεῖν τὸν ἥλιον, and cried out so much βλέπε πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, *look upon God*, that ἀνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον, *Without Vertue and real Goodness God is but a name*, a dry and empty Notion. The profane sort of men, like those old Gentile Greeks, may make many ruptures in the walls of God's Temple, and break into the holy ground, but yet may finde God no more there then they did.

Divine Truth is better understood, as it unfolds itself in the purity of mens hearts and lives, then in all those subtil Niceties into which curious Wits may lay it forth. And therefore our Saviour, who is the great Master of it, would not, while he was here on earth, draw it up into any *Systeme* or *Body*, nor would his Disciples after him ; He would not lay it out to us in any *Canons* or *Articles* of *Belief*, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the World with Opinions and Notions, as with true Piety, and a Godlike pattern of purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope

was to promote an *Holy life*, as the best and most commendous way to a *right Belief*. He hangs all true acquaintance with Divinity upon the doing Gods will, *If any man will doe his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God*. This is that alone which will make us, as *S. Peter* tells us, that we shall not be *barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour*. There is an inward sweetness and deliciousness in divine Truth, which no sensual minde can tast or relish: this is that ψυχικὸς ἀνὴρ, that *natural man* that savours not the things of God. Corrupt passions and terrene affections are apt of their own nature to disturb all serene thoughts, to precipitate our Judgments, and warp our Understandings. It was a good Maxime of the old Jewish Writers, רוּחַ הַקֹּדֶשׁ לֹא שָׂרָה בְּעַצֵּב ולא בְּכַעַשׁ the Holy Spirit dwells not in terrene and earthly passions. Divinity is not so well perceiv'd by a subtile wit, ὥσπερ αἰσθάνηται κεκαθαρμένη as by a *purified sense*, as *Plotinus* phraseth it.

Neither was the antient Philosophy unacquainted with this Way and Method of attaining to the knowledge of Divine things; and therefore *Aristotle* himself (*Eth. Nic.* l. 1. 1) thought a Young man unfit to meddle with the grave precepts of Morality, till the heat and violent precipitancy of his youthful affections was cool'd and moderated. And it is observed of *Pythagoras*, that he had several waies to try the capacity of his Scholars, and to prove the *sedateness* and *Moral* temper of their minds, before he would entrust them with the sublimer Mysteries of his Philosophy. The *Platonists* were herein so wary and solicitous, that they thought the Mindes of men could never be purg'd enough from those earthly dregs of Sense and Passion, in which they were so much steep'd, before they could be capable of their divine *Metaphysicks*: and therefore they so much sollicite a χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, as they are wont to phrase it, a *separation from the Body*, in all those that

would καθαρῶς φιλοσοφεῖν, as *Socrates* speaks, that is indeed, sincerely understand Divine Truth ; for that was the scope of their Philosophy. This was also intimated by them in their defining Philosophy to be μελέτη θανάτου a *Meditation of Death* ; aiming herein at onely a *Moral* way of *dying*, by loosening the Soul from the Body and this Sensitive life ; which they thought was necessary to a right Contemplation of Intelligible things : and therefore besides those ἀρεταὶ καθαρτικαί by which the Souls of men were to be separated from sensuality and purged from fleshly filth, they devised a further way of *Separation* more accommodated to the condition of Philosophers, which was their *Mathemata*, or Mathematical Contemplations, whereby the Souls of men might farther shake off their dependency upon Sense, and learn to go as it were alone, without the crutch of any Sensible or Material thing to support them ; and so be a little inur'd, being once got up above the Body, to converse freely with Immaterial natures, without looking down again and falling back into Sense. Besides many other waies they had, whereby to rise out of this dark Body ; ἀναβάσεις ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου, as they are wont to call them, several steps and ascents out of this miry cave of mortality, before they could set any sure footing with their Intellectual part in the land of Light and Immortal Being.

And thus we should pass from this Topick of our Discourse, upon which we have dwelt too long already, but that before we quite let it goe, I hope we may fairly make this use of it farther (besides what we have openly driven at all this while) which is, To learn not to devote or give up our selves to any private Opinions or Dictates of men in matters of Religion, nor too zealously to propugne the *Dogmata* of any Sect. As we should not like rigid Censurers arraign and condemn the Creeds of other men which we comply not with, before a full and mature understanding



of them, ripened not onely by the natural sagacity of our own Reasons, but by the benign influence of holy and mortified Affection : so neither should we over-hastily *credere in fidem alienam*, subscribe to the Symbols and Articles of other men. They are not alwaies the *Best* men that blot most paper ; Truth is not, I fear, so Voluminous, nor swells into such a mighty bulk as our Books doe. Those mindes are not alwaies the most chaste that are most parturient with these learned Discourses, which too often bear upon them a foule stain of their unlawfull propagation. A bitter juice of corrupt affections may sometimes be strain'd into the inke of our greatest Clerks, their Doctrines may taste too sowre of the cask they come through. We are not alwaies happy in meeting with that wholesome food (as some are wont to call the Doctrinal-part of Religion) which hath been dress'd out by the cleanest hands. Some men have too *bad hearts* to have *good heads* : they cannot be good at Theorie who have been so bad at the Practice, as we may justly fear too many of those from whom we are apt to take the Articles of our Belief have been. Whilst we plead so much our right to the patrimony of our Fathers, we may take too fast a possession of their Errors as well as of their sober opinions. There are *Idola specus*, Innate Prejudices, and deceitfull *Hypotheses*, that many times wander up and down in the Mindes of good men, that may flie out from them with their graver determinations. We can never be well assur'd what our *Traditional* Divinity is ; nor can we securely enough addict our selves to any Sect of men. That which was the Philosopher's motto, Ἐλεύθερον εἶναι δεῖ τῇ γνώμῃ τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφεῖν, we may a little enlarge, and so fit it for an ingenuous pursuer after divine Truth : He that will finde Truth, must seek it with a *free judgment*, and a *sanctified minde* : he that thus seeks, shall finde ; he shall live in Truth, and that shall live in him ; it shall be like a stream of living waters issuing out of

his own Soule; he shall drink of the waters of his own cisterne, and be satisfied; he shall every morning finde this Heavenly *Manna* lying upon the top of his own Soule, and be fed with it to eternal life; he will finde satisfaction within, feeling himself in conjunction with Truth, though all the World should dispute against him.

## SECTION II.

AND thus I should again leave this Argument, but that perhaps we may all this while have seemed to undermine what we intend to build up. For if Divine Truth spring onely up from the Root of true Goodness; how shall we ever endeavour to be good, before we know what it is to be so? or how shall we convince the gainsaying world of Truth, unless we could also inspire Vertue into it?

To both which we shall make this Reply, That there are some *Radical Principles* of Knowledge that are so deeply sunk into the Souls of men, as that the Impression cannot easily be obliterated, though it may be much darkned. Sensual baseness doth not so grosly sully and bemire the Souls of all Wicked men at first, as to make them with *Diagoras* to deny the *Deity*, or with *Protagoras* to doubt of, or with *Diodorus* to question the *Immortality* of Rational Souls. Neither are the *Common Principles* of Vertue so pull'd up by the roots in all, as to make them so dubious in stating the bounds of Vertue and Vice as *Epicurus* was, though he could not but sometime take notice of them. Neither is the *Retentive power* of Truth so weak and loose in all *Scepticks*, as it was in him, who being well scourg'd in the streets till the blood ran about him, question'd when he came home, whether he had been beaten or not. *Arrianus* hath well observed, That the *Common Notions* of *God* and *Vertue* imprest upon the Souls of men, are more clear and perspicuous then any else; and that if they have not more *certainty*, yet have they more *evidence*,

and display themselves with less difficulty to our *Reflexive* Faculty then any Geometrical Demonstrations: and these are both availeable to prescribe out waies of Vertue to mens own souls, and to force an acknowledgment of Truth from those that oppose, when they are well guided by a skilfull hand. Truth needs not any time flie from Reason, there being an Eternal amitie between them. They are onely some private *Dogmata*, that may well be suspected as spurious and adulterate, that dare not abide the tryall thereof. And this Reason is not every where so extinguish'd, as that we may not by that enter into the Souls of men. What the *Magnetical* virtue is in these earthly Bodies, that Reason is in mens Mindes, which when it is put forth, draws them one to another. Besides in wicked men there are sometimes Distasts of Vice, and Flashes of love to Vertue; which are the Motions which spring from a true Intellect, and the faint struglings of an Higher life within them, which they crucifie again by their wicked Sensuality. As Truth doth not alwaies act in good men, so neither doth Sense alwaies act in wicked men: they may sometimes have their *lucida intervalla*, their sober fits; and a Divine spirit blowing and breathing upon them may then blow up some live sparks of true Understanding within them; though they may soon endeavour to quench them again, and to rake them up in the ashes of their own earthly thoughts.

All this, and more that might be said upon this Argument, may serve to point out the *Way of Vertue*. We want not so much *Means* of knowing what we ought to doe, as *Wills* to doe that which we may know. But yet all that Knowledge which is separated from an inward acquaintance with Vertue and Goodness, is of a far different nature from that which ariseth out of a true *living sense* of them, which is the *best discerner* thereof, and by which alone we know the true Perfection, Sweetness, Energie, and Loveliness

of them, and all that which is οὔτε ῥητόν, οὔτε γραπτόν, that which can no more be known by a naked Demonstration, then Colours can be perceived of a blinde man by any Definition or Description which he can hear of them.

And further, the clearest and most distinct Notions of Truth that shine in the Souls of the common sort of men, may be extreemly clouded, if they be not accompanied with that answerable practice that might preserve their integrity: These tender Plants may soon be spoyl'd by the continual droppings of our corrupt affections upon them; they are but of a weak and feminine nature, and so may be sooner deceived by that wily Serpent of Sensuality that harbours within us.

While the Soul is πλήρης τοῦ σώματος, *full of the Body*, while we suffer those *Notions* and *Common Principles* of Religion to lie asleep within us; that γενεσιουργὸς δύναμις, *the power of an Animal life*, will be apt to incorporate and mingle it self with them; and that Reason that is within us, as *Plotinus* hath well express'd it, becomes more and more σύμφυτος κακαῖς ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις δόξαις, it will be infected with those evil Opinions that arise from our Corporeal life. The more deeply our Souls dive into our Bodies, the more will Reason and Sensuality run one into another, and make up a most dilute, unsavourie, and muddie kinde of Knowledge. We must therefore endeavour more and more to withdraw our selves from these Bodily things, to set our Souls as free as may be from its miserable slavery to this base Flesh: we must shut the Eyes of Sense, and open that brighter Eye of our Understandings, that other Eye of the Soul, as the Philosopher calls our Intellectual Faculty, ἣν ἔχει μὲν πᾶς, χρῶνται δὲ ὀλίγοι, *which indeed all have, but few make use of it*. This is the way to see clearly; the light of the Divine World will then begin to fall upon us, and those sacred ἐλλάμψεις, those pure *Coruscations* of Immortal and

Ever-living Truth will shine out into us, and in Gods own light shall we behold him. The fruit of this Knowledge will be sweet to our tast, and pleasant to our palates, sweeter then the hony or the hony-comb. The Priests of *Mercury*, as *Plutarch* tells us, in the eating of their holy things, were wont to cry out γλυκὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, *Sweet is Truth*. But how sweet and delicious that Truth is which holy and heaven-born Souls feed upon in their mysterious converses with the Deity, who can tell but they that tast it? When *Reason* once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit into a converse with God, it is turn'd into *Sense*: That which before was onely *Faith* well built upon sure Principles, (for such our *Science* may be) now becomes *Vision*. We shall then converse with God τῷ νῷ, whereas before we convers'd with him onely τῇ διανοίᾳ, with our *Discursive faculty*, as the *Platonists* were wont to distinguish. Before we laid hold on him onely λόγῳ ἀποδεικτικῷ, with a struggling, Agonistical, and contentious Reason, hotly combating with difficulties and sharp contests of divers opinions, and labouring in it self, in its deductions of one thing from another; we shall then fasten our minds upon him λόγῳ ἀποφαντικῷ, with such a *serene* Understanding, γαλήνῃ νοεῖᾳ, such an *Intellectual calmness* and serenity as will present us with a blissful, steady, and invariable sight of him.

### SECTION III.

AND now if you please, setting aside the *Epicurean* herd of Brutish men, who have drowned all their own sober Reason in the deepest *Lethe* of Sensuality, we shall divide the rest of Men into these Four ranks, according to that Method which *Simplicius* upon *Epictetus* hath already laid out to us, with a respect to a Fourfold kinde of Knowledge, which we have all this while glanced at.

The First whereof is Ἄνθρωπος συμπεφυρμένος τῇ γενέσει,

or, if you will, ἄνθρωπος ὁ πολὺς, that *Complex and Multifarious man* that is made up of Soul and Body, as it were by a just equality and Arithmetical proportion of Parts and Powers in each of them. The knowledge of these men I should call ἀμυδρὸν δόξαν, in *Plutarch's* phrase; a Knowledge wherein Sense and Reason are so twisted up together, that it cannot easily be unravel'd, and laid out into its first principles. Their highest Reason is ὁμόδοξος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, complying with their senses, and both conspire together in vulgar opinion. To these that Motto which the *Stoicks* have made for them may very well agree, βίος ὑπόληψις, their *life* being steer'd by nothing else but *Opinion* and *Imagination*. Their higher notions of God and Religion are so entangled with the Birdlime of fleshly Passions and mundane Vanity, that they cannot rise up above the surface of this dark earth, or easily entertain any but earthly conceptions of heavenly things. Such Souls as are here lodg'd, as *Plato* speaks, are ὀπισθοβαρεῖς, *heavy behinde*, and are continually pressing down to this world's centre: and though, like the Spider, they may appear sometime moving up and down aloft in the aire, yet they doe but sit in the loome, and move in that web of their own gross fansies, which they fasten and pin to some earthly thing or other.

The Second is Ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν ζωὴν οὐσιωμένος, The man that looks at himself as being what he is rather by his Soul than by his Body; that thinks not fit to view his own face in any other Glass but that of Reason and Understanding; that reckons upon his *Soul* as that which was made *to rule*, his *Body* as that which was born *to obey*, and like an handmaid perpetually to wait upon his higher and nobler part. And in such an one the *Communes notitiæ*, or common Principles of Vertue and Goodness, are more clear and steady. To such an one we may allow τρανεστέραν καὶ ἐμφανεστέραν δόξαν, *more clear and distinct*

*Opinions*, as being already ἐν καθάρσει, in a Method or course of *Purgation*, or at least fit to be initiated into the *Mysteria minora*, the lesser Mysteries of Religion. For though these *Innate notions* of Truth may be but poor, empty, and hungry things of themselves, before they be fed and fill'd with the practice of true Vertue; yet they are capable of being impregnated, and exalted with the Rules and Precepts of it. And therefore the Stoick suppos'd ὅτι τοιοῦτῳ προσήκουσιν αἱ ἠθικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, that the doctrine of Political and Moral virtues was fit to be delivered to such as these; and though they may not be so well prepared for Divine Vertue (which is of an higher Emanation) yet they are not immature for Humane, as having the Seeds of it already within themselves, which being water'd by answerable practice, may sprout up within them.

The Third is ἄνθρωπος ἤδη κεκαθαρμένος, He whose Soule is *already purg'd* by this lower sort of Vertue, and so is continually flying off from the Body and Bodily passion, and returning into himself. Such in S. *Peter's* language are those *who have escaped the pollutions which are in the world through lust*. To these we may attribute a νόθη ἐπιστήμη, a lower degree of Science, their inward sense of Vertue and moral Goodness being far transcendent to all meer Speculative opinions of it. But if this Knowledge settle here, it may be quickly apt to corrupt. Many of our most refined Moralists may be, in a worst sense then *Plotinus* means, πληρωθέντες τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει, full with their own pregnancy; their Souls may too much heave and swell with the sense of their own Vertue and Knowledge: there may be an ill *Ferment of Self-love* lying at the bottome, which may puffe it up the more with Pride, Arrogance, and Self-conceit. These forces with which the Divine bounty supplies us to keep a stronger guard against the evil Spirit, may be abus'd by our own rebellious Pride,



enticing of them from their allegiance to Heaven, to strengthen it self in our Souls, and fortifie them against Heaven: like that supercilious *Stoick*, who when he thought his Minde well arm'd and appointed with Wisdome and Vertue, cry'd out, *Sapiens contendet cum ipso Jove de felicitate*. They may make an aiery heaven of these, and wall it about with their own Self-flattery, and then sit in it as Gods, as *Cosroes* the Persian king was sometime laughed at for enshrining himself in a Temple of his own. And therefore if this *Knowledge* be not attended with *Humility* and a deep sense of *Self-penury* and *Self-emptiness*, we may easily fall short of that True Knowledge of God which we seem to aspire after. We may carry such an Image and *Species* of our Selves constantly before us, as will make us lose the clear sight of the Divinity, and be too apt to rest in a meer *Logical life* (it's *Simplicius* his expression) without any true participation of the *Divine life*, if we doe not (as many doe, if not all, who rise no higher) relapse and slide back by vain-glory, popularity, or such like vices, into some mundane and externall Vanity or other.

The Fourth is Ἄνθρωπος θεωρητικός, The true Metaphysical and Contemplative man, ὃς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λογικὴν ζωὴν ὑπερτρέχων, ὅλως εἶναι βούλεται τῶν κρειττόνων, who running and shooting up above his own *Logical* or *Self-rational* life, pierceth into the *Highest life*: Such a one, who by *Universal Love* and *Holy affection* abstracting himself from himselfe, endeavours the nearest Union with the Divine Essence that may be, κέντρον κέντρῳ συνάψας, as *Plotinus* speaks; knitting his owne centre, if he have any, unto the centre of Divine Being. To such an one the *Platonists* are wont to attribute θεῖαν ἐπιστήμην, a true *Divine wisdom*, powerfully displaying it self ἐν νοερᾷ ζωῇ in an *Intellectual life*, as they phrase it. Such a Knowledge they say is alwaies pregnant with *Divine Vertue*, which ariseth out of an happy Union of Souls with God, and is nothing

else but a living Imitation of a Godlike perfection drawn out by a strong fervent love of it. This Divine Knowledge καλοὺς καὶ ἔραστοὺς ποιῇ &c as *Plotinus* speaks; makes us amorous of Divine beauty, beautifull and lovely; and this *Divine Love and Purity* reciprocally exalts *Divine Knowledge*; both of them growing up together like that Ἔρως and Ἀντίερως that *Pausanias* sometimes speaks of. Though by the *Platonists* leave such a *Life and Knowledge* as this is, peculiarly belongs to the true and sober Christian who lives in Him who is *Life* it self, and is enlightned by Him who is the *Truth* it self, and is made partaker of *the Divine Unction, and knoweth all things*, as S. John speaks. This Life is nothing else but God's own breath within him, and an *Infant-Christ* (if I may use the expression) formed in his Soul, who is in a sense ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, *the shining forth of the Father's glory*. But yet we must not mistake, this Knowledge is but here in its Infancy; there is an higher knowledge or an higher degree of this knowledge that doth not, that cannot, descend upon us in these earthly habitations. We cannot here see מאירה באספקלריא *in Speculo lucido*; here we can see *but in a glass*, and that *darkly* too. Our own *Imaginative Powers*, which are perpetually attending the highest acts of our Souls, will be breathing a grosse dew upon the pure Glasse of our Understandings, and so sully and besmear it, that we cannot see the Image of the Divinity sincerely in it. But yet this Knowledge being a true heavenly fire kindled from God's own Altar, begets an undaunted Courage in the Souls of Good men, and enables them to cast a holy Scorn upon the poor petty trash of this Life in comparison with Divine things, and to pity those poor brutish *Epicureans* that have nothing but the meer husks of fleshly pleasure to feed themselves with. This Sight of God makes pious Souls breath after that blessed time when Mortality shall be swallowed up of Life, when they shall no more behold

the Divinity through those dark Mediums that eclipse the blessed Sight of it.

The two discourses which follow next are entitled 'Of Superstition' and 'Of Atheism.' They are not unimportant, though tedious. Space could be found for them here only at the sacrifice of passages which seem to be at once more characteristic of the author and more interesting. Smith's analysis of his arguments on these subjects is, however, worth notice.

#### OF SUPERSTITION.

*The true Notion of Superstition well express'd by Δεισιδαιμονία, i. e. an over-timorous and dreadful apprehension of the Deity.*

*A false Opinion of the Deity the true Cause and Rise of Superstition.*

*Superstition is most incident to such as Converse not with the Goodness of God, or are conscious to themselves of their own unlikeness to him.*

*Right apprehensions of God beget in man a Nobleness and Freedom of Soul.*

*Superstition, though it looks upon God as an angry Deity, yet it counts him easily pleas'd with flattering Worship.*

*Apprehensions of a Deity and Guilt meeting together are apt to excite Fear.*

*Hypocrites to spare their Sins seek out waies to compound with God.*

*Servile and Superstitious Fear is encreased by Ignorance of the certain Causes of Terrible Effects in Nature, &c. as also by frightful Apparitions of Ghosts and Spectres.*

*A further Consideration of Superstition as a Composition of Fear and Flattery.*

*A fuller Definition of Superstition, according to the Sense of the Ancients.*

*Superstition doth not alwaies appear in the same Form, but passes from one Form to another, and sometimes shrouds it self under Forms seemingly Spiritual and more refined.*

#### A SHORT DISCOURSE OF ATHEISM.

*That there is a near Affinity between Atheism and Superstition.*

*That Superstition doth not onely prepare the way for Atheism, but promotes and strengthens it.*

*That Epicurism is but Atheism under a mask.*

*A Confutation of Epicurus his Master-notion, together with some other pretences and Dogmata of his Sect.*

*The true knowledge of Nature is advantageous to Religion.*

*That Superstition is more tolerable then Atheism.*

*That Atheism is both ignoble and uncomfortable.*

*What low and unworthy Notions the Epicureans had concerning Man's Happiness: and What trouble they were put to How to define, and Where to place true Happinesse.*

*A true belief of a Deity supports the Soul with a present Tranquillity and future Hopes.*

*Were it not for a Deity, the World would be uninhabitable.*

A Discourse demonstrating  
THE  
IMMORTALITY  
OF  
THE SOUL.

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Phocylides.

Σῶμα γὰρ ἐκ γαίης ἔχομεν, καὶ πάντες ἐς αὐτὴν  
Λυόμενοι κόνις ἐσμέν· αἷρ δ' ἀνὰ πνεῦμα δέδεκται.

Epicharmus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 4.

Εὐσεβῆς νῶ πεφυκώς, οὐ πάθοις γ' ἂν οὐδὲν κακὸν κατ-  
θανών· ἄνω τὸ πνεῦμα διαμένει κατ' οὐρανόν.

Plotin. Ennead. 4. l. 4. c. 45.

Ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ δεῖ ἅπεις, καὶ γινώσκει πρὶν ἀπιέναι,  
οὐ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἐλθόντι οἰκεῖν, καὶ εὐελπίς ἐστίν,  
ὡς μετὰ θεῶν ἔσοιτο.

Hierocl. in Pythag. aur. carm.

Οὐ βούλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν.

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# A DISCOURSE OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

## CHAPTER I.

The *First and main Principles of Religion*, viz. 1. That God is. 2. That God is a rewarder of them that seek him : *Wherein is included the Great Article of the Immortality of the Soul. These two Principles acknowledged by religious and serious persons in all Ages.* 3. That God communicates himself to mankind by Christ. *The Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul discoursed of in the first place, and why?*

HAVING finish'd our two short Discourses concerning those two *Anti-Deities*, viz. *Superstition* and *Atheism* ; we shall now proceed to discourse more largely concerning the maine Heads and Principles of Religion.

And here we are to take Notice of those two Cardinal points which the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* makes the necessary Foundations of all Religion, viz. *That God is*, and *That He is a rewarder of them that seek him*. To which we should adde, *The Immortality of the Reasonable Soul*, but that that may seem included in the former : and indeed we can neither believe any *Invisible reward* of which he there speaks, without a *Prolepsis* of the *Soul's Immortality* ; neither can we entertain a serious belief of that, but the notions of *Poena* and *Praemium* will naturally follow from it ; we never meet with any who were perswaded of the former, that ever doubted of the latter : and therefore the former two have been usually taken alone for the First principles of Religion, and have been most

insisted upon by the *Platonists* ; and accordingly a novel Platonist writing a Summary of *Plato's* Divinity, intitles his book, *De Deo et Immortalitate Animæ*. And also the *Stoical* Philosophy requires a belief of these as the *Prolepses* of all Religion, of the one whereof *Epictetus*<sup>1</sup> himself assures us, ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον, &c. *Know that the main Foundation of Piety is this, to have ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις right opinions and apprehensions of God, viz. That he is, and that he governs all things καλῶς καὶ δικαίως*. And the other is sufficiently insinuated in that Cardinal distinction of their τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, and τὰ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, and is more fully express'd by *Simplicius*. For however the *Stoicks* may seem to lay some ground of suspicion, as if they were dubious in this point, yet I think that which *Tully* and others deliver concerning their opinion herein, may fully answer all scruples, viz. That as they made certain *Vicissitudes* of *Conflagrations* and *Inundations* whereby the World should perish in certain *periods* of time ; so they thought the Souls of men should also be subject to these *periodical revolutions* ; and therefore though they were of themselves immortal, should in these changes fall under the power of the common fate.

And indeed we scarce ever finde that any were deem'd *Religious*, that did not own these two *Fundamentals*. For the *Sadducees*, the Jewish Writers are wont commonly to reckon them among the *Epicureans*, because though they held a God, yet they denied the *Immortality* of mens Souls, which the New Testament seems to include, if not especially to aime at, in imputing to them a deniall of the Resurrection ; which is therefore more fully explained in the *Acts*<sup>1</sup>, where it is added that they held there was *neither Angel nor Spirit*. And these two Principles are chiefly aimed at in those two Inscriptions upon the Temple at *Delphos*, the one, ΕΙ, referring to God, by which Title those that came in to worship were supposed to invoke him, acknowledging

<sup>1</sup> Cap. 38.<sup>2</sup> Chap. 23. 8.



his Immutable and Eternal nature; the other, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ, as the admonition of the Deity again to all his worshippers, to take notice of the dignity and Immortality of their own Souls, as *Plutarch* and *Tully*, as also *Clemens Alexandr.* expound them.

But if we will have the Fundamental Articles of Christian Religion, we must adde to the former, *The Communication of God to Mankind through Christ*; which last the Scripture treats of at large, so far as concerns our *practice*, with that plainness and simplicity, that I cannot but think, that whosoever shall ingenuously and with humility of Spirit addressing himself to God, converse therewith, will see the bright beams of Divinity shining forth in it, and it may be find the Text it self much plainer then all those Glosses that have been put upon it; though it may be it is not so clear in matters of *Speculation*, as some Magisterial men are apt to think it is.

Now for these three Articles of *Faith* and *Practice*, I think if we duly consider the Scriptures, or the Reason of the thing it self, we shall easily find all Practical Religion to be referr'd to them, and built upon them: *The Nature of God and of our own Immortal Souls* both shew us what our Religion should be, and also the Necessity of it; and the Doctrine of *Free grace in Christ*, the sweet and comfortable means of attaining to that perfection and Blessedness which the other Belief teaches us to aime at.

In pursuing of these we shall first begin with *The Immortality of the Soul*, which if it be once cleared, we can neither leave any room for *Atheism* (which those I doubt are not ordinarily very free from that have gross material notions of their own Souls) nor be wholly ignorant what God is: for indeed the chief natural way whereby we can climbe up to the understanding of the Deity is by a Contemplation of our own Souls. We cannot think of him but according to the measure and model of our own Intellect,

or frame any other *Idea* of him then what the impressions of our own Souls will permit us: and therefore the best Philosophers have alwaies taught us to inquire for God within our selves; *Reason in us*, as *Tully* tells us, being *participata similitudo rationis internæ*: and accordingly some good Expositours have interpreted that place in *S. John's Gospel* chap. 1. *He is that true light which enlightens every man that cometh into the world*; which it I were to gloss upon in the language of the Platonists, I should doe it thus, λόγος ἐστὶ φῶς ψυχῶν, *the Eternal Word is the light of Souls*, which the Vulgar Latine referr'd to in *Signatum est supra nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*<sup>1</sup>, as *Aquinas* observes. But we shall not search into the full nature of the Soul, but rather make our inquiry into the Immortality of it, and endeavour to demonstrate that.

## CHAPTER II.

### *Some Considerations preparatory to the proof of the Soul's Immortality.*

BUT before we fall more closely upon this, *viz.* the demonstrating the Soul's *Immortality*, we shall premise three things.

1. *That the Immortality of the Soul doth not absolutely need any Demonstration to clear it by, but might be assumed rather as a Principle or Postulatum, seeing the notion of it is apt naturally to insinuate it self into the belief of the most vulgar sort of men.* Mens understandings commonly lead them as readily to believe that their *Souls* are *Immortal*, as that they have any Existence at all. And though they be not all so wise and Logical, as to distinguish aright between their *Souls* and their *Bodies*, or tell what kind of thing that is that they commonly call their *Soul*; yet they are strongly inclined to believe that some part of them shall survive

<sup>1</sup> Psal. 4. 7.

another, and that that Soul, which it may be they conceive by a gross Phantasm, shall live, when the other more visible part of them shall moulder into dust. And therefore *all Nations* have consented in this belief, which hath almost been as vulgarly received as the belief of a Deity ; as a diligent converse with History will assure us, it having been never so much questioned by the Idiotical sort of men, as by some unskilful Philosophers, who have had Wit and Fancy enough to raise doubts, like Evil Spirits, but not Judgment enough to send them down again.

This *Consensus Gentium Tully* thinks enough to conclude a Law and Maxim of Nature by, which though I should not universally grant, seeing sometimes Errour and Superstition may strongly plead this Argument ; yet I think for those things that are the matter of our *first* belief, that Notion may not be refused. For we cannot easily conceive how any *Prime notion* that hath no dependency on any other antecedent to it, should be generally entertain'd ; did not the common dictate of Nature or Reason acting alike in all men move them to conspire together in the embracing of it, though they knew not one anothers minds. And this it may be might first perswade *Averroes* to think of a *Common Intellect*, because of the uniform judgments of men in some things. But indeed in those Notions which we may call *notiones ortae*, there a *communis notitia* is not so free from all suspicion ; which may be cleared by taking an Instance from our present Argument. The notion of the *Immortality* of the Soul is such an one as is generally owned by all those that yet are not able to collect it by a long *Series* and concatenation of sensible observations, and by ■ Logical dependence of one thing upon another deduce it from sensible Experiments ; a thing that it may be was scarce ever done by the wisest Philosophers, but is rather believed with ■ kind of repugnancy to Sense, which shews all things to be mortal, and which would have been too apt to have

deluded the ruder sort of men, did not a more powerful impression upon their own Souls forcibly urge them to believe their own Immortality. Though indeed if the common notions of men were well examined, it may be some common notion adherent to this of the *Immortality* may be as generally received, which yet in it self is false; and that by reason of a common prejudice which the earthly and Sensual part of man will equally possesse all men with, untill they come to be well acquainted with their own Souls; as namely a notion of the Souls *Materiality*, and it may be it's *Traduction* too, which seems to be as generally received by the vulgar sort as the former. But the reason of that is evident, for the Souls of men exercising themselves first of all κινήσει προβατικῇ, as the Greek Philosopher expresth, meerly by a *Progressive kind of motion*, spending themselves about Bodily and Material acts, and conversing onely with Sensible things; they are apt to acquire such deep stamps of Material phantasms to themselves, that they cannot imagine their own Being to be any other then *Material and Divisible*, though of a fine Aethereal nature: which kind of conceit, though it be inconsistent with an Immortal and Incorruptible nature, yet hath had too much prevalencie in Philosophers themselves, their Minds not being sufficiently abstracted while they have contemplated the highest Being of all. And some think *Aristotle* himself cannot be excused in this point, who seems to have thought God himself to be nothing else but μέγα ζῶον, as he styles him. But such Common Notions as these are, arising from the deceptions and hallucinations of *Sense*, ought not to prejudice those which not *Sense*, but some *Higher power* begets in all men. And so we have done with that.

The second thing I should premise should be in place of a *Postulatum* to our following Demonstrations, or rather a *Caution* about them, which is, *That, to a right conceiving*

*the force of any such Arguments as may prove the Souls Immortality, there must be an antecedent Converse with our own Souls.* It is no hard matter to convince any one by clear and evident principles, fetch'd from his own sense of himself, who hath ever well meditated the *Powers* and *Operations* of his own Soul, that it is *Immaterial* and *Immortal*.

But those very Arguments that to such will be Demonstrative, to others will lose something of the strength of Probability: For indeed it is not possible for us well to know what our Souls are, but onely by their *κινήσεις κυκλικαί*, their *Circular and Reflex motions*, and Converse with themselves, which onely can steal from them their own secrets. All those Discourses which have been written of the Soul's Heraldry, will not blazon it so well to us as it self will doe. When we turn our own eyes in upon it, it will soon tell us it's own royal pedigree and noble extraction, by those sacred Hieroglyphicks which it bears upon it self. We shall endeavour to interpret and unfold some of them in our following Discourse.

3. There is one thing more to be considered, which may serve as a common *Basis* or Principle to our following Arguments; and it is this Hypothesis, *That no Substantial and Indivisible thing ever perisheth.* And this *Epicurus* and all of his Sect must needs grant, as indeed they doe, and much more then it is lawful to plead for; and therefore they make this one of the first Principles of their *Atheistical* Philosophy, *Ex nihilo fieri nil, et in nihilum nil posse reverti.* But we shall here be content with that sober *Thesis* of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, who attributes the *Perpetuation* of all Substances to the Benignity and Liberality of the Creatour, whom he therefore brings in thus speaking to the *Angels*, those *νέοι θεοί*, as he calls them, *ὅμεις οὐκ ἐστὲ ἀθάνατοι οὐδὲ ἄλυτοι*, &c. *You are not of your selves immortal, nor indissoluble; but would relapse and slide back*

from that Being which I have given you, should I withdraw the influence of my own power from you: but yet you shall hold your Immortality by a Patent of meer grace from my self. But to return, *Plato* held that the whole world, howsoever it might meet with many Periodicall mutations, should remain Eternally; which I think our Christian Divinity doth no where deny: and so *Plotinus* frames this general Axiom, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολεῖται, that no Substance shall ever perish. And indeed if we collate all our own Observations & Experience with such as the History of former times hath delivered to us, we shall not find that ever any substance was quite lost; but though this *Proteus*-like Matter may perpetually change its shape, yet it will constantly appear under one Form or another, what art soever we use to destroy it: as it seems to have been set forth in that old *Gryphe* or Riddle of the *Peripatetick* School, *Aelia Laelia Crispis, nec mas, nec foemina, nec androgyna, nec casta, nec meretrix, nec pudica; sed omnia, &c.* as *Fortunius Licetus* hath expounded it. Therefore it was never doubted whether ever any piece of Substance was lost, till of latter times some hot-brained *Peripateticks*, who could not bring their fiery and subtile fancies to any cool judgment, began rashly to determine that all *Material Forms* (as they are pleas'd to call them) were lost. For having once jumbled and crouded in a new kind of Being, never anciently heard of, between the parts of a Contradiction, that is *Matter* and *Spirit*, which they call *Material Forms*, because they could not well tell whence these new upstarts should arise, nor how to dispose of them when *Matter* began to shift herself into some new garb, they condemn'd them to utter destruction; and yet lest they should seem too rudely to controul all Sense and Reason, they found out this common tale which signifies nothing, that these *Substantial Forms* were educed *ex potentia Materiae*, whenever *Matter* began to appeare in



any new disguise, and afterwards again returned *in gremium Materiae*; and so they thought them not quite lost. But this Curiosity consisting onely of words fortuitously packt up together, being too subtile for any sober judgment to lay hold upon, and which they themselves could never yet tell how to define; we shall as carelesly lay it aside, as they boldly obtrude it upon us, and take the common distinction of all *Substantiall Being* for granted, viz. That it is either *Body*, and so *Divisible*, and of three Dimensions; or else it is something which is not properly a *Body* or *Matter*, and so hath no such Dimensions as that the Parts thereof should be crouding for place, and justling one with another, not being all able to couch together or run one into another: and this is nothing else but what is commonly called *Spirit*. Though yet we will not be too Critical in depriving every thing which is not grosly corporeal of all kind of *Extension*.

## CHAPTER III.

*The First Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That the Soul of man is not Corporeal. The gross absurdities upon the Supposition that the Soul is a Complex of fluid Atomes, or that it is made up by a fortuitous Concourse of Atomes: which is Epicurus his Notion concerning Body. The Principles and Dogmata of the Epicurean Philosophy in opposition to the Immateriall and Incorporeal nature of the Soul, asserted by Lucretius; but discover'd to be false and insufficient. That Motion cannot arise from Body or Matter. Nor can the power of Sensation arise from Matter: Much less can Reason. That all Humane knowledge hath not its rise from Sense. The proper function of Sense, and that it is never deceived. An Addition of Three Considerations for the enforcing of this first Argument, and further clearing the Immateriality of the Soul. That there is in man a Faculty which 1. controll's Sense: and 2. collects and unites all the Perceptions of our several Senses. 3. That Memory and Prevision are not explicable upon the supposition of Matter and Motion.*



WE shall therefore now endeavour to prove That the *Soul* of man is something *really distinct* from his *Body*, of an *Indivisible* nature, and so cannot be divided into such Parts as should flit one from another ; and consequently is apt of it's own Nature to remain to Eternity, and so will doe, except the Decrees of Heaven should abandon it from Being.

And first, we shall prove it *ab absurdo*, and here doe as the Mathematicians use to doe in such kind of Demonstrations: we will suppose that if the Reasonable Soul be not of such an *Immaterial* Nature, then it must be a *Body*, and so suppose it to be made up as all Bodies are: where because the Opinions of Philosophers differ, we shall only take one, *viz.* that of *Epicurus*, which supposeth it to be made up by ■ *fortuitous Concourse of Atomes* ; and in that demonstrate against all the rest : (for indeed herein a *particular* Demonstration is an *Universal*, as it is in all Mathematical Demonstrations of this kind.) For if all that which is the *Basis* of our Reasons and Understandings, which we here call *the Substance of the Soul*, be nothing else but a *meer Body*, and therefore be infinitely divisible, as all Bodies are ; it will be all one in effect whatsoever notion we have of the generation or production thereof. We may give it, if we please, finer words, and use more demure and smooth language about it then *Epicurus* did, as some that, lest they should speak too rudely and rustically of it by calling it *Matter*, will name it *Efflorescentia Materiae* ; and yet lest that should not be enough, adde *Aristotle's* Quintessence to it too : they will be so trim and courtly in defining of it, that they will not call it by the name of *Aer*, *Ignis*, or *Flamma*, as some of the ancient vulgar Philosophers did, but *Flos flammae* : and yet the *Epicurean* Poet could use as much Chymistry in exalting his fancy as these subtile Doctors doe ; and when he would dress out the Notion of it more

gaudily, he resembles it to <sup>1</sup>*Flos Bacchi*, and *Spiritus unguenti suavis*. But when we have taken away this disguise of wanton Wit, we shall find nothing better then *meer Body*, which will be recoiling back perpetually into it's own inert and sluggish Passiveness: though we may think we have quicken'd it never so much by this subtile artifice of Words and Phrases, a man's new-born *Soul* will for all this be but little better then his *Body*; and, as that is, be but a *rasura corporis alieni*, made up of some small and thin shavings pared off from the Bodies of the Parents by a continuall motion of the several parts of it; and must afterwards receive its augmentation from that food and nourishment which is taken in, as the Body doth. So that the very Grass we walk over in the fields, the Dust and Mire in the streets that we tread upon, may, according to the true meaning of this dull Philosophy, after many refinings, macerations and maturations, which Nature performs by the help of Motion, spring up into so many Rational Souls, and prove as wise as any *Epicurean*, and discourse as subtilely of what it once was, when it lay drooping in a senseless Passiveness. This conceit is so gross, that one would think it wanted nothing but that witty Sarcasm that *Plutarch* cast upon *Nicocles* the Epicurean, to confute it, ἡ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ τοσαύτας, οἶαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν.

But because the heavy minds of men are so frequently sinking into this earthly fancy, we shall further search into the entrails of this Philosophy; and see how like that is to a Rational Soul, which it pretends to declare the production of. *Lucretius* first of all taking notice of the mighty swiftness and celerity of the *Soul* in all its operations, lest his *Matter* should be too soon tired and not able to keep pace with it, he first casts the *Atomes* prepared for this purpose into such perfect *Sphaerical* and small figures as

<sup>1</sup> *Lucret. lib. 3.*

might be most capable of these swift impressions; for so he, *lib.* 3.

*At, quod mobile tantopere est, constare rotundis  
Perquam seminibus debet, perquamque minutis,  
Momine uti parvo possint impulsa moveri.*

But here before we goe any further, we might inquire what it should be that should move these *small* and *insensible Globes* of *Matter*. For *Epicurus* his two Principles, which he calls *Plenum* and *Inane*, will here by no means serve our turn to find out *Motion* by. For though our *communes notitiae* assure us that whereever there is a Multiplicity of parts, (as there is in every Quantitative Being) there may be a Variety of application in those parts one to another, and so a *Mobility*; yet *Motion* it self will not so easily arise out of a *Plenum*, though we allow it an empty *Space* and room enough to play up and down in. For we may conceive a *Body*, which is his *Plenum*, onely as *trinè dimensum*, being *longum, latum et profundum*, without attributing any motion at all to it: and *Aristotle* in his *De Caelo* doubts not herein to speak plainly, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος κίνησις οὐκ ἐγγίverαι, *that Motion cannot arise from a Body*. For indeed this Power of *motion* must needs argue some Efficient cause, as *Tully* hath well observed, if we suppose any *Rest* antecedent; or if any *Body* be once moving, it must also find some potent Efficient to stay it and settle it in *Rest*, as *Simplicius* hath somewhere in his Comment upon *Epictetus* wisely determin'd. So that if we will suppose either *Motion* or *Rest* to be contain'd originally in the nature of any *Body*; we must of necessity conclude some potent Efficient to produce the contrary, or else attribute this Power to Bodies themselves; which will at last grow unbounded and infinite, and indeed altogether inconsistent with the nature of a *Body*.

But yet though we should grant all this which *Lucretius* contends for, how shall we force up these *particles of Matter*

into any true and real *Perceptions*, and make them perceive their own or others motions, which he calls *Motus sensiferi*? For he having first laid down his Principles of all Being, as he supposeth (neither is he willing to leave his Deities themselves out of the number) he onely requires these *Postulata* to unfold the nature of all by <sup>1</sup> *Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figurae*. But how any such thing as *sensation*, or much lesse *Reason*, should spring out of this barren soil, how well till'd soever, no composed mind can imagine. For indeed that infinite variety which is in the *Magnitude* of parts, their *Positions, Figures* and *Motions*, may easily, and indeed must needs, produce an infinite variety of *Phaenomena*, which the *Epicurean* philosophy calls *Eventa*. And accordingly where there is a *Sentient faculty*, it may receive the greatest variety of Impressions from them, by which the *Perceptions*, which are the immediate result of a *Knowing faculty*, will be distinguish'd: Yet cannot the Power it self of *Sensation* arise from them, no more then *Vision* can rise out of a Glasse, whereby it should be able to perceive these *Idola* that paint themselves upon it, though it were never so exactly polish'd, and they much finer then they are or can be.

Neither can those small *corpuscula*, which in themselves have no power of *sense*, ever produce it by any kind of Concourse or Motion; for so a Cause might in its production rise up above the height of its own nature and virtue; which I think every calm contemplator of Truth will judge impossible: for seeing whatsoever any Effect hath, it must needs derive from its Causes, and can receive no other tincture and impression then they can bestow upon it; that Signature must first be in the Cause it self, which is by it derived to the Effect. And therefore the wisest Philosophers amongst the Ancients universally concluded that there was some higher Principle then meer

<sup>1</sup> Lib. I.

*Matter*, which was the Cause of all Life and Sense, and that to be Immortal: as the *Platonists*, who thought this reason sufficient to move them to assert a Mundane Soul. And *Aristotle*, though he talks much of *Nature*, yet he delivers his mind so cloudily, that all that he hath said of it may passe with that which himself said of his *Acroatici Libri*, or Physicks, that they were ἐκδεδομένοι καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένοι. Nor is it likely that he who was so little satisfied with his own notion of *Nature* as being *the Cause of all Motion and Rest*, as seemingly to desert it while he placeth so many Intelligences about the Heavens, could much please himself with such a gross conceit of *meer Matter*, that that should be the true Moving and Sentient *Entelech* of some other Matter; as it is manifest he did not.

But indeed *Lucretius* himself, though he could in a jolly fit of his over-flush'd and fiery fancy tell us (*Lib. 1*),

*Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,*  
*Et sapere, et doctis rationem reddere dictis,*  
*Non ex seminibus sapientibus, atque disertis:*

yet in more cool thoughts he found his own common notions too sturdy to be so easily silenc'd; and therefore sets his wits a-work to find the most *Quintessential* particles of *Matter* that may be, that might doe that feat, which those smooth *Spherical* bodies, *Calor*, *Aer* and *Ventus* (for all come into this composition) could not doe: and this was of such a subtile and exalted nature, that his earthly fancy could not comprehend it, and therefore he confesses plainly he could not tell what name to give it, though for want of a better he calls it *Mobilem vim*, as neither his Master before him, who was pleased to compound the Soul (as *Plutarch*<sup>1</sup> relates) of four ingredients, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν. But because this

<sup>1</sup> *Lib. 4. de placitis Philosophorum.*

Giant-like *Proteus* found himself here bound with such strong cords, that notwithstanding all his struggling he could by no means break them off from him, we shall relate his own words the more largely. I find them *lib.* 3.

*Sic calor, atque aer, et venti caeca potestas  
Mista creant unam naturam, et mobilis illa  
Vis, initum motus abs se quae dividit ollis:  
Sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus.  
Nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura, subestque;  
Nec magis hac infra quidquam est in corpore nostro;  
Atque anima'st animae proporrò totius ipsa.  
Quod genus in nostris membris et corpore toto  
Mista latens animi vis est, animaeque potestas,  
Corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creata est.  
Sic tibi nominis haec expers vis, facta minutis  
Corporibus, latet——*

Thus we see how he found himself overmaster'd with difficulties, while he endeavoured to find the place of the *Sensitive powers in Matter*: and yet this is the highest that he dares aim at, namely to prove that *Sensation* might from thence derive its Original, as stiffly opposing any Higher power of *Reason*; which we shall *in lucro ponere* against another time.

But surely had not the *Epicureans* abandoned all *Logick* together with some other Sciences (as *Tully* and *Laertius* tell us they did) they would here have found themselves too much prest with this Argument, (which yet some will think to be but *levis armaturae* in respect of some other) and have found it as little short of a Demonstration to prove the *Soules Immortality* as the *Platonists* themselves did: But herein how they dealt, <sup>1</sup>*Plotinus* hath well observed of them all who denied Lives and Souls to be immortal, which he asserts, and make them nothing but Bodies, that when they were pinch'd with the strength of

<sup>1</sup> *Enn.* 4. l. 7. c. 4.



any Argument fetch'd frō the φύσις δραστήριος of the Soul, it was usuall amongst them to call this Body πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον, or *Ventus certo quodam modo se habens*; to which he well replies, τὶ τὸ πολυθρύλητον αὐτοῖς πῶς ἔχον, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὸ σῶμα φύσιν δραστήριον. Where by this φύσις δραστήριος seems to be nothing meant but that same thing which *Lucretius* called *vīm mobilem*, and he would not allow it to be any thing else but a *Body*, though what kind of *Body* he could not tell: yet by it he understands not meerly an Active power of motion, but a more subtile Energie, whereby the force and nature of any motion is perceived and insinuated by its own strength in the bodies moved; as if these sorry Bodies by their impetuous justling together could awaken one another out of their drowsie Lethargie, and make each other hear their mutuall impetuous knocks: which is as absurd as to think a Musical instrument should hear its own sounds, and take pleasure in those harmonious aires that are plai'd upon it. For that which we call *Sensation*, is not the Motion or Impression which one Body makes upon another, but a *Recognition* of that Motion; and therefore to attribute that to a Body, is to make a Body privy to its own acts and passions, to act upon itself, and to have a true and proper *self-feeling* virtue; which <sup>1</sup> *Porphyrus* hath elegantly expressed, ὅταν τὸ ζῶον αἰσθάνηται, ἔοικεν ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ ἁρμονία χωριστῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὰς χορδὰς κινούσῃ ἡρμουςμένας· τῇ δὲ ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς ἁρμονία ἀχωρίστῳ τὸ σῶμα, *In the sensations of living creatures the Soul moves, as if unbodied Harmony her self should play upon an Instrument, and smartly touch the well-tuned strings: but the Body is like that Harmony which dwells inseparably in the strings themselves which have no perception of it.*

Thus we should now leave this *Topick* of our Demonstration, onely we shall adde this as an Appendix to it,

<sup>1</sup> In his Tract, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νηοτά.



which will further manifest the Souls *Incorporeal* and *Immaterial* nature, that is, That there is a *Higher* Principle of knowledge in man then meer *Sense*, neither is that the sole Original of all that Science that breaks forth in the minds of men; which yet *Lucretius* maintains, as being afraid lest he should be awaken'd out of this pleasant dreame of his, should any Higher power rouse his sleepy Soul: and therefore he thus layes down the opinion of his Sect<sup>1</sup>,

*Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam  
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli:  
Nam majore fide debet reperirier illud,  
Sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.*

But yet this goodly Champion doth but lay siege to his own Reason, and endeavour to storm the main fort thereof, which but just before he defended against the *Scepticks* who maintained that opinion, *That nothing could be known*; to which he having replied by that vulgar Argument, *That if nothing can be known, then neither doe we know this That we know nothing*; he pursues them more closely with another, *That neither could they know what it is to know, or what it is to be ignorant*,

*Quaeram, quom in rebus veri nil viderit ante;  
Unde sciat, quid sit scire, et nescire vicissim:  
Notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit.*

But yet if our *Senses* were the *only Judges* of things, this *Reflex* knowledge whereby we know what it is to know, would be as impossible as he makes it for *Sense* to have *Innate Ideas* of its own, antecedent to those stamps which the Radiations of external Objects imprint upon it. For this knowledge must be antecedent to all that judgment which we pass upon any *Sensatum*, seeing except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine

<sup>1</sup> *Lib. 4.*

aright upon the approach of any of these *Idola* to our Senses.

But our Author may perhaps yet seem to make a more full confession for us in these two points.

First, That no sense can judge another's objects, nor convince it of any mistake,

*Non possunt alios alii convincere sensus,*

*Nec porro poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese.*

If therefore there be any such thing within us as controlls our *Senses*, as all know there is; then must that be of an Higher nature than our *Senses* are.

But secondly, he grants further, That all our *Sensation* is nothing else but *Perception*, and therefore wheresoever there is any hallucination, that must arise from something else within us besides the power of sense,

——— *quoniam pars horum maxima fallit*

*Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,*

*Pro visis ut sint, quae non sunt sensibu' visa.*

In which words he hath very happily lighted upon the proper function of *Sense*, and the true reason of all those *mistakes* which we call the *Deceptions of Sense*, which indeed are not truly so, seeing they arise onely from a *Higher Faculty*, and consist not in *Sensation* it self, but in those deductions and Corollaries that our Judgments draw from it.

We shall here therefore grant that which the *Epicurean* philosophy, and the *Peripatetick* too, though not without much caution, pleads for universally, *That our Senses are never deceived*, whether they be *sani* or *laesi*, sound or distempered, or whatsoever proportion or distance the *Object* or *medium* bears to it: for if we well scan this business, we shall find that nothing of *Judgment* belongs to *Sense*, it consisting onely ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ πάθει, in *Perception*; neither can it make any just observation of those *Objects* that are without, but onely discerns its own

passions, and is nothing else but γνώσις τῶν παθῶν, and tells how it finds it self affected, and not what is the true cause of those impressions which it finds within it self; (which seems to be the reason of that old Philosophical maxim recited by *Aristotle* *l. 3. de Anima, cap. 2.* οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὀψεως, οὔδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως, that these *Simulachra* were onely in our Senses; which notion a late Author hath pursued :) and therefore when the Eye finds the Sun's circle represented within it self of no greater a bigness then a foot-diameter, it is not at all herein mistaken; nor a distempered Palate, when it tastes a bitterness in the sweetest honey, as *Proclus* a famous *Mathematician* and *Platonist* hath well determined, in *Plat. Tim.* αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσι πάθημα, καὶ οὐ πάντῃ ψεύδονται, The Senses in all things of this nature doe but declare their own passions or perceptions, which are alwaies such as they seem to be, whether there be any such *parallelum signaculum* in the Object as bears a true analogie with them or not: and therefore in truth they are never deceived in the execution of their own functions. And so doth *Aristotle* *l. 3 de Anima, c. 3.* conclude, That errour is neither in Sense nor Phansy, οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος, it is in no Facultie but onely that in which is Reason. Though it be as true on the other side, that *Epicurus* and all his Sect were deceived, while they judged the Sun and Moon and all the Starrs to be no bigger then that Picture and Image which they found of them in their own Eyes; for which silly conceit though they had been for many Ages sufficiently laugh'd at by wise men, yet could not *Lucretius* tell how to enlarge his own fancy, but believes the *Idolum* in his own Visive organ to be adequate to the Sun it self, in despight of all Mathematicall demonstration; as indeed he must needs, if there were no *Higher* principle of knowledge then *Sense* is, which is the most indisciplinable thing that may be, and can never be taught that Truth which

Reason and Understanding might attempt to force into it. αἰσθησις καὶ μυριάκις ἀκούη τοῦ λόγου λέγοντος ὅτι μείζων ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς, &c. *Though Reason inculcates this notion ten thousand times over, That the Sun is bigger then the Earth, yet will not the Eye be taught to see it any bigger then a foot breadth*: and therefore he rightly calls it, as all the Platonical and Stoical philosophie doth, ἄλογόν τι, and it may well be put among the rest of the Stoicks ἄλογα πάθη.

Thus I hope by this time we have found out κρείττονά τινα τῆς αἰσθήσεως δύναμιν, some *more noble Power* in the Soul then that is by which it accommodates it self to the Body, and according to the measure and proportion thereof converseth with External Matter. And this is the true reason why we are so apt to be mistaken in Sensible objects, because our Souls sucking in the knowledge of external things thereby, and not minding the proportion that is between the Body and them, mindless of its own notions, collates their corporeal impressions with externall objects themselves, and judgeth of them one by another. But whensoever our Souls act in their own power and strength, untwisting themselves from all corporeal complications, they then can find confidence enough to judge of things in a seeming contradiction to all those other *visa corporea*.

And so I suppose this Argument will amount to no lesse then a Demonstration of the Soul's *Immateriality*, seeing to all *sincere understanding* it is necessary that it should thus abstract it self from all corporeal commerce, and return from thence nearer into it self.

Now what we have to this purpose more generally intimated, we shall further branch out in these two or three Particulars.

First, That that *Mental faculty* and power whereby we *judge* and *discern* things, is so far from being a *Body*, that it must *retract* and *withdraw* it self from all *Bodily operation*

whensoever it will nakedly *discern* Truth. For should our Souls alwaies mould their judgment of things according to those *παθήματα* and impressions which seem to be framed thereof in the Body, they must then doe nothing else but chain up Errours and Delusions one with another in stead of Truth: as should the judgments of our Understandings wholly depend upon the sight of our *Eyes*, we should then conclude that our meer accesses and recesses from any *Visible* Object have such a Magical power to change the magnitudes of Visible Objects, and to transform them into all varieties of figures and fashions; and so attribute all that variety to them which we find in our corporeal perceptions. Or should we judge of *Gustables* by our *Tast*, we should attribute to one and the self-same thing all that variety w<sup>ch</sup> we find in our own Palates. Which is an unquestionable Argument That that *Power* whereby we discern of things and make judgments of them different and sometimes contrary to those perceptions that are the necessary results of all Organical functions, is something distinct from the *Body*; and therefore though the Soul, as *Plato* hath well observed, be *μεριστὴ περὶ τὰ σώματα*, various and divisible accidentally in these Sensations and Motions wherein it extends and spreads it self as it were upon the Body, and so according to the nature and measure thereof perceives its impressions; yet it is *ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀμερίστη* indivisible, returning into it self. Whensoever it will speculate Truth it self, it will not then listen to the several clamours and votes of these rude Senses which alwaies speak with divided tongues; but it consults some clearer Oracle within it self: and therefore *Plotinus*, *Enn.* 4. l. 3. hath well concluded concerning the Body, *ἐμπόδιον τοῦτο, εἴ τις αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῶτο, should a man make use of his Body in his Speculations*, it will entangle his mind with so many contradictions, that it will be impossible to attain to any true knowledge of things.

We shall conclude this therefore, as *Tully* doth his Contemplation of the Soules operations about the frame of Nature, the fabrick of the Heavens and motions of the Stars, *Animus qui haec intelligit, similis est ejus qui ea fabricatus in coelo est.*

Secondly, We also find *such a Faculty* within our own Souls as *collects* and *unites* all the Perceptions of our several Senses, and is able to *compare* them together; something in which they all meet as in one Centre: which <sup>1</sup>*Plotinus* hath well expressed, δὲ τοῦτο ὥσπερ κέντρον εἶναι γραμμὰς δὲ συλλαβούσας ἐκ περιφερείας κύκλου, τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι ἐν ὄντως, That in which all those *several Sensations* meet as so many *Lines* drawn from several points in the *Circumference*, and which comprehends them all, must needs be *One*. For should *that* be *various* and consisting of several parts, which thus receives all these various impressions, then must the *sentence* and *judgment* passed upon them be *various* too. *Aristotle* in his *de Anima*, Δεῖ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον, *That must be one that judgeth things to be diverse*; and that must judge too ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ, setting all before it at once. Besides we could not conceive how such an immense variety of impressions could be made upon any piece of Matter, which should not obliterate and deface one another. And therefore *Plotinus* hath well disputed against them who make all Sensation τυπώσεις καὶ ἐνσφραγίσεις ἐν ψυχῇ which brings me to the Third.

Thirdly, That Knowledge which the Soul retains in it self of *things past*, and in some sort Prevision of *things to come*, whereby many grow so sagacious in fore-seeing future Events, that they know how to deliberate and dispose of *present* affairs, so as to be ready furnished and prepared for such Emergencies as they see in a train and Series of Causes which sometimes work but contingently: I cannot

<sup>1</sup> *Enn.* 4. l. 7. c. 6.



think *Epicurus* himself could in his cool thoughts be so unreasonable as to persuade himself, that all the shuffling and cutting of *Atomes* could produce such a Divine piece of Wisdom as this is. What *Matter* can thus bind up *Past*, *Present* and *Future* time together? which while the Soul of man doth, it seems to imitate (as far as its own finite nature will permit it to strive after an imitation of) God's eternity : and grasping and gathering together a long Series of duration into it self, makes an essay to free it self from the rigid laws of it, and to purchase to it self the freedome of a true Eternity. And as by its χρονικοὶ πρόοδοι (as the Platonists are wont to speak) its *Chronical and successive operations*, it unravels and unfolds the contexture of its own indefinite intellectual powers by degrees ; so by this *Memory* and *Prevision* it recollects and twists them up all together again into it self. And though it seems to be continually sliding from it self in those several vicissitudes and changes which it runs through in the constant variety of its own Effluxes and Emanations ; yet is it alwaies returning back again to its first Original by a swift remembrance of all those motions and multiplicity of operations which have begot in it the first sense of this constant flux. As if we should see a Sun-beam perpetually flowing forth from the bright body of the Sun, and yet ever returning back to it again ; it never loseth any part of its Being, because it never forgets what it self was : and though it may number out never so vast a length of its duration, yet it never comes nearer to its old age, but carrieth a lively sense of its youth and infancy, which it can at pleasure lay a fast hold on, along with it.

But if our *Souls* were nothing else but a *Complex of fluid Atomes*, how should we be continually roving and sliding from our selves, and soon forget what we once were? The *new Matter* that would come in to fill up that Vacuity which the *Old* had made by its departure, would never



know what the *Old* were, nor what that should be that would succeed that : ὥσπερ ξένη ψυχὴ αὐτὴ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται, ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα οἶδε, καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἡμῶν, *that new pilgrim and stranger-like Soul would alwaies be ignorant of what the other before it knew, and we should be wholly some other bulk of Being then we were before, as Plotinus hath excellently observed Enn. 4. l. 7. c. 5.* It was a famous speech of wise *Heraclitus*, εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν δις οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, *a man cannot enter twice into the same River* : by which he was wont symbolically to express the *constant flux of Matter*, which is the most unstable thing that may be. And if *Epicurus* his Philosophy could free this *Heap of refined Atomes*, which it makes the *Soul* to be, from this inconstant and flitting nature, and teach us how it could be μόνιμὸν τι some stable and immutable thing, alwaies resting entire while it is in the *Body* ; though we would thank him for such a goodly conceit as this is, yet we would make no doubt but it might as well be able to preserve it self from dissolution and dissipation *out* of this gross *Body*, as *in* it : seeing it is no more secured from the constant impulses of that more gross *Matter* which is restlessly moving up and down *in* the *Body*, then it is *out* of it : and yet for all that we should take the leave to ask *Tully's* question with his sober disdain, *Quid, obsecro, terrâne tibi aut hoc nebuloso et caliginoso coeno aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriae?* Such a jewel as this is too precious to be found in a dunghill : meer *Matter* could never thus stretch forth its feeble force, and spread it self over all its own former praeexistencies. We may as well suppose this dull and heavy *Earth* we tread upon to know how long it hath dwelt in this part of the *Universe* that now it doth, and what variety of *Creatures* have in all past *Ages* sprung forth from it, and all those occurrences and events which have all this time happened upon it.

## CHAPTER IV.

*The second Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. Actions either Automatical or Spontaneous. That Spontaneous and Elicite Actions evidence the Distinction of the Soul from the Body. Lucretius his Evasion very slight and weak. That the Liberty of the Will is inconsistent with the Epicurean principles. That the Conflict of Reason against the Sensitive Appetite argues a Being in us superiour to Matter.*

WE have done with that which we intended for the First part of our Discourse of the Soul's *Immortality*: we have hitherto look'd at it rather *in Concreto* than *in Abstracto*, rather as a Thing complicated with and united to the Body; and therefore considered it in those Operations, which as they are not proper to the Body, so neither are they altogether independent upon it, but are rather of a mixt nature.

We shall now take notice of it in those *Properties*, in the exercise whereof it hath less commerce with the *Body*, and more plainly declares its own high descent to us, That it is able to subsist and act without the aid and assistance of this *Matter* which it informes.

And here we shall take that course that *Aristotle* did in his Books *de Anima*, and first of all inquire, *Whether it hath ἰδίον τι, some kind of Action so proper and peculiar to it self, as not to depend upon the Body.* And this soon offers it self in the first place to us in those *Elicite motions* of it, as the Moralists are wont to name them, which though they may end in those they call *Imperate acts*, yet have their first Emanation from nothing else but the Soul it self.

For this purpose we shall take notice of Two sorts of *Actions* which are obvious to the experience of every one that observes himself, according to a double Source and emanation of them, which a late Philosopher hath very happily suggested to us. The first are those *Actions* which

arise up within us *without any Animadversion*; the other are those that are *consequent to it*.

For we find frequently *such Motions* within our selves which *first are*, before we take notice of them, and which by their own turbulency and impetuousness force us to an *Advertency*: as those *Fiery spirits* and that *inflamed Blood* which sometimes fly up into the head; or those gross and Earthly *Fumes* that disturb our brains; the stirring of many other *Humours* which beget within us Grief, Melancholy, Anger, or Mirth, or other Passions; which have their rise from such Causes as we were not aware of, nor gave no consent to create this trouble to us. Besides all those *Passions* and *Perceptions* which are begotten within us by some externall motions which derive themselves through our Senses, and fiercely knocking at the door of our Minds and Understandings force them sometimes from their deepest debates and musings of some other thing, to open to them and give them an audience.

Now as to such Motions as these are, it being necessary for the preservation of our Bodies that our Souls should be acquainted with them, a mans Body was so contrived and his Soul so united to it, that they might have a speedy access to the Soul. Indeed some ancient Philosophers thought that the Soul descending more deeply into the Body, as they expresse it, first begot these corporeal motions unbeknown to it self by reason of its more deep immersion, which afterwards by their impetuousness excited its advertency. But whatsoever truth there is in that Assertion, we clearly find from the relation of our own Souls themselves that our Soul disowns them, and acknowledgeth no such Motions to have been so busy by her commission; neither knows what they are, from whence they arise, or whither they tend, untill she hath duly examined them. But these *Corporeal motions* as they seem to arise from nothing else but meerly from the *Machina* of the

Body it self; so they could not at all be sensated but by the Soul.

Neither indeed are all our own *Corporeal actions* perceived by us, but only those that may serve to maintain a good correspondence and intelligence between the Soul and Body, and so foment and cherish that Sympathy between them which is necessary for the subsistence and well-being of the whole man in this mundane state. And therefore there is very little of that which is commonly done in our Body, which our Souls are informed at all of. The *constant Circulation of Blood* through all our *Veins and Arteries*; the common *motions* of our *Animal spirits* in our *Nerves*; the *maceration of Food* within our *Stomachs*, and the *distribution of Chyle* and nourishment *to every part* that wants the relief of it; the constant *flux and reflux of more sedate Humours* within us; the *dissipations* of our corporeal *Matter* by *insensible Transpiration*, and the *accesses of new* in the room of it; all this we are little acquainted with by any vital energie which ariseth from the union of Soul and Body: and therefore when we would acquaint our selves with the *Anatomy* and vital functions of our own Bodies, we are fain to use the same course and method that we would to find out the same things in any other kind of Animal, as if our Souls had as little to doe with any of these in our own Bodies, as they have in the Bodies of any other Brute creature.

But on the other side, we know as well, that many things that are done by us, are done at the dictate and by the commission of our own Wills; and therefore all such Actions as these are, we know, without any great store of Discursive inquiry, to attribute to their own proper causes, as seeing the efflux and propagation of them. We doe not by a naked speculation know our Bodies first to have need of nourishment, and then by the Edict of our Wills injoyn our Spirits and Humours to put themselves into an hungry

and craving posture within us by corroding the Tunicles of the Stomach ; but we first find our own Souls sollicitated by these motions, which yet we are able to gainsay, and to deny those petitions which they offer up to us. We know we commonly meditate and discourse of such Arguments as we our selves please : we mould designs, and draw up a plot of means answerable thereto, according as the free vote of our own Souls determines ; and use our own Bodies many times, notwithstanding all the reluctancies of their nature, onely as our Instruments to serve the will and pleasure of our Souls. All which as they evidently manifest a true *Distinction* between *the Soul* and *the Body*, so they doe as evidently prove the *Supremacy* and dominion which the Soul hath over the Body. Our Moralists frequently dispute what kind of government that is whereby the *Soul*, or rather *Will*, rules over the *Sensitive* Appetite, which they ordinarily resolve to be *Imperium politicum* ; though I should rather say, that all good men have rather a true *despotical power* over their *Sensitive faculties*, and over the whole Body, though they use it onely according to the laws of Reason and Discretion. And therefore the *Platonists* and *Stoicks* thought the Soul of man to be absolutely freed from all the power of *Astral Necessity*, and uncontroulable impressions arising from the subordination and mutual Sympathie and Dependance of all mundane causes, which is their proper notion of *Fate*. Neither ever durst that bold *Astrologie* which presumes to tell the Fortunes of all corporeal Essences, attempt to enter into the secrets of man's Soul, or predict the destinies thereof. And indeed whatever the destinies thereof may be that are contained in the vast volume of an Infinite and Almighty Mind, yet we evidently find a τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, an αὐτεξούσιον, a liberty of Will within our selves, maugre the stubborn malice of all Second Causes. And *Aristotle*, who seems to have disputed so much against that αὐτοκινήσια of Souls which his Master

before him had soberly maintained, does indeed but quarrel with that common sense and Experience which we have of our Souls; this *αὐτοκίνησις* of the Soul being nothing else but that Innate force and power which it hath within it, to stir up such thoughts and motions within it self as it finds it self most free to. And therefore when we reflect upon the productions of our own Souls, we are soon able to find out the first Efficient cause of them. And though the subtilty of some Wits may have made it difficult to find out whether the *Understanding* or the *Will* or some other Facultie of the Soul be the *First Mover*, whence the *motus primò primus* (as they please to call it) proceeds; yet we know it is originally the Soul it self whose vital acts they all are: and although it be not *αὐτόθεν πρώτη* the First Cause as deriving all its virtue from it self, as *Simplicius* distinguisheth in 1. *de An. cap. 1.* yet it is *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις φυσικῇ*, vitally co-working with the First Causes of all. But on the other side, when we come to examine those Motions which arise from the Body, this stream runs so far under ground, that we know not how to trace it to the head of it; but we are fain to *analyse* the whole artifice, looking from the *Spirits* to the *Blood*, from that to the *Heart*, viewing all along the *Mechanical* contrivance of *Veins* and *Arteries*: neither know we after all our search whether there be any *Perpetuum mobile* in our own Bodies, or whether all the motions thereof be onely by the redundancy of some external motions without us; nor how to find the First mover in nature; though could we find out that, yet we know that there is a Fatal determination which fits in all the wheels of meer Corporeal motion; neither can they exercise any such noble freedome as we constantly find in the Wills of men, which are as large and unbounded in all their Elections as Reason it self can represent Being it self to be.

*Lucretius*, that he might avoid the dint of this Argument,



according to the *Genius* of his Sect feigns this *Liberty* to arise from a *Motion of declination*, whereby his *Atomes* alwaies moving downwards by their own weight towards the Centre of the World, are carried a little obliquely, as if they tended toward some point different from it, which he calls *clinamen principiorum*. Which riddle though it be as good as any else which they, who held the *Materiality* and *Mortality* of Souls in their own nature, can frame to salve this difficulty; yet is of such a *private interpretation*, that I believe no *Oedipus* is able to expound it. But yet by what we may guesse at it, we shall easily find that this insolent conceit (and all else of this nature) destroys the *Freedome of Will*, more then any *Fate* which the severest censours thereof, whom he sometimes taxeth, ever set over it. For how can any thing be made subject to a free and impartial debate of Reason, or fall under the Level of Free-will, if all things be the meer result either of a Fortuitous or Fatal motion of Bodies, which can have no power or dominion over themselves? and why should he or his great Master find so much fault with the *Superstition* of the world, and condemn the Opinions of other men when they compare them with that transcendent sagacity they believe themselves to be the Lords of, if all was nothing else but the meer issue of *Material* motions; seeing that *necessity* which would arise from a *different concourse* and *motion* of *several particles* of *Matter* begetting that *diversity* of *Opinions* and *Wills*, would excuse them all from any blame?

Therefore to conclude this Argument, Whatsoever Essence finds this *Freedome* within it self, whereby it is absolved from the rigid laws of *Matter*, may know it self also to be *Immaterial*; and having dominion over its own actions, it will never desert it self: and because it finds it self *non vi alienâ sed suâ moveri*, as *Tully* argues, it feels it self able to preserve it self from the forrein force of *Matter*, and can say of all those assaults which are at any time made against



those sorry mud-walls which in this life inclose it, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ, as the *Stoick* did, all this is nothing to me, who am yet free and can command within, when this feeble Carkass is able no longer to obey me ; and when that is shattered and broken down, I can live any where else without it ; for I was not *That*, but had only a command over *It*, while I dwelt in it.

But before we wholly desert this Head, we may adde some further strength to it, from the Observation of that Conflict which the Reasons and Understandings of men maintain against the *Sensitive appetite* : and wheresoever the Higher powers of Reason in a man's Soul prevail not, but are vanquish'd by the impetuosity of their Sensual affections through their own neglect of themselves ; yet are they never so broken, but they may strengthen themselves again : and where they subdue not men's inordinate Passions and Affections, yet even there will they condemn them for them. Whereas were a Man all of one piece, and made up of nothing else but *Matter* ; these Corporeal motions could never check or controul themselves, these *Material* dimensions could not struggle with themselves, or by their own strength render themselves any thing else then what they are. But this αὐτεξούσιος ζωή, as the Greeks call it, this *Self-potent Life* which is in the Soul of man, acting upon it self and drawing forth its own latent Energie, finds it self able to tame the outward man, and bring under those rebellious motions that arise from the meer *Animal powers*, and to tame and appease all those seditions and mutinies that it finds there. And if any can conceive all this to be nothing but a meer fighting of the *male-contented* pieces of *Matter* one against another, each striving for superiority and preeminence ; I should not think it worth the while to teach such an one any higher learning, as looking upon him to be indued with no higher a Soul then that which moves in Beasts or Plants.

## CHAPTER V.

*The third Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That Mathematical Notions argue the Soul to be of a true Spiritual and Immaterial Nature.*

WE shall now consider the Soul awhile in a further degree of *Abstraction*, and look at it in those *Actions* which depend not at all upon the *Body*, wherein it doth τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν ἀσπάξασθαι, as the Greeks speak, and converseth onely with its own Being. Which we shall first consider in those λόγοι μαθηματικοί or *Mathematical notions* which it contains in it self, and sends forth within it self; which as they are in themselves *Indivisible*, and of such a perfect nature as cannot be received or immersed into *Matter*; so they argue that *Subject* in which they are seated to be of a true *Spiritual* and *Immaterial* nature. Such as a pure *Point*, *Linea ἀπλατῆς*, *Latitude abstracted from all Profundity*, the *Perfection of Figures*, *Æquality*, *Proportion*, *Symmetry* and *Asymmetry of Magnitudes*, the *Rise and propagation of Dimensions*, *Infinite divisibility*, and many such like things; which every ingenuous Son of that Art cannot but acknowledge to be the true characters of some *Immaterial* Being, seeing they were never buried in *Matter*, nor extracted out of it: and yet these are transcendently more certain and infallible Principles of Demonstration than any *Sensible* thing can be. There is no Geometrician but will acknowledge *Angular sections*, or the cutting of an *Arch* into any number of parts required, to be most exact without any diminution of the whole; but yet no Mechanical art can possibly so perform either, but that the place of section will detract something from the whole. If any one should endeavour to double a *Cube*, as the *Delian Oracle* once commanded the *Athenians*, requiring them to duplicate the dimensions of *Apollo's Altar*, by any Mechanicall subtilty; he would find it as impossible as they did, and

be as much laugh'd at for his pains as some of their Mechanicks were. If therefore no *Matter* be capable of any Geometrical effections, and the *Apodictical* precepts of Geometry be altogether unimitable in the purest Matter that Phansie can imagine ; then must they needs depend upon something infinitely more pure then *Matter*, which hath all that *Stability* and *Certainty* within it self which it gives to those infallible Demonstrations.

We need not here dispute with *Empedocles*,

Γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁρώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.

*We know earth by earth, fire by fire, and water by water*, that is, by the Archetypal *Idea's* of all things in our own Souls ; though it may be it were no hard matter to prove that, as in this case *S. Austin* did, when in his Book *de Quant. animae*, he would prove the Immortality of the Soul from these notions of Quantity, which come not by any possible Sense or Experience which we can make of bodily Being, and therefore concludes they must needs be immediately ingraven upon an Immaterial Soul. For though we could suppose our *Senses* to be the School-Dames that first taught us the Alphabet of this learning ; yet nothing else but a true Mental Essence could be capable of it, or so much improve it as to *unbody* it all, and strip it naked of any Sensible garment, and then onely, when it hath done it, embrace it as its own, and commence a true and perfect understanding of it. And as we all hold it impossible to shrink up any Material Quality, which will perpetually spread it self commensurably to the Matter it is in, into a Mathematical point : so is it much more impossible to extend and stretch forth any Immaterial and unbodied Quality or notion according to the dimensions of *Matter*, and yet to preserve the integrity of its own nature.

Besides, in these *Geometricall* speculations we find that our Souls will not consult with our Bodies, or ask any leave of our Fansies how or how far they shall distribute their

own notions by a continued progress of Invention; but spending upon their own stock, are most free and liberal, and make Fansie onely to serve their own purpose in painting out not what Matter will afford a copie of, but what they themselves will dictate to it; and if that should be too busie, silence and controul it by their own Imperial laws. They so little care for *Matter* in this kind of work, that they banish it as far as may be from themselves, or else chastise and tame the unruly and refractory nature of it, that it should yield it self pliable to their sovereign commands. These *Embodied Bodies* (for so this present Argument will allow me to call them) which our Senses converse with, are perpetually justling together, contending so irresistably each for its own room and space to be in, and will not admit of any other into it, preserving their own intervals: but when they are once in their *Unbodied nature* entertained into the Mind, they can easily penetrate one another  $\delta\lambda\alpha\ \delta\iota'\ \delta\lambda\alpha$ . The Soul can easily pyle the vastest number up together in her self, and by her own force sustain them all, and make them all couch together in the same space: she can easily pitch up all those *Five Regular Bodies* together in her own Imagination, and inscribe them one in another, and then entring into the very heart and centre of them, discern all their Properties and several Respects one to another; and thus easily find her self freed from all Material or Corporeal confinement; shewing how all that which we call *Body*, rather issued forth by an infinite projection from some *Mind*, then that it should exalt it self into the nature of any Mental Being; and, as the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans* have long since well observed, how our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then our Souls in them. And so I have done with that Particular.

## CHAPTER VI.

*The Fourth Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. That those clear and stable Ideas of Truth which are in Man's Mind evince an Immortal and Immaterial Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body. The Soul more knowable than the Body. Some passages out of Plotinus and Proclus for the further confirming of this Argument.*

AND NOW we have traced *the Immortality of the Soul*, before we were aware, through those Three Relations or σχέσεις, or (if you will) Degrees of knowledge, which *Proclus* in his Comment upon *Plato's Timæus* hath attributed to it, which he calls τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων σειράν. The First is αἴσθησις ἄλογος, a naked perception of Sensible impressions, without any work of Reason. The Second, δόξα μετὰ λόγου, a Miscellaneous kind of knowledge arising of a collation of its Sensations with its own more obscure and dark *Idea's*. The Third, διάνοια καὶ λόγος, Discourse and Reason, which the *Platonists* describe Mathematical knowledge by, which, because it spins out its own notions by a constant series of Deduction, knitting up Consequences one upon another by Demonstrations, is by him call'd νόησις μεταβατική, a Progressive kind of knowledge; to which he addes a Fourth, which we shall now make use of for a further Proof of *the Immortality of the Soul*. There is therefore Fourthly νόησις ἀμετάβατος, which is a naked Intuition of Eternal Truth which is alwaies the same, which never rises nor sets, but alwaies stands still in its Vertical, and fills the whole Horizon of the Soul with a mild and gentle light. There are such calm and serene *Idea's* of Truth, that shine onely in *pacate* Souls, and cannot be discerned by any *troubled* or fluid Fancy, that necessarily prove a μόνιμον καὶ στάσιμόν τι, some *Permanent and Stable Essence* in the Soul of man, which (as *Simplicius* on *Epictet.* well observes) ariseth onely ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου τινός, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμεταβλήτου αἰτίας,

τῆς αἰὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης, *from some immoveable and unchangeable Cause which is alwaies the same.* For these Operations about Truth we now speak of, are not χρονικαὶ ἐνέργειαι any *Chronical Energies*, as he further expresses it, but the true badges of an Eternal nature, and speak a ταυτότης and στάσις (as *Plato* is wont to phrase it) in man's Soul. Such are the *Archetypall Idea's* of *Justice, Wisdome, Goodness, Truth, Eternity, Omnipotency*, and all those either *Morall, Physicall, or Metaphysical* notions, which are either the *First Principles* of Science, or the *Ultimate* complement and final perfection of it. These we alwaies find to be *the same*, and know that no Exorcisms of Material mutations have any power over them: though we our selves are but of yesterday, and mutable every moment, yet these are Eternall, and depend not upon any mundane vicissitudes; neither could we ever gather them from our observation of any Material thing where they were never sown.

If we reflect but upon our own Souls, how manifestly doe the *Species* of *Reason, Freedome, Perception*, and the like, offer themselves to us, whereby we may *know* a thousand times *more distinctly* what our *Souls* are then what our *Bodies* are? For the former we know by an immediate converse with our selves, and a distinct sense of their Operations; whereas all our knowledge of the Body is little better then meerly *Historicall*, which we gather up by scraps and piecemeals from more doubtfull and uncertain experiments which we make of them: but the notions which we have of a *Mind*, *i.e.* something within us that *thinks, apprehends, reasons, and discourses*, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a *Body*, that we can easily conceive that if all *Body-Being* in the world were destroyed, yet we might then as well subsist as now we doe. For whensoever we take notice of those *Immediate motions* of our own *Minds* whereby they make themselves known to



us, we find no such thing in them as *Extension* or *Divisibility*, which are contained in every Corporeal essence: and having no such thing discovered to us from our nearest familiarity with our own Souls, we could never so easily know whether they had any such things as Bodies joyned to them or not, did not those extrinsecal impressions that their turbulent motions make upon them admonish them thereof.

But as the more we reflect upon our own Minds, we find all Intelligible things more clear, (as when we look up to the Heavens, we see all things more bright and radiant, then when we look down upon this dark Earth when the Sun-beams are drawn away from it:) so when we see all Intelligible Being concentrating together in a greater *Oneness*, and all kind of *Multiplicity* running more and more into the strictest *Unity*, till at last we find all Variety and Division suck'd up into a perfect *Simplicity*, where all happily conspire together in the most undivided peace and friendship; we then easily perceive that the reason of all Diversity and Distinction is (that I may use *Plotinus* his words not much differently from his meaning) *μετάβασις ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς λογισμὸν*. For though in our contentious pursuits after Science, we cast *Wisdom*, *Power*, *Eternity*, *Goodness* and the like into several formalities, that so we may trace down Science in a constant chain of Deductions; yet in our naked Intuitions and visions of them, we clearly discern that *Goodness* and *Wisdom* lodge together, *Justice* and *Mercy* kiss each other: and all these and whatsoever pieces else the crack'd glasses of our Reasons may sometime break Divine and Intelligible Being into, are fast knit up together in the invincible bonds of *Eternity*. And in this sense is that notion of *Proclus* descanting upon *Plato's* riddle of the Soul, [*ὡς γεννητὴ καὶ ἀγέννητος*, as if it were generated and yet not generated] to be understood; *χρόνος ᾧμα καὶ αἰὼν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν*, the Soul partaking of *Time* in its broken and



particular conceptions and apprehensions, and of *Eternity* in its comprehensive and stable contemplations. I need not say that when the Soul is once got up to the top of this bright *Olympus*, it will then no more doubt of its own *Immortality*, or fear any *Dissipation*, or doubt whether any drowsie *Sleep* shall hereafter seize upon it : no, it will then feel it self grasping fast and safely its own *Immortality*, and view it self in the *Horizon* of *Eternity*. In such sober kind of *Ecstasies* did *Plotinus* find his own Soul separated from his Body, as if it had divorc'd it for a time from it self : πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἑμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ γενόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἑμαυτοῦ δὲ εἰσω, θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον ὄρων κάλλος, &c. *I being often awakened into a sense of my self, and being sequestred from my body, and betaking my self from all things else into my self ; what admirable beauty did I then behold, &c.* as he himself tells us, *En. 4. l. 8, c. 1.* Thus is that *Intelligence* begotten which *Proclus l. 2. in Plat. Tim.* calls a *Correction of Science* : his notion is worth our taking notice of, and gives us in a manner a brief recapitulation of our former discourse, shewing how the higher we ascend in the contemplation of the Soul, the higher still we rise above this low sphere of Sense and Matter. His words are these, Αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὡς μὲν ἐν ψυχᾷ ἀνέλεγκτός ἐστιν, ἐλέγχεται δ' ἀπὸ νοῦ, &c. that is, *Science as it is in the Soul* (by which he means the Discursive power of it) *is blameless, but yet is corrected by the Mind ; as resolving that which is Indivisible, and dividing Simple Being as if it were Compounded : as Fancy corrects Sense for discerning with passion and material mixture, from which that purifies its object ; Opinion corrects Fancy, because it apprehends things by forms and phantasms, which it self is above ; and Science corrects Opinion, because it knows without discerning of causes ; and the Mind (as was insinuated) or the Intuitive faculty corrects the Scientifical, because by a Progressive kind of Analysis it divides the Intelligible*

*Object, where it self knows and sees things together in their undivided essence: wherefore this onely is Immoveable, and Science or Scientifical reason is inferiour to it in the knowledge of true Being.* Thus he.

But here we must use some caution, lest we should arrogate too much to the power of our own Souls, which indeed cannot raise up themselves into that *pure and steddy contemplation* of true Being; but will rather act with some *Multiplicity* or ἐτερότης (as they speak) attending it. But thus much of its high original may appear to us, that it can (as our Author told us) *correct* it self, for *dividing* and *disjoyning* therein, as knowing all to be every way *One* most *entire* and *simple*: though yet all men cannot easily improve their own Understandings to this High degree of Comprehension; and therefore all ancient Philosophers and *Aristotle* himself made it the peculiar priviledge of some men more abstracted from themselves and all corporeall commerce.

## CHAPTER VII.

*What it is that, beyond the Highest and most subtile Speculations whatsoever, does clear and evidence to a Good man the Immortality of his Soul. That True Goodness and Vertue begets the most raised Sense of this Immortality. Plotinus his excellent Discourse to this purpose.*

AND now that we may conclude the Argument in hand, we shall adde but this one thing further to clear the Soul's *Immortality*, and it is indeed that which breeds a true sense of it, viz. *True and reall goodness*. Our *highest speculations* of the Soul may beget a sufficient conviction thereof within us, but yet it is onely *True Goodness and Vertue* in the Souls of men that can make them both *know* and *love*, *believe* and *delight* themselves in their own *Immortality*. Though every good man is not so Logically subtile as to be able by fit *mediums* to demonstrate his own Immortality, yet

he sees it in a higher light : His Soul being purged and enlightned by true Sanctity is more capable of those Divine irradiations, whereby it feels it self in conjunction with God, and by a *συναύγεια* (as the Greeks speak) the Light of divine goodness mixing it self with the light of its own Reason, sees more clearly not onely that it may, if it please the supreme Deity, of its own nature exist eternally, but also that it shall doe so: it knows it shall never be deserted of that free Goodness that alwaies embraceth it: it knows that Almighty Love, which it lives by, to be stronger then death, and more powerful then the grave; it will not suffer those holy ones that are partakers of it to lie in hell, or their Souls to see corruption; and though worms may devour their flesh, and putrefaction enter into those bones that fence it, yet it knows that its Redeemer lives, and that it shall at last see him with a pure Intellectual eye, which will then be clear and bright, when all that earthly dust, which converse with this mortal body filled it with, shall be wiped out: It knows that God will never forsake his own life which he hath quickned in it; he will never deny those ardent desires of a blissful fruition of himself, which the lively sense of his own Goodness hath excited within it: those breathings and gaspings after an eternal participation of him are but the Energy of his own breath within us; if he had had any mind to destroy it, he would never have shewn it such things as he hath done; he would not raise it up to such *Mounts of Vision*, to shew it all the glory of that heavenly *Canaan* flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures, and then tumble it down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Non-entity. Divine goodness cannot, it will not, be so cruel to holy souls that are such ambitious suitors for his love. The more they contemplate the blissfull Effluxes of his divine love upon themselves, the more they find themselves strengthened with an undaunted confidence in him; and

look not upon themselves in these poor bodily relations and dependences, but in their eternal alliances, ὡς κόσμιοι, ὡς υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, (as *Arrianus* sometimes speaks) as the Sons of God who is the Father of Souls, Souls that are able to live any where in this spacious Universe, and better out of this dark and lonesome Cell of Bodily matter, which is alwaies checking and clogging them in their noble motions, then in it: as knowing that when they leave this Body, they shall then be received into everlasting habitations, and converse freely and familiarly with that Source of Life and Spirit which they conversed with in this life in a poor disturbed and streightned manner. It is indeed nothing else that makes men question the Immortality of their Souls, so much as *their own base and earthly loves*, which *first* makes them *wish* their Souls were not immortal, and then to *think* they are not: which *Plotinus* hath well observed, and accordingly hath soberly pursued this argument.

I cannot omit a large recital of his Discourse, which tends so much to disparage that flat and dull Philosophy which these later Ages have brought forth; as also those heavy-spirited Christians that find so little divine life and activity in their own Souls, as to imagine them to fall into such a dead sleep as soon as they leave this earthly tabernacle, that they cannot be awakened again, till that last Trumpet and the voice of an Archangel shall rouse them up. Our Authors discourse is this, *Enn. 4. lib. 7. c. 10.* having first premised this Principle, *That every Divine thing is immortall*, λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν, μὴ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι, &c. *Let us now consider a Soul* (saith he) *not such an one as is immerst into the Body, having contracted unreasonable Concupiscence and Anger* (ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, according to which they were wont to distinguish between the Irascible and Concupiscible faculty) *and other Passions; but such a one as hath cast away these, and as little as may be communicates with the Body: such a one as this will sufficiently*

manifest that all Vice is unnaturall to the Soul, and something acquired onely from abroad; and that the best Wisdome and all other Vertues lodge in a purged Soul, as being allyed to it. If therefore such a Soul shall reflect upon it self, how shall it not appear to it self to be of such a kind of nature as Divine and Eternall Essences are? For Wisdome and true Vertue being Divine Effluxes can never enter into any unhallowed and mortall thing: it must therefore needs be Divine, seeing it is fill'd with a Divine nature διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον by its kindred and consanguinity therewith. Whoever therefore amongst us is such a one, differs but little in his Soul from Angelicall essences; and that little is the present inhabitation in the Body, in which he is inferiour to them. And if every man were of this raised temper, or any considerable number had but such holy Souls, there would be no such Infidels as would in any sort disbelieve the Soul's Immortality. But now the vulgar sort of men beholding the Souls of the generality so mutilated and deform'd with Vice and Wickedness, they cannot think of the Soul as of any Divine and Immortall Being; though indeed they ought to judge of things as they are in their own naked essences, and not with respect to that which extraessentially adheres to them; which is the great prejudice of knowledge. Contemplate therefore the Soul of man, denuding it of all that which it self is not, or let him that does this view his own Soul; then he will believe it to be Immortall, when he shall behold it ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ, fixt in an Intelligible and pure nature; he shall then behold his own Intellect contemplating not any Sensible thing, but Eternall things, with that which is Eternall, that is, with it self, looking into the Intellectual world, being it self made all Lucid, Intellectuall, and shining with the Sun-beams of eternall Truth, borrowed from the First Good, which perpetually rayeth forth his Truth upon all Intellectuall Beings. One thus qualified may seem without any arrogance to take up that saying of

Empedocles, Χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῶν θεὸς ἀμβροτος.—*Farewell all earthly allies, I am henceforth no mortall wight, but an Immortall Angel, ascending up into Divinity, and reflecting upon that likeness of it which I find in my self. When true Sanctity and Purity shall ground him in the knowledge of divine things, then shall the inward Sciences, that arise from the bottome of his own Soul, display themselves; which indeed are the onely true Sciences: for the Soul runs not out of it self to behold Temperance and Justice abroad, but its own light sees them in the contemplation of its own Being, and that divine essence which was before enshrined within it self.*

I might after all this adde many more Reasons for a further confirmation of this present *Thesis*, which are as numerous as the Soul's relations and productions themselves are; but to every one who is willing to doe his own Soul right, this Evidence we have already brought in is more than sufficient.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*An Appendix containing an Enquiry into the Sense and Opinion of Aristotle concerning the Immortality of the Soul. That according to him the Rational Soul is separable from the Body and Immortall. The true meaning of his Intellectus Agens and Patiens.*

HAVING done with the several Proofs of the Soul's Immortality (that great Principle of Naturall Theology, which if it be not entertain'd as a *Communis Notitia*, as I doubt not but that it is by the Vulgar sort of men, or as an Axiome, or, if you will, a Theoreme of free and impartial Reason, all endeavours in Religion will be very cool and languid) it may not be amiss to enquire a little concerning *His* opinion whom so many take for the great Intelligencer of Nature and Omniscient Oracle of Truth; though it be too manifest that he hath so defaced the sacred Monuments



of the ancient Metaphysical Theology by his profane hands, that it is hard to see that lovely face of Truth which was once engraven upon them (as some of his own Interpreters have long agoe observed) and so blurr'd those fair Copies of divine learning which he received from his Predecessours, that his late Interpreters (who make him their All) are as little sometime acquainted with his meaning and design, as they are with that Elder philosophy which he so corrupts : which indeed is the true reason they are so ambiguous in determining his Opinion of *the Soul's immortality* ; which yet he often asserts and demonstrates in his Three Books *de Anima*. We shall not here traverse this *Notion* through them all, but onely briefly take notice of that which hath made his Expositours stumble so much in this point ; the main whereof is that *Definition* which he gives of the *Soul*, wherein he seems to make it nothing else for the *Genus* of it, but an *Entelechia* or *Informative thing*, which spends all its virtue upon that Matter which it informs, and cannot act any other way then meerly by *information* ; being indeed nothing else but some Material *εἶδος*, like an impression in wax which cannot subsist without it, or else the result of it : whence it is that he calls onely either *Material Forms*, or the Functions and Operations of those Forms, by this name. But indeed he intended not this for a *general* Definition of the Soul of man, and therefore after he had lai'd down this *particular* Definition of the Soul, *lib. 2. cap. 1.* he tells us expresly, That that which we call the *Rational Soul* is χωριστή or *separable from the Body*, διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειαν, *because it is not the Entelech of any Body*. Which he laies down the demonstration of in several places of all those Three books, by enquiring εἰ ἔστι τὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, as he speaks, *lib. 1. cap. 1. whether the Soul hath any proper function or operation of its own*, or whether all be compounded and result from the Soul and Body together :



and in this inquirie finding that all *Sensations* and *Passions* arise as well from the *Body* as from the *Soul*, and spring out of the conjunction of both of them (which he therefore calls *ἐνυλοι λόγοι*, as being begotten by the Soul upon the Body) he concludes that all this savours of nothing else but a *Material* nature, *inseparable* from the Body. But then finding acts of Mind and Understanding, which cannot be propagated from *Matter*, or *causally* depend upon the *Body*, he resolves the Principles from whence they flow to be *Immortal*; which he thus sets down *lib. 2. cap. 2.* περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδέπω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, &c. that is, *Now as for the Mind and Theoreticall power, it appears not, viz. that they belong to that Soul which in the former Chapter was defined by ἐντελέχεια, but it seems to be another kind of Soul, and that onely is separable from the Body, as that which is Eternal and Immortal from that which is Corruptible. But the other Powers or Parts of the Soul (viz. the Vegetative and Sensitive) are not separable, καθάπερ φασί τινες, as some think.* Where by these [*τινές some*] which he here refutes, he manifestly means the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, who held that all kinds of Souls were immortal, as well the Souls of beasts as of men; whereas he upon that former enquirie concluded that nothing was immortal, but that which is the Seat of Reason and Understanding: and so his meaning is, that this Rational Soul is altogether a distinct Essence from those other; or else that glory which he makes account he reaps from his supposed victory over the other Sects of Philosophers will be much eclipsed, seeing they themselves did not so much contend for that which he decries, *viz.* an exercise of any such *Informative faculties* in a state of Separation, neither doe we find them much more to reject one part of that complex Axiome of <sup>1</sup> his, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος,

<sup>1</sup> *Lib. 3. c. 4.*

ὁ δὲ νοῦς χωριστός, *That which is sensitive is not without the Body, but the Intellect or Mind is separable*, then they doe the other.

The other difficulty which *Aristotle's* opinion seems to be clogg'd withall is that Conclusion which he laies down *lib. 3. c. 5.* ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, which is commonly thus expounded, *Intellectus patiens est corruptibilis*. But all this difficulty will soon be cleared, if once it may appear how ridiculous their conceit is, that from that Chapter fetch that idle distinction of *Intellectus Agens* and *Patiens*; meaning by the *Agens*, that which prepares phantasmes, and exalts them into the nature of intelligible *species*, and then propounds them to the *Patiens* to judge thereof: whereas indeed he means nothing else by his νοῦς παθητικός, but onely the Understanding *in potentia*, and by his νοῦς ποιητικός, the same *in actu* or *in habitu*, as the Schoolmen are wont to phrase it; and accordingly thus laies down his meaning and method of this notion. In the preceding Chapter of that Book, he disputes against *Plato's* Connate *species*, as being afraid, lest if the Soul should be prejudiced by any home-born notions, it would not be indifferent to the entertaining of any other Truth. Where, by the way, we may observe how unreasonable his Argument is: for if the Soul hath no such stock of principles to trade with, nor any proper notions of its own that might be a κριτήριον of all Opinions, it would be so indifferent to any, that the foulest Errour might be as easily entertained by it as the fairest Truth; neither could it ever know what guest it receives, whether Truth, or Falshood. But yet our Author found himself able to swallow down this absurdity, though when he had done he could not well digest it. For he could not but take notice of that which was obvious for any one to reply, That πᾶς νοῦς ἐστὶ νοητός, and so reflecting upon it self, may find matter within to work upon; and so laies down this scruple in a way not much

different from his Masters, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστι, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά, &c. *but the Soul it self is also intelligible, as well as all other intelligible natures are; and in those Beings which are purely abstracted from Matter, that which understands is the same with that which is understood.* Thus he. But not being Master of this notion, he finds it a little too unruly for him, and falls to enquire why the Soul should not then alwaies be *in actu*; quitting himself of the whole difficulty at once by telling us, that our souls are here clogg'd with a *Hyle* or *Matter* that cleaves to them, and so all the matter of their knowledge is contained in sensible objects, which they must extract out of them, being themselves onely ἐν δυνάμει or *in potentia ad intelligendum*. Just as in a like argument (Chap. 8.) he would needs perswade us, That the Understanding beholds all things in the glass of Phansie; and then questioning how our πρῶτα νοήματα or *First principles of knowledge* should be *Phantasmes*, he grants *that they are not indeed phantasmes, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων, but yet they are not without phantasmes*; which he thinks is enough to say, and so by his meer dictate without any further discussion to solve that knot: whereas in all *Reflex acts*, whereby the Soul reviews its own opinions, and finds out the nature of them, it makes neither use of Sense or *Phantasmes*; but acting immediately by its own power, finds it self ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν σωμάτων, as *Simplicius* observes.

But to return, This *Hyle* or *Matter* which our Author supposeth to hinder a free and uninterrupted exercise of Understanding, is indeed nothing else but the Souls *potentiality*; and not any kind of divisible or extended nature. And therefore when he thus distinguisheth between his *Intellectus Agens* and *Patiens*, he seems to mean almost nothing else but what our ordinary Metaphysitians doe in their distinction of *Actus* and *Potentia*, (as *Simplicius* hath truly observed) when they tell us, that the finest

created nature is made up of these two compounded together. For we must know that the *genius* of his Philosophy led him to fancy an ὑποκείμενον τι, *a certain subject or obediential power* in every thing that fell within the compass of Physical speculation, or that had any relation to any natural body ; and some other power which was εἰδοποιούν, that was of an *active and operating nature* : and consequently that both these Principles were in the Soul it self, which as it was capable of receiving impressions and *species* from the Phansie, and in a *posse* to understand, so it was *Passive* ; but as it doth actually understand, so it is ποιητικός or *Active*. And with this Notion he begins his 5. Chap. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι, τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστω γένει, &c. that is, *Seeing that in every nature there is something which as a First subject is all things potentially, and some Active principle which produceth all things, as Art doth in Matter ; it is necessary that the Soul also partake of these differences.* And this he illustrates by *Light* and *Colours* ; resembling the *Passive* power of the Intellect to *Colours*, the *Active* or Energetical to *Light* : and therefore he saies, *it is χωριστός, καὶ ἀμιγής, καὶ ἀπαθής, separable, unmixt, and impassible ;* and so at last concludes, *χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, in the state of Separation this Intellect is alwaies that which it is* (that is, it is alwaies *Active* and *Energetical*, as he had told us before, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὣν ἐνέργεια, *the essence of it being activity*) καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίδιον, οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, *and this onely is immortal and eternal, but we doe not remember because it is impassible.* In which last words he seems to disprove *Plato's Reminiscencia*, because the Soul in a state of Separation being alwaies in act, the *Passive* power of it, which then first begins to appear when it is embodied, could not represent or contain any such Traditionall *species* as the *Energetically* faculty acted upon before ; seeing there was then no Phansie to retain them in, as

*Simplicius* expounds it, διὸ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μνημονευτῶν νοήσει, δεόμεθα πάντως τοῦ μέχρι φαντασίας προϊόντος λόγου, because in all remembrance we must reflect upon our Phansie. And this our Author seems to glance at, it being indeed never out of his eye, in these words we have endeavoured to give an account of, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ, *But the Passive intellect is corruptible, and without this we can understand nothing in this life.* And thus our forenamed Commentator doubts not to glosse on them.

## CHAPTER IX.

*A main Difficulty concerning the Immortality of the Soul [viz. The strong Sympathy of the Soul with the Body] answered. An Answer to another Enquiry, viz. Under what account Impressions deriv'd from the Body do fall in Morality.*

WE have now done with the Confirmation of this Point, which is the main *Basis* of all Religion, and shall not at present trouble our selves with those difficulties that may seem to incumber it; which indeed are onely such as beg for ■ Solution, but doe not, if they be impartially considered, proudly contest with it: and such of them which depend upon any *hypothesis* which we may apprehend to be lai'd down in *Scripture*, I cannot think them to be of any such moment, but that any one who deals freely and ingenuously with this piece of God's truth, may from thence find a far better *ansa* of answering, then he can of moving of any scruples against the Souls Immortality, which that most strongly every where supposes, and does not so positively and ῥητῶς lay down, as presume that we have an antecedent knowledge of it, and therefore principally teaches us the right Way and Method of providing in this life for our happy subsistence in that eternal estate. And as for what pretends to *Reason* or *Experience*, I think it

may not be amiss briefly to search into one main difficulty concerning the Soul's Immortality : and that is, That strange kind of dependency which it seems to have on the Body, whereby it seems constantly to comply and sympathize therewith, and to assume to it self the frailties and infirmities thereof, to laugh and languish as it were together with that : and so when the Body is compos'd to rest, our Soul seems to sleep together with it ; and as the Spring of bodily Motion seated in our Brains is more clear or muddy, so the conceptions of our Minds are more distinct or disturbed.

To answer this difficulty, it might be enough perhaps to say, That the *Sympathy* of things is no sufficient Argument to prove the *Identity* of their essences by, as I think all will grant ; yet we shall endeavour more fully to solve it.

And for that purpose we must take notice, that though our Souls be of an Incorporeal nature, as we have already demonstrated, yet they are united to our Bodies, not as *Assisting forms* or *Intelligences*, as some have thought, but in some more immediate way ; though we cannot tell what that is, it being the great *arcanum* in Man's nature, that which troubled *Plotinus* so much, when he had contemplated the *Immortality* of it, that, as he speaks of himself, *Enn.* 4. *lib.* 8. *c.* 1, εἰς λογισμὸν ἀπὸ νοῦ καταβάς, ἀπορῶ πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο οὔσα οἶον ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτήν, καίπερ οὔσα ἐν σώματι. But indeed to make such a *Complex* thing as Man is, it was necessary that the *Soul* should be so united to the *Body*, as to share in its passions and infirmities so far as they are void of sinfulness. And as the *Body* alone could not perform any act of Sensation or Reason, and so it self become a ζῶον πολιτικόν, so neither would the *Soul* be capable of providing for the necessities of the *Body*, without some way whereby a feeling and sense of them might be conveyed to it ; neither could it take sufficient



care of this corporeal life, as nothing pertaining to it, were it not sollicited to a natural compunction and compassion by the indigencies of our Bodies. It cannot be a meer Mental Speculation that would be so sensibly affected with hunger or cold or other griefs that our Bodies necessarily partake of, to move our Souls to take care for their relief: and were there not such a commerce between our Souls and Bodies, as that our Souls also might be made acquainted by a pleasurable and delightful sense of those things that most gratifie our Bodies, and tend most to the support of their *Crisis* and temperament; the Soul would be apt wholly to neglect the Body, and commit it wholly to all changes and casualties. Neither would it be any thing more to us then the body of a Plant or Star, which we contemplate sometimes with as much contentment as we do our own bodies, having as much of the Theory of the one as of the other. And the relation that our Souls bear to such peculiar bodies as they inhabite, is one and the same in point of notion and speculation with that which they have to any other body: and therefore that which determines the Soul to this Body more then that, must be some subtile *vinculum* that knits and unites it to it in a more Physical way, which therefore *Proclus* sometimes calls πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, a *spiritual kind of vehicle*, whereby corporeal impressions are transferr'd to the Mind, and the dictates and decrees of that are carried back again into the Body to act and move it. *Heraclitus* wittily glancing at these mutual aspects and entercourses, calls them ἁμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, the Responsals or Antiphons wherein each of them catcheth at the others part and keeps time with it; and so he tells us that there is ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω, a way that leads upwards and downwards between the Soul and Body, whereby their affairs are made known to one another. For as the Soul could not have

<sup>1</sup> Plotin. *Enn.* 4. l. 8. c. 1.



■ sufficient relation of the state and condition of our Bodies, except it received some impressions from them ; so neither could our Souls make use of our Bodies, or derive their own virtue into them as they doe, without some intermediate motions. For as some motions may seem to have their beginning in our Bodies, or in some external mover, which are not known by our Souls till their advertency be awakened by the impetuousness of them : so some other motions are derived by our own Wills into our Bodies, but yet in such a way as they cannot be into any other body ; for we cannot by the meer Magical virtue of our Wills move any thing else without our selves, nor follow any such virtue by a concurrent sense of those mutations that are made by it, as we doe in our own Bodies.

And as this Conjugal affection and sympathy between Soul and Body are thus necessary to the Being of Mankind ; so we may further take notice of *some peculiar part* within us where all this first begins : which a late sagacious Philosopher hath happily observed to be in that part of the Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits up and down the Body take their first Original ; seeing we find all Motions that first arise in our Bodies, to direct their course straight up to that, as continually respecting it, and there onely to be sensated, and all the imperate motions of our Wills issuing forth from the same consistory. Therefore the Animal spirits, by reason of their constant mobility and swift motion, ascending to the place of our Nerves origination, move the Soul, which there sits enthron'd, in some mysterious way ; and descending at the beck of our Wills from thence, move all the Muscles and joynts in such sort as they are guided and directed by the Soul. And if we observe the subtile Mechanicks of our own Bodies, we may easily conceive how the least motion in these Animal Spirits will, by their relaxing or distending the Nerves, Membranes

and Muscles, according to their different quantity or the celerity and quality of their motions, beget all kind of motions likewise in the Organical part of our Bodies. And therefore that our Souls may the better inform our Bodies, they must perceive all their varieties; and because they have such an immediate proximity to these Spirits, therefore also all the Motions of our Souls in the highest way of Reason and Understanding are apt to stir these quick and nimble spirits alwaies attending upon them, or else fix them too much. And thus we may easily see that should our Souls be alwaies acting and working within us, our Bodies could never take that rest and repose which is requisite for the conservation of Nature. As we may easily perceive in all our studies and meditations that are most serious, our Spirits are the more fix'd, attending the beck of our Minds. And except this knot whereby our Souls are wedded to our Bodies were unloosed that our Souls were loose from them, they could not act, but presently some Motion or other would be imprest upon our Bodies: as every Motion in our Bodies that is extraordinary, when our Nerves are distended with the Animal spirits, by a continual communication of it self in these Nerves like so many intended Chords to their original, moves our Souls; and so though we alwaies perceive that one of them is primarily affected, yet we also find the other presently by consent to be affected too.

And because the Soul hath all Corporeal passions and impressions thus conveyed to it, without which it could not expresse a due benevolence to that Body which peculiarly belongs to it; therefore as the Motions of these Animal Spirits are more or less either disorderly and confus'd, or gentle and compos'd, so those Souls especially who have not by the exercise of true Vertue got the dominion over them, are also more or less affected proportionably in their operations. And therefore indeed

to question whether the Soul, that is of an Immortal nature, should entertain these corporeal passions, is to doubt whether God could make a Man or not, and to question that which we find by experience in our selves; for we find both that it doth thus, and yet that the Original of these is sometimes from Bodies, and sometimes again by the force of our Wills they are impress'd upon our Bodies.

Here by the way we may consider in a moral way what to judge of those *Impressions* that are derived from our Bodies to our Souls, which the *Stoicks* call *ἄλογα πάθη* not because they are repugnant to Reason, or are aberrations from it; but because they derive not their original from Reason, but from the Body, which is *ἄλογόν τι* and are by *Aristotle*, more agreeably to the ancient Dialect, called *ἔνυλοι λόγοι* *material* or *corporeal Idea's* or *impressions*. And these we may safely reckon, I think, amongst our *Adiaphora* in Morality, as being in themselves neither good nor evil, (as all the antient Writers have done) but onely are form'd into either by that stamp that the Soul prints upon them, when they come to be entertain'd into it. And therefore whereas some are apt in the most severe way to censure *τὰς πρώτας κατὰ φύσιν ὁρμάς*, all those Commotions and Passions that first affect our Souls; they might doe well more cautelously to distinguish between such of these motions as have their origination in our Bodies, and such as immediately arise from our Souls: else may we not too hastily displace the antient *termini*, and remove the land-marks of Vertue and Vice? For seeing the Soul could not descend into any corporeal act, as it must doe while it is more present to one body then another, except it could partake of the griefs and pleasures of the Body; can it be any more sinful for it to sensate this, then it is for it to be united to the Body? If our Soul could not know what it is to eat or drink, but onely

by a meer ratiocination, collecting by a drie syllogisticall discourse [That meats and drinks preserve the health and fabrick of the Body, repairing what daily exhales from it] without sensating any kind of grief in the want, or refreshment in the use, of them; it would soon suffer the Body to languish and decay. And therefore as these Bodily infirmities and passions are not evil in themselves; so neither are they evil as they first affect our Souls. When our *Animal Spirits*, begot of fine and good blood, gently and nimbly play up and down in our *Brains*, and swiftly flie up and down our whole Bodies, we presently find our Phansies raised with *mirth* and *chearfulness*: and as when our Phansies are thus exalted, we may not call this the *Energy of Grace*; so if our *Spleen* or *Hypochondria*, swelling with terrene and sluggish Vapours, send up such *Melancholick* fumes into our heads as move us to *sadness* and *timorousness*, we cannot justly call that *Vice*; nor when the *Gall* does degurgitate its bitter juyce into our *Liver*, which mingling it self with the blood, begets *fiery* Spirits that presently fly up into our Brain, and there beget impressions of *Anger* within us. The like we may say of those Corporeal passions which are not bred first of all by any Peccant humours or distemperatures in our own bodies, but are excited in us by any External objects which by those *idola* and images that they present to our Senses, or rather those Motions they make in them, may presently raise such commotions in our Spirits: For our Body maintains not onely a conspiracy and consent of all its own parts, but also it bears a like relation to other mundane bodies with which it is conversant, as being a part of the whole Universe. But when our Soul, once mov'd by the undisciplin'd petulancy of our Animal spirits, shall foment and cherish that Irrational Grief, Fear, Anger, Love, or any other such like Passions contrary to the dictates of Reason; it then sets the stamp of sinfulness

upon them. It is the consent of our own Wills that by brooding of them brings forth those hatefull Serpents. For though our Souls be espoused to these Earthly Bodies, and cannot but in some measure sympathize with them, yet hath the Soul a true dominion of its own acts. It is not the meer passion, if we take it in a Physicall sense, but rather some inordinate action of our own Wills that entertain it: and these passions cannot force our Wills, but we may be able to chastise and allay all the inordinacy of them by the power of our Wills and Reasons: and therefore God hath not made us under the necessity of sin, by making us men subject to such infirmities as these are which are meerly ζωαὶ σωματίων, as the Greek Philosopher hath well called them, *the blossomings and shootings forth of bodily life within us*; which is but τὸ ἀνθρώπινον or Humanity.

And, if I mistake not, our Divinity is wont sometimes to acknowledge some such thing in our Saviour himself, who was in all things made like to us, our sinfulness excepted. He was a *man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs*, as the Prophet *Esay* speaks of him: and when he was in bodily agonies and horrors, the powerfull assaults thereof upon his Soul moved him to petition his Father, that *if it were possible, that bitter Cup might pass from him*; and the sense of death so much afflicted him, that it bred in him the sad *griefs* which S. *Peter* expresseth by ὠδῖνας τοῦ θανάτου Act. 2. *the pangs or throes of death*, and that *fear* that extorted a *desire* to be freed from it, as it is insinuated by that in Heb. 5. 7. *he was delivered from what he feared*; for so the words, being nothing else but an Hebraism, are to be rendred, εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας. And we are wont to call this *the language and dictate of Nature* which lawfully endeavours to preserve it self, though presently an *higher principle* must bring all these under a subjection to God, and a free submission to his good pleasure: as it

was with our Saviour, who moderated all these passions by a ready resignation of himself and his own Will up to the Will of God; and though his Humanity crav'd for ease and relaxation, yet that Divine Nature that was within him would not have it with any repugnancy to the supreme Will of God.





A  
DISCOURSE  
Concerning  
THE EXISTENCE  
AND  
NATURE OF GOD.

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Agapetus ad Justinianum.

Ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γινῶς, γινώσεται θεόν· θεὸν δὲ ὁ γινούς, ὁμοιωθήσεται θεῷ· ὁμοιωθήσεται δὲ θεῷ, ὁ ἅγιος γενόμενος θεοῦ· ἅγιος δὲ γίνεται θεοῦ, ὁ μὴ δὲν ἀνάξιον πράττων θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ φρονῶν μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ, λαλῶν δὲ ἅ φρονεῖ, ποιῶν δὲ ἅ λαλεῖ.

M. T. Cicero l. 1. De Legibus.

*Ex tot generibus nullum est animal præter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei: ipsiſque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immanſueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamſi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum ſciat.*

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# OF THE EXISTENCE

AND

## NATURE OF GOD

### CHAPTER I.

*That the Best way to know God is by an attentive reflexion upon our own Souls. God more clearly and lively pictur'd upon the Souls of Men, then upon any part of the Sensible World.*

WE shall now come to the other *Cardinal Principle* of all Religion, and treat something *concerning God*. Where we shall not so much demonstrate *That he is*, as *What he is*.

Both which we may best learn from a *Reflexion upon our own Souls*, as *Plotinus* hath well taught us, *εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφω, εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει*, *He which reflects upon himself, reflects upon his own Originall*, and finds the clearest Impression of some Eternall Nature and Perfect Being stamp'd upon his own Soul. And therefore *Plato* seems sometimes to reprove the ruder sort of men in his times for their contrivance of Pictures and Images to put themselves in mind of the *Θεοί* or Angelicall Beings, and exhorts them to look into their own Souls, which are the fairest Images not onely of the Lower divine Natures, but of the Deity it self; God having so copied forth himself into the whole life and energy of man's Soul, as that the lovely Characters of Divinity may be most easily seen and read of all men within themselves: as they say *Phidias* the famous Statuary, after he had made the Statue of *Minerva* with the greatest

exquisiteness of Art to be set up in the *Acropolis* at *Athens*, afterwards impress'd his own Image so deeply in her buckler, *ut nemo delere posset aut divellere, qui totam statuam non imminueret*. And if we would know what the *Impresse* of Souls is, it is nothing but God himself, who could not write his own name so as that it might be read but onely in Rationall Natures. Neither could he make such without imparting such an Imitation of his own Eternall Understanding to them as might be a perpetual Memorial of himself within them. And whenever we look upon our own Soul in a right manner, we shall find an *Urim* and *Thummim* there, by which we may ask counsel of God himself, who will have this alway borne upon its breastplate.

There is nothing that so *embases* and *enthralls* the Souls of men, as the dismall and dreadfull thoughts of their own *Mortality*, which will not suffer them to look beyond this short span of Time, to see an houres length before them, or to look higher then these materiall Heavens; which though they could be stretch'd forth to infinity, yet would the space be too narrow for an enlightned mind, that will not be confined within the compass of corporeal dimensions. These black Opinions of Death and the Non-entity of Souls (darker then Hell it self) shrink up the free-born Spirit which is within us, which would otherwise be dilating and spreading it self boundlesly beyond all Finite Being: and when these sorry pinching mists are once blown away, it finds this narrow sphear of Being to give way before it; and having once seen beyond Time and Matter, it finds then no more ends nor bounds to stop its swift and restless motion. It may then fly upwards from one heaven to another, till it be beyond all orbe of Finite Being, swallowed up in the boundless Abyss of Divinity, *ὑπεράνω τῆς οὐσίας*, beyond all that which darker thoughts are wont to represent under the Idea of *Essence*. This is that *θεῖον σκότος* which the *Areopagite* speaks of, which the higher our Minds soare

into, the more incomprehensible they find it. Those dismall apprehensions which pinion the Souls of men to mortality, churlishly check and starve that noble life thereof, which would alwaies be rising upwards, and spread it self in a free heaven: and when once the Soul hath shaken off these, when it is once able to look through a grave, and see beyond death, it finds a vast Immensity of Being opening it self more and more before it, and the ineffable light and beauty thereof shining more and more into it; when it can rest and bear up it self upon an Immaterial centre of Immortality within, it will then find it self able to bear it self away by a self-reflexion into the contemplation of an Eternal Deity.

For though God hath copied forth his own Perfections in this conspicuous and sensible World, according as it is capable of entertaining them; yet the most clear and distinct copy of himself could be imparted to none else but to intelligible and inconspicable natures: and though the whole fabrick of this visible Universe be whispering out the notions of a Deity, and alway inculcates this lesson to the contemplators of it, ὡς ἐμὲ πεποίηκε ὁ θεός, as *Plotinus* expresseth it; yet we cannot understand it without some interpreter within. *The Heavens* indeed declare the glory of God, and the *Firmament* shews his handy-work, and the τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, that which may be known of God, even his eternal power and Godhead, as *S. Paul* tells us, is to be seen in these externall appearances: yet it must be something within that must instruct us in all these Mysteries, and we shall then best understand them, when we compare that copie which we find of them within our selves, with that which we see without us. The Schoolmen have well compared *Sensible* and *Intelligible* Beings in reference to the Deity, when they tell us that the one doe onely represent *Vestigia Dei*, the other *Faciem Dei*. We shall therefore here enquire what that Knowledge of a Deity is which

a due converse with our own naked Understandings will lead us into.

## CHAPTER II.

*How the Contemplation of our own Souls, and a right Reflexion upon the Operations thereof, may lead us into the knowledge of* 1. *The Divine Unity and Omniscience,* 2. *God's Omnipotence,* 3. *The Divine Love and Goodness,* 4. *God's Eternity,* 5. *His Omnipresence,* 6. *The Divine Freedom and Liberty.*

IT being our design to discourse more particularly of *that knowledge* of the Deity that we may learn immediately *from our selves*, we shall observe,

1. First, There is nothing whereby our own Souls are better known to us then by the Properties and Operations of *Reason*: but when we reflect upon our own *Idea* of *Pure* and *Perfect Reason*, we know that our own Souls are not it, but onely partake of it; and that it is of such a Nature that we cannot denominate any other thing of the same rank with our selves by; and yet we know certainly that it is, as finding from an inward sense of it within our selves that both we and other things else beside our selves partake of it, and that we have it *κατὰ μέθεξιν* and not *κατ' οὐσίαν* neither doe we or any *Finite* thing contain the source of it within our selves: and because we have a distinct Notion of the *most Perfect Mind* and *Understanding*, we own our deficiency therein. And as that *Idea* of *Understanding* which we have within us points not out to us This or That *Particular*, but something which is neither This nor That, but *Totall, Understanding*; so neither will any elevation of it serve every way to fit and answer that *Idea*. And therefore when we find that we cannot attain to *Science* but by a *Discursive* deduction of one thing from another, that our knowledge is confined, and is not fully adequate and commensurate to the largest Spheare of Being, it not running quite through it nor filling the whole *area* of it; or that our

knowledge is *Chronical* and *successive*, and cannot grasp all things at once, but works by intervals, and runs out into *Division* and *Multiplicity*; we know all this is from want of Reason and Understanding, and that a *Pure and Simple Mind and Intellect* is free from all these restraints and imperfections, and therefore can be no less than *Infinite*. As this *Idea* which we have of it in our own Souls will not suffer us to rest in any conception thereof which represents it less than *Infinite*: so neither will it suffer us to conceive of it any otherwise than as *One Simple Being*: and could we multiply Understandings into never so vast a number, yet should we be again collecting and knitting them up together in some Universal one. So that if we rightly reflect upon our own *Minds* and the *Method* of their *Energies*, we shall find them to be so framed, as not to admit of any other than *One Infinite* source of all that *Reason and Understanding* which themselves partake of, in which they live, move and have their Being. And therefore in the old Metaphysical Theology, an Originall and Uncreated *Movás* or *Unity* is made the Fountain of all Particularities and Numbers which have their Existence from the Efflux of its Almighty power.

2. And that is the next thing which our own Understandings will instruct us in concerning God, viz. *His Eternall Power*. For as we find a *Will* and *Power* within our selves to execute the Results of our own *Reason* and *Judgment*, so far as we are not hindred by some more potent Cause: so indeed we know it must be a mighty inward strength and force that must enable our Understandings to their proper functions, and that Life, Energy and Activity can never be separated from a Power of Understanding. The more *unbodied* any thing is, the more *unbounded* also is it in its *Effective* power: *Body* and *Matter* being the most sluggish, inert and unwieldy thing that may be, having no power from it self nor over it self: and therefore the *Purest Mind*



must also needs be the most *Almighty Life and Spirit*; and as it comprehends all things and sums them up together in its Infinite knowledge, so it must also comprehend them all in its own life and power. Besides, when we review our own Immortal Souls and their dependency upon some Almighty Mind, we know that we neither did nor could produce our selves; and withall know that all that *Power* which lies within the compass of our selves, will serve for no other purpose then to apply severall praeexistent things one to another, from whence all *Generations* and *Mutations* arise, which are nothing else but the *Events* of different applications and complications of Bodies that were existent before: and therefore that which produced that Substantiall Life and Mind by which we know our selves, must be something *much more Mighty* then we are, and can be no less indeed then *Omnipotent*, and must also be the First architect and δημιουργός of all other Beings, and the perpetuall Supporter of them.

3. We may also know from the same Principles, That an *Almighty Love*, every way commensurate to that most Perfect Being, eternally rests in it, which is as strong as that is Infinite, and as full of Life and Vigour as that is of Perfection. And because it finds no Beauty nor Loveliness but onely in that and the issues thereof, therefore it never does nor can fasten upon any thing else. And therefore the Divinity alwaies enjoies it self and its own Infinite perfections, seeing it is that Eternall and stable Sun of goodness that neither rises nor sets, is neither eclipsed nor can receive any encrease of light and beauty. Hence *the Divine Love* is never attended with those turbulent passions, perturbations, or wrestlings within it self, of *Fear, Desire, Grief, Anger*, or any such like, whereby *our Love* is wont to explicate and unfold its affection towards its Object. But as *the Divine Love* is perpetually most infinitely *ardent and potent*, so it is always *calm and serene*,

unchangeable, having no such ebbings and flowings, no such diversity of stations and retrogradations as that *Love* hath in us which ariseth from the weakness of our Understandings, that do not present things to us alwaies in the same Orient lustre and beauty: neither we nor any other mundane thing (all which are in a perpetual flux) are alwaies the same. Besides, though our *Love* may sometimes transport us and violently rend us from our selves and from all Self-enjoyment, yet the more forcible it is, by so much the more it will be apt to torment us, while it cannot centre it self in that which it so strongly endeavours to attract to it; and when it possesseth most, yet is it alwaies hungry and craving, as *Plotinus* hath well express'd it, πάντοτε πληροῦται καὶ πάντοτε ἐκρεῖ, it may alwaies be filling it self, but, like a leaking vessel, it will be alwaies emptying it self again. Whereas the Infinite ardour of the *Divine Love* arising from the unbounded perfection of the Divine Being, alwaies rests satisfied within it self, and so may rather be defin'd by a στάσις then a κίνησις, and is wrapt up and rests in the same Centrall Unity in which it first begins. And therefore I think some men of later times have much mistaken the nature of the *Divine Love*, in imagining that *Love* is to be attributed to God, as all other Passions are, rather *secundum effectum* then *affectum*: whereas *S. John*, who was well acquainted with this noble Spirit of *Love*, when he defin'd God by it, and calls him LOVE, meant not to signifie a bare nothing known by some Effects, but that which was infinitely such as it seems to be. And we might well spare our labour, when we so industriously endeavour to find something in God that might produce the Effects of some other Passions in us, which look rather like the Brats of Hell and Darkness then the lovely offspring of Heaven.

4. When we reflect upon all this which signifies some *Perfect Essence*, as a *Mind*, *Wisdom*, *Understanding*,

*Omnipotency, Goodness, and the like, we can find no such thing as Time or Place, or any Corporeall or Finite properties which arise indeed not ex plenitudine, but ex inopia entitatis; we may also know God to be Eternall and Omnipresent, not because he fills either Place or Time, but rather because he wanteth neither. That which first begets the Notion of Time in us, is nothing else but that Succession and Multiplicity which we find in our own Thoughts, which move from one thing to another, as the Sun in the Firmament is said to walk from one Planetary house to another, and to have his several Stages to pass by. And therefore where there is no such Vicissitude or Variety, as there can be no sense of Time, so there can be nothing of the thing. Proclus hath wittily observ'd that Saturne, or (as the Greeks call'd him) Κρόνος, was the first of the θεοὶ ἐπικόσμιοι or Mundane Gods, ὅτι ὅπου γένεσις, ἐκεῖ προηγείται χρόνος, because Time is necessarily presuppos'd to all Generation, which proceeds by certain motions and intervalls. This World is indeed a great Horologe to it self, and is continually numbring out its own age; but it cannot lay any sure hold upon its own past revolutions, nor can it gather up its infancy and old age, and couple them up together. Whereas an Infinitely-comprehensive Mind hath a Simultaneous possession of its own never-flitting life; and because it finds no Succession in its own immutable Understanding, therefore it cannot find any thing to measure out its own duration. And as Time lies in the Basis of all Finite life, whereby it is enabled by degrees to display all the virtue of its own Essence, which it cannot doe at once: so such an Eternity lies at the foundation of the Divinity, whereby it becomes one without any shadow of turning, as S. James speaks, without any Variety or Multiplicity within himself, which all created Beings that are carried down in the current of Time partake of. And therefore the Platonists were wont to attribute Αἰών or*

*Eternity* to God, not so much because he had neither beginning nor end of daies, but because of his Immutable and Uniform nature, which admits of no such variety of Conceptions as all *Temporary* things doe: And *Time* they attributed to all created Beings, because there is a *γένεσις* or constant generation both of and in their essence, by reason whereof we may call any of them, as *Proclus* tells us, by that borrowed expression, *ἐνν καὶ νέαν old and new*, being every moment as it were re-produced, and acting something which it did not individually before. Though otherwise they supposed *This World*, constantly depending upon the Creatour's Omnipotency, might from all Eternity flow forth from the same Power that still sustains it, and which was never less potent to uphold it then now it is: notwithstanding *this piece* of it which is *visible* to us, or at least *this Scheme* or *fashion of it*, they acknowledged to have been but of a late date.

5. Now thus as we conceive of God's *Eternity*, we may in a correspondent manner apprehend his *Omnipresence*; not so much by an Infinite Expanse or Extension of Essence, as by an unlimited power, as *Plotinus* hath fitly express'd it, *ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξίτητῳ ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως*. For as nothing can ever stray out of the bounds or get out of the reach of an Almighty Mind and Power; so when we barely think of *Mind* or *Power*, or any thing else most peculiar to the Divine Essence, we cannot find any of the Properties of *Quantity* mixing themselves with it: and as we cannot confine it in regard thereof to any one point of the Universe, so neither can we well conceive it extended through the whole, or excluded from any part of it. It is alwaies some *Material* Being that contends for *Space*: Bodily parts will not lodge together, and the more bulky they are, the more they jostle for room one with another; as *Plotinus* tells us, *τὰ μὲν ἐνταῦθα μεγάλα ἐν ὄγκῳ*,

τὰ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐν δυνάμει, Bodily Beings are great onely in bulk, but Divine Essences in virtue and power.

6. We may in the next place consider that *Freedome and Liberty* which we find in our own Souls, which is founded in our *Reason* and *Understanding*; and this is therefore *Infinite* in God, because there is nothing that can bound the *First Mind*, or disobey an *Almighty power*. We must not conceive God to be the *freest* Agent, because he can doe and prescribe what he pleaseth, and so set up an Absolute will which shall make both Law and Reason, as some imagine. For as God cannot *know* himself to be any other then what indeed he is; so neither can he *will* himself to be any thing else then what he is, or that any thing else should swerve from those Laws which his own Eternall Nature and Understanding prescribes to it. For this were to make God free to dethrone himself, and set up a *Liberty* within him that should contend with the royall prerogative of his own boundless Wisdome.

To be short; When we converse with our own Souls, we find the *Spring* of all *Liberty* to be nothing else but *Reason*; and therefore no *Unreasonable* creature can partake of it: and that it is not so much any *Indifferency* in our Wills of determining without, much less against, *Reason*, as the *liberall Election of*, and *Complacency in*, that which our *Understandings* propound to us as *most expedient*: And our *Liberty* most appears, when our *Will* most of all congratulates the results of our own Judgments; and then shews it self most vigorous, when either the *Particularness* of that Good which the Understanding converseth with, or the weak knowledge that it hath of it, restrains it not. Then is it most pregnant and flows forth in the fullest stream, when its Object is most full, and the acquaintance with it most ample: all *Liberty* in the Soul being a kind of *Liberality* in the bestowing of our affections, and the want or scarce measure of it *Parsimoniousness* and *Nig-*

*gardise*. And therefore the more the Results of our Judgments tend to an *Indifferency*, the more we find our *Wills dubious* and *in suspense* what to chuse; contrary inclinations arising and falling within enterchangeably, as the Scales of a Ballance equally laden with weights; and all this while the Soul's *Liberty* is nothing else but a *Fluctuation* between uncertainties, and languisheth away in the impotency of our Understandings. Whereas the Divine Understanding beholding all things most clearly, must needs beget the greatest *Freedome* that may be; which *Freedome* as it is bred in it, so it never moves without the Compass of it. And though the Divine Will be not determin'd alway to this or that particular, yet it is never bereft of Eternall Light and Truth to act by: and therefore though we cannot see a Reason for all Gods actions, yet we may know they were neither done against it nor without it.

### CHAPTER III.

*How the Consideration of those restless motions of our Wills after some Supreme and Infinite Good, leads us into the knowledge of a Deity.*

WE shall once more take a view of our own Souls, and observe how the Motions thereof lead us into the knowledge of a Deity. We alwaies find a *restless appetite* within our selves which craves for some *Supreme and Chief good*, and will not be satisfied with any thing less then *Infinity* it self; as if our own *Penury* and *Indigency* were commensurate to the Divine *fulness*: and therefore no Question has been more canvas'd by all Philosophy then this, *De summo hominis bono*, and all the Sects thereof were antiently distinguish'd by those Opinions that they entertain'd *De finibus Boni et Mali*, as *Tully* phraseth it. But of how weak and dilute a Nature soever some of them may have conceived that *Summum Bonum*, yet they could not so



satisfie their own inflamed thirst after it. We find by Experience that our Souls cannot live upon that thin and spare diet which they are entertain'd with at their own home; neither can they be satiated with those jejune and insipid morsels which this Outward world furnisheth their Table with. I cannot think the most voluptuous *Epicurean* could ever satisfie the cravings of his Soul with Corporeal pleasure, though he might endeavour to perswade himself there was no better: nor the most Quintessential *Stoicks* find an αὐτάρκεια and ἀταραξία a Self-sufficiency and Tranquillity within their own Souls, arising out of the pregnancy of their own Mind and Reason; though their sullen thoughts would not suffer them to be beholden to an Higher Being for their Happiness. The more we endeavour to extract an *Autarchy* out of our own Souls, the more we torment them, and force them to feel and sensate their own pinching poverty. Ever since our Minds became so dim-sighted as not to pierce into that Original and Primitive Blessedness which is above, our Wills are too big for our Understandings, and will believe their beloved prey is to be found where Reason discovers it not: they will pursue it through all the vast Wilderness of this World, and force our Understandings to follow the chase with them: nor may we think to tame this violent appetite or allay the heat of it, except we can look upward to some Eternal and Almighty goodness which is alone able to master it.

It is not the *nimbleness* and *agility* of our own *Reason* which stirs up these *hungry affections* within us, (for then the most ignorant sort of men would never feel the sting thereof) but indeed some *more Potent nature* which hath planted a *restless motion* within us that might more forcibly carry us out to it self; and therefore it will never suffer it self to be controll'd by any of our thin Speculations, or satisfied with those aerie delights that our Fancies may offer to it: it doth not, it cannot, rest it self any



where but upon the Centre of some Almighty good, some solid and substantial Happiness; like the hungry childe that will not be still'd by all the mother's musick, or change its sower and angry looks for her smiling countenance; nothing will satisfie it but the full breasts.

The whole work of this World is nothing but a perpetuall contention for True *Happiness*, and men are scatter'd up and down the world, moving to and fro therein, to seek it. Our Souls by a Naturall Science as it were feeling their own Originall, are perpetually travailing with new designs and contrivances whereby they may purchase the scope of their high ambitions. *Happiness* is that Pearl of price which all adventure for, though few find it. It is not Gold or Silver that the Earthlings of this world seek after, but some *satisfying* good which they think is there treasur'd up. Neither is it a little empty breath that Ambition and Popularity soars after, but some kind of *Happiness* that it thinks to catch and suck in with it.

And thus indeed when men most of all *flie from God*, they still *seek after* him. Wicked men pursue indeed after a Deity in their worldly lusts; wherein yet they most blaspheme; for God is not a meer empty Name or Title, but that *Self-sufficient good* which brings along that *Rest* and *Peace* with it which they so much seek after, though they doe most prodigiously conjoyn it with something which it is not, nor can it be, and in a true and reall strain of blasphemy, attribute all that which God is to something else which is most unlike him, and, as S. Paul<sup>1</sup> speaks of those infatuated Gentiles, *turn the glory of the uncorruptible God into the image of corruptible man, of birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things.*

God is not better defin'd to us by our *Understandings* then by our *Wills and Affections*: He is not onely the *Eternal Reason*, that *Almighty Mind and Wisdome* which

<sup>1</sup> Rom. i.

our *Understandings* converse with ; but he is also that *unstained Beauty* and *Supreme Good* which our *Wills* are perpetually catching after : and wheresoever we find *true Beauty, Love and Goodness*, we may say, Here or there is *God*. And as we cannot understand any thing of an Intelligible nature, but by some primitive *Idea* we have of God, whereby we are able to guess at the elevation of its Being and the pitch of its Perfection ; so neither doe our Wills embrace any thing without some *latent sense* of Him, whereby they can tast and discern how near any thing comes to that Self-sufficient good they seek after : and indeed without such an internal sensating Faculty as this is we should never know when our Souls are in conjunction with the Deity, or be able to relish the ineffable sweetness of true Happiness. Though here below we know but little what this is, because we are little acquainted with fruition and enjoyment ; we know well what belongs to longings and languishment, but we know not so well what belongs to plenty and fulness ; we are well acquainted with the griefs and sicknesses of this in-bred love, but we know not what its health and complacencies are.

To conclude this particular, *μεγάλας ἔχει κινήσεις ἡ ψυχή*, the Soul hath strong and weighty motions, and nothing else can bear it up but something permanent and immutable. Nothing can beget a constant serenity and composedness within, but something Supreme to its own Essence ; as if having once departed from the primitive Fountain of its life, it were deprived of it self, perpetually contesting within it self and divided against it self : and all this evidently proves to our inward sense and feeling, That there is some Higher Good then our selves, something that is much more amiable and desirable, and therefore must be loved and preferred before our selves, as *Plotinus* hath excellently observ'd, *τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, βούλεται ἐκείνο μᾶλλον ἢ ὃ ἐστὶν εἶναι, &c.*

*Every thing that desires the enjoyment of the First good, would rather be That then what it is, because indeed the nature of that is much more desirable then its own.* And therefore the *Platonists*, when they contemplate the Deity under these three notions of τὸ εἶν, τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, and question which to place first in order of understanding, resolve the preeminence to be due to the τὸ ἀγαθόν, as *Simplicius* tells us, because That is first known to us as the Architect of the world, and, we may adde, as that which begets in us this ἐρωτικὸν πάθος, these strong passionate desires whereby all sorts of men (even those that are rude and illiterate) are first known to themselves, and by that knowledge may know what diminutive, poor and helpless, things themselves are, who can never satiate themselves from themselves, and what an Excellent and Sovereign goodness there is above them which they ought to serve, and cannot but serve it, or some filthy idol in stead of it; though this mental Idolatry be like that gross and external in this also, that howsoever we attend it not (and so are never the more blameless) yet our worship of these images and pictures of Goodness rests not there, it being some all-sufficient Good that (as we observed before) calls forth and commands our adorations.



# THE EXCELLENCY and NOBLENESSE OF TRUE RELIGION,

1. *In its Rise and Original.*
  2. *In its Nature and Effence.*
  3. *In its Properties and Operations.*
  4. *In its Progreß.*
  5. *In its Term and End.*
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*Psalm* 16. 3.

To the Saints that are in the earth, and to the excellent, in whom is all my delight.

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Greg. Nazianzenus in Orat. 11.

Εὐγένεια δὲ ἡ τῆς \* εἰκόνης τήρησις, καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέ-  
τυπον ἑξομοίωσις, ἣν ἐργάζεται λόγος καὶ ἀρετή.

\* *Divinae Imaginis.*

Idem in Orat. 23.

Εὐγένειαν δὲ λέγω, οὐχ ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. ἅπαγε.  
ἀλλ' ἣν εὐσέβεια χαρακτηρίζει καὶ τρόπος, καὶ ἡ  
πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἀνοδος.

Hieronymus ad Celantiam Ep. 14.

*Nescit Religio nostra personas accipere, nec conditiones  
hominum sed animos inspicit singulorum; Servum  
& Nobilem de moribus pronunciat. Sola apud  
Deum Libertas est non servire peccatis: Summa  
apud Deum est Nobilitas clarum esse virtutibus.*



THE  
EXCELLENCY AND NOBLENESSE  
OF  
TRUE RELIGION

CHAPTER I.

1. The Nobleness of Religion in regard of its Original and Fountain: *it comes from Heaven and moves towards Heaven again. God the First Excellency and Primitive Perfection. All Perfections and Excellencies in any kind are to be measured by their approach to, and Participation of, the First Perfection. Religion the greatest Participation of God: none capable of this Divine Communication but the Highest of created Beings: and consequently Religion is the greatest Excellency. A twofold Fountain in God whence Religion flowes, viz. 1. His Nature. 2. His Will. Of Truth Natural and Revealed. Of an Outward and Inward Revelation of God's Will.*

WE begin with the First, viz. *True Religion is a Noble thing in its Rise and Original, and in regard of its Descent.* True Religion derives its pedigree from Heaven, is βλάστημα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ\* it comes from Heaven, and constantly moves toward Heaven again: it's a Beam from God, as *every good and perfect gift is from above, and comes down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning*, as S. James speaks. God is the *First Truth and Primitive Goodness*: True Religion is a vigorous *Efflux and Emanation of Both* upon the Spirits of men, and therefore is called<sup>1</sup> *a participation of the divine Nature.* Indeed God hath copyed out himself in all created Being, having no other Pattern to frame any thing by but his own Essence; so that all created Being is *umbratilis similitudo*

<sup>1</sup> 2 Peter i.



*entis increati*, and is, by some stamp or other of God upon it, at least remotely allied to him: But *True Religion* is such a Communication of the Divinity, as none but the Highest of created Beings are capable of. On the other side *Sin* and *Wickedness* is of the *basest and lowest Original*, as being nothing else but a perfect degeneration from God and those *Eternal Rules of Goodness* which are derived from him. Religion is an *Heaven-born* thing, the *Seed of God* in the Spirits of men, whereby they are formed to a similitude and likeness of himself. A true Christian is every way of a most noble Extraction, of an heavenly and divine pedigree, being born *ἀνωθεν* *from above*, as it is express'd *Joh. 3.* . . . . .

Thus much for a more *general* discovery of the *Nobleness of Religion* as to its Fountain and Original; We may further and more *particularly* take notice of this in reference to that *Twofold fountain* in God, from whence all true Religion flows and issues forth, viz. 1. *His Immutable Nature.* 2. *His Will.*

1. *The Immutable Nature of God.* From thence arise all those *Eternal Rules of Truth and Goodness* which are the Foundation of all Religion, and which God at the first Creation folded up in the Soul of man. These we may call the *Truths of Natural inscription*; understanding hereby either those *Fundamental principles* of Truth which Reason by a naked intuition may behold in God, or those necessary *Corollaries* and *Deductions* that may be drawn from thence. I cannot think it so proper to say, That God ought infinitely to be loved because he *commands* it, as because he is indeed an *Infinite and Unchangeable Goodness*. God hath stamp'd a Copy of his own Archetypal Loveliness upon the Soul, that man by reflecting into himself might behold there the glory of God, *intra se videre Deum*, see within his Soul all those Ideas of Truth which concern the Nature and Essence of God, by reason of its own resemblance of God; and so beget within himself the most

free and generous motions of Love to God. Reason in man being *Lumen de Lumine*, a Light flowing from the Fountain and Father of Lights, and being, as *Tully* phraseth it, *participata similitudo Rationis aeternae* (as the Law of Nature, the νόμος γραπτός, the Law written in mans Heart, is *participatio Legis aeternae in Rationali creatura*) it was to enable Man to work out of himself all those Notions of God which are the true Ground-work of Love and Obedience to God, and conformity to him: and in molding the inward man into the greatest conformity to the Nature of God was the Perfection and Efficacy of the Religion of Nature. But since Mans fall from God, the inward virtue and vigour of Reason is much abated, the Soul having suffered a πτερορρύησις, as *Plato* speaks, a *defluvium pennarum*: those Principles of Divine truth which were first engraven upon mans Heart with the finger of God are now, as the Characters of some ancient Monuments, less clear and legible then at first. And therefore besides the *Truth of Natural inscription*,

2. God hath provided the *Truth of Divine Revelation*, which issues forth from his own free *Will*, and clearly discovers the way of our return to God, from whom we are fallen. And this Truth, with the Effects and Productions of it in the Minds of men, the Scripture is wont to set forth under the name of *Grace*, as proceeding merely from the free bounty and overflowings of the Divine Love. Of this Revealed *Will* is that of the Apostle to be understood, τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, *None hath known the things of God*<sup>1</sup>; οὐδεὶς, *None*, neither Angel nor Man, could know the Mind of God, could unlock the Breast of God, or search out the Counsels of his Will. But God out of the infinite riches of his Compassions toward mankind is pleas'd to unbosom his Secrets, and most clearly to manifest the way into the *Holiest of all*<sup>2</sup>, and bring to light life and immortality<sup>3</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Hebrews ix.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Timothy i.

and in these last ages to send his Son, who lay in his bosom from all Eternity, to teach us his Will and declare his Mind to us. When we *look unto the Earth, then behold darkness and dimness of anguish*, that I may use those words of the Prophet *Esay*: But when we look towards Heaven, then behold light breaking forth upon us, like the Eye-lids of the Morning, and spreading its wings over the Horizon of mankind sitting in darkness and the shadow of death, *to guide our feet into the way of peace.*

But besides this *Outward revelation of God's will to men*, there is also an *Inward impression* of it on their Minds and Spirits, which is in a more special manner attributed to God. We cannot see divine things but in a divine light: God only, who is the true light, and in whom there is no darkness at all, can so shine out of himself upon our glassy Understandings, as to beget in them a picture of himself, his own Will and Pleasure, and turn the Soul (as the phrase is in *Job* 38.) חֵמָה כְּצֵפֶה like wax or *clay to the Seal* of his own light and love. He that made our Souls in his own image and likeness, can easily find a way into them. The Word that God speaks having found a way into the Soul, imprints it self there as with the point of a diamond, and becomes λόγος ἐγγεγραμμένος ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, that I may borrow *Plato's* expression. Men may teach the *Grammar* and *Rhetorick*, but God teaches the *Divinity*. Thus it is God alone that acquaints the Soul with the *Truths of Revelation*: and he also it is that does strengthen and raise the Soul to better apprehensions even of *Natural Truth*: God being that in the *Intellectual* world which the Sun is in the Sensible (ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁ ἥλιος, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁ Θεός) as some of the ancient Fathers love to speak, and the ancient Philosophers too, who meant God by their *Intellectus Agens*, whose proper work they supposed to be not so much to enlighten the *Object*, as the *Faculty*.

## CHAPTER II.

The Nobleness of Religion in respect of its Nature, *briefly discovered in some Particulars. How a man actuated by Religion* 1. *lives above the world*; 2. *converses with himself, and knows how to love, value and reverence himself, in the best sense*; 3. *lives above himself, not being content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and himself in God. How he denies himself for God. To deny a mans self, is not to deny Right Reason, for that were to deny God, in stead of denying himself for God. Self-love the only Principle that acts wicked men. The happy privileges of a Soul united to God.*

WE have done with the first Head, and come now to discourse with the like brevity on another (our purpose being to insist most upon the third Particular, viz. *The Nobleness of Religion in its Properties*, after we have handled the Second) which is *The Excellency and Nobleness of Religion in regard of its Nature*, whether it be taken *in abstracto* or *in concreto*; which we shall treat of promiscuously, without any rigid tying of our selves to exact Rules of Art: and so we shall glance at it in these following Notions, rising as it were step by step.

1. *A good man, that is actuated by Religion, lives above the World and all Mundane delights and excellencies.* The Soul is a more vigorous and puissant thing, when it is once restored to the possession of its own Being, then to be bounded within the narrow Sphere of Mortality, or to be streightned within the narrow prison of Sensual and Corporeal delights; but it will break forth with the greatest vehemency, and ascend upwards towards Immortality: and when it converses more intimately with Religion, it can scarce look back upon its own converses (though in a lawfull way) with Earthly things, without a being touch'd with an *holy Shamefac'dness* and a *modest Blushing*; and, as *Porphyrus* speaks of *Plotinus*, ἐφκει μὲν αἰσχυνομένῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι εἶη,

it seems to be ashamed that it should be in the Body. It is only True Religion that teaches and enables men to dye to this world and to all Earthly things, and to rise above that vaporous Sphere of Sensual and Earthly pleasures, which darken the Mind and hinder it from enjoying the brightness of Divine light; the proper motion of Religion is still upwards to its first Original. Whereas on the contrary the Souls of wicked men *ὑποβρύχιαυ συμπεριφέρονται*, as *Plato*<sup>1</sup> somewhere speaks, being moistened with the Exudations of their Sensual parts become heavy and sink down into Earthly things, and couch as near as may be to the Centre. Wicked men bury their Souls in their Bodies: all their projects and designs are bounded within the compass of this Earth which they tread upon. The Fleshly mind never minds any thing but Flesh, and never rises above the Outward Matter, but alwaies creeps up and down like Shadows upon the Surface of the Earth: and if it begins at any time to make any faint assays upwards, it presently finds it self laden with a weight of Sensuality which draws it down again. It was the Opinion of the *Academicks* that the Souls of wicked men after their death could not of a long season depart from the Graves and Sepulchers where their Mates were buried; but there wandred up and down in a desolate manner, as not being able to leave those Bodies which they were so much wedded to in this life.

2. *A Good man, one that is actuated by Religion, lives in converse with his own Reason*; he lives at the height of his own Being. This a great Philosopher makes the Property of a Good man, *μόνος ὁ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ συγγίνεσθαι δύναται, καὶ στέργειν ἑαυτόν*. He knows how to converse with himself, and truly to love and value himself: he measures not himself, like the Epicure, by his inferior and Earthly part, but by an Immortal Essence and that of him which is from above; and so does *ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἀναβαίνειν*,

<sup>1</sup> *Phædr.* 248 A.

climbe up to the height of that Immortal principle which is within him. The *Stoicks* thought no man a fit Auditor of their *Ethicks*, till he were dispossess'd of that Opinion, That Man was nothing but συμπλοκή ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, as professing to teach men how to live only κατὰ λόγον, as they speak. Perhaps their Divinity was in some things too rigid; but I am sure a Good man acts the best of this their doctrine in the best sense, and knows better how to reverence himself, without any Self-flattery or admiration, then ever any *Stoick* did. He principally looks upon himself<sup>1</sup> as being what he is rather by his *Soul* than by his *Body*: he values himself by his *Soul*, that Being which hath the greatest affinity with God; and so does not seek himself in the fading *Vanities* of this life, nor in those poor and low delights of his *Senses*, as wicked men doe; but as the Philosopher doth well express it, ὁση δύναμις φεύγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος βούλεται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν συννεύειν and when the Soul thus retires into it self, and views its own worth and Excellency, it presently finds a chaste and Virgin-love stirr'd up within it self towards it self, and is from within the more excited and obliged εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀξιώματος, as *Simplicius* speaks, to mind the preserving of its own dignity and glory. To conclude this Particular, A Good man endeavours to walk by Eternal and Unchangeable Rules of Reason; Reason in a Good man sits in the Throne, and governs all the Powers of his Soul in a sweet harmony and agreement with it self: whereas Wicked men live only ζωὴν δοξαστικὴν, being led up and down by the foolish fires of their own Sensual apprehensions. In wicked men there is a *Democracy* of wild *Lusts* and *Passions*, which violently hurry the Soul up and down with restless motions. All Sin and Wickedness is στάσις καὶ ὕβρις τῆς ψυχῆς, a Sedition stirred up in the Soul by the Sensitive Powers against Reason. It was one

<sup>1</sup> Κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν ζωὴν οὐσιωμένος, *Simplic. in Epict.*



of the great Evils that *Solomon* saw under the Sun, *Servants on horseback, and Princes going as servants upon the ground*<sup>1</sup>. We may find the *Moral* of it in every wicked man, whose *Souls* are only as *Servants* to wait upon their *Senses*. In all such men the whole Course of Nature is turned upside down, and the Cardinal points of Motion in this little world are changed to contrary positions: But the Motions of a Good man are Methodical, Regular and Concentrical to Reason. It's a fond imagination that Religion should extinguish Reason; whenas Religion makes it more illustrious and vigorous; and they that live most in the exercise of *Religion*, shall find their *Reason* most enlarged. I might adde, that *Reason* in relation to the capacitating of Man for converse with God was thought by some to be the *Formal Difference* of Man. *Plutarch* after a large debate whether *Brutes* had not *Reason* in them as well as *Man*, concludes it negatively upon this ground, Because they had no knowledge and sense of the Deity, οἷς οὐκ ἐγγίverαι Θεοῦ νόησις. In *Tully's* account *this Capableness of Religion* seem'd to be nothing different from *Rationality*, and therefore he doubts not to give this for the most proper Characterism of *Reason*, That it is *Vinculum Dei et Hominis*. And so with them (not to name others of the same apprehensions) *animal Rationale* and *animal capax Religionis* seem'd to be of the like importance; *Reason* as enabling and fitting Man to converse with God by knowing him and loving him, being a character most unquestionably differencing *Man* from *Brute* creatures.

3. A Good man, one that is informed by True Religion, lives above himself, and is raised to an intimate Converse with the Divinity. He moves in a larger Sphere than his own Being, and cannot be content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and himself in God.

This we shall consider two ways.

<sup>1</sup> Eccles. x.



1. In the *Self-denial* of Good men ; they are content and ready to deny themselves for God. I mean not that they should *deny* their own *Reason*, as some would have it ; for that were to deny a Beam of Divine light, and so to deny God, in stead of denying our selves for him. It is better resolved by some Philosophers in this point, that *ἔπεσθαι λόγῳ* to follow Reason is *ἔπεσθαι Θεῷ* to follow God ; and again, *Λόγῳ δὲ ὁρθῶ πείθεσθαι καὶ Θεῷ, ταὐτόν ἐστι*. But by *Self-denial* I mean, the Soul's quitting all its own interest in it self, and an entire Resignation of it self to him as to all points of service and duty : and thus the Soul loves it self in God, and lives in the possession not so much of its own Being as of the Divinity ; desiring only to be great in God, to glory in his Light, and spread it self in his Fulness ; to be fill'd alwaies by him, and to empty it self again into him ; to receive all from him, and to expend all for him ; and so to live not as its own, but as God's. The highest ambition of a Good man is to serve the Will of God : he takes no pleasure in himself nor in any thing within himself further then he sees a stamp of God upon it. Whereas wicked men are imprisoned within the narrow circumference of their own Beings, and perpetually frozen into a cold *Self-love* which binds up all the Innate vigour of their Souls, that it cannot break forth or express it self in any noble way. The Soul in which Religion rules, saies as *S. Paul* did, *I live ; and yet not I, but Christ liveth in me*. On the contrary, a Wicked man swells in his own thoughts, and pleaseth himself more or less with the imagination of a *Self-sufficiency*. The *Stoicks*, seeing they could not raise themselves up to God, endeavour to bring down God to their own Model, imagining the Deity to be nothing else but some greater kind of *Animal*, and a Wise man to be almost one of his<sup>1</sup> Peers. And this is more or less the

<sup>1</sup> *Sapiens cum Diis ex pari vivit, Deorum socius, non supplex*, Sen. in Ep. 52 and 31.

Genius of Wicked men, they will be something in themselves, they wrap up themselves in their own Being, move up and down in a Sphere of *Self-love*, live a professed Independency upon God, and maintain a *Meum et Tuum* between God and themselves. It's the Character only of a Good man to be able to deny and disown himself, and to make ■ full surrender of himself unto God ; forgetting himself, and minding nothing but the Will of his Creator ; triumphing in nothing more than in his own *Nothingness*, and in the *Allness* of the Divinity. But indeed this his being Nothing is the only way to be all things ; this his having nothing the truest way of possessing all things.

2. As a Good man lives *above himself* in a way of *Self-denial*, so he lives also above himself as he lives in the *Enjoyment of God* : and this is the very Soul and Essence of True Religion, to unite the Soul in the nearest intimacy and conjunction with God, who is  $\pi\eta\gamma\eta\ \zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$ ,  $\pi\eta\gamma\eta\ \nu\omicron\upsilon$ ,  $\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\alpha\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$ , as *Plotinus* speaks. Then indeed the Soul lives *most nobly*, when it feels it self to live and move and have its Being in God ; which though the Law of Nature makes the Common condition of all created Being, yet it is only True Religion that can give us a more feeling and comfortable sense of it. God is not present to Wicked men, when his Almighty Essence supports them and maintains them in Being ;  $^1\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\prime\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\ \theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$ , *but he is present to him that can touch him*, hath an inward feeling knowledge of God and is intimately united to him ;  $\tau\hat{\omega}\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \alpha\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\iota\ \omicron\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ , *but to him that cannot thus touch him he is not present*.

Religion is Life and Spirit, which flowing out from God who is that  $\text{Αὐτοζωή}$  that hath life in himself, returns to him again as into its own Original, carrying the Souls of Good men up with it. The Spirit of Religion is alwaies ascending upwards, and spreading it self through the whole Essence

<sup>1</sup> *Plotin.* in En. 6. 1. 9. c. 7.

of the Soul, loosens it from a Self-confinement and narrowness, and so renders it more capacious of Divine Enjoyment. God enviés not his people any good, but being infinitely bountifull is pleased to impart himself to them in this life, so far as they are capable of his Communications: they stay not for all their happiness till they come to heaven. Religion alwaies carries its reward along with it, and when it acts most vigorously upon the Mind and Spirit of man, it then most of all fills it with an inward sense of Divine sweetness. To conclude, *To walk with God* is in Scripture made the Character of a Good man, and it's the highest perfection and privilege of Created Nature to converse with the Divinity. Whereas on the contrary Wicked men converse with nothing but their *Lusts* and the *Vanities* of this fading life, which here flatter them for a while with unhallowed delights and a mere Shadow of Contentment; and when these are gone, they find both *Substance* and *Shadow* too to be lost Eternally. But true Goodness brings in a constant revenue of solid and substantial Satisfaction to the Spirit of a good man, delighting alwaies to sit by those Eternal Springs that feed and maintain it: the Spirit of a Good man (as it is well express'd by the Philosopher) ἀκινήτως ἐνίδρυται ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς θείας ἀγαθότητος, and is alwaies drinking in Fountain-Goodness, and fills it self more and more, till it be filled with all the fulness of God.

## CHAPTER V.

*The Third*<sup>1</sup> Property or Effect discovering the Nobleness of Religion, viz. That it directs and enables a man to

<sup>1</sup> In cc. III and IV two other 'properties' of Religion have been discussed:—

1. 'Religion enlarges all the Faculties of the Soul, and begets a true Ingenuity, Liberty and Amplitude, the most Free and Generous

propound to himself the Best End, *viz.* The Glory of God, and his own becoming like unto God. *Low and Particular Ends and Interests both debase and streighten a mans Spirit: The Universal, Highest and Last End both ennobles and enlarges it. A man is such as the End is he aims at. The great power the End hath to mold and fashion man into its likeness. Religion obliges a man (not to seek himself, nor to drive a trade for himself; but) to seek the Glory of God, to live wholly to him; and guides him steddily and uniformly to the One Chief Good and Last End. Men are prone to flatter themselves with a pretended aiming at the Glory of God. A more full and distinct explication of what is meant by a mans directing all his actions to the Glory of God. What it is truly and really to glorifie God. God's seeking his Glory in respect of us in the flowing forth of his Goodness upon us: Our seeking the Glory of God is our endeavouring to partake more of God, and to resemble him (as much as we can) in true Holiness and every Divine Vertue. That we are not nicely to distinguish between the Glory of God and our own Salvation. That Salvation is nothing else for the main but a true Participation of the Divine Nature. To love God above our selves, is not to love him above the Salvation of our Souls; but above our particular Beings and above our sinfull affections, &c. The Difference between Things that are Good relatively, and those that are Good absolutely and Essentially: That in our conformity to these God is most glorified, and we are made most Happy.*

THE Third *Property* or *Effect* whereby Religion discovers its own *Excellency*, is this, *That it directs and enables a man to propound to himself the Best End and Scope of life, viz. The Glory of God the Highest Being, and his own assimilation or becoming like unto God.*

That Christian in whom Religion rules powerfully, is not so low in his ambitions as to pursue any of the things

Spirit in the Minds of good men' (III); and 2. 'It restores man to a just power and dominion over himself, enables him to overcome his Self-will and Passions' (IV).

of this world as his *Ultimate End*: his Soul is too big for earthly designs and interests; but understanding himself to come from God, he is continually returning to him again. It is not worth the while for the Mind of Man to pursue any Perfection lower then its own, or to aim at any *End* more ignoble then it self is. There is nothing that more *streightens* and *confines* the free-born Soul then the *particularity*, *indigency* and *penury* of that *End* which it pursues: when it complies most of all with this lower world, τότε μάλιστα τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἔχει, as is well observed by an excellent Philosopher, the true *Nobleness* and *Freedome* of it is then *most disputable*, and the Title it holds to true *Liberty* becomes most litigious. It never more slides and degenerates from it self, then when it becomes enthrall'd to some *Particular interest*: as on the other side it never acts more *freely* or *fully*, then when it extends it self upon the most *Universal End*. Every thing is so much the more Noble, *quo longiores habet fines*, as was well observ'd by *Tully*. As *low Ends* debase a mans spirit, supplant and rob it of its birth-right; so the *Highest* and *Last End* raises and *ennobles* it, and *enlarges* it into a more Universal and comprehensive Capacity of enjoying that one Unbounded Goodness which is God himself: it makes it spread and dilate it self in the Infinite Sphere of the Divine Being and Blessedness, it makes it live in the Fulness of Him that fills all in all.

Every thing is most properly such as the *End* is which is aim'd at: the Mind of man is alwaies shaping it self into a conformity as much as may be to that which is his *End*; and the nearer it draws to it in the achievement thereof, the greater likeness it bears to it. There is a Plastick Virtue, a Secret Energy issuing forth from that which the Mind propounds to itself as its *End*, to mold and fashion it according to its own Model. The Soul is alwaies stamp'd with the same Characters that are engraven

upon the *End* it aims at; and while it converses with it, and sets it self before it, *it is turned as Wax to the Seal*, to use that phrase in *Job*. Man's Soul conceives all its Thoughts and Imaginations before his *End*<sup>1</sup>, as *Laban's* Ewes did their young before the Rods in the watering troughs. He that pursues any *worldly* interest or *earthly* thing as his *End*, becomes himself also *γῆώδης Earthly*: and the more the Soul directs it self to God, the more it becomes *θεοειδής God-like*, deriving a print of that glory and beauty upon it self which it converseth with, as it is excellently set forth by the Apostle<sup>2</sup>, *But we all with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory*. That Spirit of *Ambition and Popularity* that so violently transports the Minds of men into a pursuit of *Vain-glory*, makes them as *vain* as that *Popular air* they live upon: the Spirit of this world that draws forth a mans designs after worldly interests, makes him as unstable, unconstant, tumultuous and perplex'd a thing as the world is. On the contrary, the Spirit of true Religion steering and directing the Mind and Life to God, makes it an Uniform, Stable and quiet thing, as God himself is: it is only true Goodness in the Soul of man guiding it steddily and uniformly towards God, directing it and all its actions to the one Last End and Chief Good, that can give it a true consistency and composedness within it self.

All *Self-seeking* and *Self-love* do but *imprison* the Soul, and *confine* it to its own home: the Mind of a Good man is too Noble, too Big for such a *Particular* life; he hath learn'd to despise his own Being in comparison of that Uncreated Beauty and Goodness which is so infinitely transcendent to himself or any created thing; he reckons upon his choice and best affections and designs as too

<sup>1</sup> Genesis xxx.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Corinth. iii.



choice and precious a treasure to be spent upon such ■ poor sorry thing as himself, or upon any thing else but God himself.

This was the life of Christ, and is in some degree the life of every one that partakes of the Spirit of Christ. Such Christians seek not their own glory, but the glory of him that sent them into this world: they know they were brought forth into this world, not to set up or drive a trade for themselves, but to serve the will and pleasure of him that made them, and to finish that work he hath appointed them. It were not worth the while to have been born or to live, had it been only for such a *penurious End* as our selves are: it is most God-like and best suits with the Spirit of Religion, for a Christian to live wholly to God, to live the life of God, *having his own life hid with Christ in God*; and thus in a sober sense he becomes *Deified*. This indeed is such ■ Θεωσις *Deification* as is not transacted merely upon the Stage of *Fancy* by Arrogance and Presumption, but in the highest Powers of the Soul by a living and quickning Spirit of true Religion there uniting God and the Soul together in *the Unity of Affections, Will and End*.

I should now pass from this to another Particular; but because many are apt to misapprehend the Notion of *God's glory*, and flatter themselves with their pretended and imaginary *aiming at the Glory of God*, I think it may be of good use, a little further and more distinctly to unfold *the Designe* that a Religious mind drives on *in directing it self and all its actions to God*. We are therefore to consider, that this doth not consist in some *Transient* thoughts of God and his *Glory* as the *End* we propound to our selves in any Undertakings: ■ man does not direct all his actions to *the Glory of God* by forming a Conception in his Mind, or stirring up a strong Imagination upon any Action, That that must be *for the Glory of God*: it is not the thinking of God's glory that is *glorifying* of him. As all other parts of



Religion may be *apishly* acted over by *Fancy and Imagination*, so also may the Internal parts of Religion many times be acted over with much seeming grace by our *Fancy and Passions*; these often love to be drawing the pictures of Religion, and use their best arts to render them more beautifull and pleasing. But though true Practical Religion derives its force and beauty through all *the Lower Powers* of a mans Soul, yet it hath not its rise nor throne there: as Religion consists not in a *Form of Words* which signifie nothing, so neither doth it consist in a *Set of Fancies* or *Internal apprehensions*. Our <sup>1</sup>Saviour hath best taught what it is to live to God's glory, or to glorifie God, viz. to be fruitfull in all holiness, and to live so as that our lives may shine with his grace spreading it self through our whole man.

We rather *glorifie* God by entertaining the Impressions of his Glory upon us, then by communicating any kind of Glory to him. Then does a Good man become the Tabernacle of God wherein the Divine *Shechinah* does rest, and which the Divine glory fills, when the frame of his Mind and Life is wholly according to that Idea and <sup>2</sup>Pattern which he receives from the Mount. We best glorifie him when we grow most like to him: and we then act most for his glory, when a true Spirit of *Sanctity, Justice, Meekness, &c.* runs through all our actions; when we so live in the World as becomes those that converse with the great Mind and Wisdom of the whole World, with that Almighty Spirit that made, supports and governs all things, with that Being from whence all good flows, and in which there is no Spot, Stain or Shadow of Evil; and so being captivated and overcome by the sense of the Divine loveliness and goodness, endeavour to be like him, and conform our selves as much as may be to him.

<sup>1</sup> Joh. 15. 8. *Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit.*

<sup>2</sup> As it is said of the Material Tabernacle, *Exodus* 25.

When God *seeks his own Glory*, he does not so much endeavour any thing *without himself*. He did not bring this stately fabrick of the Universe into Being, that he might for such a Monument of his mighty Power and Beneficence gain some *Panegyricks* or Applause from a little of that fading breath which he had made. Neither was that gracious contrivance of restoring lapsed men to himself *a Plot* to get himself some Eternal *Hallelujahs*, as if he had so ardently thirsted after the layes of glorified spirits, or desired a Quire of Souls to sing forth his praises. Neither was it to let the World see how *Magnificent* he was. No, it is his own *Internal Glory* that he most loves, and the Communication thereof which he seeks: as *Plato* sometimes speaks of the Divine love, it arises not out of *Indigency*, as created love does, but out of *Fulness* and Redundancy; it is an overflowing fountain, and that love which descends upon created Being is a free Efflux from the Almighty Source of love: and it is well pleasing to him that those Creatures which he hath made should partake of it. Though God cannot *seek his own Glory* so as if he might acquire any addition to himself, yet he may *seek it* so as to communicate it out of himself. It was a good Maxime of *Plato*, τῷ Θεῷ οὐδεὶς φθόνος<sup>wh</sup> which is better stated by <sup>1</sup> *S. James*, *God giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not*. And by that *Glory* of his which he loves to impart to his Creatures, I understand those stamps and impressions of *Wisdom, Justice, Patience, Mercy, Love, Peace, Joy*, and other Divine gifts which he bestows freely upon the Minds of men. And thus God triumphs in his own *Glory*, and takes pleasure in the Communication of it.

As God's seeking his own *Glory* in respect of us, is most properly the flowing forth of his Goodness upon us: so our seeking the *Glory* of God is most properly our endeavouring a Participation of his Goodness, and an earnest uncessant

<sup>1</sup> Chap. I. 5.

pursuing after Divine perfection. When God becomes so great in our eyes, and all created things so little, that we reckon upon nothing as worthy of our aims or ambitions but a serious Participation of the Divine Nature, and the Exercise of divine Vertues, *Love, Joy, Peace, Long-suffering, Kindness, Goodness*, and the like ; When the Soul beholding the Infinite beauty and loveliness of the Divinity, and then looking down and beholding all created Perfection mantled over with darkness, is ravish'd into love and admiration of that never-setting brightness, and endeavours after the greatest resemblance of God in *Justice, Love and Goodness* ; When conversing with him ἐν ἡσυχῇ ἐπαφῇ, by a secret feeling of the virtue, sweetness and power of his *Goodness*, we endeavour to assimilate our selves to him : Then we may be said to *glorify* him indeed. God seeks no glory but his own ; and we have none of our own to give him. God in all things seeks himself and his own glory, as finding nothing *Better* than himself ; and when we love him above all things, and endeavour to be most like him, we *declare plainly* that we count nothing *Better* than He is.

I doubt we are too nice Logicians sometimes in distinguishing between *the Glory of God* and *our own Salvation*. We cannot in a true sense seek *our own Salvation* more than *the Glory of God*, which triumphs most and discovers it self most effectually in *the Salvation* of Souls ; for indeed *this Salvation* is nothing else but a true Participation of the Divine Nature. *Heaven* is not a thing *without us*, nor is Happiness any thing distinct from a true Conjunction of the Mind with God in a secret feeling of his Goodness and reciprocation of affection to him, wherein the Divine Glory most unfolds it self. And there is nothing that a Soul touch'd with any serious sense of God can more earnestly thirst after or seek with more strength of affection than This. Then shall we be happy, when God comes to be all in all in us. To love God *above our selves* is not indeed so

properly to love him *above the salvation of our Souls*, as if these were distinct things; but it is to love him *above all our own sinfull affections*, and *above our particular Beings*, and to conform our selves to him. And as that which is<sup>1</sup> *Good relatively, and in order to us*, is so much the Better, by how much the more it is commensurate and conformed to us: So on the other side, that which is *good absolutely and essentially*, requires that our Minds and Affections should, as far as may be, be commensurate and conform'd to it: and herein is God most glorified, and we made Happy. As we cannot truly love the First and Highest Good while we serve a designe upon it, and subordinate it to our selves: so neither is our own Salvation consistent with any such sordid, pinching and particular love. We cannot be compleatly blessed, till the *Idea Boni*, or the *Ipsium Bonum*, which is God, exercise its Sovereignty over all the Faculties of our Souls, rendring them as like to it self as may consist with their proper Capacity.

<sup>2</sup> [See more of this in the Discourse *Of the Existence and Nature of God*, Chap. 4. and more largely in that Latine Discourse, shortly to be printed, *Pietati studere ex intuitu mercedis non est illicitum*.]

#### CHAPTER X.

4. The Excellency of Religion in regard of its Progress, *as it is perpetually carrying on the Soul towards Perfection. Every Nature hath its proper Centre which it hastens to. Sin and Wickedness is within the attractive power of Hell, and hastens thither: Grace and Holiness is within the Central force of Heaven, and moves thither. 'Tis not the Speculation of Heaven as a thing to come that satisfyes the desires of Religious Souls, but the reall Possession of it even in this life. Men are apt to seek after Assurance of Heaven as a thing to come, rather then after Heaven it*

<sup>1</sup> See the Discourse *Of the Existence and Nature of God*. Chap. ix (not printed in this selection, but see p. 201, footnote).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 201, footnote.

*self and the inward possession of it here. How the Assurance of Heaven rises from the growth of Holinesse and the powerful Progresse of Religion in our Souls. That we are not hastily to believe that we are Christ's, or that Christ is in us. That the Works which Christ does in holy Souls testify of him, and best evidence Christ's spiritual appearance in them.*

WE have consider'd *the Excellency of True Religion* 1. in regard of its *Descent and Original*; 2. in regard of its *Nature*; 3. in regard of its *Properties and Effects*. We proceed now to a Fourth Particular, and shall shew

4. *That Religion is a generous and noble thing in regard of its Progresse*; it is perpetually carrying on that Mind in which it is once seated toward *Perfection*. Though the First appearance of it upon the Souls of good men may be but as the Wings of the Morning spreading themselves upon the Mountains, yet it is still rising higher and higher upon them, chasing away all the filthy mists and vapours of Sin and Wickedness before it, till it arrives to its Meridian altitude. <sup>1</sup>There is the strength and force of the Divinity in it; and though when it first enters into the Minds of men, it may seem to be *sowen in weakness*, yet it will raise it self *in power*. As Christ was in his *Bodily appearance*, he was still increasing in wisdom and knowledge and favour with God and man, untill he was perfected in glory: so is he also in his *Spiritual appearance* in the Souls of men; and accordingly the New Testament does more then once distinguish of Christ in his several ages and degrees of growth in the Souls of all true Christians. Good men are always walking on from strength to strength, till at last they see God in Zion. Religion though it hath its infancy, yet it hath no old age: while it is in its *Minority*, it is always *in motu*; but when

<sup>1</sup> Prov. 4. 18. *The path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day.*

it comes to its Maturity and full age, it will always be *in quiete*, it is then always the same, and its years fail not, but it shall endure for ever. Holy and religious Souls being once toucht with an inward sense of Divine Beauty and Goodness, by a strong impress upon them are moved swiftly after God, and (as the Apostle expresses himself) *'forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, they presse toward the Mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus; that so they may attain to the resurrection of the dead.*

Where a Spirit of Religion is, there is *the Central force of Heaven* it self quickening and enlivening those that are informed by it in their motions toward Heaven. As on the other side all unhallowed and defiled minds are within *the attractive power of Hell*, and are continually hastening their course thither, being strongly pressed down by the weight of their Wickedness. 'Αεί τινας ἔχει κινήσεις ἡ φύσις, as *Plutarch* hath well observ'd, Every nature in this world hath some proper Centre which it is always hastening to. Sin and Wickedness does not hover a little over *the bottomeless pit* of Hell, and onely flutter about it; but it's continually sinking lower and lower into it. Neither does true *Grace* make some feeble assaies toward Heaven, but by a mighty Energy within it self it's always soaring up higher and higher into heaven. A good Christian does not onely court his Happiness, and cast now and then ■ smile upon it, or satisfy himself merely to be contracted to it; but with the greatest ardours of Love and Desire he pursues the solemnity of the just Nuptials, that he may be wedded to it and made one with it. It is not an airy speculation of *Heaven* as a thing (though never so undoubtedly) *to come*, that can satisfy his hungry desires, but the reall<sup>2</sup> possession of it even in this life. Such an

<sup>1</sup> Phil. 3.

<sup>2</sup> So we read Joh. 6. 54. *hath eternal life*; and 1 Ep. Jo. ch. 5. 11, 13.



Happiness would be less in the esteem of Good men, that were onely good to be enjoyed at the end of this life when all other enjoyments fail him.

I wish there be not among some such a light and poor esteem of *Heaven*, as makes them more to seek after *Assurance of Heaven* onely in the *Idea* of it as a *thing to come*, then after *Heaven it self*; which indeed we can never well be assured of, untill we find it rising up within our selves and glorifying our own Souls. When true *Assurance* comes, *Heaven* it self will appear upon the Horizon of our Souls, like a morning light chafing away all our dark and gloomy doubtings before it. We shall not need then to light up our Candles to seek for it in corners; no, it will display its own lustre and brightness so before us, that we may see it in its own light, and our selves the true possessours of it. We may be too nice and vain in seeking for *signes and tokens* of Christ's *Spiritual appearances* in the Souls of men, as well as the Scribes and Pharisees were in seeking for them at his *First appearance* in the World. When he comes into us, let us expect till the works that he shall doe within us may testify of him; and be not over-credulous, till we find that he doth those works there which none other could doe. As for a true well-grounded *Assurance*, say not so much, *Who shall ascend up into heaven*, to fetch it down from thence? or *who shall descend into the deep*, to fetch it up from beneath? for in the *Growth* of true internal Goodness and in the *Progress* of true Religion it will freely unfold it self within us. Stay till the grain of Mustard-seed it self breaks forth from among the clods that buried it, till through the descent of the heavenly dew it sprouts up and discovers it self openly. This holy *Assurance* is indeed the budding and blossoming of Felicity in our own Souls; it is the inward sense and feeling of the true life, spirit, sweetness and beauty of Grace powerfully expressing its own Energy within us.



Briefly, True Religion in *the Progresse* of it transforms those Minds in which it reigns from glory to glory: it goes on and prospers in bringing all enemies in subjection under their feet, in reconciling the Minds of men fully to God; and it instates them in a firm possession of the Supreme Good. This is *the Seed of God* within holy Souls, which is always warring against *the Seed of the Serpent*, till it prevail over it through the Divine strength and influence. Though *Hell* may open her mouth wide and without measure, yet a true Christian in whom the seed of God remaineth, is in a good and safe condition; he finds himself borne up by an Almighty arm, and carried upwards as upon Eagles wings; and the Evil one hath no power over him, or, as *S. John* expresseth it, ὁ Πονηρὸς οὐχ ἄπτεται αὐτοῦ, *the Evil one toucheth him not*, 1 Ep. chap. 5. v. 18.

[Throughout this discourse Smith repeats much of what he had said in sections, not here reprinted, of the Discourse of the Existence and Nature of God. The Synopsis of chap. iv of that discourse runs thus:—‘That all Divine productions are the free Effluxes of Omnipotent Love and Goodness. *The true Notion of Gods glory what it is. Men very apt to mistake in this point. God needs not the Happiness or Misery of his Creatures to make himself glorious by. God does most glorifie himself by communicating himself: we most glorifie God when we most partake of him and resemble him most.*’

Chap. ix is called ‘An Appendix concerning the Reason of Positive Laws.’ The following passage sufficiently illustrates Smith’s argument: ‘Some things are so *absolutely*, and some things are so *onely relatively*. That which is *absolutely good* is every way *Superiour to us* and we ought alwaies to be *commanded by it*, because we are made under it: But that which is *relatively good to us* may sometime be *commanded by us*. Eternall Truth and Righteousness are in themselves perfectly and *absolutely good*, and the more we *conform* our selves to them, the better we are. But those things that are *onely good relatively* and in order to us, we may say of them, that they are so much the better, by how much the more they are *conform’d to us* . . . and such indeed is the matter of all *Positive Laws*, and the *Symbolicall* or *Rituall* part of Religion.’]

## CHAPTER XI.

5. The Excellency of Religion in regard of its Term and End, *viz.* Perfect Blessednesse. *How unable we are in this state to comprehend and describe the Full and Perfect state of Happiness and Glory to come. The more Godlike a Christian is, the better may he understand that State. Holiness and Happiness not two distinct things, but two several Notions of one and the same thing. Heaven cannot so well be defined by any thing without us, as by something within us. The great nearness and affinity between Sin and Hell. The Conclusion of this Treatise, containing a Serious Exhortation to a diligent minding of Religion, with a Discovery of the Vanity of those Pretenses which keep men off from minding Religion.*

WE come now to the Fifth and Last Particular, *viz.*

5. The Excellency of Religion in *the Terme and End of it*, which is nothing else but *Blessedness it self in its full maturity*. Which yet I may not here undertake to explain, for it is altogether ἀπρητόν τι, nor can it descend so low as to accommodate it self to any humane style. Accordingly S. John tells us, *it does not yet appear what we shall be*; and yet that he may give us some glimpse of it, he points us out to God, and tells us, ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, *we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is*. Indeed the best way to get a discovery of it, is to endeavour as much as may be to be *Godlike*, to live in a feeling converse with God and in a powerful exercise and expression of all God-like dispositions: So shall our inner man be best enabled *to know the breadth and length, the depth and height* of that Love and Goodness *which yet passeth all knowledg*. There is a *State of Perfection* in the life to come so far transcendent to any in this life, as that we are not able from hence to take the just proportions of it, or to form a full and comprehensive notion of it. We are unable to comprehend the vastness and fullness of that Happiness which

the most purified Souls may be raised to, or to apprehend how far the mighty power and strength of the Divinity deriving it self into created Being, may communicate a more Transcendent life and blessedness to it. We know not what latent powers our Souls may here contain within themselves, which then may begin to open and dilate themselves to let in the full streams of the Divine Goodness when they come nearly and intimately to converse with it ; or how *Blessedness* may act upon those Faculties of our Minds which we now have. We know not what illapses and irradiations there may be from God upon Souls in Glory, that may raise them into a state of Perfection surpassing all our imaginations.

As for *Corporeal* Happiness, there cannot be any thing further added to the *Pleasure* of our *Bodies* or Animal part, then a restoring it from disturbing Passion and Pain to its just and natural constitution ; and therefore some Philosophers have well disputed against the opinion of the *Epicureans* that make *Happiness* to consist in *Bodily pleasure*, ὃ τι πολλαπλάσιον ἔχει τὸ λυπηρὸν προηγούμενον· and when *the molestation* is gone, and the just constitution of Nature recovered, *Pleasure* ceaseth. But the highest *Pleasure* of *Minds* and *Spirits* does not onely consist in the relieving of them from any antecedent pains or grief, or in a relaxation from some former molesting Passion : neither is their Happiness a mere Stoical ἀταραξία· as the Happiness of the Deity is not a mere *Negative* thing, rendring it free from all disturbance or molestation, so that it may eternally rest quiet within it self ; it does not so much consist in *Quiete*, as in *Actu et vigore*. A Mind and Spirit is too full of activity and energy, is too quick and potent a thing to enjoy a full and complete Happiness in a mere *Cessation* ; this were to make *Happiness* an heavy Spiritless thing. The Philosopher hath well observ'd, that τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀγαθῷ σύνεστιν ἡ ἀληθινὴ ἡδονή, there is infinite

power and strength in Divine joy, pleasure and happiness commensurate to that Almighty Being and Goodness which is the Eternal source of it.

As Created Beings, that are capable of conversing with God, stand nearer to God or further off from him, and as they partake more or less of his *likeness*; so they partake more or less of that *Happiness* which flows forth from him, and God communicates himself in different degrees to them. There may be as many degrees of *Sanctity* and *Perfection*, as there are of States and Conditions of Creatures: and that is properly *Sanctity* which guides and orders all the Faculties and Actions of any Creature in a way suitable and correspondent to that rank and state which God hath placed it in: and while it doth so, it admits no sin or defilement to it self, though yet it may be elevated and advanced higher; and accordingly true Positive *Sanctity* comes to be advanced higher and higher, as any Creature comes more to partake of the life of God, and to be brought into a nearer conjunction with God: and so the *Sanctity* and *Happiness* of Innocency it self might have been perfected.

Thus we see how True Religion carries up the Souls of Good men above the black regions of *Hell* and Death. This indeed is the great ἀποκατάστασις of Souls, it is *Religion* it self, or a reall participation of God and his Holiness, which is their true *restitution* and advancement. All that *Happiness* which Good men shall be made partakers of, as it cannot be borne up upon any other foundation then *true Goodness and a Godlike nature* within them; so neither is it distinct from it. *Sin* and *Hell* are so twined and twisted up together, that if the power of *Sin* be once dissolv'd, the bonds of Death and Hell will also fall asunder. *Sin* and *Hell* are of the same kind, of the same lineage and descent: as on the other side True *Holiness* or Religion and True *Happiness* are but

two severall Notions of one thing, rather then distinct in themselves. *Religion* delivers us from *Hell* by instating us in a possession of True Life and Blisse. *Hell* is rather a *Nature* then a *Place*: and *Heaven* cannot be so truly defined by any thing *without* us, as by something that is *within* us.

Thus have we done with those Particulars wherein we considered the *Excellency and Nobleness of Religion*, which is here exprest by אֶרֶץ חַיִּים *The way of life*, and elsewhere is stiled by Solomon עֵץ חַיִּים *A tree of life*: true Religion being an inward Principle of life, of a Divine life, the best life, that which is *Life* most properly so called: accordingly in the Holy Scripture a life of Religion is stiled *Life*, as a life of Sin and Wickedness is stiled *Death*. In the ancient Academical Philosophy it was much disputed whether that *Corporeal and Animal life*, which was always drawing down the Soul into Terrene and Material things, was not more properly to be Stiled *Death* then *Life*. What sense hereof the *Pythagoreans* had may appear by this practise of theirs, They were wont to set up κεντάφια Empty coffins in the places of those that had forsaken their School and degenerated from their Philosophy and good Precepts, as being Apostates from life it self, and dead to Vertue and a good life, which is *the true life*, and therefore fit only to be reckoned among *the dead*.

For a Conclusion of this Discourse; The *Use* which we shall make of all shall be this, To awaken and exhort every one to a serious minding of Religion: as *Solomon* doth earnestly exhort every one to seek after true *Wisedome*, which is the same with *Religion* and Holiness, as *Sin* is with *Folly*; *Prov.* 4. 5. *Get Wisedome, get understanding*; and v. 7. *Get Wisedome, and with all thy getting get understanding. Wisedome is the principal thing.* This is the summe of all, *the Conclusion of the whole matter, Fear God, and keep his Commandements*; for this is the

*whole* (duty, business and concernment) *of man*. Let us not trifle away our time and opportunities which God hath given us, wherein we may lay hold upon Life and Immortality, in doing nothing, or else pursuing Hell and Death. Let us awake out of our vain dreams; Wisdom calls upon us, and offers us the hidden treasures of Life and Blessedness: Let us not perpetually deliver over our selves to laziness and slumbering. Say not, *There is a lion in the way*; say not, Though Religion be good, yet it is unattainable: No, but let us intend all our Powers in a serious resolv'd pursuance of it, and depend upon the assistance of Heaven which never fails those that soberly seek for it. It is indeed the Levity of mens spirits, their heedlessness and regardlessness of their own lives, that betrays them to Sin and Death. It is the general practice of men *αὐτοσχδιάζειν τὸν βίον*, *extempore vivere*, as the Satyrist speaks; they ordinarily ponderate and deliberate upon every thing more then how it becomes them to live, they so live as if their Bodies had swallowed up their Souls: their lives are but a kind of Lottery: the Principles by which they are guided are nothing else but a confused multitude of Fancies rudely jumbled together. Such is the life of most men, it is but a meer *Casual* thing acted over at peradventure, without any fair and calm debates held either with Religion, or with Reason which in it self, as it is not distorted and depraved by corrupt men, is a true Friend to Religion, and directs men to God and to things good and just, pure, lovely and praise-worthy; and the directions of this Inward guide we are not to neglect. Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing *the Candle of the Lord* within us is no piece of Religion, nor advantageous to it: That certainly will not raise men up to God, which sinks them below men. There had never been such an *Apostasy from Religion*, nor had such a Mystery of iniquity (full of deceiveableness



and imposture) been revealed and wrought so powerfully in the Souls of some men, had there not first come an *Apostasy from sober Reason*, had there not first been a falling away and departure from Natural Truth.

It is to be feared our nice speculations about a τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν in Theology have tended more to exercise mens Wits then to reform their lives, and that they have too much descended into their practice, and have tended rather to take men off from minding Religion, then to quicken them up to a diligent seeking after it. Though the Powers of Nature may now be weakned, and though we cannot produce a living form of Religion in our own Souls; yet we are not surely resolved so into a sluggish *Passiveness*, as that we cannot, or were not in any kind or manner of way to seek after it. Certainly a man may as well read *the Scriptures* as study a piece of *Aristotle*, or of Natural Philosophy or Mathematicks. He that can observe any thing comely and commendable, or unworthy and base, in another man, may also reflect upon himself, and see how *face answers to face*, as *Solomon* speaks *Proverbs* 27. 19. If men would seriously commune with their hearts, their own Consciences would tell them plainly, that they might avoid and omit more evil then they doe, and that they might doe more good then they doe: and that they doe not put forth that power which God hath given them, nor faithfully use those Talents nor improve the advantages and means afforded them.

I fear the ground of most mens Misery will prove to be a *Second fall*, and a *Lapse upon a Lapse*. I doubt God will not allow that Proverb, *The Fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge*, as not in respect of *Temporal misery*, much less will he allow it in respect of *Eternal*. It will not be so much because our First parents incurred God's displeasure, as because we have neglected what might have been done by us



afterwards in order to the seeking of God, his face and favour, while he might be found.

Up then and be doing; and the Lord will be with us. He will not leave us nor forsake us, if we seriously set our selves about the work. Let us endeavour to acquaint our selves with our own lives, and the true Rules of life, with this which *Solomon* here calls *the Way of Life*: let us inform our Minds as much as may be in the Excellency and Loveliness of Practical Religion; that beholding it in its own beauty and amiableness, we may the more sincerely close with it. As there would need nothing else to deterr and affright men from *Sin* but its own ugliness and deformity, were it presented to a naked view and seen as it is: so nothing would more effectually commend Religion to the Minds of men, then the displaying and unfolding the Excellencies of its Nature, then the true Native beauty and inward lustre of Religion it self: οὐθ' ἔσπερος, οὐθ' ἑῷος οὐτῶ θαυμαστός· neither the Evening nor the Morning-Star could so sensibly commend themselves to our bodily Eyes, and delight them with their shining beauties, as True Religion, which is an undefiled Beam of the uncreated light, would to a mind capable of conversing with it. *Religion*, which is the true *Wisedome*, is (as <sup>1</sup>the Author of the Book of *Wisedome* speaks of *Wisedome*,) *a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty, the brightness of the Everlasting light, the unspotted mirrour of the power of God, and the image of his Goodness: She is more beautiful then the Sun, and above all the order of Stars; being compared with the light, she is found before it.*

Religion is no such austere, sour and rigid thing, as to affright men away from it: No, but those that are acquainted with the power of it, find it to be altogether sweet and amiable. An holy Soul sees so much of the

<sup>1</sup> Chap. 7.

glory of Religion in the lively impressions which it bears upon it self, as both woos and winns it. We may truly say concerning Religion to such Souls as *S. Paul* spake to the Corinthians<sup>1</sup>, *Needs it any Epistles of Commendation to you?* Needs it any thing to court your affections? *Ye are indeed its Epistle, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God.*

Religion is not like the Prophet's roll, sweet as honey when it was in his mouth, but as bitter as gall in his belly. Religion is no sullen *Stoicisme*, no sour *Pharisaisme*; it does not consist in a few Melancholy passions, in some dejected looks or depressions of Mind: but it consists in *Freedom, Love, Peace, Life and Power*; the more it comes to be digested into our lives, the more sweet and lovely we shall find it to be. Those spots and wrinkles which corrupt Minds think they see in the face of Religion, are indeed nowhere else but in their own deformed and misshapen apprehensions. It is no wonder when a defiled Fancy comes to be the Glass, if you have an unlovely reflection. Let us therefore labour to purge our own Souls from all worldly pollutions; let us breath after the aid and assistance of the Divine Spirit, that it may irradiate and enlighten our Minds, that we may be able to see Divine things in a Divine light: let us endeavour to live more in a real practice of those Rules of Religious and Holy living commended to us by our ever-Blessed Lord and Saviour: So shall we know Religion better, and knowing it love it, and loving it be still more and more ambitiously pursuing after it, till we come to a full attainment of it, and therein of our own Perfection and Everlasting Bliss.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. iii.



AN  
ELEGANT  
And Learned  
DISCOURSE  
OF THE  
Light of Nature,  
With feveral other  
TREATISES:

VIZ. { *The Schisme.* } { *Mount Ebal.* }  
      { *The Act of Oblivion.* } { *The White Stone.* }  
      { *The Childs Returne.* } { *Spiritual Opticks.* }  
      { *The Panting Soul.* } { *The Worth of Souls.* }

By *Nathanael Culverwel*, Master of Arts, and lately  
Fellow of *Emanuel Colledge* in *Cambridge*.

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A  
DISCOURSE

Of the LIGHT of NATURE

PROVERBS xx. 27.

אדם נר יהוה נחשמת אדם *Mens hominis lucerna Domini*; The understanding of a man is the Candle of the Lord.

Φῶς Κυρίου, πνοή ἀνθρώπων, Septuag. λύχνος Κυρίου, *Aquin. Symm. Theod. Δαμπτήρ Κυρίου. Sic alii.*

CHAPTER I.

The *Porch*, or *Introduction*.

IT is a work, that requires our choicest thoughts, the exactest discussion, that can be ; a thing very material, and desirable, to give unto *Reason* the things, that are *Reason's*, and unto *Faith* the things, that are *Faith's*, to give *Faith* her full scope, and latitude, and to give *Reason* also her just bounds, and limits ; this is the first-borne, but the other ha's the blessing. And yet there is no such a vast *hiatus* neither, such a μέγα χάσμα between them, as some would imagine : there is no such implacable antipathy, no such irreconcilable jarring between them, as some do fancy to themselves ; they may very well salute one another ἀγίῳ φιλήματι, *osculo Pacis* ; *Reason*, and *Faith* may kiss each other. There is a twin-light springing from both, and they both spring from the same Fountain of light, and they both sweetly conspire in the same end, the glory of that being, from which they shine, and the welfare, and happiness of that being, upon which they shine. So that to blaspheme

*Reason*, 'tis to reproach Heaven it self, and to dishonour the God of *Reason*, to question the beauty of his Image, and by a strange ingratitude to slight this great and Royal gift of our Creatour. For 'tis he, that set up these two great Luminaries in every Heavenly soul, *the Sun to rule the day, and the Moon to rule the night*, and though there be some kind of creatures, that will bark at this lesser light, and others so severely critical, as that they make Mountains of those spots, and freckles, which they see in her face; yet others know how to be thankfull for her weaker beams, and will follow the least light of God's setting up, though it be but *the Candle of the Lord*.

But some are so strangely prejudiced against *Reason* (and that upon sufficient reason too, as they think, which yet involves a flat contradiction) as that they look upon it not as *the Candle of the Lord*, but as on some blazing Comet, that portends present ruine to the Church, and to the soul, and carries a fatal, and venomous influence along with it. And because the unruly head of *Socinus*, and his followers, by their meer pretenses to *Reason*, have made shipwreck of *Faith*, and have been very injurious to the Gospel; therefore these weak, and staggering apprehensions are afraid of understanding any thing; and think, that the very name of *Reason*, especially in a *Pulpit*, in matters of Religion, must needs have at least a thousand Heresies couched in it. If you do but offer to make a *Syllogism*, they'll straightway cry it down for *carnal reasoning*. What would these men have? Would they be banished from their own *essences*? Would they forfeit, and renounce their understandings? or have they any to forfeit, or disclaim? Would they put out this *Candle of the Lord*, *intellectuals* of his own lighting? or have they any to put out? would they creep into some lower *species*, and go a grazing with *Nebuchadnezzar* among the beasts of the field? or are they not there already? Or, if they themselves can be willing to be so shamefully degraded,



do they think, that all others too are bound to follow their example? Oh, what hard thoughts have these of Religion? do they look upon it only as on a bird of prey, that comes to peck out the eyes of men? Is this all the nobility, that it gives, that men by vertue of it must be beheaded presently? do's it chop off the *intellectuals* at one blow? Let's hear awhile what are the offences of *Reason*? are they so heinous, and capital? what ha's it done? what laws ha's it violated? whose commands ha's it broken? what did it ever do against the Crown, and Dignity of Heaven, or against the peace, and tranquility of men? Why are a weak, and perverse Generation, so angry, and displeased with it? Is it because this *Daughter of the morning* is fallen from her primitive glory? from her original vigour, and perfection? Far be it from me to extenuate that great, and fatal overthrow, which the sons of men had in their first, and original Apostasie from their God; that, under which the whole Creation sighs, and groans: but, this we are sure, it did not annihilate the soul, it did not destroy the essence, the powers, and faculties, nor the operations of the soul; though it did defile them, and disorder them, and every way indispose them.

Well then, because the eye of *Reason* is weakned, and vitiated, will they therefore pluck it out immediately? and must *Leah* be hated upon no other account, but because she is *blear-eyed*? The whole head is wounded, and akes, and is there no other way, but to cut it off? *The Candle of the Lord* do's not shine so clearly, as it was wont, must it therefore be extinguished presently? Is it not better to enjoy the faint and languishing light of this *Candle of the Lord*, rather than to be in palpable, and disconsolate darkness? There are indeed but a few seminal sparks left in the ashes, and must there be whole floods of water cast on them to quench them? 'Tis but an old imperfect *Manuscript*, with some Broken periods, some letters worn out;

must they therefore with an unmerciful indignation rend it, and tear it asunder? 'Tis granted, that the picture ha's lost its gloss, and beauty, the oriency of its colours, the elegancy of its lineaments, the comliness of its proportion; must it therefore be totally defac'd? must it be made one great blot? and must the very frame of it be broken in pieces? Would you perswade the Lutanist to cut all his strings in sunder, because they are out of Tune? And will you break the Bowe upon no other account, but because it's unbended? because men have not so much of *Reason* as they should, will they therefore resolve to have none at all? Will you throw away your Gold, because it's mix'd with dross? Thy very Being, that's imperfect too, thy graces, they are imperfect; wilt thou refuse these also? And then consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of *Reason*, even this in some measure comes from *Reason*. *Reason*, when awakned, it feels her own wounds, it hears her own jarrings, she sees the dimness of her own sight. 'Tis a glass, that discovers its own spots, and must

- it therefore be broke in pieces? *Reason* her self ha's made many sad complaints unto you; she ha's told you often, and that with tears in her eyes, what a great shipwrack she ha's suffered, what goods she ha's lost, how hardly she escaped with a poor decayed Being; she ha's shewn you often some broken reliques, as the sad remembrancers of her former ruines; she told you how that, when she swam for her life, she had nothing, but two, or three Jewels about her, two, or three *common notions*; and would you rob her of them also? Is this all your tenderness, and compassion? Is this your kindness to your friend? Will you trample upon her now she is so low? Is this a sufficient cause to give her a *Bill of Divorcement*, because she ha's lost her former beauty, and fruitfulness?

Or is *Reason* thus offensive to them, because she cannot grasp, and comprehend the things of God? Vain men,

will they pluck out their eyes, because they cannot look upon the Sun in his brightness, and glory? What, though *Reason* cannot reach to the depths, to the bottomes of the *Ocean*, may it not therefore swim, and hold up the head, as well as it can? What, though it cannot enter into the *Sanctum Sanctorum*, and pierce within the Veil; may it not, notwithstanding, ly in the Porch, *at the gate of the Temple called Beautiful, and be a Door-keeper in the House of its God?* Its wings are clipt indeed, it cannot flie so high, as it might have done; it cannot flie so swiftly, so strongly, as once it could: will they not therefore allow it to move, to stir, to flutter up and down, as well as it can? The Turrets, and Pinnacles of the stately structure are fallen: will they therefore demolish the whole Fabrick, and shake the very Foundations of it, and down with it to the ground? Though it be not a *Jacob's Ladder* to climbe up to Heaven by, yet may they not use it as a staff to walk upon Earth withall? And then *Reason* it self knows this also, and acknowledges, that 'tis dazled with the Majesty, and Glory of God; that it cannot pierce into his mysterious, and unsearchable ways; it never was so vain, as to go about to measure immensity by its own finite Compass, or to span out absolute Eternity by its own more imperfect duration. True *Reason* did never go about to comprize the *Bible* in its own Nut-shel. And, if *Reason* be content with its own *Sphere*, why should it not have the liberty of its proper motion?

Is it, because it opposes the things of God, and wrangles against the Mysteries of Salvation, is it therefore excluded? An heinous and frequent accusation indeed; but nothing more false, and injurious: and if it had been *an open Enemy*, that had done her this wrong, why then she could have borne it; but it's thou, her *friend*, and *companion*, ye have *took sweet counsel together*, and have entred into the House of God as friends, 'tis you, that have your dependance

upon her ; that cannot speak one word to purpose against her, without her help, and assistance. What mean you thus to revile your most intimate, and inseparable self? why do you thus slander your own Beings? would you have all this to be true, which you say? Name but the time if you can, when ever right *Reason* did oppose one *jot*, or *apex* of the word of God. Certainly, these men speak of distorted *Reason* all this while. Surely they do not speak of the *Candle of the Lord*, but of some shadow, and appearance of it. But if they tell us, that all *Reason* is distorted, whether then is theirs so, in telling us so? if they say that they do not know this by *Reason*, but by the Word of God, whether then is that their *Reason*, when it acknowledges the Word of God? whether is it then distorted, or no? Besides, if there were no right *Reason* in the World, what difference between sobriety, and madness, between these men, and wiser ones? how then were the *Heathen left without excuse*, who had nothing to see by, but this *Candle of the Lord*? and how do's this thrust men below *sensitive* creatures? for better have no *Reason* at all, then such as do's perpetually deceive them, and delude them.

Or do's *Reason* thus displease them, because the blackest Errours sometimes come under the fair disguise of so beautiful a name, and have some tincture of *Reason* in them? But truly this is so far from being a disparagement to *Reason*, as that 'tis no small commendation of it: for *πρόσωπον χρὴ θέμεν τηλανγές*, Men love to put a plausible title, a winning frontispiece upon the foulest Errours. Thus Licentiousness would fain be called by the name of Liberty; and all Dissoluteness would fain be countenanced, and secured under the Patronage, and Protection of free-Grace. Thus wickedness would willingly forget its own name, and adopt it self into the family of goodness. Thus *Arminianism* pleads for it self under the specious notion of *God's love to Mankind*. Thus that silly Error of

*Antinomianism* will needs stile it self an *Evangelical Honey-comb*. Thus all irregularities, and anomalies in Church Affairs, must pride themselves in those glittering titles of a *New Light*, *A Gospel-way*, *An Heaven upon Earth*. No wonder then that some also pretend to *Reason*, who yet run out of it, and beyond it, and besides it; but must none therefore come near it? because *Socinus* ha's burnt his wings at this *Candle of the Lord*, must none therefore make use of it?

May he not be conquer'd with his own weapons, and beat out of his own strong holds, and may not the head of an *uncircumcised Philistine* be cut off with his own sword?

Or lastly, are they thus afraid of *Reason*, because by vertue of this, men of wit, and subtilty, will presently argue, and dispute them into an Errour, so as that they shall not be able to disintangle a Truth, though in it self it be never so plain, and unquestionable? But first, *Reason* it self tells them, that it may be thus, and so prepares, and fortifies them against such a tryal; and then, this only shews, that some mens *Reason* is not so well advanc'd and improv'd, either as it might be, or as others is; a sharper edge would quickly cut such difficulties a sunder. Some have more refined and clarifi'd intellectuals, more vigorous and sparkling eyes than others, and one soul differs from another in glory; and that reason, which can make some shift to maintain Errour, might with a great deal less sweat, and pains, maintain a Truth.

There's no question, but that *Bellarmino*, and the rest of the learned *Papists* could have, if they had pleased, far more easily defended the *Protestant* Religion, than that of their own. Besides, the vigour, and triumph of *Reason* is principally to be seen in those first-born-beams, those pure and unspotted irradiations, that shine from it; I mean those first bubblings up of common Principles, that are own'd, and acknowledg'd by all; and those evident, and

kindly derivations, that flow from them. *Reason* shews her face more amiably and pleasantly in a pure and clear stream, then in those mudded and troubled waters, in which the Scholemen (that have leasure enough) are always fishing. Nay, some of their works are like so many raging Seas, full of perpetual tossings, and disquietings, and foamings, and sometimes casting up mire, and dirt; and yet these vast and voluminous *Leviathans* love to sport therein, and that, which is most intolerable, these grand σοφοί, that seem'd so zealous for *Reason*, at length in express terms disclaim it; and in a most blindfold, and confused manner, cry up their great *Diana*, their Idol of Transubstantiation; and the *Lutherans* are very fierce against *Reason* too, much upon the same account, because it would never allow of that their monstrous and mis-shapen lump of Consubstantiation.

But why have *I* all this while beaten the air, and spilt words upon the ground? why do *I* speak to such, as are incurable, and incapable? for if we speak *Reason* to them, that's that, which they so much disclaim: if we do not speak *Reason* to them, that were to disclaim it too.

But *I* speak to men, to Christians, to the friends of learning; to the professors of *Reason*: to such as put *this Candle of the Lord* into a golden Candlestick, and pour continual Oil into it. Yet lest any among you, *Athenians*, should erect an Alter to an unknown God; lest you should ignorantly worship him, we will declare him to you.

And that, which we have now said, may serve as a Porch, and Preamble, to what we shall speak hereafter out of those words,

Where we shall see,

First, How *The understanding of a man is the Candle of the Lord.*

Secondly, What this *Candle of the Lord* discovers; where we shall finde,

*First*, That all the Moral Law is founded in natural, and common light of *Reason*.

*Secondly*, That there's nothing in the mysteries of the Gospel contrary to the light of *Reason*; nothing repugnant to this light, that shines from *the Candle of the Lord*.

### CHAPTER III<sup>1</sup>.

*What Nature is.*

THE *words* being to be understood of *Lumen Naturale* according to the minds of the best, and most *Interpreters*, it will be very needful to enquire what *Nature* is, and here we will be sure not to speak one word for *Nature*, which shall in the least measure tend to the eclipsing of *Grace*; nay, nothing, but what shall make for the greater brightening, and amplifying of the *free-Grace*, and *distinguishing goodness* of God in *Christ*; and nothing, but what an *Augustine*, or a *Bradwardine*, those great Patrons of *Grace*, would willingly set their seals unto.

Well then, as for *Nature*, though it be not far from any one of us, though it be so intimate to our very *Beings*, though it be printed, and engraved upon our *essences*, and not upon ours onely, but upon the whole Creation, and though we put all the letters, and Characters of it together, as well as we can: yet we shall find it hard enough, to spell it out, and read what it is. For, as it is in *corporeal vision*, the too much approximation, and vicinity of an object, do's stop up, and hinder sight: so 'tis also many times in *Intellectual Opticks*, we see some things better at a distance; the Soul cannot so easily see its own face, nor so fully explain its own nature. We need some *Scholiast*, or *Interpreter*, to *comment* upon our own *Beings*, and to acquaint us with our own *Idioms*: and I meet with many *Authours*, that speak of the *Light of Nature*; but I can scarce finde one,

<sup>1</sup> Ch. II, on '*The Explication of the Words*,' is omitted.



that tells us *what* it is. Those famous, and learned *Triumviri*; SELDEN, that ha's made it his work to write *De Jure Naturali*; and *Grotius*, that ha's said somewhat of it in his Book *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; and *Salmasius*, that ha's touch'd it in his late Treatise *De Coma*, and in his little *Dialogue* subordinate to it, in either of which, if he had pleased, he might have described it without a digression: yet none of these (as far as I can find) give us the least adumbration of it; which notwithstanding was the rather to be expected from them, because the *Philosophers* had left it in such a cloudy, and obscured manner, as if they had never seen *Nature* face to face, but onely through a glass darkly, and in a Riddle. And, as we read of a *Painter*, that represented *Nature* appearing to *Aristotle* with a Veil, and Mask upon her face: so truly *Aristotle* himself painted her, as he saw her, with her Veil on; for he shews her onely wrapped up, and muffled in *matter*, and *form*; whereas, methinks, he, that could set *Intelligences* to the wheel to spin out *time*, and *motion*, should have allowed them also some natural ability for performing so famous a task, and employment, which his head set them about. And truly why *Angelical Beings* should be banished from the *Commonwealth* of *Nature*; nay; why they should not properly belong to *Physicks*, as well as other particular *Beings*; or why *Bodies* onely should engross, and monopolize *Natural Philosophy*, and why a *Soul* cannot be admitted into it, unless it bring a *Certificate*, and *Commendamus* from the *Body*, is a thing altogether unaccountable, unless it be resolved into a meer Arbitrary Determination, and a *Philosophical* kind of *Tyranny*.

And yet *Aristotle's* Description of *Nature* ha's been held very sacred, and some of the *Scholemen* do even dote upon it. *Aquinas* tells us in plain Terms; *Deridendi sunt, qui volunt Aristotelis definitionem corrigere*. The truth is, I make no question, but that *Aristotle's* Definition is very commen-

surate to what he meant by *Nature*; but, that he had the true, and *adequate notion* of *Nature*, this *I* think *Aquinas* himself can scarce prove: and I would fain have him to explain what it is for a thing *innotescere lumine Naturae*, if *Nature* be onely *principium motûs et quietis*. Yet *Plutarch* also in this point seems to compromise with *Aristotle* and after a good, specious, and hopeful *Preface*, where he saith, that he must needs tell us what *Nature* is, after all this preparation he do's most palpably restrain it to *corporeal Beings*, and then votes it to be ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ ἐρημίας. And *Empedocles*, (as he is quoted by him) will needs exercise his *Poetry*, and make some *Verses* upon *Nature*, and you would think, at the first dash, that they were in a good lofty strain; for thus he sings,

—— φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐκάστου  
Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτῳ γενέθλη.

'Twas not of a *mortal, withering off-spring*, nor of a *fading Genealogy*; but yet truely his *Poetical raptures* were not so high, as to elevate him above a *body*, for he presently sinks into ὕλη, he falls down into *matter*, and makes *Nature* nothing else, but that which is *ingenerable*, and *incorruptible* in *material Beings*; just as the *Peripateticks* speak of their *Materia prima*. But *Plato*, who was more spiritual in his *Philosophy*, chides some of his Contemporaries, and is extreemly displeased with them, and that very justly, for they were degenerated into a most stupid *Atheism*, and resolved all *Beings* into one of these three *Originals*, that they were either διὰ φύσιν, διὰ τύχην, διὰ τέχνην. They were either the workmanship of *Nature*, or of *Fortune*, or of *Art*. Now as for the first, and chief *corporeal Beings*, they made them the productions of *Nature*, that is, (say they) they sprung from eternity into *Being* by their own *impetus*, and by their own virtue, and efficacy, ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, like so many natural *automata*,

they were the *Principles* of their own *Being*, and *Motion*: and this they lay down for one of their *Axioms*; Τὰ μὲν μέγιστα, καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν, καὶ τύχην· τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· *All the Master-pieces of Being, the most lovely, and beautiful Pictures were drawn by Nature, and Fortune*; and *Art* only could reach to some poor rudiments, to some shadows, and weaker imitations: which you will be somewhat amazed at, when you hear by and by what these τὰ σμικρότερα were.

The foundation of *Being*, that they said was *Natural*, the mutation, and disposing of *Being*, that they made the employment of *Fortune*; and then they said the work of *Art* was to finde out *Laws*, and *Morality*, and *Religion*, and a *Deity*; these were the τὰ σμικρότερα they spake of before.

But that *Divine Philosopher* do's most admirably discover the prodigious folly of this opinion, and demonstrate the impossibility of it in that excellent Discourse of his, in his tenth Book *De Legibus*, where he do's most clearly, and convincingly shew, That those things, which they say were framed by *Art*, were in duration infinitely before that, which they call *Nature*; That Ψυχὴ ἐστὶ πρεσβυτέρα σώματος that *spirituals* have the seniority of *corporeals*. This he makes to appear by their (1) πρωτοκινήσις, (2) αὐτοκινήσις, (3) ἀλλοκινήσις. For these three, though they be not expressly mentioned in him, yet they may very easily be collected from him. *Souls* they move themselves, and they move *Bodies* too, and therefore must needs be *first* in motion, so that νοῦς, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ νόμος, τῶν σκληρῶν, καὶ μαλακῶν, καὶ βαρέων, καὶ κονφῶν πρότερα ἂν εἴη. *Reason*, and *Religion*, *Laws* and *Prudence* must needs be before *Density*, and *Rarity*, before *Gravity*, and *Levity*, before all *conditions*, and *dimensions* of *Bodies*. And *Laws*, and *Religion*, they are indeed τοῦ νοῦ γεννήματα· that is, the *contrivances*, and *productions* of that eternal νοῦς, and λόγος, the *wisdom* of God himself.

So that all, that *Plato* will allow to *Nature*, amounts to no more, then this, that it is not δημιουργός, *opifex rerum*, but onely *Dēi δημιουργούντος famula, et ministra*. As the eyes of a *Servant* wait upon his *Master*, and as the eyes of an *Handmaiden* look up to her *Mistress*; so wait her eyes upon the *Lord* her *God*. And he doth fully resolve, and determine, that *God* is the *soul* of the world, and *Nature* but the *body*; which must be took onely in *sensu florido*, in a flourishing, and *Rhetorical* sense: that *God* is the *fountain* of *Being*, and *Nature* but the *chanel*; that he is the *Kernel* of *Being*, and *Nature* but the *shell*. Yet herein *Plato* was defective, that he did not correct, and reform the abuse of this word *Nature*; that he did not scrue it up to an higher, and more spiritual notion. For 'tis very agreeable to the *choicest*, and *supremest Being*; And the *Apostle* tells us of ἡ θεία φύσις. So that 'tis time at length to draw the veil from *Nature's* face, and to look upon her beauty.

And first, 'tis the usual language of many, both *Philosophers* and others, to put *Nature* for *God* himself, or at least for the *general Providence* of *God*; and this, in the *Schoolemens* rough and unpolish'd *Latin*, is stiled *Natura naturans*; thus *Nature* is took for that *constant*, and *Catholick Providence*, that spreads its wings over all *created Beings*, and shrouds them under its warm, and happy protection. Thus that elegant *Moralist*, *Plutarch*, speaks more like to himself, then in his former Description; Πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβής, καὶ φιλότεχνος, ἀνελλιπής, καὶ ἀπερίτμητος. *Nature* is in all things accurate, and punctual, 'tis not defective nor parcimonious, nor yet sprouting, and luxuriant. And consonant to this is that sure Axiom; *Natura nihil facit frustra*. Thus *God* set up the world, as a fair, and goodly Clock, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner; not by its own weights (as *Durand* would have it) but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward, and intimate spring of immediate concurrence, that

shall supply it in a most uniform, and proportionable manner.

Thus God framed this great *Organ* of the world, he turned it, yet not so, as that it could play upon it self, or make any Musick by virtue of this general composure, (as *Durand* fansies it) but that it might be fitted, and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of his powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creatour, in a most sweet, and harmonious manner.

And thus *Nature* is that *regular Line*, which the wisdom of God himself ha's drawn in *Being*: τάξις γάρ, ἢ τάξεως ἔργον, ἢ φύσις, as he speaks; whereas that, which they mis-call'd *Fortune*, was nothing but a *line* fuller of *windings*, and *varieties*. And, as *Nature* was a *fixed*, and *ordinary* kinde of *Providence*; so *Fortune* was nothing, but a more *abstruse*, and *mysterious*, and *occult* kinde of *Providence*: and therefore *Fortune* was not blinde, as they falsely painted, and represented her; but they themselves were blinde, and could not see into her. And in this sense that speech of that grave *Moralist*, *Seneca*, is very remarkable; *Providentia, Fatum, Natura, Casus, Fortuna, sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina*.

But then, secondly, *Nature*, as 'tis scattered, and distributed in *particular Beings*, so 'tis the very same with *Essence* it self; and therefore *Spirituals*, as they have their *Essence*, so they have their *Nature* too: and, if we gloried in names, it would be easie to reap up a multitude of testimonies, in which these two must needs be ἰσοδυναμοῦντα.

And thus *Nature* speaks these two things.

(1) It points out *Originem entis*, 'tis the very *Genius* of *Entity*, 'tis present at the nativity of every *Being*, nay, 'tis *Being* it self. There is no moment, in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its *Nature*.

(2) It speaks *Operationem entis*, and 'tis a *Principle* of working in *spirituals*, as well as *Principium motûs et quietis* in *corporeals*.

All *Essence* bubbles out, flows forth, and *paraphrases* upon it self in *operations*. Hence it is, that such workings, as are facilitated by *custom*, are esteemed *natural*. Hence that known speech of *Galen*; Ἐπικτήτοι φύσεις τὰ ἔθη. *Customs are frequently adopted, and ingrafted into Nature*. Hence also our usual *Idiom* calls a good *Disposition* a good *Nature*. Thus the *Moralists* express *Virtues*, or *Vices*, that are deeply rooted, by this term πεφυσιωμένα.

And so some, and *Grotius* amongst the rest, would understand that place of the Apostle, *Do's not even Nature it self teach you*, of a *general custom*: but that word Αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις *do's* plainly refuse that interpretation; and the learned *Salmasius* *do's* both grant, and evince, that it cannot be meant of *custom* there. And thus, having seen what *Nature* is, 'twill be very easie, in the next place, to tell you what the *Law of Nature* is.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### *Of the nature of a Law in general.*

BEFORE we can represent unto you the *Law of Nature*, you must first frame, and fashion in your minds the just notion of a *Law in general*. And *Aquinas* gives us this shadowy representation of it; *Lex est quaedam regula, et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur*. But *Suarez* [is] offended with the latitude of this *Definition*, and esteems it too spreading, and comprehensive, as that, which extends to all *Naturals*, ay, and to *Artificials* to; for they have *regulas, et mensuras operationum*. Thus God ha's set a *Law* to the *Waves*, and a *Law* to the *Winds*; nay, thus *Clocks* have their *Laws*, and *Lutes* have their *Laws*, and whatsoever ha's the least appearance of *motion*, ha's some *rule* proportionable to it. Whereas these workings were always reckoned to be at the most but *inclinationes, et pondera*, and not the fruits of a

*legislative* power. But yet the *Apostle Paul*, to stain the pride of them, that gloried in the *Law*, calls such things by the name of *Law*, as were most *odious*, and *anomalous*. Thus he tells us of Νόμος θανάτου, and Νόμος ἁμαρτίας, though *sin* be properly ἀνομία. Thus he mentions *Legem membrorum* the same, which the *Scholemen* call *Legem fomitis*.

And yet this is sure, that a *rational Creature* is onely capable of a *Law*, which is a *moral restraint*, and so cannot reach to those things, that are *necessitated* to act *ad extremum virium*.

And therefore *Suarez* do's give us a more refined *Description*, when he tells us, that *Lex est mensura quaedam actuum moralium, ità ut, per conformitatem ad illam, Rectitudinem moralem habeant, et, si ab illa discordent, obliqui sint*. 'A *Law* is such a just, and regular turning of *Actions*, as that, by virtue of this, they may conspire into a moral *Musick*, and become very pleasant, and harmonious.' Thus *Plato* speaks much of that Εἰρηνθμία, and συμφωνία, that is in *Laws*, and in his second Book *De Legibus* he do's altogether discourse of *Harmony*, and do's infinitely prefer *mental*, and *intellectual Musick*, those powerful, and practical strains of goodness, that spring from a well-composed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft, and transient touches, that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner: and he tells you of a *spiritual Dancing*, that is answerable to so sweet a *Musick*, to these τὰ θεϊότατα αὑλήματα. Whilst the *Laws* play in *consort*, there is a *Chorus* of well-ordered affections, that are raised, and elevated by them.

And thus, as *Aristotle* well observes, some *Laws* were wont to be put in *Verse*, and to be sung, like so many pleasant *Odes*, that might even charm the people into obedience.

'Tis true, that learned *Philosopher* gives this reason of it, they were put into *Verse*, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιλάθωνται, that they



*might remember them the better*: but why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace, and allurement, that they might hear them as pleasantly, as they would do the voice of a *Viol*, or an *Harp*, that ha's *Rhetorick* enough to still, and quiet the *evil spirit*? But yet this do's not sufficiently paint out the *being* of a Law, to say, that 'tis onely *regula, et mensura*; and *Suarez* himself is so ingenuous, as to tell us, that he cannot rest satisfied with this *Description*, which he drew but with a *Coal*, as a Rudiment rather, then a full portraicture; and therefore we'll give him some time to perfect it, and to put it into more *orient Colours*.

And, in the mean time, we'll look upon that *speculative* Lawgiver, *Plato* I mean, who was always new-modelling of *Laws*, and rolling *Political Ideas* in his minde.

Now you may see him gradually ascending, and climbing up to the Description of a *Law* by these four several steps, and yet he do's not reach the top, and ἀκμή of it neither. First, he tells us, that *Laws* are τὰ Νομιζόμενα, *such things, as are esteemed fitting*; but because this might extend to all kind of *Customs* too, his second thoughts limit, and contract it more, and tell us, that a *Law* is Δόγμα πόλεως, *Decretum civitatis*; yet, because the mass, and bulk of people, the rude head, and undigested lump of the multitude may seek to establish τὸ Δόγμα πονηρόν, as he calls it, therefore he bethinks himself how to *clarifie* a *Law*, how to purge out the *dross* from it, and tells us in the next place, that it is τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, *inventio ejus, quod verè est*, where it is very remarkable what this *Philosopher* means by τὸ ὄν, by which he is wont usually to point out a *Deity*, which is stiled by *Aristotle* ὃν ὄντων but it is not capable of this sense here; for thus *Laws* are not τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, but rather τοῦ ὄντος εἰρήματα. *Lex est inventio, vel donum Dei*, as the *Oratour* speaks. Τὸ ὄν therefore in this place speaks these two *Particulars*.

1. Τὸ ὀρθόν for all *rectitude* ha's a *Being*, and flows from the *fountain of Being*; whereas *obliquities*, and *irregularities* are meer *privations*, and *non entities*; and 'tis a notable speech of *Plato*, Τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ Βασιλικός, the very same expression, which the *Apostle* gives to the *Law of God*, when he calls it the *royal Law*.

2. Τὸ ὄν implies τὸ χρηστόν, every thing, that is *profitable*, ha's a *being* in it; but you can gather no fruit from a *privation*: there is no sweetness in an *obliquity*, and therefore a *Law* is an wholesome mixture of that, that is *just*, and *profitable*, and this is τέλος τοῦ νόμου, as *Plutarch* speaks. Whereas *turpe praeceptum non est lex, sed iniquitas*; for *obligation*, that's the very *form*, and *essence* of a *Law*: Now every *Law obligat in Nomine Dei*; but so glorious a name did never binde to any thing, that was wicked and unequal. Πᾶν δίκαιον ἡδύ, and πᾶν δίκαιον ὠφέλιμον, and that onely is countenanced from heaven. The *golden Chain of Laws*, 'tis tied to the *chair of Jupiter*, and a command is onely vigorous, as it issues out, either immediately, or remotely, from the great *Sovereign* of the world. So that τὸ ὄν, is the sure bottome and foundation of every *Law*.

But then, because he had not yet express'd, who were the competent searchers out of this τὸ ὄν, therefore he tells you in the last place, that *Laws* are πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα, which he clears by other things; for ἱατρικὰ συγγράμματα are ἱατρικοὶ νόμοι, and γεωμετρικὰ συγγράμματα are γεωμετρικοὶ νόμοι. And he resolves it into this, that in all true kinds of government there is some *supreme power*, derived from God himself, and fit to contrive *Laws*, and *Constitutions* agreeable to the welfare, and happiness of those, that are to be subject to them; and οἱ κρείττους (as he speaks) are the fittest makers of *Law*.

Yet you must take notice here of these two things.

(1) That he did not lay stress enough upon that *binding* virtue, which is the very *sineu*, nay, the *life*, and *soul* of a *Law*.

(2) That these three *Descriptions*, τὰ νομιζόμενα, δόγμα πόλεως, πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα, intend onely *humane Laws*, and so are not boil'd up to the purer notion of a *Law* in *general*.

And, though that same other branch τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις may seem to reach farther yet, 'tis too obscure, too much in the clouds, to give a clear manifestation of the nature of a *Law*. And yet *Aristotle* do's not in this supply *Plato's* defects, but seems rather to *paraphrase* upon these *Descriptions* of *humane Laws*, and tells in more enlarged language, that, 'Ο νόμος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὠρισμένος καθ' ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μηνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα. Where yet he cannot possibly mean, that every *individual* should give his suffrage; but certainly the *representative* consent of the whole will content him.

But I see these antient *Philosophers* are not so well furnish'd, but that we must return to the *Scholemen* again, who by this time have lick'd their former *Descriptions* into ■ more comely form. We will look upon *Aquinas* his, first.

*Lex* (saith he) *est ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune ab eo, qui curam habet Communitatis, promulgata*. 'It is a rational Ordinance for the advancing of publick good, made known by that power, which ha's care, and tuition of the publick.'

And *Suarez* his picture of a *Law*, now that 'tis fully drawn, hath much the same aspect. *Lex est commune praeceptum, justum, ac stabile, sufficienter promulgatum*. A *Law* is a *publick command*, a *just*, and *immovable command*, *lifting up its voice like a Trumpet*: and, in respect of the *Law-giver*, though it do *praesupponere actum intellectus*, as all acts of the *Will* do; yet it do's *formally consist in actu voluntatis*: not the *Understanding*, but the *Will* of a *Law-giver* makes a *Law*. But in respect of him, that is subject to the *Law*, it do's consist *in actu rationis*,

'tis required onely, that he should know it; not *in actu voluntatis*, it do's not depend upon his obedience. The want of his Will is not enough to enervate, and invalidate a Law, when 'tis made; all Laws then would be abrogated every moment. His Will indeed is required to the execution, and fulfilling of the Law, not to the validity, and existence of the Law: and thus all the Laws of God do not at all depend upon the will of man, but upon the power, and will of the Law-giver. Now in the framing of every Law there is to be

I. *Intentio boni communis*, and thus that Speech of *Carneades*, *Utilitas justi prope mater, et aequi*, if it be took in this sense, is very commendable: whereas in that other sense (in which 'tis thought he meant it) it is not so much as tolerable. *Law-givers* should send out Laws with *Olive-branches in their mouths*, they should be *fruitful*, and *peaceable*; they should drop sweetness and fatness upon a Land. Let not then *Brambles* make Laws for *Trees*; lest they scratch them, and tear them, and write their Laws in *blood*. But Law givers are to send out Laws, as the Sun shoots forth his beams, *with healing under their wings*: and thus that elegant *Moralist*, *Plutarch* speaks. 'God (saies he) is angry with them, that counterfeit his Thunder, and Lightning, οὐ σκῆπτρον, οὐ κεραυνόν, οὐ τρίαιναν, his *Scepter*, and his *Thunderbolt*, and his *Trident*, he will not let them meddle with these. He do's not love they should imitate him in his absolute dominion, and sovereignty; but loves to see them darting out those warm, and amiable, and cherishing ἀκτινοβολίαι, those *beamings out of Justice*, and *Goodness*, and *Clemency*. And as for Laws, they should be like so many green, and pleasant Pastures, into which these ποιμένες λαῶν are to lead their *flocks*, where they may feed sweetly, and securely by those refreshing *streams of Justice*, that *run down like water*, and *Righteousness like a mighty Torrent*. And this considera-

tion would sweep down many *cobweb-Laws*, that argue onely the venome, and subtilty of them, that spin them; this would sweep down many an *Achitophel's* web, and many an *Haman's* web, many an *Herod's* web, every *Spider's* web, that spreads Laws onely for the catching, and entangling of weaker ones. Such Law-givers are fit to be *Domitian's* play-fellows, that made it his Royal sport, and pastime to catch *Flies*, and insult over them, when he had done. Whereas a Law should be a *Staff* for a Common-wealth to lean on, and not a *Reed* to pierce it through. Laws should be *cords* of love, not *nets*, and *snares*. Hence it is, that those Laws are most radical, and fundamental, that principally tend to the conservation of the *vitals*, and *essentials* of a Kingdom; and those come nearest the Law of God himself, and are participations of that eternal Law, which is the spring, and original of all inferiour, and derivative Laws. Τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ νόμια, as *Plato* speaks; and there is no such publick benefit, as that, which comes by *Laws*; for all have an equal interest in them, and priviledge by them. And therefore, as *Aristotle* speaks most excellently, Νόμος ἐστὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ὁρέξεως. *A Law is a pure intellect*, not onely without a sensitive appetite, but without a will. 'Tis pure judgment without affections, a Law is impartial, and makes no factions; and a *Law* cannot be bribed, though a *Judge* may. And that great *Philosopher* do's very well prosecute this; 'If you were to take *Physick*, (saies he) then indeed 'tis ill being determind by a Book, 'tis dangerous taking a printed *Recipe*, you had better leave it to the breast of the *Physician*, to his skill, and advice, who mindes your health, and welfare, as being most for his gain, and credit. But in point of *Justice* the case is very different; you had better here depend upon a *Rule*, then to leave it to the arbitrary power of a *Judge*, who is usually to decide a controversie between two; and, if left to himself, were apt

to be swayed, and biassed by several interests, and engagements, which might encline him to one, more than another.' Nay, now that there is a *fix'd Rule*, an *immoveable Law*, yet there is too much partiality in the application of it, how much more would there be, if there were no *Rule* at all?

But the truth is, the *Judge* should onely follow the *ultimum et practicum dictamen legis*; his *Will*, like a *coeca potentia*, is to follow the *novissimum lumen intellectus* of this *Noûs*, that is to rule, and guide him: and therefore *Justice* was painted *blinde*, though *ipsa lex* be *oculata*, for *Noûs ὁρᾷ*, *Noûs ἀκούει*, and the *Will* is to follow the *ultimum nutum capitis*, the meaning of the *Law* in all circumstances.

II. In a *Law-giver* there is to be *judicium, et prudentia Architectonica ad ferendas leges*. The *Ægyptian Hieroglyphick* for *Legislative power* was *Oculus in sceptro*; and it had need be such an *eye*, that can see both *πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω*. It had need have a full, and open prospect into publick affairs, and to put all advantages into one scale, and all inconveniences into another.

To be sure the *Laws of God*, they flow from a fountain of wisdom, and the *Laws of men* are to be lighted at this *Candle of the Lord*, which he ha's set up in them, and those *Laws* are most potent, and prevalent, that are founded in light; ἡ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴ χρυσῇ, καὶ ἱερᾷ. Other *Laws* are σκληροὶ καὶ σίδηροι, they may have an *iron* and *adamantine* necessity; but the others have a *soft* and *downy* perswasion going along with them, and therefore as he goes on, τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πράου δέ, καὶ οὐ βιαίον, *Reason* is so beautiful, as that it wins, and allures, and thus constrains to obedience.

III. There is to be *sigillum legis*, I mean, *Electio et Determinatio Legis*. After a sincere aim at publick good, and a clear discovery of the best means to promote it, there comes then a *fix'd*, and sacred resolution; *Volumus*

*et statuimus* ; this speaks the *will* of the *Law giver*, and breaths life into the Law, it adds vigour, and efficacy to it. But yet notwithstanding,

IV. There must be *vox tubae*, that is, *promulgatio et insinuatio Legis*. The Law, 'tis for a publick good, and is to be made known in a publick manner : for as none can desire an unknown good, so none can obey an unknown Law ; and therefore *invincible Ignorance* do's excuse ; for else men should be bound to absolute impossibilities. But whether it be required to the publishing of a Law, that it should be in way of *Writing*, which is more fix'd, and durable, or whether the manifestation of it in a *Vocal*, and *Oral* manner will suffice, (which yet is more transient, and uncertain) I leave the *Lawyers*, and *School-men* to dispute it. This I am sure, that all the Laws of God are proclaimed in a most sufficient, and *emphatical* manner.

#### CHAPTER V.

##### *Of the Eternal Law.*

HAVING thus look'd upon the *being* of a Law in *general*, we now come to the spring and original of all Laws, to the *eternal Law*, that fountain of Law, out of which you may see the *Law of Nature* bubbling and flowing forth to the sons of men. For, as *Aquinas* do's very well tell us, the *Law of nature* is nothing but *participatio Legis aeternae in Rationali creatura*, the *copying out* of the *eternal Law*, and the *imprinting* of it upon the breast of a *Rational Being*. That *eternal Law* was in a manner *incarnated* in the *Law of Nature*.

Now this *eternal Law*, it is not really distinguished from God himself. For *Nil est ab aeterno, nisi ipse Deus* ; so that 'tis much of the same nature with those Decrees of his, and that Providence, which was awake from everlasting.



For, as God, from all eternity, by the hand of infinit wisdom, did draw the several faces, and lineaments of *Being*, which he meant to shew in time: So he did then also contrive their several frames with such limits, and compass, as he meant to set them; and said to every thing, *Hither shalt thou go, and no farther.*

This the *Platonists* would call *ιδέαν τῶν νόμων*, and would willingly head such honourable Titles as these upon it, Ὁ νόμος ἀρχηγός, πρωτουργός, αὐτοδίκαιος, αὐτόκαλος, αὐτοάγαθος, ὁ ὄντως νόμος, ὁ νόμος σπερματικός. and the greatest happiness the other Laws can arrive unto is this; that they be Νόμοι δουλεύοντες, καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντες, *ministring*, and *subservient Laws*, waiting upon this their *Royal Law*; Or, as they would choose to stile them, Σκιαὶ νόμων, Νομοειδεῖς, some *shadows*, and *appearances* of this bright, and glorious Law; Or, at the best, they would be esteemed by them but Νόμοι ἑγγονοι, the *noble off-spring*, and *progeny* of Laws; blessing *this womb, that bare them, and this breast, that gave them suck.*

And thus the *Law of Nature* would have a double portion, as being *Lex primogenita*, the *first-born* of this *eternal Law*, and *the beginning of its strength.* Now, as God himself shews somewhat of his face in the glass of *Creatures*; so the beauty of this Law gives some representations of it self in those pure derivations of *inferiour Laws*, that stream from it. And, as we ascend to the *first*, and *supreme Being* by the steps of *Second Causes*; so we may climb up to a sight of this *eternal Law* by those fruitful branches of *secondary Laws*, which seem to have their root in earth, when as indeed it is in Heaven; and that I may vary a little that of the *Apostle* to the *Romanes*, *The invisible Law of God, long before the creation of the World, is now clearly seen, being understood by those Laws, which do appear*; so that τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ νόμου, is manifested in them, God having shown it to them. Thus, as the

*Scholemen* say very well, *Omnis lex participata supponit legem per essentiam*. Every impression supposes a *Seal*, from whence it came ; every ray of light puts you in minde of a *Sun*, from which it shines. Wisdom and Power, these are the chief Ingredients into a Law ; now where do's Wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity ? and where do's power triumph, but in the arm of Omnipotency ?

A Law is born *ex cerebro Jovis* and it is not *brachium saeculare*, but *coeleste*, that must maintain it ; even *humane Laws* have their virtue *radicaliter, et remotè* (as the *Scholes* speak) from this *eternal Law*. Thus that famous, and most renowned *Oratour*, and *Patriot* (*Tully* I mean) do's most admirably express the lineage, and descent of Laws in this golden manner. *Hanc video Sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse Populorum ; sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi, prohibendique sapientiâ. Ità principem illam Legem, et ultimam mentem, dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei* : which I shall thus render ; *Wise men did ever look upon a Law, not as on a spark struck from humane Intellectuals, not blown up, or kindled with popular breath ; but they thought it an eternal light shining from God himself, irradiating, guiding, and ruling the whole Universe ; most sweetly, and powerfully discovering what ways were to be chosen, and what to be refused. And the mind of God himself is the centre of Laws, from which they were drawn, and into which they must return.*

Thus also that florid *Moralist*, *Plutarch*, resolves all Law and Justice, into that Primitive, and eternal Law, even God himself, for even thus he tells us, *Justice* (saies he) *do's not onely sit like a Queen at the right hand of Jupiter, when he is upon his Throne ; but she is always in his bosom, and one with himself* ; and he closes it up with this, *That God himself is τῶν νόμων πρεσβύτατος, καὶ τελειότατος*. As he is the most *Antient of Days*, so also he is the most *antient*

of *Laws*, as he is the *perfection* of *Beings*, so is he also the *Rule of operations*.

Nor must I let slip that Passage of *Plato*, where he calls a Law *Ζηνὸς σκῆπτρον*, the *golden Scepter*, by which *God* himself rules, and commands ; for, as all true Government ha's a bright *stamp* of divine *Sovereignty*, so every true Law ha's a plain *superscription* of his *Justice*. Laws are anointed by *God* himself, and most precious Oil drops down upon them to the *skirts* of a Nation ; and the *Law of Nature* had the *Oil of gladness poured out upon it above its fellows*.

So then, that there is such a prime, and supreme Law is clear, and unquestionable ; but who is worthy to unseal, and open this Law ? and who can sufficiently display the glory of it ? We had need of a *Moses*, that could ascend up into the *Mount*, and converse with *God* himself, and yet when he came down, he would be fain to put a *veil* upon his *face*, and upon his *expressions* too, lest otherwise he might too much dazle inferiour understandings : but, if the *Schoolemen* will satisfie you, (and you know some of them are stiled *Angelical*, and *Seraphical*) you shall hear, if you will, what they'll say to it.

Now this Law, according to them, is *Aeterna quaedam ratio practica totius dispositionis, et gubernationis Universi*. 'Tis an eternal Ordinance made in the depth of *God's infinite wisdom*, and counsell, for regulating, and governing of the whole *World* ; which yet had not its binding virtue in respect of *God* himself, who ha's always the full, and unrestrained liberty of his own *essence*, which is so infinite, as that it cannot binde it self, and which needs no Law ; all goodness, and perfection being so *intrinsecal*, and *essential* to it : but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all *irrational Beings*, did onely *fortiter inclinare* ; but, in respect of *Rationals*, it do's *formaliter obligare*.

By this great, and glorious Law every good action was

commanded, and all *evil* was discountenanc'd, and forbidden from everlasting. According to this righteous Law all rewards, and punishments were distributed in the eternal thoughts of God. At the command of this Law all *created Beings* took their several ranks, and stations, and put themselves in such operations, as were best agreeable, and conformable to their *Beings*. By this Law all *essences* were ordained to their ends by most happy, and convenient means. The Life, and vigour of this Law sprang from the Will of God himself, from the voluntary decree of that eternal Law-giver, minding the publick Welfare of *Being*; who, when there were heaps of varieties, and possibilities in his own most glorious thoughts, when he could have made such, or such Worlds, in this, or that manner, in this, or that time, with such, and such *species*, that should have had more, or fewer *individuals*, as he pleased, with such operations, as he would allow unto them; he did then select, and pitch upon this way, and method, in which we see things now constituted, and did binde all things according to their several capacities, to an exact, and accurate observation of it.

So that by this you see how those *eternal Ideas* in the minde of God, and this *eternal Law* do differ. I speak now of *Ideas* not in a *Platonical* sence, but in a *Scholastical*, (unless they both agree, as some would have them.) For *Idea est possibilium, Lex tantum futurorum*. God had before him the picture of every *possibility*, yet he did not intend to binde a *possibility*, but onely a *futurity*. Besides, *Ideas*, they were situated onely in the *understanding* of God; whereas a Law ha's force, and efficacy from his *will*; according to that much commended Saying, *In Coelesti et Angelica curia voluntas Dei Lex est*. And then an *Idea* do's *magis respicere artificem*, it stays there where first it was; but a Law, do's *potius respicere subditum*, it calls for the obedience of another: as *Suarez* do's very well difference them.

Neither yet is this *eternal Law* the same with the *Providence* of God, though that be eternal also. But, as *Aquinas* speaks, *Lex se habet ad Providentiam, sicut principium generale ad particulares conclusiones*; or, if you will, *Sicut principia prima practica ad prudentiam*: his meaning is this, that *Providence* is a more punctual, and particular application of this binding rule, and is not the *Law it self*, but the *superintending* power, which looks to the *execution*, and accomplishment of it; or, as the most acute *Suarez* ha's it, *Lex dicit jus in communi constitutum: Providentia dicit curam, quae de singulis actibus haberi debet*.

Besides, a *Law*, in its strict, and peculiar notion, do's onely reach to *rational Beings*; whereas *Providentia* do's extend, and spread it self over all. But that, which vexes the *Scholemen* most, is this, that they, having required *promulgation* as a necessary condition to the *existence* of a *Law*, yet they cannot very easily shew how this *eternal Law* should be publish'd from everlasting. But the most satisfactory account, that can be given to that, is this; that other Law-givers being very voluble, and mutable before their *minde*, and *will* be fully, and openly declared, they may have a purpose indeed, but it cannot be esteem'd a *Law*. But, *in God there being no variableness, nor shadow of turning*, this his *Law* ha's a binding virtue, as soon as it ha's a *Being*, yet so as that it do's not *actually*, and *formally* oblige a Creature, till it be made known unto it, either by some *revelation* from God himself, which is possible onely, and extraordinary; or else by the mediation of some other *Law*, of the *Law of Nature*, which is the usual, and constant way, that God takes for the promulgation of this his *eternal Law*. For that νόμος γραπτός, that sacred *Manuscript*, which is writ by the *finger* of God himself in the heart of man, is a plain *transcript* of this original *Law*, so far as it concerns man's welfare. And this you see do's most directly bring me to search out the *Law of Nature*.

## CHAPTER VI.

*Of the Law of Nature in general, its subject, and nature.*

THE *Law of Nature* is that Law, which is *intrinsecal*, and *essential* to a *rational* Creature; and such a Law is as necessary as such a Creature: for such a Creature, as a *Creature*, ha's a superiour, to whose Providence, and disposing it must be subject: and then, as an *Intellectual Creature*, 'tis capable of a *moral* government, so that 'tis very suitable, and *connatural* to it to be regulated by a Law; to be guided, and commanded by one, that is infinitely more wise, and intelligent, then it self is, and that mindes its welfare more, then it self can. Insomuch that the most bright, and eminent Creatures, even *Angelical Beings*, and *glorified Souls* are subject to a *Law*, though with such an happy priviledge, as that they cannot violate, and transgress it; whereas the very dregs of *entity*, the most ignoble *Beings* are most incapable of a *Law*, for you know *inanimate beings* are carried on onely with the vehemency, and necessity of *natural inclinations*; nay, *sensitive Beings* cannot reach or aspire to so great a perfection, as to be wrought upon in such an *illuminative* way, as a *Law* is: they are not *drawn with these cords of men*, with these *moral* Engagements, but in a more *impulsive* manner driven, and spurred on with such impetuous propensions, as are founded in *matter*; which yet are directed by the wise, and violent eye, and by the powerful hand of a *Providence*, to a more beautiful, and amiable end, then they themselves were acquainted with.

A Law, 'tis founded in *Intellectuals*, in נִשְׁמָת, not in נֶפֶשׁ: it supposes a noble, and free born Creature; for where there is no *Liberty*, there's no *Law*, a *Law* being nothing else, but a *Rational restraint, and limitation of absolute Liberty*. Now all Liberty is *Radicaliter in Intellectu*; and

such Creatures, as have no *light*, have no choice, no *Moral* variety.

The *first*, and *supreme Being* ha's so full, and infinite a liberty, as cannot be bounded by a Law ; and these *low*, and *slavish Beings* have not so much liberty, as to make them capable of being bound. *Inter Bruta silent leges*. There is no *Turpe*, nor *Honestum* amongst them : no *duty*, nor *obedience* to be expected from them ; no *praise*, or *dispraise* due to them ; no *punishment*, nor *reward* to be distributed amongst them.

For *Punishment*, in its *formal notion*, is ἀμαρτήματος ἐκδίκησις (as the *Greek Lawyers* speak) or, as the fore-mentioned *Authour*<sup>1</sup> describes it, 'tis *malum Passionis, quod infligitur ob malum Actionis*. In all *punishment* there is to be some ἀντάλλαγμα, and ἀμοιβή, so that every *Damnum*, or *Incommodum* is not to be esteem'd a *punishment*, unless it be *in vindictam culpae*.

Neither yet can the proper end of a *Punishment* agree to *sensitive Creatures* ; for all *Punishment* is ἐνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, as *Plato* speaks οὐκ ἐνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι, οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἀγέννητον ἔσται ποτέ. 'Tis not in the power of *Punishment* to *recall* what is past, but to *prevent* what's possible. And that wise *Moralist*, *Seneca*, does almost translate *Plato* verbatim, *Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur : Revocari enim praeterita non possunt ; futura prohibentur*.

So that the end of all *Punishment* is either in *compensationem*, which is κακοῦ ἀναπόδοσις εἰς τὸ τοῦ τιμωροῦντος συμφέρον ἀναφερομένη, 'tis *in utilitatem ejus, contra quem peccatum est* : or else tis *in emendationem*, and so *in utilitatem peccantis* ; in respect of which that elegant *Moralist* *Plutarch*, stiles *punishment* ἱατρειὰν ψυχῆς, and *Hierocles* calls it ἱατρικὴν πονηρίας : or else it is *in exemplum, in utilitatem aliorum* ; ἵνα ἄλλοι πρόνοιοι ποιῶνται, καὶ φοβῶνται, as the *Greek*

<sup>1</sup> Grotius.



*Oratour* speaks; the same, which God speaks by *Moses*, that *Israel* may hear, and fear: and thus Punishment does παραδειγματίζειν.

But none of these ends are applyable to *sensitive Creatures*; but there is no more satisfaction to *Justice* in inflicting an evil upon them, then there is in the ruining of *inanimate Beings*, in demolishing of *Cities*, or *Temples* for *Idolatry*, which is onely for the good of them, that can take notice of it: for otherwise, as that grave *Moralist*, *Seneca*, has it, *Quam stultum est his irasci, quae iram nostram nec meruerunt, nec sentiunt*: No satisfaction is to be had from such things, as are not apprehensive of Punishment. And therefore *Annihilation*, though a great evil, yet wants this sting, and aggravation of a Punishment; for a *Creature* is not sensible of it.

Much lesse can you think, that a Punishment has any power to mend, or meliorate *sensitive Beings*, or to give *Example* to others amongst them.

By all this you see, that amongst all *irrational Beings* there is no ἀνομία, and therefore no ἁμαρτία, and therefore no τιμωρία: from whence it also flows, that the *Law of Nature* is built upon Reason.

There is some good so proportionable, and nutrimental to the *Being* of man, and some evil so venemous, and destructive to his *Nature*, as that the Good of *Nature* does sufficiently *antidote*, and fortifie him against the one, and does maintain, and sweeten his *Essence* with the other. There is so much Harmony in some actions, as that the Soul must needs dance at them: and there is such an harsh discord, and jarring in others, as that the Soul cannot endure them.

Therefore the learned *Grotius* does thus describe the *Law of Nature*; *Jus Naturale est dictatum rectae Rationis, indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura Rationali, inesse Moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem Moralem; et consequenter ab Authore Naturae,*

*ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari, aut praecipere.* Which I shall thus render; ‘*The Law of Nature* is a streaming out of Light from *the Candle of the Lord*, powerfully discovering such a deformity in some evil, as that an intellectual eye must needs abhor it; and such a commanding beauty in some good, as that a *rational Being* must needs be enamour’d with it; and so plainly shewing, that God stamp’d and seal’d the one with his command, and branded the other with his disliking.’

*Chrysostome* makes mention of this Νόμος φυσικός, and does very *Rhetorically* enlarge himself upon it in his twelfth, and thirteenth *Orations* Περὶ Ἀνδριάντων where he tells us, that it is αὐτοδίδακτος ἢ γνῶσις τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν οὐ τοιούτων a Radical, and fundamental knowledge, planted in the *Being* of Man, budding, and blossoming in *first principles*, flourishing, and bringing forth fruit, spreading it self into all the fair, and goodly branches of *Morality*, under the shadow of which the Soul may sit with much complacency and delight. And, as he pours out himself very fluently, Οὐ χρεία τῶν λόγων, οὐ τῶν διδασκάλων, οὐ τῶν πόνων, οὐ καμάτων. There’s no need of *Oratory* to allure men to it, you need not heap up *Arguments* to convince them of it: No need of an *Interpreter* to acquaint them with it: No need of the mind’s *spinning*, or *toying*, or *sweating* for the attaining of it; it grows *spontaneously*, it bubbles up *freely*, it shines out *cheerfully*, and *pleasantly*; it was so visible, as that the most *infant-age* of the World could *spell* it out; and read it without a *Teacher*: οὐ Μωϋσής, οὐ προφηταί, οὐ δικασταί, as he goes on: ’twas long extant before *Moses* was born, long before *Aaron* rung his *golden Bells*, before there was a *Prophet*, or a *Judge* in *Israel*. Men knew it οἰκόθεν παρὰ τοῦ συνειδότος διδαχθέντες. They had a *Bible* of God’s own *printing*, they had this *Scripture* of God *within* them. By this *Candle of the Lord*, *Adam* and *Eve* discovered their own folly and nakedness; this *Candle* flamed in *Cain’s*

conscience, and this *Law* was proclaimed in his heart with as much terror, as 'twas publish'd from *Mount Sinai*, which fill'd him with those furious reflexions for his *unnatural Murder*. *Enoch*, when he *walk'd with God*, walk'd by this *light*, by this *rule*. *Noah*, the *Preacher of Righteousnesse*, took this *Law* for his *Text*. Nay, you may see some print of this *Law* upon the *hard heart* of a *Pharaoh*, when he cries out, *The LORD is righteous, but I and my people have sinned*. Hence it was, that God, when he gave his *Law* afresh, gave it in such a compendious *Brachygraphy*; he wrot as it were in *Characters*, Οὐ φονεύσεις, Οὐ μοιχεύσεις, Οὐ κλέψεις, without any explication, or amplification at all. He onely enjoyned it with an *Imperatorious brevity*, he knows there was enough in the breasts of men to convince them of it, and to *comment* upon it, onely in the *Second Command* there is added an *enforcement*; because his people were excessively prone to the violation of it; and in that of the *Sabbath* there is given an *exposition* of it, because in all its circumstances it was not founded in *Natural Light*. So that in *Plutarchs* language the *Decalogue* would be call'd νόμος σφυρήλατος, *Gold in the Lump*; whereas other *Lawgivers* use to beat it *thinner*. Of this *Law*, as 'tis *printed* by *Nature*, *Philo* speaks very excellently; Νόμος δ' ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεινός, ἢ τοῦ δεινὸς θνητοῦ φθαρτὸς ἐν χαρτιδίοις ἢ στήλαις ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθεὶς. '*Right reason* (saith he) is that fix'd, and unshaken *Law*, not writ in perishing paper by the Hand, or Pen of a Creature, nor graven like a dead letter upon livelesse, and decaying Pillars; but written with the point of a Diamond, nay, with the finger of God himself in the heart of man.' A *Deity* gave it an *Imprimatur*; and an *eternal Spirit* grav'd it in an *immortal mind*. So as, that I may borrow the expression of the *Apostle*, the *mind* of man is σῦλος, καὶ ἐδραῖωμα τῆς ἀληθείας ταύτης. And I take it in the very same sense,

as tis to be took of the *Church* ; Tis a *Pillar* of this Truth, not to *support* it, but to *hold it forth* ; Neither must I let slip a passage in *Plutarch*, which is very near of kin to this of *Philo* ; ‘Ο Νόμος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἔξω γεγραμμένος, οὐδέ τισι ξύλοις, ἀλλ’ ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐαυτῷ λόγος αἰεὶ συνοικῶν, καὶ παραφυλάττων, καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐὼν ἔρημον ἡγεμονίας. You may take it thus : ‘This Royal *Law of Nature* was never shut up in a Paper-prison, was never confind, or limited to any outward surface ; but it was bravely situated in the *Centre* of a *Rational Being*, alwaies keeping the Soul company, guarding it, and guiding it ; ruling all its Subjectes, (every *obedient Action*) with a *Scepter of Gold*, and crushing in pieces all its enemies (breaking every *rebellious Action*) with a *Rod of Iron*.’ You may hear the *Lyrick* singing out the praises of this *Law* in a very lofty strain : Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε, καὶ ἀθανάτων, οὗτος ἄγει βιαίως τὸ δικαιοτάτον ὑπερτάτα χειρί· ‘This *Law*, which is the Queen of *Angelical*, and *Humane Beings*, does so rule, and dispose of them, as to bring about *Justice* with a most *high*, and *powerful*, and yet with a most *soft*, and *delicate* hand.’

You may hear *Plato* excellently discoursing of it, whilst he brings in a *Sophister* disputing against *Socrates*, and such an one, as would needs undertake to maintain this *Principle*, Ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσις, καὶ ὁ νόμος· That there was an *untunable antipathy* between *Nature*, and *Law* ; That *Laws* were nothing but *hominum infirmiorum commenta* : That this was Τὸ λαμπρότατον τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον ; the most *bright*, and *eminent Justice of Nature*, for men to rule according to *Power*, and according to no other *Law* ; That ὁ ισχυρότερος was ὁ κρείττων, and ὁ βελτίων· That all other *Laws* were παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντες· Nay he calls them *cheatings* and *bewitchings*, οὐκ ᾠδαί, ἀλλ’ ἐπῳδαί, they come (saies he) like *pleasant Songs*, when as they are meer *Charms*, and *Incantations*. But *Socrates*, after he had stung this same *Callicles* with a few quick *Interrogations*,

pours out presently a great deal of honey and sweetness, and plentifully shews that most pleasant, and conspiring Harmony, that is between *Nature*, and *Law*; That there's nothing more κατὰ φύσιν then a *Law*; That *Law* is founded in *Nature*; That it is for the maintaining, and ennobling, and perfecting of *Nature*. Nay, as *Plato* tells us elsewhere, There's no way for men to happiness, unlesse they follow τὰ ἔχνη τῶν λόγων, these *steps of Reason*, these *foot-steps of Nature*. This same *Law* *Aristotle* does more then once acknowledge, when he tells us of Νόμος ἴδιος, and Νόμος κοινός a *Positive Law* with him is a more *private Law*, καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται but *Nature's Law* is a more *publick*, and *Catholick Law*, ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, which he proves to be a very Sovereign, and commanding *Law*, for thus he saies, Ὁ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ὑπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. *The Law, that is most filled with Reason, must needs be most victorious, and triumphant.*

The same *Philosopher*, in his tenth book *de Republica*, hath another *distinction* of *Laws*; one branch whereof does plainly reach to the *Law of Nature*.

*There are*, saies he, Νόμοι κατὰ γράμματα, which are the same with those, which he call'd Νόμοι ἴδιοι before; and then there are Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη, which are all one with that he stil'd before Νόμος κοινός. Now, as he speaks, these Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη are κυριώτεροι, *Laws of the first Magnitude*, of a *Nobler Sphere*, of a *vaster*, and *purser influence*. Where you see also, that he calls the *Law of Nature* the *Moral Law*; and the same, which the *Apostle* calls Νόμος γραπτός, he, with the rest of the *Heathen*, calls it Ἀγραφα νόμιμα, couching the same sense in a seeming contradiction.

The *Oratour* has it expressly; *Non scripta, sed nata Lex.*

And amongst all the *Heathen* I can meet with none,

that draws such a lively portraicture of the *Law of Nature*, as that *Noble Oratour* does.

You may hear him thus pleading for it : *Nec, si, regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat scripta Lex de Stupris, &c.* 'Grant (*saies he*) that *Rome* were not for the present furnish'd with a *Positive Law* able to check the lust, and violence of a *Tarquin*; yet there was a *Virgin-Law of Nature*, which he had also ravish'd, and deflour'd: there was the beaming out of an *eternal Law*, enough to revive a modest *Lucretia*, and to strike terrour into the heart of so licentious a *Prince*:' for, as he goes on, *Est quidem vera Lex Recta Ratio, Naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quae vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen probos, neque frustra, jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo, aut vetando movet. Huic Legi nec propagari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abnegari potest: nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per Populum solvi hac Lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator, aut interpres eius alius. Non erat alia Romae, alia Athenis; Alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, omni tempore, Vna Lex, et sempiterna, et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit quasi communis Magister, et Legislato omnium Deus: Ille Legis hujus Inventor, Disceptator, Lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, et Naturam hominis aspernabitur. Hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.*

His meaning is not much different from this:

'*Right Reason* is a beautiful Law; a Law of a pure complexion, of a natural colour, of a vast extent, and diffusion, its colour never fades, never dies. It encourages men in obedience with a smile, it chides them, and frowns them out of wickednesse. Good men hear the least whispering of its pleasant voice, they observe the least glance of its lovely eye; but wicked men sometimes will not hear it, though it come to them in Thunder, nor take the least notice of it, though it should flash out in Lightning.



None must enlarge the *Phylacteries* of this Law, nor must any dare to prune off the least branch of it. Nay, the malice of man cannot totally deface so indelible a beauty. No *Pope*, nor *Prince*, nor *Parliament*, nor *People*, nor *Angel*, nor *Creature* can absolve you from it. This *Law* never *paints* its face, never changes its colour, it does not put on one Aspect at *Athens* and another face at *Rome*: but looks upon all Nations, and Persons with an impartial eye, it shines upon all Ages, and Times and Conditions with a perpetual Light, *it is yesterday, and to day, the same for ever*. There is but one Law-giver, one Lord, and supreme Judge of this Law, *God blessed for evermore*. He was the Contriver of it, the Commander of it, the Publisher of it, and none can be exempted from it, unlesse he will be banish'd from his own *essence*, and be excommunicated from *Humane Nature*. This Punishment would have sting enough, if he should avoid a thousand more, that are due to so foul a transgression.'

Thus you see, that the *Heathen* not onely had this Νόμος γαππρός upon them, but also they themselves took *special* notice of it, and the more *refined* sort amongst them could discourse very admirably about it, which must needs leave them the more *inexcusable* for the violation of it.

We come now to see where the strength of the *Law of Nature* lies, where its *nerves* are, whence it hath such an efficacious influence, such a binding virtue.

And I find *Vasquez* somewhat singular, and withall erroneous in his opinion, whilst he goes about to shew, that the *formality* of this *Law* consists onely in that *harmony*, and *proportion*, or else that *discord*, and *inconvenience*, which such and such an *object*, and such and such an *action* has with a *Rational Nature*; for (saies he) every *Essence* is *Mensura Boni et Mali* in respect of it self.

Which, as he thinks, is plainly manifested, and discovered also in *Corporeal Beings*, which use to fly onely from such



things, as are *destructive* to their own *forms*, and to embrace all such *neighborly* and *friendly Beings*, as will close, and comply with them. But he might easily have known, that as these *material Beings* were never yet so honoured, as to be judg'd capable of a *Law*; so neither can any *naked Essence*, though never so pure, and noble, lay a *Moral* engagement upon it self, or bind its own *Being*: for that would make the very same *Being superiour* to it self, as it gives a *Law*, and *inferiour* to it self, as it must obey it.

So that the *most high*, and *sovereign Being*, even God himself, does not subject himself to any *Law*; though there be some Actions most agreeable to his *Nature*, and others plainly inconsistent with it, yet they cannot amount to such a power, as to lay any obligation upon him, which should in the least Notion differ from the liberty of his own *Essence*.

Thus also in the *Commonwealth of Humane Nature* that proportion, which Actions bear to *Reason*, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a *Law* to build upon, but it is not the *Law* it self, nor a *formal obligation*.

Yet some of the *Schoolmen* are extreme bold, and vain in their *Suppositions*, so bold, as that I am ready to question whether it be best to repeat them: yet thus they say,

*Si Deus non esset, vel si non uteretur Ratione, vel si non recte judicaret de rebus; si tamen in homine idem esset dictamen Rectae Rationis quod nunc est, haberet etiam eandem Rationem Legis, quam nunc habet.*

But what are the *goodly spoils*, that these men expect, if they could break through such a croud of *Repugnancies*, and *Impossibilities*? The whole result, and product of it will prove but a meer *Cypher*; for Reason, as tis now, does not bind in its *own* name, but in the name of its *supreme Lord*, and *Sovereign*, by whom Reason *lives*, and *moves*, and *has its being*.

For, if onely a *Creature* should bind it self to the observa-

tion of this Law, it must also inflict upon it self such a *punishment*, as is answerable to the violation of it : but no such *Being* would be *willing*, or *able* to punish it self in so high a measure, as such a *transgression* would *meritoriously* require ; so that it must be accountable to some other *Legislative power*, which will vindicate its own commands, and will by this means engage a *Creature* to be more mindful of its own happinesse, then otherwise it would be.

For though some of the Gallenter *Heathen* can brave it out sometimes in an expression, that the very *turpitude* of such an *Action* is *punishment* enough, and the very *beauty* of *Goodness* is an abundant *reward*, and *compensation* ; yet we see, that all this, and more then this, did not efficaciously prevaile with them for their due conformity, and full obedience to *Nature's Law* ; such a *single cord* as this will easily be broken.

Yet there is some *truth* in what they say ; for thus much is visible, and apparent, that there is such a *Magnetical power* in some good, as must needs allure, and attract a *Rational Being* ; there is such a *native Fairness*, such an *intrinsecal loveliness* in some *objects*, as does not depend upon an *external* command, but by its own worth must needs win upon the *Soul* : and there is such an inseparable *deformity*, and *malignity* in some evil, as that *Reason* must needs loath it, and abominate it.

Insomuch as that, if there were no *Law*, or *Command*, yet a *Rational Being*, of its own accord, out of meer love, would espouse it self to such an *amiable* good, 'twould clasp, and twine about such a precious *object*, and, if there were not the least *check*, or *prohibition*, yet, in order to its own welfare, 'twould abhor, and flie from some *black evils*, that spit out so much venome against its *Nature*.

This is that, which the *Schoolmen* mean when they tell us, *Quaedam sunt mala, quia prohibentur ; sed alia prohibentur, quia sunt mala* : that is, in *positive Laws*, whether

*Divine* or *Humane*, Acts are to be esteem'd *evil* upon this account, because they are *forbidden*; but in the *Law* of *Nature* such an *evil* was *intimately*, and *inevitably* an *evil*, though it should not be *forbidden*.

Now that there are such *Bona per se*, and *Mala per se*, (as the *Schools* speak) I shall thus demonstrate: *Quod non est malum per se, potuit non prohiberi*; for there is no reason imaginable, why there should not be a *possibility* of not prohibiting that, which is not *absolutely* evil, which is in its own nature *indifferent*.

But now there are some *evils* so *excessively evil*, so *intolerably* bad, as that they cannot but be *forbidden*; I shall onely name this one, *Odium Dei*; for a *Being* to hate the *Creatour*, and cause of its *Being*, if it were possible for this not to be *forbidden*, it were possible for it to be *lawful*; for *Ubi nulla Lex, ibi nulla praevaricatio*: Where there's no *Law*, there's no 'Ανομία, where there's no *Rule*, there's no *Anomaly*; if there were no *prohibition* of this, 'twould not be *sin* to do it. But that to *hate God* should not be *sin*, does involve a whole heap of *contradictions*; so that this *evil* is so *full* of evil, as that it cannot but be *forbidden*; and therefore is an evil in order of *Nature* before the *Prohibition* of it. Besides, as the Philosophers love to speak, *Essentiae rerum sunt immutabiles*, *Essences* neither *ebb* nor *flow*, but have in themselves a *perpetual Unity*, and *Identity*: and all such *Properties*, as *flow*, and *bubble up* from *Beings*, are constant, and unvariable; but, if they could be stopt in their *motion*, yet that state would be *violent*, and not at all *connatural* to such a subject.

So that grant onely the *Being* of Man, and you cannot but grant this also; That there is such a constant *Convenience*, and *Analogy*, which some *Objects* have with its *Essence*, as that it cannot but encline to them; and that there is such an irreconcilable *Disconvenience*, such an

*Eternal Antipathy* between it and *other Objects*, as that it must cease to be what it is, before it can come near them.

This *Suarez* terms a *Natural Obligation*, and a *just foundation for a Law*. But now, before all this can rise up to the height and perfection of a *Law*, there must come a Command from some *Superiour Power*, from whence will spring a *Moral Obligation* also, and make up the *formality* of a *Law*.

Therefore God himself, for the brightning of his own *Glory*, for the better regulating, and tuning of the *World*, for the maintaining of such a choice piece of his workmanship, as *Man* is, has publish'd this his *Royal Command*, and proclaim'd it by that *principle* of *Reason*, which he has planted in the *Being* of *Man*: which does fully convince him of the *righteousness*, and *goodnesse*, and *necessity* of this *Law*, for the *materials* of it; and of the *validity*, and *authority* of this *Law*, as it comes from the *Minde*, and *Will* of his *Creatour*. Neither is it any *eclipse*, or *diminution* of the *Liberty* of that *first Being*, to say, that there is some *evil* so foul, and ill-favour'd, as that it cannot but be *forbidden* by him; and that there is some *good* so fair, and eminent, as that he cannot but *command* it.

For, as the *Schoolmen* observe, *Divina voluntas, licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra, ex suppositione tamen unius Actus liberi, potest necessitari ad alium*.

Though the *Will* of God be compleatly *free* in respect of all his looks, and glances towards the *Creature*, yet notwithstanding, upon the voluntary, and free precedency of *one Act*, we may justly conceive him necessitated to *another*, by virtue of that indissoluble connexion, and concatenation between these *two Acts*, which does in a manner knit, and unite them into one.

Thus God has an *absolute* liberty, and choice, whether he will make a *promise*, or no; but if he has made it, he

cannot but *fulfil* it. Thus he is perfectly *free*, whether he will reveal his mind, or no ; but, if he will reveal it, he cannot but speak *truth*, and manifest it as it is.

God had the very same liberty, whether he would *create* a *World*, or no ; but, if he will *create* it, and keep it in its comeliness, and proportion, he must then have a *vigilant*, and *providential eye* over it ; and, if he will provide for it, he cannot but have a perfect, and indefective *Providence* agreeable to his own *wisdom*, and *goodness*, and *Being* : so that if he will create such a *Being*, as *Man*, such a *Rational Creature*, furnish'd with sufficient knowledge to discern between some *good*, and *evil* ; and, if he will supply it with a proportionable concourse in its *operations*, he cannot then but prohibit such *acts*, as are *intrinsically prejudicial*, and detrimental to the *Being* of it : neither can he but command such *acts*, as are necessary to its *preservation* and *welfare*.

God therefore, when from all *Eternity* in his own glorious Thoughts he contriv'd the *Being* of *Man*, he did also with his piercing eye see into all *conveniences* and *disconveniencies*, which would be in reference to such a *Being*, and by his *eternal Law* did restrain, and determine it to such *acts*, as should be advantageous to it, which in his wise *Oeconomy* and dispensation, he publish'd to man by the voice of *Reason*, by the mediation of this *Natural Law*.

Whence it is, that every *violation* of this *Law* is not onely an injury to man's *being* ; but, *ultra nativam rei malitiam*, (as the *Scholes* speak) 'tis also a *virtual* and *interpretative* contempt of that *supreme Law-giver* ; who, out of so much *wisdom*, *love* and *goodnesse* did thus bind man to his own happiness.

So much then, as man does start aside and *apostatize* from this *Law* ; to so much *misery*, and *punishment* does he expose himself : though it be not necessary that the *Candle* of *Nature* should discover the full extent and

measure of that Punishment, which is due to the breakers of this Law; for to the nature of Punishment *non requiritur, ut praecognita sit poena, sed ut fiat actus dignus tali poena.*

The *Lawyers* and *Schoolmen* both will acknowledge this *Principle*. For, as *Suarez* has it, *Sequitur reatus ex intrinseca conditione culpae; ita ut, licet poena per Legem non sit determinata, arbitrio tamen competentis Judicis puniri possit.* Yet the *Light of Nature* will reveal, and disclose thus much; That a *Being* totally dependent upon another, essentially subordinate, and subject to it, must also be accountable to it for every *provocation*, and *rebellion*; And, for the violation of so good a *Law*, which he has set it, and for the sinning against such admirable *Providence* and *Justice*, as shines out upon it, must be lyable to such a *Punishment*, as that glorious *Law-giver* shall judge fit for such an offence; who is so full of *Justice*, as that he cannot, and so great in *Goodnesse*, as that he will not, punish a *Creature* above its desert.

## CHAPTER VII.

### *The Extent of the Law of Nature.*

THERE are stamp'd and printed upon the *Being* of Man some clear and indelible *Principles*, some *first* and *Alphabetical Notions*; by putting together of which it can spell out the *Law of Nature*.

There's scatter'd in the *Soul* of man some seeds of *Light*, which fill it with a vigorous pregnancy, with a multiplying fruitfulness, so that it brings forth a numerous, and sparkling posterity of *secondary Notions*, which make for the crowning, and encompassing of the *Soul* with happiness.

All the fresh Springs of *Common* and *Fountain-Notions* are in the *Soul* of Man, for the watering of his *Essence*, for the refreshing of this heavenly *Plant*, this *Arbor inversa*, this *enclosed Being*, this *Garden of God*.

And, though the wickedness of man may stop the pleasant *Motion*, the clear and *Chrystalline* progress of the *Fountain*; yet they cannot hinder the *first risings*, the *bubbling* endeavours of it. They may pull off *Natures leaves*, and pluck off her *fruits*, and chop off her *branches*, but yet the *root* of it is *eternal*, the foundation of it is *inviolable*.

Now these *first*, and *Radical principles* are winded up in some such short bottoms as these: *Bonum est appetendum, malum est fugiendum; Beatitudo est quaerenda; Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.* And Reason thus ὠτόκησε τὸν νόμον, *incubando super haec ova*; by warming, and brooding upon these *first* and *Oval Principles* of her own laying, it being it self quicken'd with an heavenly vigour, does thus *hatch* the *Law of Nature*.

For, you must not, nor cannot think that *Natures Law* is confin'd, and contracted within the compasse of two, or three *common Notions*; but Reason, as with one foot it fixes a *Center*, so with the other it measures, and spreads out a *Circumference*, it draws several *Conclusions*, which do all meet, and croud into these *first*, and *Central Principles*. As in those Noble *Mathematical Sciences* there are not onely some first αἰτήματα, which are *granted* as soon as they are *ask'd*, if not before; but there are also whole heaps of firm, and immoveable *Demonstrations*, that are built upon them: in the very same manner, *Nature* has some *Postulata*, some προλήψεις, (which *Seneca* renders *Praesumptiones*, which others call *Anticipationes Animi*,) which she knows a *Rational Being* will presently and willingly yield unto; and therefore, by virtue of these, it does engage and oblige it to all such commands, as



shall by just result, by genuine production, by kindly and evident derivation flow from these.

For men must not onely look upon the *Capital Letters* of this Νόμος γραπτός, but they must read the whole *context* and *coherence* of it; they must look to every *jot* and *Apex* of it: for *Heaven and Earth shall sooner pass away, then one Jot or Title of this Law shall vanish.*

They must not onely gaze upon two or three *Principles* of the *first Magnitude*; but they must take notice of the lesser *Celestial Sporades*: for these also have their *light*, and *influence*.

They must not onely *skim* off the *Cream* of *first Principles*; but whatsoever *sweetness* comes streaming from the *Dug* of *Nature*, they must feed upon it, they may be nourish'd with it.

*Reason* does not onely crop off the *tops* of *first Notions*, but does so gather all the *Flowers* in *Nature's Garden*, as that it can bind them together in a pleasant *Posy*, for the refreshment of it self and others.

Thus, as a *Noble Author* of our own does well observe, *Tota ferè Ethica est Notitia communis: All Morality is nothing, but a collection and bundling up of Natural Precepts.* The *Moralists* did but πλατύνειν φυλακτήρια, *enlarge the fringes of Nature's Garment*: they are so many *Commentatours* and *Expositours* upon *Nature's Law*. This was his meaning, that stil'd *Moral Philosophy*, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα Φιλοσοφία, *that Philosophy, which is for the maintaining and edifying of Humane Nature.* Thus *Nature's Law* is frequently call'd the *Moral Law*. But the *Schoolmen* in their rougher *Language* make these several ranks and distributions of *Natural Precepts*. Τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν. First, there come in the front *Principia Generalia*, (as some call them) *per se nota: ut, Honestum est faciendum; Prævum vitandum.* Then follow next *Principia particularia et magis determinata; ut, Justitia*

*est servanda ; Deus est colendus ; Vivendum est temperatè.* At length come up in the rear, *Conclusiones evidenter illatae, quae tamen cognosci nequeunt nisi per discursum ; ut, Mendacium, Furtum et similia prava esse.*

These, though they may seem somewhat *more remote*, yet being fetch'd from clear, and unquestionable *Premises*, they have *Nature's Seal* upon them ; and are thus far *sacred*, so as to have the usual *priviledge* of a *Conclusion*, to be untouch'd and undeniable.

For though that *learned Authour*, whom I mention'd not long before, do justly take notice of this, that *Discourse* is the usual *inlet* to *Errour*, and too often gives an open admission, and courteous entertainment to such *falsities*, as come disguis'd in a *Syllogistical* form, which by their *sequacious windings* and *gradual insinuations* twine about some weak understandings : yet, in the *nature* of the thing it self, 'tis as impossible to collect an *Errour* out of a *Truth*, as 'tis to gather the *blackest Night* out of the *fairest Sunshine*, or the *foulest wickedness* out of the *purest goodness*. A *Conclusion* therefore, that's built upon the *Sand*, you may very well expect its *fall* ; but that, which is built upon the *Rock*, is *impregnable* and *immoveable* : for, if the *Law of Nature* should not extend it self so far, as to oblige men to an accurate observation of that, which is a remove or two distant from *first Principles*, 'twould then prove extremely defective in some such *Precepts*, as do most *intimately* and *intensely* conduce to the welfare and advantage of an *Intellectual Being*.

And these *first Notions* would be most *barren*, *inefficacious Speculations*, unless they did thus increase and multiply, and bring forth fruit with the blessing of Heaven upon them.

So that there is a *necessary connexion* and *concatenation* between *first Principles*, and such *Conclusions*. For, as *Suarez* has it, *Veritas Principii continetur in Conclusionem* :

so that he, that questions the *Conclusion*, must needs also strike at the *Principle*. Nay, if we look to the *notion* of a *Law*, there is more of that to be seen in these more *particular Limitations*, then in those more *universal Notions*; for *Lex est proxima Regula operationum*. But now *Particulars* are nearer to *existence* and *operation*, then *Universals*: and in this respect do more immediately steer and direct the *motions* of such a *Being*. The one is the *bending* of the *Bow*; but the other is the *shooting* of the *Arrow*.

*Suarez* does fully determine this in such words as these, *Haec omnia Praecepta* (he means both *Principles* and *Conclusions*) *prodeunt a Deo, Auctore Naturae, et tendunt ad eundem finem, nimirum ad debitam conservationem, et naturalem perfectionem, seu felicitatem Humanae Naturae*.

This *Law of Nature*, as it is thus branch'd forth, does bind in *foro Conscientiae*: for as that *Noble Author*, (whom I more then once commended before) speaks very well in this: *Natural Conscience*, 'tis *Centrum Notitiarum communium*, and tis a kind of *Sensus communis* in respect of the *inward Faculties*, as that other is in respect of the *outward Senses*. 'Tis the competent *Judge* of this *Law of Nature*: 'tis the *natural Pulse* of the *Soul*, by the beating, and motion of which, the state, and temper of men is discernible. The Apostle *Paul* thus felt the *Heathen's pulse*, and found their *Consciences* sometimes *accusing* them, sometimes making *Apology* for them. Yet there's a great deale of difference between *Natural Conscience*, and the *Law of Nature*; for (as the *Scholemen* speak) *Conscience*, 'tis *Dictatum Practicum in particulari*; 'tis a prosecution, and application of this *Natural Law*, as *Providence* is of that *eternal Law*.

Nay, *Conscience* sometimes does embrace onely the *shadow* of a *Law*, and does engage men, though erroneously, to the observation of that, which was never dictated by any just *Legislative* power. Nor is it content to glance

onely at what's to come, but *Janus*-like, it has a double aspect, and so looks back to what's past, as to call men to a strict account for every *violation* of this *Law* :

Which *Law* is so accurate, as to oblige men not onely *ad actum*, but *ad modum* also : it looks as well to the *inward form* and *manner*, as to the *materiality* and *bulk* of *outward Actions* : for every *Being* owes thus much kindness, and courtesie to it self, not onely to put forth such *acts*, as are *essential* and *intrinsecal* to its own welfare ; but also to delight in them and to fulfill them with all possible *freenesse* and *alacrity*, with the greatest *intenseness* and *complacency*. *Self-love* alone might easily constrain men to this *natural* obedience. *Humane Laws* indeed rest satisfied with a *visible*, and *external obedience* ; but *Nature's Law* darts it self into the most *intimate Essentials*, and looks for entertainment there.

You know that amongst the *Moralists* onely such *acts* are esteem'd *Actus Humani*, that are *Actus Voluntarii*. When *Nature* has tun'd a *Rational Being*, she expects that every *String*, every *Faculty* should spontaneously and chearfully sound forth his praise.

And the God of *Nature*, that has not *chain'd*, nor *fetter'd*, nor *enslav'd* such a Creature ; but has given it a competent liberty and enlargement, the free diffusion and amplification of its own *Essence*, he looks withall, that it should willingly consent to its own *happiness*, and to all such *means*, as are necessary for the accomplishment of its *choicest end* : and that it should totally abhor whatsoever is *destructive*, and *prejudicial* to its own *Being* ; which if it do, 'twill presently embrace the *Law of Nature*, if either it loves its God, or it self ; the *command* of its God, or the *welfare* of it self.

Nay, the *Precepts* of this *Natural Law* are so potent and triumphant, as that some *acts*, which rebel against it, become not on'ly *Illiciti*, but *Irriti*, as both the *Scholemen*

and *Lawyers* observe; they are not onely *irregularities*, but meer *nullities*: and that either *ob defectum Potestatis, et Incapacitatem Materiae*; as if one should go about to give the same thing to two several *Persons*, the second *Donation* is a *Moral Non-entity*: or else *Propter perpetuam rei Indecentiam, et Turpitudinem durantem*; as in some *anomalous* and *incestuous Marriages*. And this *Law of Nature* is so exact, as that 'tis not capable of an ἐπιείκεια, which the *Lawyers* call *Emendatio Legis*: but there is no mending of *Essences*, nor of *Essential Laws*; both which consist in *Puncto, in Indivisibili*, and so cannot *Recipere magis et minus*: nor is there any need of it; for in this *Law* there's no *Rigour* at all, 'tis pure *Equity*, and so nothing is to be abated of it. Neither does it depend onely à mente *Legislatoris*, which is the usual *Rise of Mitigation*; but 'tis conversant about such *acts*, as are *per se tales*, most *intrinsecally* and *inseparably*.

Yet notwithstanding this *Law* does not refuse an *Interpretation*, but *Nature* her self does gloss upon her own *Law*, as in what *circumstances* such an *Act* is to be esteem'd *Murder*, and when *not*; and so in many other *Branches of Nature's Law*, if there be any appearance of *intricacy*, any seeming *knot* and *difficulty*, *Nature* has given *edge* enough to cut it asunder.

There is another *Law* bordering upon this *Law of Nature, Jus Gentium, Juri Naturali propinquum et consanguineum*; and 'tis *Medium quoddam inter Jus Naturale, et Jus Civile*. Now this *Jus Gentium* is either *per similitudinem et concomitantiam*, when several *Nations*, in their distinct conditions, have yet some of the same *positive Laws*: or else (which indeed is most properly Νόμιμον ἔθνικόν) *per communicationem et societatem*, which, as the learned *Grotius* describes, *Ab omnium, vel multarum gentium voluntate vim obligandi accepit*: that is, when *all*, or *many* of the most *refined Nations*, bunching and clustering

together, do binde themselves by *general compact* to the observation of such *Laws*, as they judge to be for the good of them all; as the Honourable entertainment of an *Embassadour*, or such like.

So that 'tis *Jus humanum non scriptum*. 'Tis εὔρημα βίου καὶ χρόνου. For, as *Justinian* tells us, *Usu exigente, et Humanis necessitatibus Gentes humanae quaedam sibi jura constituerunt*. Whereas other *Humane Laws* have a narrower *Sphere* and *compass*, and are *limited* to such a state, which the *Orator* stiles *Leges populares*, the *Hebrews* call their *positive Laws* חקים, sometimes משפטים, though the one do more properly point at *Ceremonials*, the other at *Judicials*. The *Septuagint* render them ἐντολαί, some others call them τὰ τῆς δευτερώσεως: as they call *Natural Laws* מצות, which the *Hellenists* render δικαιώματα. But, according to the *Greek Idiom*, these are termed τὰ ἐν φύσει, and the others τὰ ἐν τάξει.

Now, though the *formality* of *Humane Laws* do flow *immediately* from the powers of some *particular men*; yet the *strength* and *sinew* of these *Laws* is founded in the *Law of Nature*: for *Nature* does *permissively* give them leave to make such *Laws*, as are for their greater convenience; and when they are made, and whilst they are in their force, and vigour, it does oblige and command them not to break, or violate them: for they are to esteem their own *consent* as a *sacred thing*; they are not to contradict their own *Acts*, nor to oppose such *Commands*, as *ex pacto* were fram'd and constituted by themselves.

Thus much for the *Law of Nature* in *general*. We must look in the next place to that *Lumen Naturae*, that *Candle of the Lord*, by which this *Law of Nature* is manifested and discovered.



## CHAPTER VIII.

*How the Law of Nature is discovered ; not by Tradition.*

GOD having contrived such an *admirable* and *harmonious Law* for the guiding and governing of his *Creature*, you cannot doubt, but that he will also provide sufficient means for the *discovery* and *publishing* of it ; *Promulgation* being pre-requir'd, as a *necessary condition*, before a *Law* can be valid and *vigorous*. To this end therefore he has set up an *Intellectual Lamp* in the Soul, by the *light* of which it can read this Νόμος γραπτός, and can follow the *Commands* of its *Creatour*.

The *Scholemen*, with full and general consent, understand that place of the *Psalmist* of this *Lumen Naturale*, and many other *Authors* follow them in this too securely. Nay, some *Critical Writers* quote them, and yet never chide them for it. The words are these, נסה על־נוֹאֵר פִּנִּיךְ *Eleva super nos lumen vultûs tui* : but yet they, very ignorantly, though very confidently, render them, *Signatum est super nos lumen vultûs tui* : and they do as erroneously interpret it of the *light* of *Reason*, which (say they) is *Signaculum quoddam, et impressio increatae lucis in Anima*. So much indeed is true ; but it is far from being an *Exposition* of this place. Yet perhaps the *Septuagint* mis-led them, who thus translate it ; Ἐσημειώθη ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου but *Aquila*, that had a *quicker eye* here, renders it Ἐπαρον, and *Symmachus* Ἐπίσημον πόλινσον.

The *words* are plainly put up in the form of a *Petition* to Heaven, for some *smiles* of *love*, for some propitious and favourable *glances*, for God's gracious *presence*, and *acceptance*. And they amount to this sense ; *If one Sun do but Shine upon me, I shall have more joy then worldlings have, when all their Stars appear.*

But to let these passe with the *Errours* of their *Vulgar*



*Latine*; I meet with one more remarkable, and of larger influence: I mean that of the *Jews*, who (as that worthy *Author* of our own, in his learned Book *De Jure Naturali secundùm Hebraeos*, makes the report) do imagine, and suppose, that the *light* of *Nature* shines onely upon themselves *originally* and *principally*, and upon the *Gentiles* onely by way of *participation* and dependance upon them; they all must light their *Candles* at the *Jewish Lamp*. Thus they strive, as much as they can, to *engross* and *monopolize* this *Natural Light* to themselves; onely it may be sometimes, out of their great liberality, they will distribute some *broken Beams* of it to the *Gentiles*. As if these מצות בני נח, these *Praecepta Noachidarum* had been *lock'd up* and *cabinetted* in *Noah's Ark*, and afterwards kept from the *prophane* touch of a *Gentile*: as if they had been part of that *Bread*, which our *Saviour* said was not to be cast unto *Dogs*; and therefore they would make them glad to *eat* of the *Crumbs*, that *fall from their Master's Table*: as if they onely enjoyed a *Goshen* of *Natural Light*, and all the rest of the world were *benighted* in most palpable, and unavoidable *Darkness*: as if the *Sun* shin'd onely upon *Canaan*: as if *Canaan* onely flow'd with this *Milk* and *Honey*: as if no *drops* of *Heaven* could fall upon a *Wilderness*, unlesse an *Israelite* be there: as if they had the *whole impression* of *Nature's Law*: as if God had *not dealt thus with every Nation*: as if the *Heathen* also had not the *knowledge of this Law*. 'Tis true, they had the first *Beauty* of the *rising Sun*, the first *peepings* out of the *Day*, the first *dawnings* of *Natural Light*; for there were no other, that it could then shine upon: but do they mean to check the *Sun* in its motion, to stop this *Giant* in his *race*, to hinder him from scattering *rayes* of *Light* in the world? Do they think, that *Nature's Fountain* is enclos'd, that her *Well* is seal'd up, that a *Jew* must onely drink of it, and a *Gentile* must die for *Thirst*? O!

but they tell you they are עם סגולה—Λαὸς περιούσιος, a *Darling*, and *peculiar Nation*.

We shall fully acknowledge with the *Hebrew of Hebrews*, Πολὺ τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου, though not in respect of *Natural Light*, which, doubtlesse, is planted by *Nature* in the heart both of *Jew* and *Gentile*, and shines upon both with an *equal* and *impartial Beam*. And yet this must not be denied, that the *Jews* had even these *Natural Notions* much clarified, and refined from those *clouds*, and *mists*, which יצר הרע *Original Sin* had brought upon them, and this by means of that pure, and powerful *Beam* of heavenly Truth, which shined more *peculiarly* upon them. Those *Laws*, which *Nature* had engraven ἐν δέλτοις φρενῶν, upon the *Tables of their Hearts*, Sin like a *Moth* had eaten and defaced (as in all other men it had done), but in them those *fugitive Letters* were call'd home again, and those many *Lacunæ* were *supplied* and *made good* again by comparing it with that other *Copy* (of God's own writing too) which *Moses* received in the *Mount*; and besides, they had a great number of *revealed Truths* discovered to them, which were *engrafted* indeed upon the *stock* of *Nature*, but would never have grown out of it: so that this *second Edition* was *Auction* also, as well as *Emendation*; but yet, for all this, they have no greater a portion of the *Light* of *Nature*, then all men have. Thus *Christians* also are עם סגולה, and yet in respect of their *natural condition*, have no more then others.

Now, if the *Jews* have so many *priviledges*, why are not they *content*? Why do not they rest satisfied with them? Why will they thus be *claiming*, and arrogating more then their due?

Are they the *first-born*, and have they a *double-portion*, and do they envy their *younger Brethren* their *Birth*, and *Being*? Have they a bright, and eminent *Sun-shine*; and do they envy a *Gentile* the *Candle* of the *Lord*?

No (as that *learned Author* tells us) they will grant, that the *Gentiles* had their *Candle* and their *Torch*; but it was lighted at the *Jew's Sun*. They must have some *Bottles* of *Water* to *quench* their *thirst*; but they must be fill'd at their *streams*, ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν ναμάτων, *ex fluentis Hebraicis*.

This indeed must be granted, that the whole generality of the *Heathen* went a *gleaning* in the *Jewish* fields. They had some of their *grapes*, some *ears* of *Corn*, that dropp'd from them. *Pythagoras* and *Plato* especially were such notable *gleaners*, as that they *stole* out of the very *sheaves*, out of those *Truths*, that are bound up in the *Sacred volume*. Yet all this while they ne're stole *first Principles*, nor *Demonstrations*; but they had them οἰκοθεν, and needed not to take such a *long Journey* for them.

Give then unto the *Jew* the things of the *Jewes*, and to the *Gentile* the things that are the *Gentiles*; and that, which God has made *common*, call not thou *peculiar*. The *Apostle Paul's Question* is here very seasonable; \* Ἡ Ἰουδαίων ὁ Θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἔθνῳν; ναί, καὶ ἔθνῳν.

There was never any *partition-wall* between the *Essence* of *Jew*, and *Gentile*. Now the *Law of Nature* 'tis founded in *Essentials*. And that which is disconvenient to that *Rational Nature*, which is in a *Jew*, is as opposite and disagreeable to the same *Nature* in a *Gentile*; as that *good*, which is suitable and proportionable to a *Jew* in his *Rational Being*, is every way as *intrinsecal* to the welfare of a *Gentile*, that does not differ *essentially* from him. So likewise for the *promulgation* of this *Law*, being it does equally *concern* them both, and equally *oblige* them both; it is also by *Nature* equally *publish'd* and *manifested* to them both. So that what the *Apostle* speaks in respect of the freeness of *Evangelical Light*, we may say the very same in respect of the commonnesse of *Natural Light*;

Οὐκ ἔστι Ἕλληνας καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, περιτομὴ καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκύθης, δούλος, ἐλεύθερος· but all these are *one*, in respect of *Nature*, and *Nature's Law*, and *Nature's Light*.

## CHAPTER IX.

*The Light of Nature.*

THIS *Law of Nature*, having a firm and unshaken Foundation in the *necessity* and *conveniency* of its *materials*, becomes *formally* valid and vigorous by the mind and command of the *Supreme Law-giver*, so as that all the *strength* and *nerves* and *binding* virtue of this *Law* are rooted and fasten'd partly in the *excellency* and *equity* of the commands themselves. But they principally depend upon the Sovereignty and Authority of *God* himself, thus contriving, and commanding the *welfare* of his *Creature*, and advancing a *Rational Nature* to the just perfection of its *Being*. This is the rise and original of all that *obligation*, which is in the *Law of Nature*. But the *publishing* and *manifestation* of this *Law*, which must give notice of all this, does flow from that *heavenly Beame*, which *God* has *darted* into the *Soul* of *Man*; from the *Candle* of the *Lord*, which *God* has *lighted up* for the discovery of his own *Laws*; from that *intellectual eye*, which *God* has fram'd and made exactly proportionable to this *Light*.

Therefore we shall easily grant that the obligation of this *Law* does not come from this *Candle of the Lord*; and others, I suppose, will deny that the *Manifestation* of this *Law* does come from this *Candle* of the *Lord*, that the promulgation of this *Law* is made by the voice of *Reason*.

In order of *Nature*, this *Law*, as all others, must be *made*, before it can be made *known*, *Entity* being the just root and bottom of *Intelligibility*. So that *Reason* does not *facere*, or *ferre legem*; but onely *invenire*: as a *Candle* does not *produce* an *Object*, but onely *present* it to the

eye, and make it *visible*. All *Veritie*, 'tis but the *gloss* of *Entity*: there's a loving *Union* and *Communion* between them, as soon as *Being* is, it may be known.

So that *Reason* is the *Pen*, by which *Nature* writes this Law of her own composing. This *Law*, 'tis publish'd by Authority from Heaven, and *Reason* is the *Printer*. This *eye* of the *Soul*, 'tis to spy out all *dangers* and all *advantages*, all *conveniences* and *disconveniences* in reference to such a *Being*, and to warn the *Soul* in the name of its *Creatour*, to fly from such irregularities, as have an *intrinsecal* and *implacable malice* in them, and are prejudicial and *destructive* to its *Nature*; but to *comply* with, and embrace all such *acts*, and *objects*, as have a *native comeliness* and *amiableness*, and are for the *heightning* and *ennobling* of its *Being*.

*Hierocles* does most excellently set forth this, whilst he brings that *golden verse* of *Pythagoras* to the *Touchstone*:

Μηδ' ἀλογίστως σαυτὸν ἔχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἐθίζον,

and does thus brighten it and display it in its *full glory*, 'Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς κανόνα τὴν οὐσίαν ἡμῶν ἀποβλέποντες, τὸ δέον ἐν πᾶσιν εὐρίσκομεν. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, συμφώνως τῇ ἑαυτῶν οὐσίᾳ διαζῶντες. His meaning is this: 'there is a kind of a *Canon-Law* in the *essences* of men, and a *Rational Tuning* all their *faculties* according to those *Lessons*, which *Nature* has set; it does ζῆν συμφώνως, with a most grateful and *harmonious life*, pleases both it self, and others. So, whilst he weighs that other *golden Verse* in the *Balance*, he speaks very high,

Βουλεύου δὲ πρὸ ἔργου ὅπως μὴ μῶρα πέληται·

he gives us this *learned* accompt of it; Λόγῳ δ' ὀρθῶ πείθεσθαι, καὶ Θεῷ ταυτόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν γένος, εὐμοιρῆσαν τῆς οἰκείας ἐλλάμψεως, ταῦτα βούλεται, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ὀρίζει νόμος· καὶ γίνεται σύμψηφος Θεῷ ἢ κατὰ Θεὸν διακειμένη ψυχὴ· καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀποβλέπουσα πράττει ἃ ἂν πράττη. ἡ δὲ

ἐναντίως διακειμένη πρὸς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινόν, εἰκῇ καὶ ὥς ἔτυχε φερομένη, ἅτε τῆς μόνης τῶν καλῶν στάθμης, νοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ ἀποπεσοῦσα. Which I may thus render; *To obey Right Reason, 'tis to be perswaded by God himself, who has furnish'd and adorn'd a Rational Nature with this intrinsecal, and essential Lamp, that shines upon it, and guides it in the waies of God; so, as that the Soul and its Creatour become perfect Unisons, and being bless'd with the light of his Countenance, it steers all its motions and actions, with much security and happinesse. But, if this Lamp of Reason be darkned and obscured, the Soul presently embraces a Cloud, and courts a Shadow; the blackest and most palpable Atheism, and Wickedness must needs cover the face of that Soul, that starts back and apostatizes from its God and its Reason. Where you cannot but take notice, that he calls the light of Reason, Οἰκεία ἔλλαμψις, which is an expression very parallel to this of Solomon, The Candle of the Lord.*

That wise Heathen, *Socrates*, was of the very same mind, in whose mouth that speech was so frequent and usual, Οὐδεὶν χρὴ πείθεσθαι πλὴν τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. 'Tis vain to trust any thing, but that which Reason tells you has the Seal of God upon it. Thus that Heathen Oratour, very fully and Emphatically; *Nos Legem bonam à mala, nullâ aliâ, nisi Naturali norma, dividere possumus. Nec solùm Ius, et Iniuria à Natura dijudicantur, sed omnino omnia Honesta et Turpia. Nam et communis Intelligentia nobis Res notas efficit, ea quae in animis nostris inchoavit, ut Honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis Turpia.* That is, Nature has distinguish'd Good from Evil by these indelible stamps and impressions, which she has graven upon both; and has set Reason, as a competent Judge, to decide all Moral Controversies: which by her first seeds of Light plainly discovers an honourable Beauty in Goodness, and an inseparable Blot in Wickednesse. Hence these three, Ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ζῆν



κατὰ λόγον, ἤν κατὰ Θεόν, are esteem'd equivalencies by that Emperour and Philosopher, *Marcus Antoninus*. But yet the *Jews* will by no means yield that there is *light* enough in the *dictates* of *Reason*, to display *Common Notions*; for they look upon it as a various and unsatisfactory *light*, mix'd with much *Shadow* and *Darkness*, labouring with perpetual *inconstancy* and *uncertainty*. What, are *first Principles* become so *mutable* and *treacherous*? Are *Demonstrations* such *fortuitous* and *contingent* things? Had I met with this in a fluctuating *Academick*, in a rowling *Sceptick*, in a *Sextus Empyricus*, in some famous *Professour of Doubts*, I should then have look'd upon it, as a tolerable expression of their *trembling* and *shivering opinion*. But how come I to find it among those *Divers* into the *depths* of *Knowledge*, who grant a *certainty*, and yet will not grant it to *Reason*? I would they would tell us then, where we might hope to find it. Surely not in an *Oriental Tradition*, in a *Rabbinical Dream*, in a dusty *Manuscript*, in a remnant of *Antiquity*, in a *Bundle of Testimonies*; and yet this is all you are like to get of them: for they tell you this *Story*, that these *Natural Precepts tum in ipsis rerum initiis, tum in ea, quae fuit post Diluvium, instauratione, Humano generi ipsâ sanctissimâ Numinis voce fuisse imperata, atque ad Posterios per Traditionem solùm inde manasse*; that is, that ' these *Commands* were proclaim'd by the voice of God himself, first to *Adam* in the first *setting out* of the *World*; and then they were *repeated* to *Noah*, when there was to be a *reprinting* and *new Edition* of the *World* after the *Deluge*; and thus were in way of *Tradition* to be propagated to all *Posterity*. O rare and admirable foundation of *Plerophory*! O incomparable method, and contrivance to find out *certainty*, to rase out *first Principles*, to pluck down *Demonstrations*, to demolish the whole structure, and fabrick of *Reason*, and to build upon the word of two or three *Hebrew Doctours*, that



tell you of a *voice*, and that as confidently as if they had heard it, and *they* are entrusted with this voice, they must *report*, and *spread* it unto others, though they do it, like *unfaithful Echoes*, with false and *imperfect* rebound !

This is to tell you, that Men have no *Candle* of the *Lord* within them ; but onely there must be *Traditio Lampadis*, a *general* and *publick Light*, that must go from one hand to another. This is to *blot out* the *Νόμος γραπτός*, to leave out *Canonical Scripture*, and to give you *Apocrypha* in the room of it. 'Tis to set a *Jew* in the *chair*, dictating the *Law of Nature*, with the very same *Infallibility*, that the *Pope* promises himself in determining all points of *Religion*. Therefore some it may be will have recourse to such an *Intellectus Agens*, as must clear up all things.

It should seem by that *eminent Writer* of our own, that *Fryer Bacon* was of the same mind too, for whose words these are quoted, amongst many others, out of an *Oxford-Manuscript* ; *Deus respectu animae est sicut Sol respectu Oculi temporalis, et Angeli sicut stellae*. Now what *Angels* they were, that this *Roger Bacon* fix'd his eye upon, whether they were not *fallen stars*, let others examine. I should think that *Cardan's Intellectus Agens* and his were both much of the same colour.

But this you may perceive in him, and the rest of the great *Pleaders* for an *Intellectus Agens*, that they found all their *Arguments* in a pretty *similitude* of an *Eye*, and *Light*, and *Colours* ; as if this were some *inconquerable Demonstration* : whereas that great *Master of Subleties*, whom I have more than once nam'd before, has made it appear, that the whole *Notion* of an *Intellectus agens* is a meer *fancy* and *superfluity*.

Yet this may be granted to all the forementioned *Authors*, and this is the onely *spark* of *Truth*, that lies almost buried in that heap of *Errours* ; That God himself, as he does supply

every *Being*, the Motion of every Creature, with an *intimate* and *immediate* *concourse* every way answerable to the measure and degree of its *Entity*; so he does in the same manner constantly assist the *Understanding* with a proportionable *Co-operation*. But then, as for any such *Irradiations* upon the *Soul*, in which that shall be merely *patient*; God indeed, if he be pleas'd to reveal himself in a *special*, and *extraordinary* manner, he may thus *shine* out upon it, either *immediately* by his *own light*, or else drop *Angelical Influence* upon it: but that this should be the natural and ordinary way, necessarily required to *Intellectual* workings, is extremely prejudicial to such a *noble Being*, as the *Soul* of man is, to which God gave such *bright participations* of himself, and stamp'd his *Image* upon it, and left it to its own workings, as much as any other *created Being* whatsoever. Nay, as *Scaliger* does most confidently object it to *Cardan*, you will not have one *Argument* left, by which you can evince the *Immortality* of the *Soul*, if you shall resolve all the excellency of its *Being*, and *Operations* into an *Intellectus agens* really distinct from it.

But then to make this Νοῦς ποιητικός and παθητικός onely the *various Aspects*, and different *relations* of the same *Soul*, is but a weak and needlesse device; and, if 'twere *Aristotle's*, to be sure 'twas none of his *Master-pieces*; for 'tis built upon, I know not what *Phantasms* and *false Appearances*.

Whereas those *species* and *Colours*, those *Pictures* and *Representations* of *Being*, that are set before an *Intellectual Eye*, carry such a light and beauty in themselves, as may justly *engratiolate* them with the *Understanding*. And though some tell us, that they have too much *drosse* and impurity, that they are too *muddy* and *feculent*, not proportionable to the *purity* of a *reasonable Soul*; yet let them but think of those many *strainers* they have gone through, those *double refinings* and *clarifyings*, that they have had from so many *percolations*: and withall they may

know, that the *Understanding* can drink in the most *pure*, and *flowering* part of the *Species*, and can leave the *dregs* at bottom. Have you not thus often seen a *Seal* stamping it self upon the *Wax*, and yet not communicating the least particle of *matter*, but onely leaving a *form*, and *impression* upon it?

However, there is as much proportion between these *Species*, and an *Intellectus Patiens*; as between these, and an *Intellectus Agens*. Nay, there is more proportion between these *species*, and the *Understanding*, then between the *Soul*, and *Body*, which yet are *joyned*, and *married* together in a most loving and *conjugal Union*.

## CHAPTER X.

### *Of the Consent of Nations.*

THOUGH *Natur's Law* be principally proclaim'd by the voice of *Reason*; though it be sufficiently discover'd by the *Candle of the Lord*; yet there is also a *secondary* and *additional* way, which contributes no small light to the manifestation of it: I mean the *Harmony* and *joynt consent* of *Nations*; who, though there be no *κοινωνία*, nor *συνθήκη*, no *communion*, nor *commerce*, nor *compact* between them, yet they do *tacitly* and *spontaneously* conspire in a dutiful observation of the most *radical* and *fundamental* Laws of *Nature*.

So that, by this *pleasant consort* of theirs, you may know, that the same *Nature* did *tune* them all. When you see the same *prints* and *impressions* upon so many several Nations, you easily perceive that they were stamp'd *eodem communi Sigillo*, with the same *publick Seal*. When you see the very same *seeds* thrown in such *different soils*; yet all *encreasing* and *multiplying*, *budding* and *blossoming*,

*branching out and enlarging themselves into some fruitful expressions; you know then, that 'twas Natur's hand, her bountiful and successful Hand, that scatter'd such seminal Principles amongst them; you presently know, that 'tis no enclosed way, 'tis a Via Regia, in which you meet with so many Travellers, such a concourse and confluence of a People.*

Amongst many others, the learned *Grotius* is full and express for searching out the *Law of Nature* in this manner.

You shall hear his own words, which he speaks in that excellent work of his *De Iure Belli et Pacis*. *Esse aliquid Juris Naturalis probari solet tum ab eo, quod prius est; tum ab eo, quod posterius: quarum probandi Rationum illa subtilior est, haec popularior. A priori, si ostendatur Rei alicujus convenientia aut disconvenientia necessaria cum Natura Rationali ac Sociali. A posteriori verò, si non certissima fide, certè probabiliter admodum, Juris Naturalis esse colligitur id, quod apud gentes omnes, aut moraliores omnes, tale esse creditur.* And he does annex this reason of it: *Universalis effectus Universalem requirit causam.* When you see such fresh *Springs* and streams of *Justice* watering several *Kingdoms* and *Nations*, you know, that they are *participations* of some rich *Fountain*, of a vast *Ocean*. When you see so many *Rays* of the same *Light* shooting themselves into the several *Corners* of the world, you presently look up to the *Sun*, as the glorious *Original* of them all.

Let me then a little vary that place in the *Acts* of the *Apostles*: *You may hear every man in his own Language, in his own Dialect and Idiom, speaking the same works of Nature: Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the Dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, in Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Lybia about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews, and Proselytes, Cretes, and Arabians, you may hear them speak in their Tongue the wonderful works of God, and Nature.*

For whatsoever is *Natural* and *Essential*, is also *Universal* in order to such a *Species*. The *Philosopher* speaks to this very pertinently; Τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. That is, 'Whatsoever is *Natural* is *immoveable*, and in the same manner perpetually *energetical*: as *fire* does not put on one colour amongst the *Grecians*, and paint its face otherwise among the *Persians*; but it has alwaies the same *ruddiness* and *purity*, the same *zeal* and *vehemency*.'

As *Nature* shews choice *variety* and *Needle-work* in this, in that she works every *Individual* with several *flourishes*, with some *singular* and *distinguishing* notes: So likewise she plainly aspires to *concord* and *unity*, whilst she knits all together in a *common* and *specifical* *Identity*. Not onely in the *faces* of men, but in their *Beings* also, there is much of *Identity*, and yet much of *Variety*.

You do not doubt, but that in *all Nations* there is an exact likeness and agreement in the *fabrick* and *composure* of men's *Bodies* in respect of *Integrals*; excepting a few *Monsters* and *Heteroclitcs* in *Nature*: nor can you doubt, but that there is the very same frame and constitution of men's *spirits*, in respect of *Intrinsecals*; unless in some *prodigious* ones, that in the *Philosopher's* Language are Ἀμαρτήματα τῆς φύσεως. As *face* answers *face*, so does the *heart* of one man the *heart* of another; even the *Heart* of an *Athenian* the *Heart* of an *Indian*.

Wherefore the *Votes* and *Suffrages* of *Nature* are no *contemptible* things.

Φήμη δ' οὗτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα λαοὶ  
πολλοὶ φημίζουσι

as the *Poet* sings. This was the mind of that grave *Moralist*, *Seneca*: as appears by that speech of his; *Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.*

But the *Oratour* is higher and fuller in his expression; *Omni autem in re, Consensio omnium Gentium Lex Naturae putanda est.* And that other *Oratour*, *Quintilian*, does not much differ from him in this; *Pro certis habemus ea, in quae communi opinione concessum est.* Or if the judgment of a *Philosopher* be more potent and prevalent with you, you may hear *Aristotle* telling you; Κράτιστον πάντας ανθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογούντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις. You may hear *Heraclitus* determining, that ὁ λόγος ξυνός is an excellent κριτήριον of *Truth*; and therefore he was wont to lay down this for a *Maxime*, Τὰ κοινῇ φαινόμενα πιστά which may be rendred *Vox Populi, vox Dei*; yet, upon this condition, that it be took with its due *restraints* and *limitations*. If you would have a *sacred Author* set his seal to all this, *Tertullian* has done it, *Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum, sed traditum.*

Surely, that must needs be a clear *convincing light*, that can command *respect* and *adoration* from all beholders; it must be an *Orient Pearl* indeed, if none will *trample* upon it. It must be a *conquering* and *triumphant Truth*, that can *stop* the *mouths* of *Gain-sayers*, and pass the world without *contradiction*: surely that's *pure Gold*, that has been examin'd by so many several *Touchstones*, and has had *approbation* from them all: certainly, 'tis some *transcendent beauty*, that so many *Nations* are enamour'd withall. 'Tis some *powerful Musick*, that sets the *whole world* a *Dancing*. 'Tis some *pure*, and *delicious Relish*, that can content and satisfie *every palate*. 'Tis some *accurate piece*, that passes so many *Criticks* without any *Animadversions*, without any *variae Lectiones*. 'Tis an *elegant Picture*, that neither the *eye* of an *Artist*, nor yet a *popular eye* can find fault withall. Think but upon the *several tempers* and *dispositions* of men; how *curious* are some! how *ensorious* are others! how *envious* and *malicious* are some! how *various* and *mutable* are others! how do some love to be *singular*!

others to be *contentious*! how *doubtful* and *wavering* is one! how *jealous* and *suspicious* is another! and then tell me, whether it must not be some *Authentic*, *unquestionable Truth*, that can at all times have a *Certificate* and *Commendamus* from them all.

Then look upon the *diversities* of *Nations*, and there you will see a rough and barbarous *Scythian*, a wild *American*, an unpolish'd *Indian*, a superstitious *Ægyptian*, a subtle *Æthiopian*, a cunning *Arabian*, a luxurious *Persian*, a treacherous *Carthaginian*, a lying *Cretian*, an elegant *Athenian*, a wanton *Corinthian*, a desperate *Italian*, a fighting *German*, and many other heaps of *Nations*, whose *titles* I shall now spare: and tell me, whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious *Truth*, that shall so *overpower* them all, as to pass *current* amongst them, and be *owned* and *acknowledged* by them.

Yet, notwithstanding, as we told you before, that the *obligation* of *Nature's Law* did not spring from *Reason*; so much lesse does it arise from the *consent* of *Nations*. That *Law* indeed, which is peculiarly term'd Νόμιμον Ἐθνικόν, *Jus Gentium*, has its *vigour* and *validity* from those *mutual* and *reciprocal compacts*, which they have made amongst themselves: but the meeting of *several Nations* in the observation of *Nature's Law* has no *binding* or *engaging virtue* in it any otherwise, then in an *exemplary* way; but yet it has a *confirming* and *evidencing power*, that shews, that they were all obliged to this by some *supreme Authority*, which had such an *ample influence* upon them all. Thus you know the *sweetnesse* of *Honey*, both by your *own tast*, and by the *consent* of *Palates* too: yet neither the one nor the other does drop any *sweetnesse* or *lusciousness* into the *Honey-comb*. Thus you see the *beauty* and *glory* of *Light*, and you may call most men in the *World* to be *eye-witnesses* of it; yet those *several eyes* add no *gloss* or *lustre* to it, but onely take notice of it.



Man being ζῶον πολιτικόν, and ζῶον ἡμερον, as the *Philosopher* stiles him, a *sociable* and *peaceable Creature*; ἀγελαστικόν, καὶ σύννομον ζῶον, as that *sacred Oratour* terms him, a *congregating Creature*, that *loves to keep company*, he must needs take much delight and complacency in that, in which he sees the whole *Tribe* and *species* of *Mankind* agreeing with him.

Why then do the *Jews* look upon the נִיִּים with such a disdain and scornful eye, as if all the *Nations*, in comparison of them, were *no more then* (what the *Prophet* saies they are in respect of *God*), as the *drop of a Bucket*, as the *dust of the Balance*, that cannot incline them one way, or other?

Do but hear a while how that *learned* and *much honoured Authour* of our own<sup>1</sup> does represent their mind unto you. *Gentium* (saies he) *sive omnium, sive complurium opinionones, mores, constitutiones, mensurae apud Hebraeos, in eo decernendo, quod jus esse velint Naturale, seu Universale, locum habent nullum.* These are the *Contents* of that *Chapter*, which he begins thus: *Quemadmodum ex aliorum animantium actibus, aut usu, jus aliquod Naturale disci, aut designari nolunt Hebraei; ita neque ex aliarum, sive omnium, sive plurimarum Gentium usu, ac moribus, de Jure Naturali, seu hominum Universali decerni volunt.* It seems the *Jews* look upon the *Gentiles*, as if they differ'd *specifically* from them: as they do not search for the *Law of Nature* amongst *sensitive Beings*, so neither amongst other *Nations*.

But I had thought, that the *Jewish Writers* had promis'd the *Heathens* an *Angel*, an *Intelligence*, to irradiate and illuminate them, and does he *shine* upon them no clearer? does he perform his *office* no better? The *Jews* told us, that they themselves were to *inform* them and *instruct* them, and have they taught them their *Lessons* no better? They mention'd a voice that came to *Adam* and to *Noah*, and have they *whisper'd* it onely in one another's *ear*?

<sup>1</sup> Selden, *De Jure Heb.*

Why have they not *proclaim'd* it to the rest of the world? How sad were the condition of the *Gentiles*, if they were to live upon the *Jews courtesie* and *benevolence*, that would *strip* them of *Nature*, *plunder* them of their *Essences*, rob them of their *first Principles* and *Common Notions*? But *God* has not left them, like *Orphans*, to such unmerciful *Guardians*. He himself has took *care* of them, and has made *better provision* for them.

Now these *several Nations* are to be consider'd either in the *common bulk* and *heap* of them; or else in the *major part* of them, or in the *noblest* and *most refined* sort amongst them; either οἱ πάντες and οἱ πολλοί, or οἱ εὐγενέστεροι and φρονιμώτεροι.

If we take them in the fullest *universality* of them, then that *worthy Authour* of our own saies truly; *Nec olim, nec hactenus, aut qualesnam, aut quot sint, fuerintve, est ab aliquo satis exploratum*. Nor indeed is it at all material in respect of this, whether we know them, or no; but having the *formal consent* of so many, and knowing, that there is *Par ratio reliquorum*, being that they have the same *natural Engagements* and *obligations* upon them, we cannot justly distrust, but that, if there should *new Nations*, nay, if there should *new Worlds* appear, that every *Rational Nature* amongst them would comply with, and embrace the *several Branches* of this *Law*: and as they would not differ in those things, that are so *intrinsecal* to *Sense*; so neither in those, that are *essential* to the *Understanding*. As their *Corporal eye* would be able to distinguish between *Beauty* and *Deformity*: so their *Intellectual eye* would as easily discern some *goodness* from some kind of *wickedness*.

But are there not many *Nations* of them, that live in the *perpetual violation* of *Nature's Law*? If you speak of the more *Capital Letters* of this Νόμος γραπτός, you find no *Nation* so *barbarous*, but that it can read them, and observe them. I never heard of a *Nation apostatizing*

from *Common Notions*, from these *first Principles*. But, if you mean the whole *context* and *coherence* of *Nature's Law*, if you speak of those *Demonstrations*, that may be built upon these *fundamental Principles*, of those kindly *Derivations* and *Conclusions*, that flow from these *fountain-Notions*, then this indeed must be granted, that tis the *condemning sin* of the *Heathen*; That so many of them *imprison* this *Natural Light* and *extinguish* this *Candle of the Lord*.

There are many *wild* and *Anomalous Individuals* amongst them, οἱ πόρρω βάρβαροι, θηριώδεις, ἀλόγιστοι, as *Aristotle* calls them, οἱ διεφθαρμένοι, as others term them: but are there not such also even amongst *Jews*? nay, amongst such as call themselves *Christians*, that are *laps'd*, and fallen *below* themselves? many *Natural Precepts* are *violated* even amongst them. Have you *weeds* and *Bryers* and *Thorns* in a *Garden*? no wonder then, that you meet with more in a *Wilderness*? Are there some *Prodigies* in *Europe*? you may very well look for more *Monsters* in *Africa*. Do *Christians* *blur* and *blot* the *Law of Nature*? no wonder then, that an *American* seeks quite to *rase* it out. Does an *Israelite* put *Truth* sometimes in *Prison*? no wonder then, that an *Egyptian* puts it in a *Dungeon*. Yet, notwithstanding amongst all those, that have had so much *Culture* and *Morality*, as to *knit* and *embody* and *compact* themselves into a *Common-wealth*, to become τοῖς νόμοις ὑποκείμενοι, to be *regulated* by a *Legal Government*, you will scarce find any *Nation*, that did *generally* and *expressly*, and for *long continuance*, either *violate*, or *countenance* the *violation* of, any *Precept* clearly *Natural*.

This is that, in which the learned *Grotius* satisfies himself, that *Omnes Gentes Moraliiores et Illustriiores* gave due obedience and conformity to *Nature's Law*, so that all *Testimonies*, fetch'd from them, are to have an *high price*, and *esteem* put upon them.

But the famous *Salmasius*, in his late Tractate *De Coma*, goes a far different way; and tells us, that he had rather search for *Nature's Law* in a naked *Indian*, then in a spruce *Athenian*; in a rude *American*, rather than in a gallant *Roman*; in a meer *Pagan*, rather than in a *Jew*, or *Christian*. His words are these, *Quanto magis Barbari, tantò felicius faciliùsque Naturam Ducem sequi putantur. Eam detorquent, aut ab ea magis recedunt politiores Gentes.*

Those *Nations*, that have more of *Art* and *improvement* amongst them, have so *painted Nature's* face, have hung so many *Jewels* in her *Ear*, have put so many *Bracelets* upon her *Hand*, they have *cloath'd* her in such *soft* and *silken rayments* as that you cannot guess at her so well, as you might have done, if she had nothing, but her own *simple* and *neglected beauty*: you cannot taste the *Wine* so well, because they have put *Sugar* into it, and have *brib'd* your *Palate*.

So that the learned *Salmasius* will scarce go about to fetch the *Law of Nature* from the *Jews* principally: you see he chooses to fetch it rather from a *Scythian*, from a *Barbarian*; there he shall see it without any *Glosses*, without any *Superstructures*, without any *carving* and *gilding*, a *Nóμος γραπτός* plainly written, without any *flourishes* and *amplifications*. Yet the *Author*, whom I but now commended (*Salmasius* I mean) neither could, nor would go about to vindicate all those *Nations* from some *notorious Rebellions* against *Nature's Law*; but he would rather choose (as much as he could) to abstract their *Intellectuals* from their *Practicals*, and would look to their *Opinions* and *Laws*, rather than to their *Life* and *Conversation*.

Indeed *Aristotle* tells us; Πολλὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει. That same *Phrase*, εὐχερῶς ἔχει, does onely speak a *propensity*, and inclination in their *vile affections* to such *wickednesses* as these were, which

sometimes also they acted in a most *violent*, and *impetuous* manner. Though, to be sure, they could not be long a *Nation*, if they did thus *kill*, and *eat up*, and *devour* one another.

But, let us suppose, that they dealt thus with their *enemies*, yet, can it be shewn us, that they establish'd *Anthropophagy* by a *Law*? That their *Natural Conscience* did not check them for it? Or, if their *Reason* did *connive* at them; yet how comes it to passe, that their *Angel* did not *jog* them all this while; that their *Intellectus Agens* did not *restrain* them?

But, out of what *Antiquity* doth it appear, that any *Nation* did favour *Atheism* by a *Law*? that any *Kingdom* did licence *Blasphemy* by a *Statute*; or countenance *Murder* by a *Law*? Out of what *Author* can they shew us a *Nation*, that ever did *allow* the *breaches* of solemn *Compacts*, the *dishonouring* of *Parents*; that ever made a *Law* for this, that there should be no *Law* or *Justice* amongst them?

Till all this can appear, let the *Testimonies* of *Gentiles* be esteem'd somewhat more then the *barking* of *Dogs*. Methinks, if they were meer *Cyphers*, yet the *Jews* going *before* them, they might *amount* to somewhat. Let the *prints* of *Nature* in them be accounted *sacred*: a *Pearl* in the *head* of an *Heathen*, some *Jewels* hid in the *rubbish* of *Nations*; let them be esteemed *precious*. Whatsoever *remains* of God's *Image* upon them; let it be lov'd, and acknowledg'd. Their *darkness* and *misery* is great enough; let not us *aggravate* it, and make it *more*. To mix the light of their *Candle* with that *light*, which comes *shining* from the *Candle* of an *Heathen*, is no disparagement to *Jew*, nor *Christian*.

## CHAPTER XI.

*The light of Reason is a Derivative light.*

Now the *Spirit of man* is the *Candle of the Lord*.

First, as *Lumen derivatum*, φῶς ἐκ φωτός. Surely there's none can think, that *Light* is *primitively* and *originally* in the *Candle*; but they must look upon that onely as a *weak participation* of something, that is more *bright* and *glorious*. All *created Excellency* shines with *borrowed Beames*; so that *Reason* is but *Scintilla divinae lucis*, 'tis but *Divinae particula aurae*. This was the very *end*, why God framed *intellectual Creatures*, that he might communicate more of himself to them, then he could to other more *drossie* and *inferiour Beings*, and that they might in a more compleat and circular manner *redire in principium suum*, (as the *Schoolmen* speak) that they might return into the bosome of the *first* and *supreme Cause*, by such *operations*, as should in some measure imitate and represent the working of God himself; who, being a most *free* and *Intellectual Agent*, would have some *Creature* also, that should not onely take notice of these his *perfections*, so as to *adore* and *admire* them, but should also *partake* of them, and should follow the *Creatour* in his *dispensations* and *workings*, though still at an infinite *distance* and *disproportion*.

This moved him to *stamp* upon some *Creatures Understanding* and *Will*, which in themselves make up one simple, and entire *print*, and *signature* of *Reason*, though we break the *Seal* for the better opening of them, and part them into two several *Notions*. To this end he fill'd the *highest part* of the *World* with those *Stars* of the *first Magnitude*, I mean those *Orient* and *Angelical Beings*, that dwell so near the *fountain* of *Light*, and continually drink in the *Beams* of *Glory*; that are exactly conformable to

their *Creatour* in all his *motions*: for the same end he furnished and beautified this *lower part* of the *World* with *Intellectual Lamps*, that should shine forth to the *praise* and *honour* of his *Name*, which totally have their *dependance* upon him, both for their *Being*, and for their *perpetual continuation* of them in their *Being*. 'Twas he, that *lighted up* these *Lamps* at first; 'tis he, that *drops* הזהב the *golden oyl* into them. Look then a while but upon the *parentage* and *original* of the *Soul* and of *Reason*, and you'll presently perceive, that it was the *Candle of the Lord*. And if you have a mind to believe *Plato*, he'll tell you such a *feigned story* as this; That there were a goodly company of *Lamps*, a multitude of *Candles*, a set number of *Souls* lighted up altogether, and afterwards sent into *Bodies*, as into so many *Dark Lanthorns*. This *stock* and *treasure* of *Souls* was reserved and *cabinetted* in I know not what *Stars*; perhaps, that they might the better *calculate* their own *Incarnation*, the time when they were to descend into *Bodies*, and, when they came there, they presently sunk into ὕλη, they slip'd into λήθη, which he terms ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολή, the *putting off of knowledge for a while*, the *clouding*, and *burying* of many *sparkling* and *twinkling Notions*, 'till by a *waking Reminiscence*, as by a joyful *Resurrection*, they rise out of their *graves* again. *Plato*, it seems, look'd upon the *body* as the *blot* of *Nature*, invented for the *defacing* of this Νόμος γραπτός, or at the best, as an impertinent tedious *Parenthesis*, that *check'd* and interrupted the *Soul* in her former *Notions*, that *eclipsed* and obscured her *antient glory*, which sprung from his ignorance of the *Resurrection*; for, had he but known what a *glory* the *Body* was capable of, he would have entertained *more honourable* thoughts of it.

Yet *Origen* was much taken with this *Platonical Notion*, it being indeed a pretty piece of *Philosophy* for him to pick *Allegories* out of. And, though he do a little vary from *Plato* in a *circumstance* or two; yet in recompense of that,



he gives you this addition and enlargement, That, according to the carriage and behaviour of these *naked Spirits* before they were *embodied*, there were prepared *answerable mansions* for them: That such a *Soul* as had *walk'd with God acceptably*, was put into a *fairer Prison*, was clothed with an *amiable and elegant Body*; but that *Soul*, which had *displeased and provoked* its *Creatour*, was put into a *darker Dungeon*, into a more *obscure and uncomely Body*: That *Candle*, which had *shined clearly*, was honoured with a *golden Candlestick*; That, which had soiled its *Light*, was condemned to a *Dark-Lanthorn*. One would think by this, that *Origen* had scarce read *Genesis*; he doth in this so contradict the *Sacred History* of the *Creation*. Nor is this the just product of *Plato's Opinion*, but 'tis pregnant with much more *folly*; he returns him his *own* with *usury*, gives him this, as the just *τόκος*, and *improvement* of it.

*Aquinas* doth *clash in pieces* all these *Platonical fictions* in his two Books *Contra Gentiles*; yet upon this sinking and putrid *foundation* was built the tottering *Superstructure* of *connate Species*. For when *Plato* had laid down this *Error* for a *Maxime*, Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμῶς, ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, that The *Souls* of men were long extant before they were born; then, that other *Phancie* did presently step in, Ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι, that The *Soul* was very speculative and contemplative, before it was immers'd in the *Body*; which made way for the next *Conceit*, that The *Soul* brought many of its old *Notions* along with it into the *Body*: many *faithful Attendants* that would bear the *Soul company* in her most *withering condition*, when other more *volatile and fugitive Notions* took wing to themselves, and flew away: many a precious *Pearl* sunk to the *bottom* of *Lethe*, but some *Reliques* of *Notions* floated upon the *top* of the *Waters*, and in the *general Deluge* of *Notions* there was an *Ark* prepared for some *select Principles*, some *praecepta Noachidarum*, which were to *increase*,

and *multiply*, and *supply* the wants of the *Intellectual World*.

This makes the *Platonists* look upon the *Spirit of Man* as the *Candle* of the *Lord* for illuminating and irradiating of *objects*, and darting *more light* upon them, then it receives *from* them. But *Plato*, as he failed in *corporeal Vision*, whilst he thought, that it was *per extramissionem radiorum*: so he did not *ab errore suo recedere* in his *intellectual Opticks*; but, in the very same manner, tells us, that *spiritual Vision* also is *per emissionem radiorum*. And, truly, he might as well phansie such *implanted Ideas*, such *seeds* of *Light* in his *external Eye*, as such *seminal Principles* in the *Eye* of the *mind*. Therefore *Aristotle* (who did better *clarify* both these kinds of *Visions*) pluck'd these *Motes* out of the *sensitive Eye*, and those *Beams* out of the *intellectual*. He did not *antedate* his own *Knowledge*, nor remember the several *postures* of his *Soul*, and the famous *exploits* of his *Mind*, before he was born; but plainly profess'd, that his *Understanding* came *naked* into the *World*. He shews you an ἄγραφον γραμματεῖον, an *abrasa tabula*, a *Virgin-soul* espousing it self to the *Body*, in a most *entire*, *affectionate* and *conjugal Union*, and, by the blessing of *Heaven* upon this loving *pair*, he did not doubt of a *Notional off-spring* and *posterity*. This makes him set open the *windows* of *sense*, to welcome and entertain the *first dawnings*, the *early glimmerings* of *morning light*.

—Clarum Mane fenestras

*Intrat, et angustas extendit lumine rimas.*

Many *sparks*, and *appearances* fly from variety of *Objects* to the *Understanding*; the *Mind*, that *catches* them all, and *cherishes* them, and *blows* them; and thus the *Candle* of *Knowledg* is lighted. As he could perceive no *connate Colours*, no *Pictures*, or *Portraits* in his *external Eye*: so neither could he find any *signatures* in his *Mind*, till

some outward Objects had made some impression upon his νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει, his soft and pliable Understanding, impartially prepared for every Seal. That this is the true method of Knowledge he doth appeal to their own Eyes, to their own Understandings. Do but analyse your own thoughts; do but consult with your own Breasts; tell us, whence it was, that the Light first sprang in upon you. Had you such Notions as these when you first peep'd into Being? at the first opening of the Soul's eye? in the first exordium of Infancy? had you these connate Species in the Cradle? and were they rock'd asleep with you? or did you then meditate upon these Principles; *Totum est majus parte*, and *Nihil potest esse et non esse simul*. Ne're tell us, that you wanted Organical Dispositions; for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these Lattices. Why else should not your Candle enlighten you before? who was it, that chained up and fettered your Common Notions? Who was it, that restrained and imprisoned your connate Ideas? Me thinks, the working of a Platonist's Soul should not all depend on ὕλη, and why had you no connate Demonstrations, as well as connate Principles? Let us but see a catalogue of all these Truths you brought with you into the World. If you speak of the Principles of the Laws of Nature, you shall hear the Scholemen determining: *Infans pro illo statu non obligatur lege Naturali; quia non habet usum Rationis et Libertatis*. And a more Sacred Author saies as much; *Lex Naturae est lex Intelligentiae, quam tamen ignorat Pueritia, nescit Infantia*. There's some time to be allowed for the promulgation of Nature's Law by the voice of Reason. They must have some time to spell the Νόμος γραπτός, that was of Reason's writing. The Mind, having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince, that the true rise of Knowledge is from the observing, and comparing

of *Objects*, and from thence extracting the *Quintessence* of some such *Principles*, as are *worthy of all acceptation*; that have so much of *certainty* in them, that they are near to a *Tautology* and *Identity*: for this *first Principles* are.

These are the *true* and *genuine* κοινὰ ἔννοιαι these are the λόγοι σπερματικοί these are the *props* of *Reason's* contriving, upon which you may see her *leaning*, about which you may see her *turning*, and *spreading*, and *enlarging* her self. That *learned Knight*<sup>1</sup>, in his *Discourse concerning the Soul*, doth at large shew the manner how the *Minde* thus goes a *gathering* of *Knowledge*; how, like a *Bee*, it goes from *flower* to *flower*, from one *entity* to another; how it *sucks* the *purest* and *sweetest* of all; how it *refuses* all that is *distastful* to it, and makes a *pleasant composition* of the rest; and thus prepares *Honey-combs* for it self to feed on.

But, if it were at all to be granted, that the *Soul* had any *stamps* and *characters* upon it, that it had any *implanted* and *ingrafted Species*; 'twere chiefly to be granted, that it hath the *connate Notion* of a *Deity*, that *pure* and *infinitely-refined Entity*, abstracted from all appearance of *Matter*. But mark, how the *great Doctour* of the *Gentiles* convinces them of the Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ he doth not set them a searching their *connate Species*; but bids them look into the *glass* of the *Creatures*. O, but! (might some *Platonist* say) why? he is all *Spirit*, and an *invisible Being*, what shall we find of him amongst *material objects*? Yes, (saies the *Apostle*) τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the invisible things of God are made known by the things that do appear*; for a *Being*, endowed with such a *Soul* as *Man* is, can easily in a *discursive* way, by such eminent steps of *Second Causes*, ascend to some knowledge of a *prime* and *supreme Being*; which doth fully explain, that he means by his Νόμος γραπτός those *clear dictates* of *Reason*, fetched from the several workings of the *Understanding*, that have *sealed* and *printed*

<sup>1</sup> Sir Kenelm Digby.

such a truth upon the *Soul*; so that no other *innate light*, but onely the *power* and *principle* of *Knowing* and *reasoning* is the *Candle* of the *Lord*.

Yet there is a *Noble Author*<sup>1</sup> of our own, that hath both his *truth*, and his *errour*, (as he hath also writ about both) who pleads much for his *Instinctus naturales*, so as that, at the first dash, you would think him in a *Platonical* strain; but, if you attend more to what he says, you will soon perceive, that he prosecutes a far different *Notion*, much to be preferred before the other *phancy*.

For he doth not make these *instincts* any *connate Ideas*, and *representations* of *Things*; but tells us, that they are *powers* and *faculties* of the *Soul*, the *first-born faculties* and *beginning* of the *Soul's strength*, that are presently *espoused* to their *Virgin-objects* closing and complying with them, long before *Discourse* can reach them; nay, with such objects, as *Discourse* cannot reach at all in such a *measure* and *perfection*: these *Instincts* he styles *Naturae dotes, et providentiae Divinae universalis Idea, et typus optimus*. Some of these are to be found in the lowest *inanimate Beings*, which yet have no *connate Species* among them; though they have *powers*, and propension to their own welfare, a blind *tendency* and *inclination* to their own security: for thus he speaks; *Instinctus, ille Naturalis in quovis inarticulato licet et incauto elemento, sapiens est ad conversationem propriam*: and such a *noble Being*, as *Man* is, must needs have it in a more *sublime* and *eminent* manner.

Therefore he terms these *Instincts* in *Man* *facultates noeticae, et facultates Deo analogae*; whereas those other *inferiour faculties* are esteem'd *facultates analogae mundo*; his words, being somewhat *cloudy*, I shall thus *paraphrase* upon them. The *Soul*, 'tis made with a *through light*, with a *double Window*; at *one Window* it looks upon

<sup>1</sup> Lord Herbert, *De Veritate* and *De Religione Gentilium et Errorum apud eos Causis*.

*corporeals*, at the *other* it hath a *fair prospect* upon *spirituals*. When it takes notice of the *material world*, it looks out at the *window of Sense*, and views the *putamina et cortices rerum*, the *outward husks and shells of Being*; but not at all *pleas'd* or *contented* with them, those *higher powers*, those *purer faculties* of the Soul *unclasp* and *disclose* themselves, and *extend* themselves for receiving some delight more precious and satisfactory, being made in as *harmonious proportion* suitable to *spiritual Objects*, as the *Eye* is to *Colours*, or the *Ear* to *Sounds*. And, as you know, a *corporeal Eye* is so fashioned and *organized*; that, though it have no *connate species* of the *Sun*, yet 'tis pleasant to behold it: so the *Eye* of the *soul* doth willingly open it self to look upon God *per modum objecti*, and has all *per receptionem* from him, fixing its *Eye* upon so *transcendent* and *beautiful* an *Object*, and viewing all those *streamings out of Light*, those *beamings out of eternal and universal Notions*, that flow from him, as the *Fountain of Lights*, where they have dwelt from *everlasting*, which now appear to it in time with a most *powerful* and *enamouring ray*, to direct the *Soul* to that *happinesse* it longed for, and to *guide* and *conduct* it in all its *operations*. If you ask when these *highest faculties* did first *open* and *display* themselves, he tells you, 'tis then when they were *stimulated*, and *excited* by *outward Objects*, and it may be upon this account, that, when the *Soul* can find nothing there worthy one *glance*, one cast of its *Eye*, impatient of such *empty* and *shadowy sights*, it opens it self to the τὰ ἄνω, and warms it self in those *everlasting Sun beams*: but, when it comes down from the *Mount*, it puts on the *veil of Sense*, and so converses with *material objects*.

Yet I do not here *positively* lay down this for a *Truth* in all the *branches* of it; but onely represent the mind of the *forementioned Author*, who himself doth acknowledge, that the *rise* of these *first Principles* is very *cryptical* and



*mysterious*. His words are these : *Vos interea non morari debet, quod quomodo eliciantur istae Notitiae Communes nesciatis. Satis, superque diximus, vos nescire quomodo fiat Gustus, Odoratus, Tactus, &c.* By which you cannot but perceive that he makes the *conformity* of such a *Faculty* with such an *Object* the *spring* and *Original* of *common Notions*. Yet this then had deserved a little clearing, whence the difficulty of understanding *Spirituals pro hoc statu* does arise, if there be such a *present* and *exact analogy* between them ; whereas the *intuitive knowledge* of *God*, and viewing those *goodly Notions*, that are steep'd in his *essence*, uses to be reserved as a *privilege* of a *glorified Creature*. Yet this, I suppose, may be said, that herein is the *Soul's Imperfection*, that it cannot sufficiently attend both to *spirituals* and *corporeals* ; and therefore *Sense* being so *busie* and *importunate* for the *prosecution* of her *Objects* ; no wonder, that these *noetical Faculties* do *faint* and *languish*. So that, if there be any, whom the former *Discursive* way will not suffice, it seems better for them to have recourse to an *innate power* of the *Soul*, that is fitted and fashioned for the receiving of *Spirituals*, *quatenus* *Spirituals*, then to fly to I know not what *connate Species*, of I know not how long *duration* before the *Soul* was acquainted with the *Body*. Yet that other *Noble Author*<sup>1</sup> of our own, that has the same Title of *Truth*, not without a competent mixture of *Errour* too, doth choose to resolve all into a *Platonical Remembrance* : which yet that *acute Answerer*<sup>2</sup> of him doth shew to be a *meer vanity* ; for, as for matters of *fact*, to be sure, they have no *implanted Ideas* : and, if *Historical Knowledge* may be acquired without them, why then should *discursive knowledge* have such a *dependence* upon them ? And, I wish, that the *Platonists* would but once determine,

<sup>1</sup> Lord Brooke, *The Nature of Truth*.

<sup>2</sup> John Wallis, *Truth Tried*. Cp. Brown's *Culverwel*, p. 131.



whether a *Blind Man* be a *competent Judge* of *Colours* by virtue of his *connate Species*; and whether, by supply of these *Ideas*, a *Deaf Man* may have the *true notion* of *Musick*, and *Harmony*? If not, then they must ingenuously confesse, that the *Soul*, for the present, wants so much of *Light*, as it wants of the *window* of *Sense*. But, if they tell us, that some *outward Objects* must *jog* and *waken* these *drowsie*, and *slumbring Notions*, they then lay the *Foundation* in *Sensitives*: and, withall, let them shew us, why the *generality* of men in their *Intellectuals* are not equally improved; whereas they have the same *Objects* to *quicken* and *enflame* them? In the mean time we will look upon the *Understanding*, as *speculum non coloratum*, a *Glasse* not prejudic'd, nor prepossess'd with any *connate Tinctures*; but *nakedly* receiving, and *faithfully* returning all such *colours*, as fall upon it. Yet the *Platonists* in this were commendable, that they look'd upon the *Spirit* of a *Man* as the *Candle* of the *Lord*; though they were deceiv'd in the time when 'twas *lighted*.

Nor is this *Candle* lighted out of the *Essence* of *God* himself. 'Twere a far more tolerable *Error* to make the *light* of a *Candle* a piece of the *Sun's Essence*, then to think that this *intellectual Lamp* is a *particle* of the *Divine Nature*. There is but one ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, I mean the wonderful ὁ λόγος not a *Candle*, but a *Sun* that shined from *everlasting*. But I find the *Stoicks* challenged for this *Error*, that they thought there was a *real emanation* and *traduction* of the *Soul* out of *God*, *ex ipsa Dei substantia*. And the *Gnosticks*, the *Manichees*, and *Priscillianists* are look'd upon as their *Successours* in this folly.

Now as for the *Stoicks*, you'll scarce find *evidence* enough to prove them *guilty* of this *Opinion*. They have indeed some *doting*, and *venturing Expressions*, when they amplify and dignifie the *nobility* of the *Soul*; and will needs have

some of the *Royal Bloud* to run in every *vein* and *faculty* of it : nor are the *Platonists* defective in this, but lift up the *soul* to as high a pitch of *Perfection*, as the *Stoicks* ever did : yet surely both of them but as a *limited* and *dependant Being* infinitely *remote* from the *fulness* of a *Deity*. . . .

I know not whether you can, I am sure I cannot, sufficiently perceive, that the *generality* of the *Heathen* did think that every *Soul* was immediately *created* by *God* himself, but onely, that, at the first, there was bestowed more then *ordinary workmanship* upon them, which they knew *principally* by those *generous motions*, which they found *working* in their own *Souls* ; and partly by some *reliques* of *Mosaical History*, that were scattered amongst them.

Thus then I have represented unto you, as *indifferently* as I can, the *state* of this *great Controversie* ; and, though I could easily tell you, which part I do most easily *incline* to ; yet I shall rather *refer* it to your *own thoughts*, with this *intimation*, that a *modest hesitancy* may be very *lawful* here : for, if you will believe *Gregory the Great* he tells you its a *Question* which cannot be *determined* in this *Life*. However 'tis enough for us, that the *Spirit* of a *Man*, either by virtue of its *constant Creation*, or by virtue of its *first Creation*, is the *Candle of the Lord*.

As the *Soul* is the *shadow* of a *Deity*, so *Reason* also is a *weak* and *faint resemblance* of *God* himself, whom therefore that *learned Emperour*, *M. Antoninus*, calls λόγος σπερματικός. 'Tis *God*, that *plants Reason*, 'tis he, that *waters* it, 'tis he, that gives it an *increase*. Ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπων πέφυκεν ἀπὸ θείου λόγου. The *Title* of ὁ λόγος belongs to *Christ* himself ; in *whom* are *hid the treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge*. *Reason* first *danced* and *triumphed* in those *eternal Sun-beams*, in the *thoughts* of *God* himself, who is the *fountain* and *original* of *Reason*. And, as his *Will* is the *rule* of *Goodnesse* ; so his *Understanding* is the *rule* of *Reason*. For *God* himself is a most *knowing* and

*intellectual Being*, he is the *first mover* of *Entity*, and does *determinate tendere in aliquem finem*, which speaks an *Intelligent Agent*. He does propound most *choice designes*, and *blessed ends* to himself; and is not that a worke of *Reason*? He does contrive, and *dispose*, and *order* means for *acomplishing* of them, and doth not that require *Understanding*? He makes all *Beings instrumental* and *subordinate* to him, he *moves* all *inferiour Wheels* in a *regular* manner; he *moves* all the *spheres* of *second Causes* in an *Harmonical* way; such *blind Entities*, as want *intellectual eyes*, he himself doth *lead* them and *conduct* them; and to others he gives an *eye* for their *guidance*, and *direction*. Now he, that hath *framed* an *intellectual Eye*, shall not he *see*? he, that hath *cloathed* the Soul with *light*, as with a *garment*, shall not he much more be *cloathed* himself with a *fuller* and *purser brightnesse*? In that which we esteem *Reason* amongst *Men*, there are many *clouds* and *blemishes*, many *dark spots* and *wrinkles*, that are *scattered* and *conquered* by this more *glorious light*. The *Soul*, 'tis fain to *climb up* and *ascend* to *knowledge* by several *steps* and *gradations*; but his *Understanding* is all at the same *height* and *eminency*. Man's *Reason* is fain to *spend time* in *knitting* a *Proposition*, in *spinning out* a *Syllogism*, in *weaving* a *Demonstration*; but he is *infinitely beyond* and *above* these *first Draughts* and *Rudiments* of *knowledge*; he sees all ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ, at the *first opening* of his *Eye* from *everlasting*, with one *intellectual glance* he pierceth into the whole depth of *Entity*, into all the *dimensions* of *Being*. Man's *Understanding* is fain to borrow a *Species* from the *Object*, which presents to the *Mind* the *Picture* and *Portraicture* of it self, and strikes the *intellectual Eye* with a *colour suitable* and *proportionable* to it: but the *Divine Understanding* never receives the *least Tincture* from an *Object*, no *Species ab extra*, but views all things in the *pure Chrystal* of his own *Essence*; he does not at all see himself

in the *glasse* of the *Creatures*, as we see *him*, but he sees *Creatures* in the *glasse* of his own *Being*: how else should he see them *from everlasting*, before they were extant, before they were *visible* by any *Species* of their own? God therefore doth *primarily* and *principally* look upon himself; for he is *nobilissimum intelligibile*, he cannot have a more *beautiful* and *satisfying* *Object* to look upon, then his *own face*. τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ is an *object* fit to *enamour* all *Understanding*: for the more any *Being* is *abstracted* from *Materiality*, the more 'tis *refin'd* from *material* conditions, the more *graceful* and *welcome* it is to the *Understanding*; for *matter* does *cloud* and *darken* the *glosse* of *Being*; it doth *eclipse* an *Object*, and is no *friend* to *intelligibility*. So that God, being a *pure* and *immaterial Spirit*, must needs be *praestantissimum intelligibile*; and a most *adaequate* *Object* for his *own eye* to look upon. And this *Understanding* is himself, it being *actio immanens*, always *dwelling* with him; *Dei scientia est Dei essentia*, (as the *Scholemen* speak) God is ὁλος ὀφθαλμός, ὅλον φῶς, he is both *all Eye*, and *all Light*: as suppose, the *bright body* of the *Sun* had a *visive faculty*, so as it could *view* and *survey* its own *light* and *beams*, and could by virtue of them look upon all *other* things, which its own *Light* does *unveil* and *discover*, 'twould then give some *languishing adumbration* of a *Deity*, who is always *looking* upon his own *perfections* and seeing *Creatures* by his *own light*, by his *own uncreated beams*: for *Species et similitudo omnium est in Dei essentia*. Thus God, looking upon his own *omnipotency*, knows all *possibilities*; viewing his own *determinations*, he sees all *Futurities*; looking upon his own *wisdom*, he beholds all *varieties*, all *degrees* and *differencies* of *Being*: which yet put not the *least shadow* of *difference* in him; because the *excellencies* of all *Beings* are *treasured up* in him onely by way of *Transcendency*, not *per modum compositionis*, sed *per modum perfectionis* (as the *Scholes* have it). So that, when God beholds all *created*

*Beings* by virtue of his *own essence*, yet you must not imagine, that the *formality* of a *Creature* is contained in an *uncreated Being*; but onely, that there is enough of *Being* there to give a *representation* of all *Being* whatsoever. As when a *glass* reflects a *face*, there's not the least *mutation* in the *glasse*, much less is the *face* any part of the *Glasse's essence*, though the *glasse* give a sufficient *resemblance* of it. Yet herein there's this *disparity*, that the *glasse* of God's *essence* did *represent* a *Creature*, before any *created face* could look into it; for God, looking upon himself from *eternity*, did then know *quot modis aliquid assimilari potuit ipsius essentiae*, and did know how far such a *Being* would *imitate* his *essence*, and how far it would fall short of it. He saw, that *this Being* would come *nearer*, that *that Being* would be more *distant* and *remote* from him; this *Picture* would be liker him, that would shew very *little* of him. Now the *actuality* and *existence* of such an *Object* is not requisite to the understanding of it; for how then could we conceive of the *privation* of a *non-Entity*? How can we otherwise *apprehend* them, then by framing the *notion* of *something positive* in our *mindes*, and supposing a *total deficiency* from it? Thus, as they use to speak, *Rectum est index sui et obliqui*; and *Nobilissimum in unoquoque genere est mensura et exemplar reliquorum*: that *first* and *supreme Being*, by the great *example* and *pattern* of himself, can judge of all *inferiour* and *imperfect Beings*. Nor could he see them *ab aeterno* any otherwise, then in *himself*; there being nothing else *eternal* but *himself*, and in *himself* he could clearly see them, as we see *Effects* in their *Cause*. All *created Beings* were *eminently* contained in the *Centre* of one *indivisible Essence*; who, by his infinite virtue, was to *produce* them all; who, being an *intelligent Centre*, did see those *several Lines* that might be *drawn* from him; and withall, being a *free* and a *voluntary Centre*, did know how *many Lines* he meant to draw for *himself*. Now you know amongst

men a Demonstration *a priori* is esteemed most certain and scientific: *Scire est per causas cognoscere*. God thus knew Creatures, perfectly knowing himself, who was the first cause of them all. This doth much speak the immutability of the eternal Reason and Wisdom in the mind of God, and doth remove all imperfections from it. For you see, he did not move in an axiomatical way, *per compositionem et divisionem*; for he saw things by his own uncompounded and indivisible essence; much lesse did his knowledge improve it self in a Syllogistical way, deducing and collecting one thing out of another. This is the Scholemens meaning, when they tell us, *Cognitio Dei non est ratiocinativa*, that is, *non est discursiva*. They that will light a Candle may strike such sparks: but the Sun and Stars want no such light. Angels are above Syllogismes, how much more is God himself? Nay, even amongst men, first Principles are above Disputings, above Demonstrations; now all things are more naked in respect of God himself, then common Notions are to the sight of men. 'Tis a *modus testudineus*, a tardy and tedious work, a fetching a compass, to gather one thing out of another; 'tis the slow pace of a limited Understanding. But there's no succession in God, not in the knowledge of God. There's no *prius et posterius*; no Premisses, or Conclusions; no *transitus ab uno ad aliud*, no *externum medium*: for he does not *cognoscere per aliud medium a seipso distinctum*. There's a compleat simultaneity in all his knowledge; his Essence is all together, and so is his Knowledge. Plurality of Objects will confound a finite Understanding, for they must be presented by different species, and a created Eye cannot exactly view such different Faces at once, such several Pictures at once. The Understanding sometimes loses it self in a crowd of objects; and when such a multitude comes thronging upon it, it can scarce attend to any of them. But God, seeing them all *per unicum speciem*, *per unicum operationem*, takes notice of them all with an infinite delight and facility. For



he loves to *attend* to his own *Essence*, which doth so admirably *represent* them all : hence his *Knowledge* is always in *act* ; because his *Essence* is a *pure act*. *Humane Understandings* have much of their *knowledge* stor'd up in *Habits* ; but there are no *Habits* in a *Deity* : for *Knowledge* is *dormant* in an *Habit*, but his *Understanding* never *slumbers* nor *sleeps*. There's no *Potentiality* in him, but hee's always in *ultima perfectione*, he is *semper in actu intelligendi* ; as *Sol* is *semper in actu lucendi*. *Humane Understandings* are fain to *unbend* themselves sometimes, as if they were *faint* and *weary* : but *Divinity* is always *vigorous*, and *Eternity* can never *languish*. The *Understanding* of God thus being fill'd with *light*, his *Will* also must needs be *rational*, *non coeca*, *sed oculata notitia*. This makes the *Scholemen* very well *determine*, That, though there cannot be *causa divinae voluntatis*, yet there may be assign'd *ratio divinae voluntatis*. There can be no *cause* of his *Will* ; for then there would be a *cause* of his *Essence*, his *Will* being *all one* with his *Essence* : but there cannot be *causa prior prima*. Yet this account may be given of his *Will*, that *bonum intellectum est fundamentum voliti* ; so that as God does *primarily intelligere seipsum*, so he does understand other things only *per seipsum* ; so likewise he does principally and *necessarily velle seipsum*, and does *will* other things *secondarily*, and out of a choice, *propter seipsum*. And, as God hath set all other *Beings* a *longing* after the *perfections*, and *conservations* of their own *Beings*, and has in a *special* manner stamp'd upon a *rational Nature* an *intellectual appetite* of its own *well-fare*, and *happinesse*, so as that it cannot but propound an *ultimate scope* and *end* to it self, and *bend* and *direct* all its *desires* for the *hitting* and *attaining* of it : so he himself also sets up himself, as the most *adequate* and *amiable end* of all his *workings* and *motions*, and does *bend* the whole *creation*, does *shoot* every *Being*, and *order* it to his own *glory*. Now how *rational* is that *Will* of his, that does chiefly fix it self



upon the fairest good, and wills other things onely as they are subservient to it. *Deus vult bonitatem suam tanquam finem, et vult omnia alia tanquam media ad finem.* Out of the intense and vehement willing of himself, he wills also some prints and resemblances of himself. The beauty of his own face, of his own goodnesse is so great as that he loves the very picture of it: and, because one picture cannot sufficiently expresse it, therefore he gives such various and numerous representations of it. As when men cannot express their mind in one word, they are willing to rhetoricate, and enlarge themselves into more. God doth give many similitudes of himself, for the greater explication of his own essence. His essence in itself not being capable of augmentation or multiplications; he loves to see some imitations and manifestations of it, to make known his own power and perfection in a way of causality. Now the Vnderstanding of God being so vast and infinite, and his Will being so commensurate and proportion'd to it, nay, all one with it; all those Decrees of his, that are the Eternal product and results of his Mind and Will, must needs be rational also. For in them his Vnderstanding and Will met together, his Truth and Goodness kissed each other. And though these Decrees of God must be resolved into his absolute supremacy and dominion, yet that very Sovereignty of his is founded upon so much reason, and does act so wisely and intelligently, as that no created Understanding can justly question it, but is bound obediently to adore it. The Prosecution and Application of these Decrees, 'tis accompanied with the very same wisdom and reason: for what's Providence, but *Oculus in Sceptro*, a rational guiding and ruling all affairs in the World? 'tis *ipsa ratio divina in summo Principe constituta*; 'tis *ratio ordinandorum in finem*; that, which in Man is called Prudence, in God is called Providence; the right tuning and regulating of all circumstances, and making them to conspire and contribute to his own end and glory. And,

if man could but rightly *interpret* and *comment* upon *Providence*, what fresh *discoveries*, what *bright displayings* of *divine Reason* would they all continually meet withall? What *shinings* and *sparklings* of *Divine Wisdom* are there in some remarkable *providential passages*? You, that are most *acquainted* with the *ways* of God, tell us if you did ever find any thing *unreasonable* in them. Enquire still more into his *dealings*, and you'll see more of *Reason* in them. Could you search *deeper* into the *rich Mine* of his *councell*, you would still meet with more *precious veins* of *Wisdom*. The *depth* of his *Counsels*, what are they but the very *profoundnesse* of his *Reason*? τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ, they are τὰ βάθη τοῦ λόγου. And whensoever this *secret counsel* of his *issues out*, and *bubbles forth*, it is in most *rational manifestations*. His *Commands* are all *rational*, his *Word* is the very *pith* and *marrow* of *Reason*. His *Law* is the *quickenings* and *wakenings* of men's *Reason*; his *Gospel*, 'tis the *flowing out* of his own *Reason*; 'tis the *Quintessence* of *wisdome* from above; his *spirit* is a *rational Agent*; the *motions* of the *holy Ghost* are *rational Breath*; the *revelations* of the *Holy Ghost*, a *rational Light*, as *rational* as a *Demonstration*: the *Apostle* calls them so. As when the *Spirit of God* overpowers the *Will*, it makes a *willingnesse* there, where there was an absolute *nolency*, an obstinate *refusal* before; so, when it over-powers the *Mind*, it makes it *understand* that, which it *did not*, which it *could not* understand before; *Spiritual irradiations* stamp *new light*, create *new reason* in the *Soul*. Nothing comes to Man with the *superscription* of a *Deity*; but that, which hath upon it some *signature* of *Wisdom*. God himself is an *intelligent worker* in his dealing with *all Beings*, how much rather in his dealing with *rational Beings*? By all this you see, that *God* himself is the *Eternal Spring* and *Head* of *Reason*; and that *humane Wisdome* is but a *created* and an *imperfect Copy* of his *most perfect* and *original Wisdom*.

Now *Philosophy* could dictate thus much ; Τέλος πάντων ἔπεσθαι τοῖς Θεοῖς. God *loves* to see such a *noble Creature*, as *Man* is, to *follow* and *imitate* him in his *Reason* ; *Omnia intendunt assimilari Deo* ; as the *Scholemen* have it. Now men cannot be more *assimilated* unto *God*, then by moving as *Intelligent Agents*. Does *God* himself work according to *Reason* from *eternity* to *eternity* ? And has he made a *Creature* in time, whose very *essence* is *Reason* ? Why then does it not open its *Eyes* ? why does it not use its *Lamp* ? and though it cannot discover *all*, yet let it discern *as much* as it can. Let it not act in the *choicest points* of *Religion* out of *blind* and *implicite Principles*, and *huddle up* its *chiefest operations* in I know not what *confused*, and *obscure*, and *undigested* manner. This neither becomes *Sons of Light*, nor *works of Light*. The more men *exercise Reason*, the more they *resemble God* himself ; who has but *few Creatures*, that can *represent* him in so *bright* an excellency as this ; onely *Angels* and *Men* : and therefore he expects it the more from them. And the more they *exercise* their *own Reason*, the more they will *admire* and *adore* his. For none can *admire Reason*, but they that use some *Reason* themselves. And this may suffice for the *first Particular*, that *The Candle of the Lord*, 'tis *lumen derivatum*, it was *first lighted* at a *Sun-beam*.

CHAPTER XV.<sup>1</sup>

*The Light of Reason is directive.*

'TIS *Lumen dirigen*s, this νόμος γραπτός, 'tis a *Light for the Feet* and a *Lanthorn for the Paths*. For the *Understanding*, 'tis the τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, the *leading* and *guiding Power* of the *Soul*. The *Will* looks upon that, as *Leander*

<sup>1</sup> In chapter xii, Culverwel speaks of the Light of Reason as 'A Diminutive Light' ; in xiii, as 'Discovering Present Things not Future' ; in xiv, as 'A Certain Light.'

in *Musaeus* look'd up to the *Tower* for *Hero's Candle*, and calls it, as he doth there,

Λύχρον ἐμοῦ βιότοιο, φαεσφόρον ἡγεμονῆα.

Reason doth *facem praeferre*, it carries a *Torch* before the *Will*, nay, more then so, 'tis an *Eye* to the *Blinde*; for otherwise 'twere in vain to light up a *Candle* for a *Caeca potentia* to see withall. *Intellectuals* are first in *motion*. Αἱ πύλαι φωτός, these *Gates of Light*, must first be set open, before any *glorious* and *beautiful Object* can enter in, for the *Will* to court and embrace. The *Will* doth but *echo* to the *Understanding*, and doth *practically* repeat the last syllable of the *ultimum dictamen*; which makes the *Moralist* well determine, *Virtutes Morales non possunt esse sine Intellectualibus*: for to the presence of *Moral Virtues* there are necessarily pre-required *Intelligentia et Prudentia*; the one being the knowledge of *Principia speculativa*, as the other of *Principia operativa*. That *Action* must needs be *hopeful* and *promising*, when the *Understanding* aims before the *Will* shoots; but he, that in an *implicite* way rushes upon any performance, though the *action* it self should prove *materially* good, yet such an one deserves no more *commendation* for it, then he would do, that first put out his *Eyes*, and then *contingently* hit the *Mark*. Other *Creatures* indeed are shot more *violently* into their *ends*: but *Man* hath the *skill* and *faculty* of *directing* himself, and is (as you may so imagine) a *rational* kind of *Arrow*, that moves *knowingly* and *voluntarily* to the *Mark* of its own accord. For this very *end* God hath set up a *distinct Lamp* in every *Soul*, that men might make use of their own *Light*. All the *works* of men, they should *olere lucernam*, smell of this *Lamp* of the *Lord*, that is to *illuminate* them all. Men are not to depend wholly upon the *courtesie* of any fellow-creature; not upon the *dictates* of men; nay, not upon the *Votes* and *determinations* of Angels: for, if an *Angel* from

*Heaven should contradict first Principles*, though I will not say in the *Language* of the *Apostle*, *Let him be accursed*; yet this we may safely say, that all the *Sons of men* are bound to *dis-believe* him.

All *Arguments* drawn from *Testimony* and *Authority* (*created Authority* I mean) were always look'd upon as more *faint* and *languishing*, then those that were *fetch'd* from *Reason*. Matters of *fact*, indeed, do necessarily depend upon *Testimony*: but in *Speculations* and *Opinions* none is bound so far to *adore* the *Lamp* of another, as to put out his *own* for it. For when any such *Controversie* is mov'd, when any *Author* is *quoted* and *commended*, all the *credit* and *esteem*, that is to be given him, is *founded* either in the *Reason*, which he doth *annex* to his *Assertion*; or else in this more *remote* and *general Reason*, that such an one had a very *clear*, and *bright Lamp*, that the *Candle of the Lord* did *shine* very *eminently* in him: therefore what he says is much to be attended to; for in his *words*, though there should not be *ratio explicata*, yet it is to be suppos'd, that there's *ratio subintellecta*. So that the *assent* here is *ultimately* resolv'd into the *Reason* of him that *speaks*, and the other that *receives* it; for he, that *complies* with a *naked Testimony*, makes a *tacit acknowledgment* of thus much, that he is willing to *resign* up himself to another's *Reason*, as being *surer* and *fuller* then his *own*; which *temper* and *frame of Spirit* is very *commendable* in a state of *inchoation*: for Χρὴ τὸν μανθάνοντα πιστεύειν. *Knowledge* in the *Cradle* cannot *feed* it self. *Knowledge*, in its *infancy*, must *suck* at the *Breasts* of another. And *Babes* in *Intellectuals* must take in the ἄδολον γάλα, those *spoonfuls* of *Knowledge*, that are put in their *mouths* by such as are to *nurse* and to *educate* them. *Paul*, when he sits at the *feet* of *Gamaliel*, must observe the *prints* and *foot-steps* of the *Hebrew Doctour*, and must *roll* himself in *pulvere sapientium*. *Knowledge*, in its *non-age*, in its *pupil-*

age, and *minority*, must *hide* it self under the *wing* and *protection* of a *Guardian*. Men use at first to *borrow light*, and to light their *Candle* at the light of *another's*; yet here I find some *Licence* and *encouragement* given to these *first-beginners*, to these *setters up* in *Learning*, to be ζητητικοί, modestly *inquisitive* into the *grounds* and *Reasons* of that which is delivered to them.

Thus that *Sacred Writer*, *Hierom*, commends *Marcella*, though one of the *weaker Sex*, upon this account, that she was wont to *search* and to *examine* his *Doctrine*: *Ita ut me sentirem* (saies he) *non tam Discipulum habere, quam Iudicem*. Nay, a far greater then *Hierom*, honours the *Bereans* with the *Title* of οἱ ἐγγενέστεροι, a more *noble* and *generous* sort of *Christians*, that would bring even *Apostolical words* to the *Touch stone*. Why is it not then lawful for them, that are *in statu adulto*, that are come to some *pregnancy* and *maturity* in *knowledge*, to look upon the *stamp* and *super-scription* of any *Opinion*, to look any *Opinion* in the *face*? The *great* and *noble Verulam* much complains (and not without too much cause) of those *sad obstructions* in *Learning*, which arose upon the *extreme doting* upon some *Authors*, which were indeed men of *rare accomplishments*, of *singular worth* and *excellency*, and yet but *men*, though, by a strange kind of Ἀποθέωσις, a great part of the world have worship'd them as *Gods*. The *Canonizing* of some *profane Authours*, and esteeming all others as *Apocryphal*, hath *blasted* many *buds* of *Knowledge*, it has *quench'd* many *sparks* and *beams* of *Light*, which otherwise would have *gilded* the *World* with an *orient* and *unspotted lustre*. Far be it from me to drop one word, that should tend to the *staining* and *eclipsing* of that *just glory*, that is due to the *immortal* name of *Aristotle*. There are those, that are *envious* and *ungrateful* enough; let them do it if they please; yet this I shall say, and it shall be without any *injury* to him, that to set him up as a *Pope* in *Philosophy*, as a *Visible Head* of the *Truth*



*militant*, to give him a *Negative Voice*, to give him an *Arbitrary power*, to quote his *Texts as Scripture*, to look upon his *Works as the irreversible Decrees of Learning*; as if he had *seal'd up the Canon*, so that whoe're adds to him, or takes one word from him, must be struck with a present *Anathema*: to condemn all for *Hereticks*, that oppose him; for *Schismatics*, that depart from him; for *Apostates*, that deny him; what's all this but to forget, that he was but *the Candle of the Lord*, and to adore him as a *Sun in the Firmament*, that was set to rule the day of Knowledge? 'Tis to make him an *ὁν ὄντων*, the *Causa prima*, the *first Mover of Learning*; or, at least, 'twas to make him such an *Intellectus Agens*, as *Averroes* would have, that must *enforme* and *quicken* all, that come after him. Could that modest *Philosopher* have foreseen and prophesied that the World would thus flatter him, 'tis to be fear'd, that he would have thrown his *Works* also, his legible self, into *Euripus*, rather than they should have occasioned such excessive *Idolatry* and *partiality*: yet 'tis no fault of his, if the World would over-admire him; for that, which first inhand'd the price and esteem of *Aristotle*, was that rich vein of Reason that ran along and interlin'd most of his *Works*. Let this therefore, and this onely commend him still; for this is of *indelible* and *perpetual duration*; yet, if these blind *Admirers* of him could have followed him fully and entirely, they might have learn'd of him a braver liberty and independency of spirit: for he scorned to enslave and captivate his thoughts to the Judgment of any whatsoever; for though he did not deal violently and dis-ingeniously with the *Works* of his Predecessours, (as some affirm) yet he dealt freely with them, and was not over-indulgent to them. He came like a Refiner amongst them, he purged away their Dross, he boyl'd away their froth and scum, he gathered a Quintessence out of their rude and elementary Principles. How impartially did he deal with his Master *Plato*, and not favour



him in any of his *Errours* ! And his *words* are answerable to his *practises* ; you may hear him what he saith and professes, Τοὺς παλαιοὺς αἰδεῖσθαι μὲν δίκαιον, φρίττειν δὲ οὐκ ἄξιον, to have a reverend esteem of *Antiquity* is but *fitting* and *equal* ; but to stand in awe of it, is *base* and *unworthy*. *Potestas Senatoria* is very *honourable* and *beneficial* ; but *Dictatoria Potestas* is not to be allowed in the *Commonwealth* of *Learning* ; yet such hath been the *intolerable Tyranny* and *Oppression* of the *Roman Faction*, as that they have enjoyn'd and engaged as many as they could to screw and torture their Wits for the maintaining of whatever such an one as pleaseth them shall please to say : for they care not how *prejudicial* or *detrimental* they prove to *Learning* ; so that they may but train up their *Scholars* in an *implicite faith*, in a *blind obedience*, in a *slavish acknowledgment* of some *infallible Judge* of *Controversies*, and may shut up and imprison the generality of people in a *dark* and *benighted* condition ; not so much as allowing them the *light* of their own *Candle*, this *Lamp* of the *Lord*, that ought to shine in them. That *great Advancer* of *Learning*, whom I commended before, takes notice, that by such *unhappy means* as these, the more *noble* and *liberal Sciences* have made no *progress* proportionable to that, which more *inferiour* and *Mechanical Arts* have done : for in these later *ingenia multorum in unum coeunt* ; whereas in the former, *ingenia multorum sub uno succubuerunt*. What *brave improvements* have been made in *Architecture*, in *Manufactures*, in *Printing*, in the *Pyxis Nautica* ? For here's no limiting and restraining men to *Antiquity*, no chaining them to *old Authours*, no regulating them to I know not what *prescribed Forms* and *Canons* : no such *strange voices* as these ; *You must not build better then your Predecessours have done* ; *you must not Print fairer then the first Tullie's Offices, that e're was printed*. 'Tis not look'd upon as a *transgression* and a *piaculum*, if they should

chance to be a little more *accurate* than they were that went before them. But in *Speculatives*, in meer *Mathe-maticks* (which one would think were far enough from any breach of *Faith* or *Manners*, yet here) if a *Galilaeus* should but present the world with an handful of *new Demonstrations*, though never so *warily* and *submissively*; if he shall but *frame* and *contrive* a *Glass* for the discovery of some more *Lights*: all the *reward* he must expect from *Rome* is to *rot* in an *Inquisition* for such *unlicenced Inventions*, for such *venturous undertakings*. The same *strain* of *Cruelty* hath march'd more vehemently and impetuously in *sacred* and *religious matters*: for here *Babylon* hath heated her *Furnace* seven times hotter, whilst under the *pompous* name of a *Catholick Church*, under the *glittering pretences* of *Antiquity* and *Authority*, they have, as much as they could, put out all the *Lamps* of the *Lord*, and that *Bestian Empire* hath transform'd all its *Subjects* into *sensitive* and *irrational Creatures*. A noble *Author*<sup>1</sup> of our own tells us in his Book *De Veritate*, that he for his part takes them for the *Catholick Church*, that are *constant* and *faithful* to *first Principles*; that *Common Notions* are the *bottom* and *Foundation*, upon which the *Church* is built. Excuse our diffidence here, *great Sir*: the *Church*, 'tis built upon a *surer* and *higher Rock*, upon a more *Adamantine* and *precious Foundation*; yet thus much is acceptable, and undeniable, that who e're they are, that by *any practises*, or *Customes*, or *Traditions*, or *Tenents*, shall stop the passage of *first Principles*, and the *sound Reason* that flows from them, they are in this farther from a *Church*, than the *Indians* or the *Americans*, whilst they are not onely *Anti-Christian*, but *unnatural*. And, of the two, the *Church* hath more security in resting upon *genuine Reason*, than in relying upon some *spurious Traditions*; for think but a while upon those *infinite deceits* and *uncertainties*, that such *Historical conveyances* are liable

<sup>1</sup> Lord Herbert.

and exposed to. I always except those *sacred* and *heavenly Volumes of Scripture*, that are *strung* together as so many *Pearls*, and make a *Bracelet* for the *Spouse* to wear upon her *Hands* continually. These *Writings* the *Providence of God* hath deeply engaged it self to keep as the *Apples* of his own *Eye*. And they do not borrow their *certainty* or *validity* from any *Ecclesiastical* or *universal Tradition* (which is at the most but *previous* and *preparatory*) but from those *prints of Divinity* in them, and specially from the *seal* of the same *Spirit*, that *endited* them, and now assures the *Soul* that they were *Oracles* breathed from *God* himself. As for all other *sacred Antiquity*, though I shall ever honour it as much as any either *did*, or *can* do *justly*, and with sobriety; and shall always *reverence* a *gray-headed Truth*: yet, if *Antiquity* shall stand in *competition* with this *Lamp of the Lord* (though *genuine Antiquity* would never offer to do it) yet, if it should, it must not think much, if we prefer *Reason*, a *daughter of Eternity*, before *Antiquity*, which is the *off-spring* of *Time*. But, had not the *spirit* of *Anti-Christianism*, by its early *twinnings* and *insinuations*, wound and wrought it self into the most *flourishing* and *Primitive Times*, into the *bosome* of a *Virgin-Church*, and had it not offered *violence* to the *works* of some *sacred Writers*, by *detracting* and *augmenting*, according to its several *exigencies*; by *feigning* and *adulterating*; by *hiding* and *annihilating* some of them, as much as they could, (the ordinary *tricks* of *Anti-Christ*, which he used always more *subtilly*, though of late more *palpably*) had it not been for such *devices* as these, *Antiquity* had come flowing to us in *purser* and *fuller streams*, in more *fair* and *kindly derivations*, and so might have *run down* more *powerfully* and *victoriously*, then now it will. But *Anti-Christ* hath endeavoured to be the *Abaddon* and the *Apollyon* of all *sacred Antiquities*, though the very *Reliques* of those *shining* and *burning Lights*, that adorn'd the *Church of God*, have

*splendour* enough to scatter the *darkness* of *Popery*, that *empty shadow* of *Religion*, that arises *ob defectum Luminis*: yet *Antiquity* (setting aside those that were peculiarly *θεόπνευστοι*) was but the *first dawning* of *Light*, which was to *shine out brighter and brighter till perfect day*. Let none therefore so *superstitiously* look back to *former ages* as to be angry with *new Opinions* and *displayings* of *Light*, either in *Reason* or *Religion*. Who dares oppose the *goodnesse* and *wisdom* of God; if he shall *enamour* the World with the *beauty* of some *Pearls* and *Jewels*, which, in former times, have been *hid* or *trampled* upon? if he shall discover some *more light* upon *Earth*, as he hath let some *new stars* be found in the *Heavens*? This you may be *sure* and *confident* of, that 'tis against the mind and meaning of *Antiquity*, to stop the *progresse* of *Religion* and *Reason*. But I know there are some will tell us of a *visible Tribunal*, of an *infallible Head* of the *Church*, born to *determine* all *Controversies*, to *regulate* all *Men*, 'tis a wonder they do not say *Angels* too; others more *prudently* and *equally* resolve the *final judgment* of *Controversies* into a *general* and *Oecumenical Council*: but I shall speak to them all in the *language* of the *Philosopher*, Δεῖ τὸν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, and I shall explain it according to the *minde* of the learned *Davenant* in his *Discourse De Iudice ac norma fidei et cultus Christiani*. God onely is to *rule* his own *Church* αὐτοκρατικῶς καὶ νομοθετικῶς, *judicio auctoritativo*, by a *determining* and *Legislative power*: men, that are *fitted* by God himself, are to *guide* and *direct* it ὑπηρετικῶς καὶ ἐρμηνευτικῶς, *iudicio ministeriali*, in way of *subserviency* to him, by an *explication* of his mind; yet so as that every one may *judge* of this ιδιωτικῶς καὶ ἀκροατικῶς, *iudicio privato et practicae discretionis*, by *acts* of their own *Understanding* illuminated by the *spirit* of God; for there are no *representatives* in *Intellectuals* and *Spirituals*. Men may represent the *bodies* of others, in *Civil* and *Temporal*

*Affairs*, in the acts of a *Kingdome*; and thus a *bodily obedience* is always due to *just Authority*: but there is none can always represent the *mind* and *judgment* of another in the *vitals* and *inwards* of *Religion*; for I speak not of *representations* in *outward Order* and *Discipline*. A *General Council* does and may produce *iudicium forense*; but still there is reserved to every single *individual iudicium rationale*: for can you think that *God* will excuse any one from *Errour* upon such an account as this, *Such a Doctour told me thus*; *Such a piece of Antiquity enform'd me so*; *Such a General Council determin'd me to this*. Where was thine own *Lamp* all this while? Where was thy *Ratio illuminata et gubernata secundum normas bonae et necessariae consequentiae rationali creaturae impressas*? Yet this must be gratefully acknowledged, that these *General Councils* have been of *publick influence*, of most admirable *use* and *advantage* to the *Church* of *God*; though they are not of the very *Essence* of it: for tis well known, that there were none of them till the days of *Constantine*. But herein is the *benefit* of *Councils*, that they are (or ought to be) a *comparing* and *collecting* of many *Lights*, an *uniting* and *concentricating* of the *Judgments* of many *holy, learned, wise Christians* with the *Holy Ghost* breathing amongst them; though not always so *fully* and *powerfully*, as that they shall be sure to be *priviledg'd* from every *Errour*: but being all of them subject to *frailty* and *fallibility*, and sometime the *major part* of them proving the *pejor part*, there is none bound to give an *extemporary assent* to their *Votes* and *Suffrages*, unless *his* mind also concur with *theirs*. That worthy *Divine*<sup>1</sup> of our own, whom I mentioned before, speaks very fully and clearly to this, *Ad nudam praescriptionem aut determinationem alterius, sine lumine privati iudicii, nemo est, qui credere potest, etiamsi cupiat maxime*. The most eminent *Mirandula* will give you the reason of

<sup>1</sup> Davenant.

it; For (saies he) *Nemo credit aliquid verum praeise quia vult credere illud esse verum: non est enim in potentia hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum, quando ipse voluerit.* But, before there can be *Faith* in any *Soul*, there must be *cognitio propositionis credendae*, and there must be *inclinatio intellectus ad assentiendum huic propositioni revelatae et cognitae*. Before you understand the *terms* of any *Proposition*, you can no more believe it, then if it came to you in an *unknown Tongue*. A *Parrot* may repeat the *Creed* thus—

*Corvos<sup>1</sup> poetas et poetridas picas  
Cantare credas Pegaseium nectar.*

Though such at length may very safely conclude, as that *talkative Bird* is reported to have done by an *happy* and *extemporary* contingency; *Operam et oleum perdidi*. This is the misery of those *implicite* believers amongst the *Papists* ('tis well, if not among some *Protestants* too) that do *in aliorum sententias pedibus potius quam cordibus ire*; dancing in a *circular* kind of *Faith*; they *believing* as the *Church* believes, and the *Church* believing as *they* believe, &c., and this is with them כל האדם, the whole *perfection* of a *Roman Catholick*.

But *Religion*, fram'd according to the *Gospell*, did always *scorn* and *refuse* such *carnal supports* as these are. That *Truth*, that must look the *Sun* in the *face* for ever, can you think, that it will fear a *Candle*? must it stand in the *presence* of *God*, and will it not endure the *tryal* of *Men*? Or can you imagine that the *Spouse* of *Christ* can be so unmerciful as to *pull out* her *Children's Eyes*? though she may very well *restrain* their *Tongues* sometimes, and their *Pens*, if they be too *immodest* and *unruly*. I shall need to say no more then this, that true *Religion* never *was*, nor *will be*, nor need be shy of *sound Reason*, which is thus far *Lumen*

<sup>1</sup> Persius, *Prolog.*, 13, 14.



*dirigens*, as that 'tis oblig'd by the *will* and *command* of God himself not to entertain any *false Religion*, nor any thing under *pretense* of *Religion*, that is *formally* and *irreconcilably* against *Reason*; *Reason* being above *humane Testimony* and *Tradition*, and being only *subordinate* to God himself, and those *Revelations* that come from God. Now 'tis express *blasphemy* to say that either *God*, or the *Word of God* did ever, or ever will, oppose *Right Reason*.

## CHAPTER XVI.

*The Light of Reason is calm and peaceable.*

'Tis *Lumen tranquillum et amicum*; 'tis a *Candle*, not a *Comet*; it is a *quiet* and *peaceable Light*. And though the *Candle of the Lord* may be too *hot* for some, yet the *Lamp*, tis onely maintain'd with *soft* and *peaceable Oyl*. There is no *jarring* in *pure Intellectuals*; if men were *tun'd* and *regulated* by *Reason* more, there would be more *Concord* and *Harmony* in the *World*. As *Man* himself is a *sociable Creature*; so his *Reason* also is a *sociable Light*. This *Candle* would shine more *clearly* and *equally*, if the *Windes of Passions* were not *injurious* to it. 'Twere a commendable piece of *Stoicism*, if men could always *hush* and *still* those *Waves* that *dash* and *beat* against *Reason*. If they could *scatter* all those *Clouds* that *soil* and *discolour* the *face* and *brightnesse* of it: would there be such *factions* and *commotions* in the *State*; such *Schisms* and *Ruptures* in the *Church*; such *hot* and *fiery persecutions* of some *trifling Opinions*? If the *soft* and *sober voice* of *Reason* were more attended to, *Reason* would make some *differences* kiss and be *friends*, 'twould *sheath* up many a *Sword*, 'twould *quench* many a *flame*, 'twould *bind up* many a *Wound*. This *Candle of the Lord*, 'twould *scatter* many



a *dark suspicion*, many a *sullen jealousy*. Men may *fall out* in the *dark* sometimes, they cannot tell for what: if the *Candle of the Lord* were but amongst them, they would chide one another for nothing then but their *former breaches*. Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἰσטיσι τὴν ψυχὴν it *calms and composes* a *Soul*; whereas *Passion* (as the grand *Stoick*, *Zeno*, paints it) is ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις an *abounding and over-boiling impetus*, a *praeternatural agitation* of *Soul*; *animi commotio aversa a recta ratione, et contra naturam*, as the *Oratour* stiles it. The *Soul*, 'tis *toss'd* with *Passion*; but it *anchors* upon *Reason*. This *gentleness* and *quietness* of *Reason* doth never commend it self more, then in its *agreeing* and *complying* with *Faith*; in *not opposing* those *high* and *transcendent Mysteries*, that are above its own *reach* and *capacity*: nay, it had always so much *humility* and *modesty* waiting and attending upon it, that it would always *submit* and *subordinate* it self to all such *Divine Revelations*, as were above its own *Sphere*. Though it could not *grasp* them, though it could not *pierce* into them; yet it ever resolv'd with all *gratitude* to admire them, to *bow* its head and to *adore* them. *One Light* does not oppose *another*. *Lumen fidei et Lumen rationis*, may shine both *together*; though with *far different* brightness. The *Candle of the Lord*, tis not impatient of a *superiour Light*; 'twould both *ferre parem et priorem*. The *light* of the *Sun*, that indeed is *Lumen Monarchicum*, a *supreme and sovereign Light*; that with its *golden Scepter* rules all *created Sparkles*, and makes them *subject* and *obedient* to the *Lord* and *Rule of Light*. *Created Intellectuals* depend upon the *brightness* of *God's Beams*, and are *subordinate* to them. *Angelical Star-light* is but *Lumen Aristocraticum*; it *borrowes* and *derives* its *glory* from a *more vast and majestic Light*. As they *differ* from *one another* in *glory*; so all of them infinitely differ from the *Sun* in *glory*. Yet 'tis far above

the *Lumen Democraticum*, that *Light*, which appears unto the *Sons of men*; 'tis above their *Lamps* and *Torches*, poor and contemptible *Lights*, if left to themselves. For do but imagine such a thing as this, that this *external* and *corporeal World* should be adjudg'd never to see the *Sun* more, never to see one *Star* more; if *God* should shut all the *Windows* of *Heaven*, and spread out nothing but *clouds* and *curtains*, and allow it nothing but the light of a *Candle*: how would the *World* look like a *Cyclops* with its *Eye* put out? 'Tis now but an *obscure prison* with a few *grates* to look out at; but what would it be then, but a *capacious Grave*, but a *nethermost Dungeon*? Yet this were a more *grateful Shade*, a *pleasanter* and more comely *Darknesse*, then for a *Soul* to be condemned to the *solitary Light* of its own *Lamp*, so as not to have any *supernatural irradiations* from its *God*. *Reason* does not refuse any *auxiliary Beams*; it joys in the *company* of its *fellow-Lamp*, it delights in the *presence* of an *intellectual Sun*, which will so far *favour* it, as that 'twill *advance* it and *nourish* it and *educate* it; 'twill *encrease* it and *inflame* it, and will by no means *put it out*. A *Candle* neither can, nor will put out the *Sun*: and an *intellectual Sun* can, but will not put out the *Lamp*. The light of *Reason* doth no more *prejudice* the light of *Faith*, then the light of a *Candle* doth *extinguish* the light of a *Star*. The same *Eye* of a *Soul* may look sometimes upon a *Lamp*, and sometimes upon a *Star*; one while upon a *first Principle*, another while upon a *revealed Truth*; as hereafter it shall *always* look upon the *Sun*, and see *God face to face*. *Grace* doth not come to pluck up *Nature* as a *Weed*, to root out the *Essences* of *Men*; but it comes to graft *Spirituals* upon *Morals*, that so, by their *mutual supplies* and *intercourse*, they may produce most noble and generous fruit. Can you tell me why the *Shell* and the *Kernell* may not dwell together? why the *Bodies* of *Nature* may not be quickened

by the *Soul of Grace*? Did you never observe an *Eye* using a *Prospective Glasse* for the *discovering* and *amplifying* and *approximating* of some *remote* and yet *desireable Object*? and did you perceive any *opposition* between the *Eye* and the *Glass*? Was there not rather a *loving correspondency* and *communion* between them? Why should there be any *greater strife* between *Faith* and *Reason*; seeing they are *Brethren*? Do they not both *spring* from the same *Father of Lights*? and can the *Fountain of Love* and *Unity* send forth any *irreconcilable streams*? Do you think that God did ever intend to *divide* a *rational Being*, to *tear* and *rend* a *Soul* in *pieces*, to scatter *Principles of discord* and *confusion* in it? If God be pleased to open some *other passage* in the *Soul*, and to give it another *Eye*, does that *prejudice* the former? *Man*, you know, is ordained to a *choicer end*, to a *nobler happiness*, then for the *present* he can *attain* unto, and therefore he cannot expect that God should now *communicate* himself in such *bright* and *open discoveries*, in such *glorious manifestations* of himself as he means to give *hereafter*. But he must be content, for the *present*, to behold those *infinite treasures* of reserved *Love*, in a *darker* and more *shadowy way* of *Faith*, and not of *Vision*. *Nature* and *Reason* are not sufficiently *proportion'd* to such *blessed Objects*: for there are such *weights of Glory* in them as do *opprimere ingenium humanum*; there are such *Depths*, such *Pleonasms*, such *Oceans* of all *Perfections* in a *Deity*, as do infinitely exceed all *Intellectual capacity*, but its *own*. The most that *Man's Reason* can do, is to fill the *Understanding* to the *brim*; but *Faith*, that throws the *Soul* into the *Ocean*, and lets it *roll*, and *bath* it self in the *vastnesse* and *fulnesse* of a *Deity*. Could the *Sons of men* have extracted all the *Spirits of Reason*, and made them *meet* and *jump* in one *Head*; nay, could *Angels* and *Men* have *united* and *concentricated* all their *Reason*: yet they would never have been able to *spy out* such *pro-*

*found and mysterious excellencies* ; as *Faith* beholds in one twinkling of her *Eye*. *Evangelical Beauties* shine through a *veyl* that's upon their *face* ; you may see the *precious Objects* of *Faith*, like so many *Pearls* and *Diamonds*, sparkling and glittering in the *Dark*. *Reveal'd Truths* shine with their own *Beams*, they do not borrow their *Primitive* and *original Lustre* from this *Candle of the Lord*, but from the *purser Light*, wherewith God hath cloathed and attir'd them, as with a *Garment*. God crowns his own *Revelations* with his own *Beams*. The *Candle of the Lord*, it doth not discover, it doth not oppose them, it cannot eclipse them. They are no *sparks* of *Reason's* striking ; but they are *flaming Darts* of *Heaven's* shooting, that both *open* and *enamour* the *Soul*. They are *Stars* of *Heaven's* lighting. *Men* behold them at a great distance twinkling in the *Dark*. Whatsoever comes in *God's* name does aut invenire viam aut facere. Whatever God reveals in his *Word*, tis *supra providentiam rerum communem constitutum*. Tis not the *road* of *Nature* ; and therefore, for the *welcoming* and *entertaining* of it (as a *Noble Author*<sup>1</sup> of our own doth very well observe) *explicatur sensus quidam supernaturalis, et θαυμασιος*, there's an *opening* of a *new Window* in the *Soul*, an *Intellectual Eye* looks out at the *Window*, and is much *pleased* and *affected* with the *oriency* of that *Light*, that comes *springing* and *rushing* in upon it. As there's a νόμος γραπτός so there's an εὐαγγέλιον γραπτόν too : the one 'tis written by the *Pen* of *Nature* ; the other by the *finger* of the *Spirit* : for *ubi definit Natura, ibi incipit Gratia* ; and this *Second Edition* set out by *Grace*, 'tis *auctior et emendatior*, yet so as it doth not at all contradict the *first Edition*, that was set out by *Nature* ; for this is the *voice* of *Nature* it self, that *Whatsoever God reveals must needs be true*, and this *Common Principle* is the *bottom* and *foundation* of all *Faith* to build upon. The

<sup>1</sup> Lord Brooke (*Brown*).

*Soul* desires no greater *satisfaction*, then an 'Αὐτὸς ἔφη' for, if God himself say it, who can *question* it? who dare *contradict* it? Reason *will* not, Reason *cannot*; for it does most immovably *acknowledge* a *Deity* and the *unquestionable Truth* of a *Deity*. In all *believing* there is an *assent*, a *yielding*, to him that speaks, by virtue of his *own Authority*, though he don't *prove* it, though he don't *evince* it. Now *men* themselves look upon it as a *contempt* and *injury*, not to have their *words taken*; and Reason it self *dictates* thus much, that we are to *believe* such an one whom we have no *reason* to *distrust*: for without some *Faith* there would be no *commerce*, nor *trafficking* in the World; there's no *trading* without some *trusting*. A general and *total Incredulity* would threaten a *present* and *fatal dissolution* to *humane Society*. Matters of *fact* are as certain in *being* and *reality*, as *Demonstrations*; yet in appearance most of them can never be *prov'd* or *evin'd* any other way, then by *meer Testimony*. . . . So that all the *stresse* and *difficulty* will be to know whether *God reveals* such a thing or *no*, for here Reason (*corrupt Reason* I mean,) is wont to *slip* and *evade*, and when it cannot frame a *conceit* adequate and *commensurate* to some *transcendent* and *superlative Mysteries*, it would then fain *cloud* them and *eclipse* them, that it may *quench* and *avoid* the *dazzling brightness* of them. It would fain make them *stoop* and *condescend* to its own *capacity*, and therefore it puts some *inferiour Notion* upon them. When it cannot *grasp* what God saith, it then presently *questions*, whether God say *so*, or *no*; whether that be the *mind* of his *Word*. . . . But the *Law* of *sound reason* and *Nature* does oppose such *unworthy dealings* as these are: for *men* look upon't very *heinously* to have their *words mis-interpreted*, to have their *meaning wrested* and *violenc'd*. Can you think that the *Majesty* of *Heaven* will allow or endure, that a *Creature* should study, or busie it self in *pervverting* his *Words*, in

corrupting his *meaning*, in *blending* it and *mixing* it with the *crude imaginations* of their own *Brain*? That *Spirit*, which *breath'd out* the *Word* at first, and which *convinces* and *satisfies* the *Soul*, that 'tis the *Word of God*; the very *same Spirit* is the *Interpreter* of it, he is the *Commentatour* upon it. The *Text* is his and the *Gloss* is his, and who-soever shall call this a *private Spirit*, must needs be a bold *Blasphemer*, a *Jesuit*, an *Atheist*. But they, that know what the *Spirit of God* is, will easily grant, that the *Spirit* of God *unsheaths* his own *Sword*; that he *polishes* Evangelical *Pearls*; that he *anoints* and *consecrates* the *eye* of the *Soul* for the *welcoming* and *entertaining* of such *precious Objects*. 'Tis true, indeed, that some *Explications* are so *impertinent* and *distorted*, as that a *prophane* and *carnal* *Eye* may presently discern, that there was either some *violence* or *deceit* used in them; as who cannot tell when any *Authour* is extremely *vex'd* and *wrong'd*? But, if there be any such *obscurity* as may give just occasion of *doubting* and *diffidence*; who then can be fitter to *clear* and *unfold* it than the *Author* himself? nay, who can *explain* his *mind* certainly, but he himself? Is it not thus in *Spirituals* much rather? When God scatters any *Twilight*, any *Darkness* there, is it not by a more *plentiful shedding* abroad of his own *Beams*? Such a *Knot*, as a *created Understanding* cannot untie, the *edge* of the *Spirit* presently cuts asunder. Nor yet is *Providence* wanting in *external* means, which by the *goodnesse* and *power* of God were annexed, as *sigilla verbi*: *miracles* I mean, which are upon this account very *suitably* and *proportionably* *subservient* to *faith*, they being above *natural power*, as *revealed Truths* are above *natural Understanding*. The one's above the *hand* of *Nature*, as the other's above the *head* of *Nature*. But *Miracles*, though they be very *potent*, yet they are not always *prevalent*, for there were many *spectatours* of *Christ's miracles*, which yet, like so



many *Pharaohs*, were *hardened* by them, and some of them, that *beheld* them, were no more moved by them, then some of them, who onely *hear* of them, will not at all *attend* to them. So that onely the *seal* of the *Spirit* can make a *firm impression* upon the *Soul*, who *writes* his own *Word* upon the *soul* with a *conquering and triumphant Sun-beam*, that is impatient either of *cloud* or *shadow*. Be open therefore, ye *everlasting Doors*, and stand *wide open*, ye *intellectual Gates*, that the *spirit* of *Grace* and *Glory*, with the goodly *train* of his *revealed Truths*, may *enter in*. There's *foundation* for all this in a *Principle of Nature*; for we must still put you in mind of the *concord* that is betwixt *Faith* and *Reason*. Now this is the *voice* of *Reason*, that God *can*, and that none *but* God can, assure you of his *own mind*; for if he should *reveal* his mind by a *Creature*, there will still be some *tremblings* and *waverings* in the *Soul*, unlesse he does withall *satisfie* a *Soul*, that such a *Creature* does *communicate* his mind *truly* and *really*, as it is: so that *ultimately* the *Certainty* is resolv'd into the *voice* of *God*, and not into the *courtesie* of a *Creature*. This *Holy Spirit* of God *creates* in the *Soul* a *Grace* answerable to these *transcendent objects*: you cannot but know the *name* of it, tis called *Faith*, *Supernaturalis forma fidei*, as *Mirandula* the *Younger* stiles it, which *closes* and *complies* with every word, that drops from the *voice* or *pen* of a *Deity*, and which *facilitates* the *Soul* to *assent* to *revealed Truths*, so as that with an *Heavenly inclination*, with a *delightful propension* it moves to them, as to a *Centre*. *Reason* cannot more delight in a *Common Notion* or a *Demonstration*, then *Faith* does in *revealed Truth*. As the *Unity* of a *Godhead* is *demonstrable* and clear to the *Eye* of *Reason*: so the *Trinity* of *Persons*, that is, *three glorious relations* in *one God*, is as *certain* to an *Eye* of *Faith*. Tis as certain to this eye of *Faith* that *Christ* is *truly God*; as it was *visible* to an



eye both of *Sense* and *Reason*, that he is *truly Man*. *Faith* spies out the *Resurrection* of the *Body*; as *Reason* sees the *immortality* of the *Soul*. I know there are some *Authours* of great *worth*, and *Learning*, that endeavour to maintain this *Opinion*, that *Revealed Truths*, though they could not be *found* by *Reason*; yet, when they are *once revealed*, that *Reason* can then *evince* them and *demonstrate* them. But I much rather encline to the *Determinations* of *Aquinas* and multitudes of others, that are of the *same Judgment*, that *humane Reason*, when it has *stretch'd* it self to the *uttermost*, is not at all *proportion'd* to them; but, at the best, can give onely some *faint illustrations*, some *weak adumbrations* of them. They were never *against Reason*, they were always *above Reason*. 'Twill be *employment* enough, and 'twill be a *noble employment* too, for *Reason* to *redeem* and *vindicate* them from those *thorns* and *difficulties*, with which some *subtle* ones have *vex'd* them and *encompass'd* them. Twill be *honour* enough for *Reason* to shew, that *Faith* does not *oppose Reason*; and this it *may* shew, it *must* shew this; for else οἱ ἔσω, those that are *within* the inclosure of the *Church*, will never rest *satisfied*; nor οἱ ἔξω, *Pagans*, *Mahumitans*, *Jews*, will never be *convinc'd*. God, indeed, may *work* upon them by *immediate revelation*; but *man* can onely *prevail* upon them by *reason*: yet 'tis not to be *expected*, nor is it *required*, that every weak and *new-born Christian*, that gives *real assent* and *cordial entertainment* to these *mysterial Truths*, should be able to deliver them from those *seeming contradictions*, which some *cunning Adversaries* may cast upon them. There are some things *demonstrable*, which to many seem *impossible*; how much more easily may here be some *matters of Faith*, which every one cannot *free* from all *difficulties*? 'Tis sufficient therefore for such, that they so far forth *understand* them, as to be sure, that they are not *against Reason*, and that principally upon this

account, because they are sure God has *revealed* them. And others, that are of more *advanced* and *elevated intellectuals*, may give such *explications* of them, as may *disentangle* them from all Repugnancy, though they cannot *display* them in their *full glory*. . . . You see there are *mutual embraces* 'twixt the *Law* and the *Gospel*: *Nature* and *Grace* may *meet together*; *Reason* and *Faith* have *kissed each other*.



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